Triall: of Wits

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Examen de Ingenios.

THE EXAMINATION of mens WITS.

IN WHICH, BY DISCOVERING THE varietie of natures, is shewed for what profession each one is apt, and how far he shall pro-*fit therein.*

BY IOHN HVARTE.

Translated out of the Spanish tongue by

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Englished out of his Italian, by

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TO THE RIGHT WORSHIPFVL SIR FRANCIS GODOLPHIN KNIGHT, ONE OF THE DEPVTIE LIEVTENANTS OF CORNWAILE.

Good Sir, your Booke returneth vnto you clad in a Corniſh gabardine, which if it become him not wel, the fault is not in the ſtuffe, but in the botching Tailor, who neuer bound Prentice to the occupation, & working onely for his paſſetime, could hardly obſerue the preciſe rules of meaſure: but ſuch as it is, yours it is, and yours is the workeman, entirely addicted to reuerence you for your vertues, to loue you for your kindneſſe, and ſo more readie in deſire than able in power to teſtifie the ſame, and doe with my deweſt remembrance take leaue, reſting.

At your diſpoſition.

TO THE MAIESTIE of DON PHILIP, our *Soueraigne.*

TO the end that Artificers may attaine the perfection requisit for the vse of the common-wealth, mee thinketh (Catholike royall Maiesty) a law should be enacted, that no carpenter should exercise himselfe in any worke which appertained to the occupation of an husbandman, nor a tailor to that of an architect, & that the Aduocat should not minister Phisick, nor the Phisition play the Aduocat, but ech one exercise onely that art to which he beareth a naturall inclination, and let passe the residue. For considering how base and narrowly bounded a mans wit is for one thing and no more, I haue alwaies held it for a matter certain, That no man can be perfectly seene in two arts, without

in one of them: now to the end he may not erre in chuſing that which fitteth beſt with his owne nature, there ſhould be deputed in the cõmon-wealth, men of great wiſdome and knowledge, who might diſcouer each ones wit in his tender age,& cauſe him perforce to ſtudie that ſcience which is agreeable for him,not permitting him to make his own choice: whẽce this good would enſue to your ſtates and ſignories; that in them ſhould reſide the rareſt artificers of the world, and their workes ſhould be of the greateſt perfection,for nought elſe than becauſe they vnited art with nature. The like wold I that the vniuerſities of our kingdõs did put in practiſe,for ſeeing they allow not that a ſcholler ſhould paſſe to another facultie,vnleſſe he perfectly vnderſtand the Latine tongue,they ſhould haue alſo examiners,to trie whether he who purpoſeth to ſtudy Logick, Philoſophy,Diuinity, or the Laws,haue ſuch a wit as is requiſit for euery of theſe ſciẽces, for otherwiſe, beſides the dammage that ſuch a one ſhall worke afterwards to the Common-wealth,by vſing an art wherein he is not skilled, it is a griefe to ſee that a man ſhould take pains, and beat his braines about a matter wherein he

cannot reape any aduantage. For that at this day ſuch a diligence is not vſed, thoſe who had not a wit fit for Diuinity, haue deſtroied the Chriſtian religion. So do thoſe who are vntoward for Phiſicke, ſhorten many a mans daies: neither poſſeſſeth the Legall Science that perfection which it might receiue, becauſe it is not made knowne to what reaſonable power the vſe and interpretation of the lawes appertaineth. All the antient Philoſophers found by experience, that where nature doth not diſpoſe a man to knowledge, it falleth out a ſuperfluous labour to toile in the rules of art. But none hath cleerely & diſtinctly deliuered what that nature is which maketh a man able for one ſcience, and vncapable of another, nor how many differences of wits there are found in mankind, nor what Arts or Sciences do anſwere each in particular, nor by what tokens this may bee knowne, which is the thing that moſt importeth.

Theſe foure points (though they ſeem vnpoſſible) containe the matter whereof I am to entreat, beſides many others appurtenant to the purpoſe of this doctr ne, with intention that curious parents may haue an art & maner to diſ-

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couer the wit of their childrē, & may weet how to ſet ech of them in hand with that ſcience, wherein hee ſhall principally profit. And this is an aduiſe which *Galen* ſaith was giuen his father, namely that he ſhould ſet him to ſtudy Phiſick, becauſe for that ſcience hee had a ſingular wit. By which your Maieſtie ſhall vnderſtand how much it importeth the common-wealth, that there be eſtabliſhed in the ſame a choice, & examination of wits for the ſciences, ſeeing from the ſtudy which *Galen* beſtowed in Phiſick, there enſued ſo great good to the diſeaſed of his time, and he left ſo many remedies in writing for the poſterity, Euen as *Baldus* (a notable man in profeſsion of the lawes) when he ſtudied & practiſed Phiſicke, if hee had paſſed further therein, would haue prooued but an ordinarie Phiſitian, as he was not better, for that he wanted the difference of wit requiſit for this ſcience, but the lawes ſhould haue loſt one of the greateſt helps that might be found amongſt men for expounding them.

When I therfore purpoſed to reduce this new manner of Philoſophie to art, and to proue the ſame in ſome wits, I remēbred my ſelfe of your

Maieſtie, as the beſt knowne, and one, at whom the whole world wõdereth, beholding a Prince of ſo great knowledge and wiſedome, of whom here wee cannot conueniently entreat, the laſt chapter ſaue one is your conuenient place, where your Maieſtie ſhall ſee the purport of your owne wit, and the art and learning where-with you would haue benefited our com-mon-with, if you had beene a priuat perſon, as by nature you are our king and ſoue-reigne.

The second Proeme to the Reader.

When Plato *would teach any doctrine graue, ſubtile, and deuided from the vulgar opinion, hee made choiſe amongſt his ſchollers of ſuch as hee reputed beſt witted, and to thoſe onely he imparted his mind, knowing by experience, that to teach delicat matters to perſons of baſe vnderſtanding, was loſſe of time, loſſe of pains, and loſſe of learning. The ſecond thing which hee did after this choiſe made, was to preuent them with certaine preſuppoſitions, cleare and true, which ſhould not be wide from his concluſion: for the ſpeeches and ſentences which vnlooked for are deliuered againſt that which the vulgar beleeueth, at the beginning ſerue for nought elſe, (ſuch preuention not being made) than to put in confuſion him that liſteneth, and to breed ſuch a loathing in mens minds, as it cauſeth them to looſe their*

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good affection, and to abhorre and detest this doctrin. This manner of proceeding would I, that I might obserue with thee, (curious Reader) if meanes could bee vsed, that I might first treate with thee, and discouer betweene thee and mee the dispositiõ of thy wit. For if it be such as is requisite for this doctrine, and estranged from the ordinarie capacities, I would in secret tell thee such new and speciall conceits, as thou wouldest neuer haue thought could fall within the compasse of a mans imagination. But inasmuch as this will not bee, and this worke must issue in publicke for all sortes, I could not but set thy braines somewhat a worke: for if thy wit bee of the common and vulgar alloy, I know right well thou art alreadie persuaded, that the number of the sciences, and their perfection, hath beene accomplished many dayes agoe. And hereto thou art mooued by a vaine reason, that they hauing found out no more what to ad, it is a token, that now there is in nothing, any more nouelties. Now if by hap thou art possessed of such an opinion, goe no further, nor read thou any longer on, for thou wilt be much agreeued, to see how miserable a difference of wit possesseth thee. But if thou be discreet, wel compounded, and sufferent, I will

deliuer

deliuer vnto thee 3 conclusions very true, albeit for their noueltie they are worthie of great maruell.

The first is, that of many differences of wit, which are in mankind, one onely with preheminence can fall to thy lot, if alreadie, nature, as very mightie, at such time as shee framed it for thee, did not bestow all her endeuour, in vniting two onely, or three, (in that she could not effect the same) left thee a dolt, and depriued of them all.

The second, that to euery difference of wit there answereth in preheminence but one onely science, and no more of that condition. So as if thou diuine not to chuse that which answereth thy naturall ability, thou shalt be very remisse in the rest, though thou ply them night and day.

The third, that after thou hast knowne which the science is, that most answereth thy wit, there resteth yet (that thou maist not bee deceiued) another greater difficultie, which is, whether thine abilitie bee more appliable to the practick than theorick, for these two parts (be it what science it wil) are so opposit betwixt themselues, & require wits so different, that they may be placed one against the other, as if they were contraries. Hard arē these sentences, but yet they haue

greater

greater difficultie & hardnes, viz. that we cãnot appeale frõ thẽ, nor pretẽd that we haue receiued wrong. For God being the author of nature, and seeing that she gaue not to each man more than one difference of wit, (as I haue said before) through the opposition or difficultie which combreth vs in vniting them, he applied himselfe to her, & of the Sciences which are distributed amongst men by grace, it is a miracle, if in an eminent degree, he giue more than one. But there are (saith S. Paul) deuisions of graces, and the same spirit; there are diuisions of ministeries, and the same Lord; there are diuisions of operation, but the same God, who worketh all things in all persons. To euery one is giuen the ministerie of the spirit for profit: and to one is giuen by the spirit the word of wisdome, to another that of knowledge, after the same spirit, to another faith, in the same spirit, and to another the grace of healing, in the same spirit, to another the working of vertues, to another prophecying, and the description of spirits, vnto others the varietie of tongues, to another the interpretation of words: but one selfe spirit, which diuideth to euery one as him pleaseth, worketh all these things.

This bestowing of sciences (I doubt not) God vseth, hauing

*hauing regard to the wit and naturall disposition of euery person. For the Talents which he distributeth in S.*Matthew, *the same Euangelist saith, that hee gaue them vnto euery one according to his proper vertue.*

And to thinke that these supernaturall Sciences require not some dispositions in the subiect, before they be infused, is an errour very great: for when God formed Adam *and* Eue, *it is certain that before he filled them with wisdome, hee instrumentalized their braine in such sort, as they might receiue it with ease, and serue as a commodious instrument, therewith to be able to discourse, & to forme reasons. And therefore the diuine scripture saith; God gaue them an heart to thinke, and filled them with the discipline of vnderstanding, & that according to the difference of which euery one partaketh, one science is infused, and not another, or more or lesse of each of them, is a thing which may be vnderstood by this exãple of our first parents, for God filling them both with wisdome, it is a verified conclusion, that he infused the lesser portion into her, for which reasons the Diuines say, that the deuill tooke hardinesse to beguile her, and durst not tempt the man, as fearing his much*

wisdome:

wisdome. The reason hereof (as hereafter we will proue) is, that the naturall composition which the woman hath in her braine, is not capable of much wit, nor much wisdome. In the Angelicall substances, we shall find also the like count and reason: for God, to giue an angel more degrees of glory and higher gifts, first giueth him a more delicat nature, and if you enquire of the Diuines whereto this delicat nature serueth, they answere, that the Angel who hath the deepest vnderstanding, and the best nature, with most facilitie conuerteth himselfe vnto God, and vseth his gift with the more efficacie; and that the like betideth in men. Hence we cleerely inferre, that there being an election of wit for sciences supernaturall, and that, not whatsoeuer difference of abilitie, is their commodious instrument, humane learning (with more reason) requireth the same, because it is to be learned by men, with the force of their wit.

To bee able then to distinguish and discerne these naturall differences of mans wit, and to applie to each by art, that science wherein he may profit, is the intention of this my worke. If I bring the same to end (as I haue purposed) we will yeeld the glory to God, seeing from his hand proceedeth whatsoeuer is good

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and certaine: and if not, thou knowest well (discreet Reader) that it is impossible both to deuise an art, and to reduce the same to perfection. For so long and large are humane sciences, that a mans life sufficeth not to find them out, and to giue them that perfection which is requisit.

The first inuenter performeth very much, if hee discouer some notable principles, to the end that such as come after, may with this seed take an occasion to amplifie the art, and to bring it into that estimation and account which is due thereunto. Aristotle *alluding hereunto, saith: that the errors of those who first began to handle matters of Philosophie, are to be held in great reuerence, for it prooving a matter so difficult, to deuise new things, & so easie to adde vnto that which hath been already spoken and treated of; the defects of the first deserue not (by this reason) to be much reprooued, neither hee who addeth ought, meriteth any great commendation. I confesse that this my worke cannot be excused from some errors, seeing the matter is so delicat, and no way fore-opened to entreat thereof. But if the same bee in a matter where the vnderstanding hath place to thinke, in this case I pray thee (wittie Reader) that before thou giue sen-*

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tence thou read ouer the whole worke, and assure thy selfe what the difference of thine owne wit is, and if in the worke thou find ought which in thine opinion is not well said, consider wel of the reasons which sway the most against it, and if thou canst not resolue, then turne to read the eleuenth chapter, for in that shalt thou find the answere which they may receiue.

The Examination or Triall of mens wits and dispositions.

CHAP. I.

He proueth by an example, that if a Child haue not the disposition & abilitie, which is requisit for that science whereunto he will addict himselfe, it is a superfluous labour to be instructed therin by good scholemasters, to haue store of bookes, and continually to studie it.

THe opinion of *Cicero* was good, who, that his sonne *Marke* might prooue such a one in that kind of learning, which himselfe had made choice of, as he desired; iudged, that it sufficed to send him to a place of studie, so renowmed and famous in the world, as that of *Athens*, and to giue him *Cratippus* for his scholemaster, who was the greatest Philosopher of those daies, bringing him vp in a citie so populous, where, through the great concourse of people which thither assembled, he should of necessitie haue many examples and profitings of strangers, fit to teach him by experience those things which appertained to the knowledge that himselfe was to learne. But, notwithstanding all this diligence, and much more besides,

which (as a good father) he vſed, prouiding him bookes, and writing ſome vnto him of his own head; the Hiſtorians report, that he proued but a Cods-head, with little eloquence, and leſſe Philoſophie, (a matter vſuall amongſt men, that the ſonne abies the much wiſdome of the father.) Verely *Cicero* greatly beguiled himſelfe, imagining that albeit his ſonne were not iſſued out of Natures hands, with that wit & habilitie which is requiſit for eloquence & Philoſophie, yet by means of the good induſtrie of ſuch a teacher, and the many bookes, and examples of *Athens*, togither with the young mans continuall endeauour, and proceſſe of time, the defects of his vnderſtanding would be amended: but we ſee, that finally he deceiued himſelfe; neither do I maruel thereat, for he had many examples to this purpoſe, which encouraged him to beleeue, that the ſame might alſo befall in the perſon of his ſonne.

For the ſame *Cicero* reports in his booke of *Deſtinie* that *Zenocrates* had a wit very vntoward for the ſtudie of Naturall and Morall Philoſophie, of whom *Plato* ſaid, That he had a ſcholler, who ſtood in need of a ſpur: and yet notwithſtanding, through the good induſtry of ſuch a maſter, and the continuall trauel of *Zenocrates* himſelf, he became a verie great Philoſopher. And he writes the like alſo of *Cleantes*, who was ſo doltiſh and void of vnderſtanding, that no teacher would receiue him into his ſchoole; whereat the young man agreeued & aſhamed, endured ſo great toile in ſtudying, that he came afterwards to be called a ſecond *Hercules* for wiſedome. No leſſe vntoward for matters of eloquence, ſeemed the wit of *Demoſthenes*, of whom it is ſaid, that when he was now grown big, he could not yet ſpeake plain, but labouring and applying the art, by hearing of good teachers, he

proued

proued the beſt Oratour of the world: and ſpecially (as *Cicero* recounts) hee could not pronounce the letter R, for that he did ſomwhat ſtammer, and yet by practiſe he grew to articulat it ſo well, as if he had neuer had that way any defect. Hence tooke that prouerbe his original, which ſaith, That mans wit in matters of ſcience is like a plaier at dice, for if any one proue vnluckie in throwing his chãce, by artificial practiſe he comes to amend his euill fortune. But none of theſe examples produced by *Cicero*, remains without a conuenient anſwere in my doctrine: For (as we will hereafter proue) there is in young men a certain dulnes, which argues a greater wit in another age, than if the ſame had beene ſharpe from their childhood: nay it is a iudgement that they will proue lowtiſh men, when they begin verie ſoone to diſcourſe, and be quicke of conceipt. Wherfore, if *Cicero* had knowne the true tokens by which wits are in the firſt age to bee diſcouered, hee would haue held it a good ſigne, that *Demoſthenes* was rude and ſlow of ſpeech, and that *Zenocrates* had need of a ſpur whileſt hee learned. I take not from a good Inſtructor art, and induſtrie, their vertue and force, to manure wits, as well rude as pliant: but that which I will ſay, is, That if a young man haue not of himſelfe an vnderſtanding capable of precepts and rules, which properly belong to the art he would learne, and to none other, that the diligence vſed by *Cicero* with his ſonne, was as vaine as that which any other parent ſhal vſe with his ſonne, wil be in the like. Thoſe who haue read *Plato*, ſhal eaſily know, that this doctrine is true, who reports that *Socrates* was the ſonne (as he alſo reported himſelfe) of a midwife, & that as his mother (albeit ſhe were much praiſed in the art) could not make a woman to be deliuered, that before her comming to her was not with child; ſo hee (performing the like of-

fice as his mother) could not make his ſchollers bring forth any ſcience, if of themſelues they had not their vnderſtanding conceiued therewith. He was of opinion, that ſciences were (as it were) naturall to thoſe men only, who had their wits appliable thereunto: and that in ſuch it befell, as we ſee by experience in thoſe who haue forgotten ſomewhat which they firſt knew, who if wee put them in mind but of one word, gather from that all the reſidue.

Maiſters (for ought that I can gather) haue none other office with their ſchollers, than to bring learning to their remembrance: for if they haue a fruitfull wit, they make them with this only to bring forth wonderfull conceipts, otherwiſe they do but afflict themſelues, and thoſe whom they inſtruct, nor euer obtaine their deſires. And (at leaſt if I were a teacher) before I receiued any ſcholler into my ſchoole, I would grow to many trials and experiments with him, vntill I might diſcouer the qualitie of his wit, and if I found it by nature directed to that ſcience whereof I made profeſſion, I would willingly receiue him, for it breeds a great contentment in the teacher, to inſtruct one of good towardlineſſe: and if not, I would counſell him to ſtudie that ſcience which were moſt agreeable with his wit. But if I ſaw, that he had no diſpoſition or capacitie for any ſort of learning, I would friendly and with gentle words tell him; Brother, you haue no meanes to proue a man of that profeſſion which you haue vndertaken, take care not to looſe your time and your labour, and prouide you ſome other trade of liuing, which requires not ſo great an habilitie as appertaineth to learning. Hereof is ſeene verie plaine experience, for we behold a great number of ſchollers enter the courſe of whatſoeuer ſcience, and (be the teacher very good or very bad) finally euery day ſome prooue of great skil, ſome of mean, and ſome in

their

their whole course, haue done nought else than leese their time, spend their goods, and beat their braines without any maner of profit.

I wot nere whence this effect may spring, they all hearing one selfe teacher, and with equall diligence and care, and perhaps the dull taking more paine than the wittie: and this difficultie grows the greater, by seeing that those who are vntoward for one sciẽce, are verie apt to another, and the toward in one sort of learning, passing to another sort, can vnderstand nothing. But my selfe am at least a good witnesse in this truth; for there were three companions of vs, who entered together to studie the Latine tongue, & one of vs learned the same with great facilitie, the rest could neuer make any commendable composition; but all passing on to Logicke, one of those who could not learn Grammer, proued in that art a principal Aegle, and the other two, in the whole, neuer learned one readie point: then all three comming to learn Astrologie, it was a matter worthie of consideration, that he who could no skill of Latine or Logicke, in few daies knew more in Astrologie than his master that taught them, and the rest could neuer learne it. I then maruelling hereat, began forthwith to make discourses, and play the Philosopher hereon, and so I found that euery science required a speciall and peculiar wit, which reaued from that, was little worth in other sorts of learning. And if this be true (as verily it is, and we will so proue it hereafter) he that at this day should enter into the schoole of our times, making proofe & assay of the schollers wits, how many would he change from one science to another, & how many would hee send into the fields for dolts and vnable to learne? and how many would he cal backe of those, who for want of abilitie are occupied in base exercises, & yet their wits

were by nature created only for learning? but ſithens this cannot bee brought about nor remedied, it behooues to ſtay no longer hereon, but to paſſe forward.

It cannot be denyed, but that (as I haue ſayd) there are wits found capable of one ſcience, which are vntoward for another: and therefore it behooues, before the child be ſet to ſtudie, to diſcouer the manner of his wit, and to ſee what ſcience agreeth with his capacitie, and then to prouide that he may applie the ſame. But it is neceſſarie alſo to conſider, that this which hath beene ſaid, ſufficeth not to make a man prooue ſufficiently learned, but wee muſt haue regard to our conditions no leſſe requiſite than is this of towardlyneſſe. For *Hippocrates* ſayth, That mans wit holds the like proportion with knowledge, as the earth doth with ſeed, which though of her ſelfe ſhee be fruitful and fat, yet it behooues to manure her, and vſe aduiſement to what ſort of ſeed her naturall diſpoſition enclineth: for euery ſort of earth cannot without diſtinction produce euery ſort of ſeede. Some better brings forth Wheate than Barley, and ſome Barley better than Wheat; and of Wheats ſome bring a plentifull encreaſe of good Lammas Wheat, and cannot away with the baſeſt ſort.

Neither doth the good husbandman content himſelfe to make this only diſtinction, but after hee hath manured the earth in due ſeaſon, he lookes for conuenient time to ſow it, for it cannot be done at all times of the yeare, and after that the grain is ſprung vp, he clenſeth and weedeth it, that it may encreaſe and grow; giuing the fruit which of the ſeed is expected. After this ſort, it is neceſſarie that the ſcience being knowne, which beſt fitteth with the perſon, he begin to ſtudie from his firſt age, for this (ſayth *Ariſtotle*) is the moſt pliant of all others to learning. Moreo-

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uer, mans life is very ſhort, and the arts long and toilſome, for which it behooues that there bee time ſufficient to know them, and ſpace to exerciſe them, and therewith to profit the commonwealth. Childrens memorie (ſayth *Ariſtotle*) is a table without any picture, becauſe it was but a little while ſince they were borne, and ſo they receiue any thing whatſoeuer with facilitie; and not as the memorie of old men, which full of thoſe many things they haue ſeene in the long courſe of their life, is not capable of more: and therefore *Plato* ſayth, That in the preſence of youth, we ſhould recount honeſt tales and actions, which may incite them to vertuous doings, for what they learne in that age, abides ſtill in their mindes, and not (as *Galen* ſayth) that then it behooues to learne the arts, when our nature hath accrued all the forces that ſhe cã haue; which point is void of reaſon, if you admit no diſtinction. Hee that is to learne the Latine tongue or any other language, ought to do it in his childhood, for if he tarrie till the bodie be hardened, and take the perfection that it ought to haue, he ſhall neuer reape auaileable profit. In his ſecond age, namely boys ſtate, it is requiſit that he trauaile in the art of Syllogiſmes, for then the vnderſtanding begins to diſplay his forces, which hath the ſame proportion with Logicke, as ſhackles haue with the feet of mules not yet trayned, who going ſome dayes therewith, take afterward a certain grace in their pace: ſo our vnderſtanding ſhackled with the rules and precepts of Logick, take afterwards a gracefull kind of diſcourſing & arguing in ſciences and diſputations. Then followes youth, in which all the ſciences appertaining to the vnderſtanding may bee learned, for that hath a ripened knowledge.

True it is, that *Ariſtotle* excepteth natural Phyloſophy, ſaying, a young man is not of fit diſpoſition for this kind

of doctrine, wherein it seemeth he hath reason, for that it is a science of deeper consideration and wisedome than any other.

Now the age thus knowne, in which sciences are to be learned, it behooues to search out a commodious place for the same, where nothing else saue learning may bee handled, and such are the Vniuersities : but the youth must forgoe his fathers house, for the dandling of the mother, brethren, kindred, and friends which are not of his profession, do greatly hinder his profiting. This is plainly seene in the schollers who are natiue of the cities and places where Vniuersities are seated, none of which (saue by great miracle) euer become learned. And this may easily bee remedied, by changing of Vniuersities, and the natiue of one citie going to studie in another. This faring that a man takes from his owne countrie to make himselfe of worth and discretion, is of so great importance, that there is no master in the world who can teach him more, and especially, when a man sees himselfe (sometimes) abandoned of the fauour and delights of his countrie. Depart out of thy land (said God to *Abraham*) & sever thy selfe from amidst thy kindred and thy fathers house, and come to the place where I will shew thee, in which thou shalt make thy name great, & I will giue thee my blessing. The like saies God to all men, who desire to prooue of value and wisedome: for albeit he can blesse them in their natiue countrie, yet hee will that men dispose themselues by this meane which he hath ordained, and that wisdome be not attained by them with idlenesse. All this is meant with a foregoing presuppolal, that a man haue a good wit & be apt, for otherwise, *He that goes a beast to Rome, returns a beast againe.* Little anailes it, that a dullard go to learn in the famous place of studie, where there is no chaire of vnder-

vnderſtanding, nor wiſedome, nor a man to teach it.

The third point of diligence is, to ſeeke out a maſter who hath a direction and method in teaching, whoſe doctrine is ſound and firme, not ſophiſticall nor of vaine conſiderations: for all that the ſcholler doth, whileſt hee is a learning, is to credite all that which his maſter propounds vnto him, for hee hath no ſound judgement or diſcretion to diſcerne or ſeperat falſhood from trueth, albeit this is a chauncefull caſe, and not placed in the choice of ſuch as learne, that the ſchollers come in due time to ſtudie, and that the Vniuerſities haue good or vnfit inſtructors; as it befell certaine Phiſitions, of whom *Galen* reports, that hauing conuinced them by many reaſons and experiments, and ſhewed them, that the practiſe which they vſed was falſe and prejudiciall to mens health; the teares fell from their eyes, and in his preſence they began to curſe their hard hap, in lighting on ſuch bad maſters as bare ſway during the time that they were learners. True it is, that there are found ſome ſchollers of ſo ripe wit, as they ſtraightwaies looke into the condition of the teachers, and the learning which hee teacheth, and if it be vitious, they know how to confute the ſame, and to giue allowance to ſuch as deliuer ſoundly: theſe at the yeares end teach their maſter much more than their maſter taught them; for doubting and demaunding wittily, they make him to vnderſtand and anſwere things ſo exquiſit, as hee himſelfe neuer knew nor ſhould haue knowne, if the ſcholler with the felicitie of his wit, had not brought them to his mind: but thoſe who can doe this, are one or two at the moſt, and the dullards are infinit. Through which, it would doe well (ſeeing this choiſe and Examination of Wits for euery ſcience is not had) that the

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Vniuersities alwayes made prouision of good teachers, endued with sound learning, and a cleere discerning wit, to the end they may not instruct the ignorant in errours and false propositions.

The fourth diligence requisit to bee vsed, is to studie euery science with order, beginning at his principles, and passing through the midst to the end, without hauing matter that may presuppose another thing before. For which cause, I haue alwayes held it an errour, to heare many lessons of diuers matters, and to carry them all home fardled vp together. By this meanes there is made a masse of things in the vnderstanding, which afterwards, when they come to practise, a man knowes not how to turne to vse the precepts of his art, nor to assigne them a place conuenient: and it is much better to bestow labour in euery matter by it selfe, and with that naturall order which it holds in his composition; for in the selfe manner as it is learned, so is it also preserued in the memory. And more in particular, it is necessarie that they doe this, who of their owne nature haue a confused wit: and this may easily be remedied by hearing one matter by it selfe, and that being ended, to enter into the next following, till the whole art be atchieued. *Galen* well vnderstanding of how great importance it was to studie matters with order and concert, wrot a booke to teach the manner that was to bee held in reading his workes, to the end that the Physition might not bee tangled in confusion. Others adde hereunto, that the scholler whilest hee learneth, haue but one booke which may plainely containe the points of his learning, and that he attend to studie that only and no more, least he grow into a garboile and confusion: and herein they are warranted by great reason.

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The laſt thing which makes a man proue of rare learning, is to conſume much time at his booke, and to expect, that knowledge haue his due digeſtion, and take deepe root; for as the bodie is not maintained by the much which we eat and drinke in one day, but by that which the ſtomacke digeſteth and turneth: ſo our vnderſtanding is not filled by the much which wee read in little time, but by that which by little and little it proceeds to conceiue and chew vpon. Our wit day by day diſpoſeth it ſelfe better and better, and comes (by proceſſe of time) to light on things which before it could neither vnderſtand nor conceiue. Vnderſtanding hath his beginning, his encreaſe, his ſtanding, and his declining, as hath a man, and other creatures and plants; it begins in boyes age, hath his encreaſe in youth, his ſtanding in middle or mans age, and in old age it begins to decline. Who ſo therefore would know at what time his vnderſtanding enioyeth all the forces which it may partake, let him weet, that it is from the age of thirty and three vntill fiftie, little more or leſſe, within which compaſſe we may beſt giue credit to graue authors, if in the diſcourſe of their life they haue held contrarie opinions; and he that will write bookes, let him doe it about this age, and not before nor after, if he meane not to vnſay againe, or change opinion.

But mans age hath not in all people a like meaſure and reaſon; for in ſome, childhood ends in twelue yeares, in ſome at foureteene, ſome haue ſixteene, and ſome eighteen; ſuch liues very long, becauſe their youth arriues to little leſſe than fortie yeares, and their ripe or firme age to threeſcore, and they haue afterward twentie yeares of old age, wherethrough their life amounts to foureſcore, and this is the tearme of thoſe who are very

very ſtrong. The firſt ſort, who finiſh their childhood at twelue yeres, are very ſhort liued, and begin ſpeedily to diſcourſe, their beard ſoone ſprowteth out, and their wit laſteth but a ſmall time, theſe at thirtie fiue yeres begin to decline, and at fortie and eight finiſhed their life.

Of all the conditions aboue ſpecified, there is not any one which is not very neceſſarie, profitable, and helpeful in practiſe for a young man to receiue notice of; but to haue a good and aunſwerable nature to the ſcience which he pretendeth to ſtudie, is the matter which moſt makes for the purpoſe: for with this, we haue ſeene that diuers men haue begun to ſtudie, after their youth was expired, and were inſtructed by bad teachers, with euill order, and in their owne birth-places, and yet for all that haue prooued great clearkes. But if the wit faile (ſayth *Hippocrates*) all other diligences are loſt. But there is no man who hath better verefied this, than the good *Marcus Cicero*, who through griefe of ſeeing his ſonne ſuch a doo-nought, with whom none of the meanes could preuaile, that he had procured to breed him wiſedome, ſaid in the end after this ſort: *what elſe is it, after the manner of the Giants, to fight with the gods, than to reſiſt againſt nature?* as if he ſhould haue ſaid: What thing is there, which better reſembles the battaile which the Gyants vndertooke againſt the gods, than that a man who wanteth capacitie, ſhould ſet himſelfe to ſtudie? for as the Gyants neuer ouercame the gods, but were ſtill vanquiſhed by them: ſo whatſoeuer ſcholler will labour to ouercome his own vntoward nature, ſhal reſt vanquiſhed by her. For which cauſe, the ſame *Cicero* counſelleth vs, that we ſhould not vſe force againſt our nature, nor endeauour to become Orators, if ſhe aſſent not, for we ſhal vndergo labour in vaine.

CHAP.

CHAP. II.

That Nature is that which makes a man of habilitie to learne.

IT is an opinion very common and ordinarie amongſt the ancient Philoſophers, to ſay, That Nature is ſhe who makes a man of habilitie to learn, and that art with her precepts and rules giues a facilitie therunto: but then vſe and experience, which hee reapes of particular things, makes him mightie in working. Yet none of them euer ſhewed in particular, what thing this Nature was, nor in what ranke of cauſes it ought to be placed: onely they affirmed, that this, wanting in him who learned; art, experience, teachers, bookes, and trauaile are of none auaile. The ignorant vulgar, ſeeing a man of great wit and readineſſe, ſtraightwaies aſſigne God to be the author thereof, and looke no further, but hold euerie other imagination that goes beyond this, for vanitie: but naturall Philoſophers deſpiſe this manner of talking; for put caſe that the ſame be godly, and containe therein religion and truth, yet it groweth from not knowing the order and diſpoſition which God placed amongſt naturall things that day when they were created, and ſo couer their ignorance with a kind of warrantize, and in ſort, that none may reprehend or gaineſay the ſame, they affirme that all befals as God will, and that nothing ſucceeds, which ſprings not from his diuine pleaſure. But though this bee neuer ſo apparant a trueth, yet are they worthie of reproofe,

proofe: becauſe, as not euerie kind of demaund (ſaith *Ariſtotle*) is to be made after one faſhion, ſo not euerie anſwere (though true) is to be giuen.

Whileſt a natural Philoſopher reaſoned with a Grammarian, there came to them an inquiſitiue Gardener, and asked, What the cauſe might bee, that he cheriſhing the earth ſo charily, in deluing, turning, dunging, and watering it, yet the ſame neuer well brought forth the hearbage which hee ſowed therein; whereas the hearbes which ſhe bred of her ſelfe, ſhee cauſed to encreaſe with great facilitie? The Grammarian anſwered, This grew from the diuine prouidence, and was ſo ordained thorow the good gouernement of the world: at which aunſwere the naturall Philoſopher laughed, ſeeing he reduced this to God, becauſe hee knew not the diſcourſe of naturall cauſes, nor in what ſort they proceeded to their effects. The Grammarian preceiuing the other laugh, asked whether he mocked him, or whereat elſe he laughed? The Philoſopher anſwered, that hee laughed not at him, but at the maiſter who taught him ſo ill: for the knowledge and ſolution of things which ſpring from the diuine prouidence (as are the workes ſupernaturall) appertaine to the Metaphiſickes (whom we now tearme Diuines:) but this queſtion propounded by the Gardener, is naturall, and appertaineth to the iuriſdiction of the naturall Philoſophers, becauſe there are certaine ordered and manifeſt cauſes, from which this effect may ſpring. And thus the naturall Philoſopher anſwered, ſaying, That the earth is conditioned like a ſtepmother, who very carefully brings vp her owne children which ſhee breeds her ſelfe, but takes away the ſuſtenance from thoſe which appertayne to her husband; and ſo wee ſee that her owne children are fat and freſh, and her ſtep-

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children weake and ill coloured. The hearbs which the earth brings forth of her selfe, are borne of her proper bowels, and those which the Gardener makes to grow by force, are the daughters of another mother, wherethrough shee takes from them the vertue and nourishment by which they ought to increase, that she may giue it to the hearbs which are borne of her selfe.

Hipocrates likewise reports, that he going to visit the great Philosopher *Democritus*, hee told him the follies which the vulgar speake of Phisicke, namely, that seeing themselues recouered from sickenesse, they would say, it was God who healed them, and that if his wil were not, little had the good diligence of the Phisition availed. This is so auncient a manner of talke, and the naturall Philosophers haue so often refuted it, that the seeking to take the same away, were superfluous, neither is it conuenient: for the vulgar, who know not the particular causes of any effect, answereth better and with more trueth, as touching the vniuersall cause, which is God, than to say some other vnfitting thing. But I haue often gone about to consider the reason and the cause whence it may grow, that the vulgar sort is so great a friend to impute all things to God, and to reaue them from nature, and do so abhorre the naturall meanes: and I know not whether I haue bin able to find it out. The vulgar (at least) giues hereby to vnderstād, that for as much as they know not what effects they ought to attribute to God immediatly, and what to Nature, they speake after this maner. Besides that, men are for the most part impatient, and desirous to accomplish speedily what they couet. But because the natural means are of such prolixitie, and worke with length of time, they possesse not the patience to stand marking thereof, and knowing that God is omni-

omnipotent, and in a moment of time performeth whatsoeuer him pleaseth (whereof they find many examples) they would that he should giue them health, as he did to the sicke of the palsie; and wisedome, as to *Salomon*; riches, as to *Iob*; and that he should deliuer them from their enimie, as he did *Dauid*.

The second cause is, for that men are arrogant, and vaine conceited, many of whom desire secretly in their hearts, that God would bestow vpon them some particular graces, which should not befall after the common vse, (as it is, that the Sunne ariseth vpon the good & bad, and that the raine fals vpon all in generall:) for benefits are so much the more highly prized, as they are the more rare. And for this cause we haue seene many men to feigne miracles in houses and places of deuotion, for straightwaies the people flockes vnto them, and holds them in great reuerence, as persons of whome God makes a speciall account: and if they be poore, they fauour them with large almes, and so some sinne vpon interest.

The third reason is, that men haue a liking to be well at their ease: whereas naturall causes are disposed with such order and conceipt, that to attaine their effects, it behooues to bestow labour. Wherefore they would haue God demeane himselfe towards them, after his omnipotencie, and that (without sweating) they might come to the well head of their desires. I leaue aside the mallice of those, who require miracles at Gods hand, thereby to tempt his almightinesse, and to prooue whether he be able to doe it: and othersome, who to be reuenged after their hearts desire, cal for fire from heauen, and such other cruell chastisements.

The last cause is, for that many of the vulgar are religiously

ligiously giuen, and hold deere, that God may be honored and magnified, which is much sooner brought about by way of miracles than by naturall effects: but the common sort of men know not, that workes aboue nature and wonderfull, are done by God to shew those who know it not, That he is not omnipotent, and that he serues himselfe of them, as an argument to prooue his doctrine, and that this necessitie once ceasing, he neuer doth it more. This may well be perceiued, considering that God doth no longer those vnwonted things of the new Testament: and the reason is, for that on his behalfe hee hath performed all necessarie diligence, that men might not pretend ignorance. And to thinke that hee will begin anew to do the like miracles, and by them once againe to prooue his doctrine, in raising the dead, restoring sight to the blind, and healing the lame and sicke of the palsie, is an errour very great; for once God taught men what is behoofefull, and prooued the same by miracles, but returnes not to doe it any more. God speakes once (sayth *Iob*) and turnes not to a second repliall.

The token whereon I ground my iudgement, when I would discouer whether a man haue a wit appropriat to Naturall Philosophie, is, to see whether he be addicted to reduce all matters to miracle, without distinction: and contrariwise, such as hold not themselues contented, vntill they know the particular cause of euery effect, leaue no occasion to mistrust the goodnesse of their witte. These doe well know, that there are effects which must be reduced to God immediately, (as miracles) and others to Nature, (and such are those, which haue their ordinarie causes from whence they accustome to spring:) but speaking both of the one manner and the

other, wee alwaies place God for author: for when *Aristotle* ſaid, That God and Nature did nothing in vaine, hee meant not, that Nature was an vniuerſall cauſe, endowed with a iuriſdiction ſeuered from God, but that ſhee was a name of the order and concert which God hath beſtowed in the frame of the world, to the end that the neceſſarie effects might follow for the preſeruation thereof. For in the ſame manner it is vſually ſaid, that the King and Ciuile Reaſon doe no man wrong. In which kind of ſpeech no man conceiueth, that this name Reaſon, ſignifieth a prince which poſſeſſeth a ſeuerall iuriſdiction from that of the king; but a tearme, which by his ſignification embraceth all the royall lawes and conſtitutions ordained by the ſame king, for the preſeruation of his commonwealth in peace. And as the king hath his ſpeciall caſes reſerued to himſelfe, which cannot be decided by the law, for that they are vnuſuall and waightie: in like manner God left miraculous effects reſerued for himſelfe, neither gaue allowance vnto naturall cauſes, that they might produce them. But here we muſt note, that he who ſhould know them for ſuch, and difference them from naturall workes, behooues to bee a great naturall Philoſopher, and to vnderſtand the ordinary cauſes that euery effect may hold, and yet all this ſufficeth not, vnleſſe the Catholike church ratifie them to be ſuch. And as the Doctors labour and ſtudie in reading this Ciuile Reaſon, preſeruing the whole in their memorie, that they may know and vnderſtand what the kings will was, in the determination of ſuch a caſe: ſo wee naturall Philoſophers (as doctors in this facultie) beſtow all our ſtudie in knowing the diſcourſe and order which God placed that day when he created the world, ſo to contemplate and vnderſtand

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in what ſort, and vpon what cauſe he would that things ſhould ſucceed. And as it were a matter worthie laughter, that a doctor ſhould alleage in his writings (though approoued) that the king commaunds a caſe ſhould be thus determined, without ſhewing the Law and Reaſon, through which it was ſo decided: ſo naturall Philoſophers laugh at ſuch as ſay, This is Gods doing; without aſſigning the order and diſcourſe of the particular cauſes whence they may ſpring. And as the king wil giue them no eare, when they require him to breake ſome iuſt law, or to rule ſome caſe beſides the order of iuſtice, which hee hath commaunded to bee obſerued: ſo God will not hearken when any man demaunds of him miracles and workes beſides naturall order, without cauſe why. For albeit the king euery day abrogates and eſtabliſheth new lawes, and changeth iudiciall order, as well through the variation of times, as for that it is the iudgement of a fraile man, and cannot at one only time attaine to perfect right and iuſtice: notwithſtanding the naturall order of the vniuerſe, which we call Nature, from that day wherein God created the world, vnto this, hath had no need of adioining or reauing any one iot, becauſe hee framed the ſame with ſuch prouidence and wiſedome, that to require this order might not be obſerued, were to ſay, that his workes were vnperfect.

To returne then to that ſentence ſo often vſed by naturall Philoſophers, that *Nature makes able*; we muſt vnderſtand that there are Wits, and there are Abilities, which God beſtoweth vpon men beſides naturall order, as was the wiſedome of the Apoſtles, who beeing ſimple and of baſe account, were miraculouſly enlightened and repleniſhed with knowledge and learning. Of this ſort of abilitie and wiſedome it cannot be verefied,

that Nature makes able; for this is a worke which is to be imputed immediatly vnto God, and not vnto Nature. The like is to be vnderstood of the wisedome of the Prophets, and of all those to whom God graunted some grace infused. Another sort of abilitie is found in men, which springs of their being begotten, with that order and consent of causes which are established by God to this end: and of this sort it may be said with truth, *Nature makes able.* For (as we will prooue in the last Chapter of this Worke) there is to be found such an order and consent in naturall things, that if the fathers in time of procreation haue regard to obserue the same, all their children shall prooue wise, and none otherwise. But the whilest this signification of Nature is very vniuersall and confused, and the vnderstanding contents not it selfe, nor stayeth, vntill it conceiue the particular discourse, and the latest cause; therefore it behooues to search out another signification of this name Nature, which may be more agreeable to our purpose.

Aristotle and other naturall Philosophers discend into more particularities, and call Nature, whatsoeuer substantiall forme, which giues the being to any thing, and is the originall of all the working thereof: in which signification, our reasonable soule may reasonably be tearmed Nature, for from her we receiue our formall being, which wee haue of being men, and the selfe-same is the beginning of whatsoeuer wee doe and worke. But all soules being of equall perfection (as well that of the wiser, as that of the foolish) it cannot be affirmed, that Nature in this signification is that which makes a man able, for if this were true, all men should haue a like measure of wit and wisedome: and therefore the same *Aristotle* found out another signification of Nature, which is the

cause

cauſe, that a man is able or vnable; ſaying, that the temperature of the foure firſt qualities, (hot, cold, moiſt, and drie) is to be called Nature; for from this iſſue al the habilities of man, all his vertues and vices, and this great varietie of wits which we behold. And this is clearely proued, by conſidering the age of a man when he is wiſeſt, who in his childhood is no more than a bruite beaſt, and vſeth none other powers than thoſe of anger and concupiſcence; but comming to youth, there begins to ſhoot out in him a maruellous wit, and wee ſee that it laſteth till a time certaine, and no longer, for old age growing on, he gowes euery day looſing his wit, vntill it come to be quite decayed.

This varietie of wits, is a matter certaine, that it ſprings not from the reaſonable ſoule, for that is one ſelfe in all ages, without hauing receiued in his forces and ſubſtance any alteration: but man hath in euery age a diuers temperature, and a contrarie diſpoſition, by meanes whereof, the Soule doth other workes in child-hood, other in youth, and other in old age. Whence wee draw an euident argument, that one ſelfe-Soule doing contrarie workes in one ſelfe-Bodie, for that it partakes in euery age a contrarie temperatute, when of young men, the one is able, and the other vnapt: this growes for that the one of them enioyes a diuers temperature from the other: And this (for that it is the beginning of all the workes of the reaſonable Soule) was by the Phiſitions and the Philoſophers tearmed Nature; of which ſignification this ſentence is properly verefied, that *Nature makes able.*

For confirmation of this doctrine, *Galen* writ a booke, wherein he prooueth, That the manners of the Soule follow the temperature of the bodie, in which it keepes re-

ſidence, and that by reaſon of the heat, the coldneſſe, the moiſture, and the drouth of the territorie where men inhabit, of the meats which they feed on, of the waters which they drinke, and of the aire which they breath: ſome are blockiſh, and ſome wiſe: ſome of woorth, and ſome baſe: ſome cruell, and ſome mercifull: many ſtraight breaſted, and many large: part liers, and part true ſpeakers: ſundrie traitors, and ſundrie faithfull: ſomewhere vnquiet, and ſomewhere ſtaied: there double, here ſingle: one pinching, another liberall: this man ſhamefaſt, that ſhameleſſe: ſuch hard, and ſuch light of beleefe. And to prooue this, he cites many places of *Hippocrates*, *Plato*, and *Ariſtotle*, who affirme, that the difference of nations, as well in compoſition of the bodie, as in conditions of the ſoule, ſpringeth from the varietie of this temperature: and experience it ſelfe euidently ſheweth this, how far are different *Greekes* from *Tartarians*, *Frenchmen* from *Spaniards*, *Indians* from *Dutch*, and *Æthiopians* from *Engliſh*. And this may be ſeene, not onely in countries ſo far diſtant, but if we conſider the prouinces that enuiron all *Spaine*, wee may depart the vertues and vices which wee haue recounted amongſt the inhabitants, giuing ech one his particular vice and vertue: and if we conſider the wit and manners of the *Catalonians*, *Valentians*, *Mercians*, *Granatines*, *Andaluzians*, *Eſtremenians*, *Portugals*, *Galleſians*, *Aſturians*, *Montagneſes*, *Biſcanes*, *Nauarriſts*, *Aragouois*, and of the kingdome of *Caſtile*; who ſees not and knowes not, how farre theſe are different amongſt themſelues, not onely in ſhape of countenance, and in feature of bodie, but euen in the vertues and vices of the ſoule? Which all growes, for that euery of theſe prouinces hath his particular and different temperature. And this varietie of manners is knowne, not onely in coun-

countries so farre off, but in places also that are not more than a little league in distance, it cannot bee credited what ods there is found in the wits of the inhabitants. Finally, all that which *Galen* writeth in this his booke, is the groundplot of this my Treatise, albeit hee declares not in particular the differences of the habilities which are in men, neither as touching the sciences which euerie one requires in particular. Notwithstanding, hee vnderstood that it was necessarie to depart the sciences amongst young men, and to giue each one that which to his naturall habilitie was requisit, in as much as hee said, That well ordered common-wealths ought to haue men of great wisedome and knowledge, who might in their tender age discouer each ones wit and naturall sharpenesse, to the end they might be set to learne that art which was agreeable, and not leaue it to their owne election.

CHAP. III.

What part of the bodie ought to be well tempered, that a young man may haue habilitie.

MAns bodie hath so many varieties of parts and powers (applied each to his end) that it shall not stray frõ our purpose, but rather grows a matter of necessitie, to know first, what member was ordained by nature for the principall instrument, to the end man might become wise and aduised. For it is a thing apparant, that we discourse not with our foot, nor walke on our head,

nor see with our nostrils, nor heare with our eyes, but that euery of these parts hath his vse and particular disposition, for the worke which it is to accomplish.

Before *Hippocrates* and *Plato* came into the world, it held for a generall conceipt amongst the naturall Philosophers, that the heart was the principall part where the reasonable facultie made his residence, and the instrument wherewith the soule wrought the workes of wisedome, of diligence, of memorie, and of vnderstanding. For which cause, the diuine scripture (applying it selfe to the ordinarie speech of those times) in many places calls heart the soueraigne part of a man. But these two graue Philosophers comming into the world, gaue euidence that this opinion was false, and prooued by many reasons and experiments, that the Braine is the principall seate of the reasonable Soule, and so they all gaue hands to this opinion, saue onely *Aristotle*, who (with a purpose of crossing *Plato* in all points) turned to reuiue the former opinion, and with topicall places to make it probable: with which of these opinions the truth swayeth, time serueth not now to discusse. For there is none of these Philosophers that doubteth, but that the braine is the instrument ordained by nature, to the end that man might become wise and skilfull, it sufficeth onely to declare with what conditions this part ought to be endued, so as we may affirme, that it is duly instrumentalized, and that a young man in this behalfe may possesse a good wit and habilitie.

Foure conditions the braine ought to enioy, to the end the reasonable soule may therewith commodiously performe the workes which appertaine to vnderstanding and wisedome. The first, good composition; the second, that his parts be well vnited; the third, that the heat

heat exceed not the cold, nor the moyst the drie; the fourth, that his substance be made of parts subtile and very delicate.

In the good composition are contained other foure things: the first is, good figure: the second, quantitie sufficient: the third, that in the braine the foure ventricles be distinct and seuered, each duly bestowed in his seat and place: the fourth, that the capableneſſe of these be neither greater nor lesse than is conuenient for their workings.

Galen collects the good figure of the braine by an outward consideration, namely the forme and disposition of the head, which he sayth ought to be such, as it should be, if taking a perfect round ball of wax, and pressing it together some-what on the sides, there will remaine (after that manner) the forehead and the nape with a little bunchineſſe. Hence it followes, that the man who hath his forehead very plaine, and his nodocke flat, hath not his braine so figured, as is requisit for wit and habilitie. The quantitie of the braine, which the soule needeth to discourse and consider, is a matter that breeds feare, for amongst all the bruit beasts there is none found to haue so much braine as a man, in sort, as if we ioyne those of two the greatest oxen together, they will not equall that of one onely man, be he neuer so little. And that whereto behooues more consideration, is, that amongst bruit beasts, those who approch neereſt to mans wisedome and discretion (as the Ape, the Fox, and the Dog,) haue a greater quantitie of braine than the other, though bigger bodied than they. For which cause, *Galen* said, That a little head in any man is euer faultie, because that it wanteth braine; notwithstanding, I auouch, that if his hauing a great head proceedeth from abundance

dance of matter, and ill tempered, at such time as the same was shaped by Nature, it is an euill token, for the same consists all of bones and flesh, and containes a small quantitie of braine, as it befals in very big Orenges, which opened, are found scarce of iuice, and hard of rinde. Nothing offends the reasonable soule so much, as to make his abode in a bodie surcharged with bones, fat, and flesh. For which cause *Plato* said, That wise mens heads are ordinarily weake, and vpon any occasion are easily annoied, and the reason is, for that Nature made them of an emptie skull, with intention not to offend the wit, by compassing it with much matter. And this doctrine of *Plato* is so true, that albeit the stomacke abides so far distant from the braine, yet the same workes it offence, when it is repleniſhed with fat and flesh. For confirmation hereof, *Galen* alleageth a prouerbe which saith, *A grosse bellie makes a grosse vnderstanding*, and that this proceeds from nothing else, than that the braine and the stomacke are vnited and chained together with certaine sinewes, by way of which they interchangeably communicat their dammages. And contrariwise, when the stomacke is drie and shrunke, it affoords great aid to the wit, as wee see in the hunger-starued, and such as are driuen to their shifts, on which doctrine (it may be) *Persius* founded himselfe, when he said, That the belly is that which quickens vp the wit. But the thing most pertinent to be noted for this purpose, is, that if the other parts of the bodie bee fat and fleshie, and there-through a man growes ouergrosse, *Aristotle* sayes, It makes him to leese his wit. For which cause I am of opinion, that if a man haue a great head, albeit the same proceed for that he is endued with a very able nature, and that he is furnished with a quantitie of well tempered matter, yet he shall

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not be owner of so good a wit, as if the same held a meaner size.

Aristotle is of a contrarie opinion, whilest he enquires for what cause a man is the wisest of all liuing creatures? to which doubt he answers, That you shall find no creature which hath so little a head as man, respecting withall the greatnesse of his bodie: but herein hee swarued from reason, for if he had opened some mans head, and viewed the quantitie of his braine, hee should haue found, that two horses together had not so much braine as that one man. That which I haue gathered by experience, is, that in little men it is best that the head incline somewhat to greatnesse; and in those who are big bodied, it prooues best that they be little: and the reason is, for that after this sort there is found a measurable quantitie, with which the reasonable soule may well performe his working.

Besides this, there are needfull the foure ventricles in the braine, to the end the reasonable soule may discourse and Philosophize: one must be placed on the right side of the braine, the second on the left, the third in the middle of these, and the fourth in the part behind the braine. Whereunto these ventricles serue, and their large or narrow capableness for the reasonable soule, all shall bee told by vs a little hereafter, when we shall intreat of the diuersities of mens wits.

But it sufficeth not, that the braine possesse good figure, sufficient quantitie, and the number of ventricles by vs forementioned, with their capableness great or little, but it behooues also that his parts hold a certaine kind of continuednesse, and that they bee not deuided. For which cause, we haue seene in hurts of the head, that some men haue lost their memorie, some their vnderstanding,

ſtanding, and others their imagination : and put caſe, that after they haue recouered their health, the braine re-vnited it ſelfe againe, yet this notwithſtanding, the naturall vnion was not made, which the braine before poſſeſſed.

The third condition of the fourth principall, was, that the braine ſhould be tempered with meaſurable heat, and without exceſſe of the other qualities, which diſpoſition wee ſaid heretofore that it is called *good nature*; for it is that which principally makes a man able, and the contrarie vnable.

But the fourth, (namely that the braine haue his ſubſtance or compoſition of ſubtill and delicate parts) *Galen* ſayth is the moſt important of all the reſt. For when he would giue a token of the good diſpoſition of the braine, he affirmeth, that a ſubtile wit ſheweth that the braine is framed of ſubtile and very delicat parts, and if the vnderſtanding be dull, it giues euidence of a groſſe ſubſtance, but hee makes no mention of the temperature. Theſe conditions the braine ought to bee endued withall, to the end the reaſonable ſoule may there-through ſhape his reaſons and ſillogiſmes. But here encounters vs a difficultie very great, and this is, that if we open the head of any beaſt, we ſhall find his braine compoſed with the ſame forme and manner as a mans, without that any of the fore-reported conditions will be failing. Whence we gather, that the bruit beaſts haue alſo the vſe of Prudence and reaſon, by meanes of the compoſition of their braine, or elſe that our reaſonable ſoule ſerues not it ſelfe of this member, for the vſe of his operations; which may not be auouched. To this doubt *Galen* anſwereth in this manner: Amongſt the kinds of beaſts it is doubted, whether that which is termed vnreaſonable, be altogether

get her void of reaſon, or not. For albeit the ſame want that which conſiſts in voyce (which is named ſpeech) yet that which is conceiued in the ſoule, and tearmed diſcourſe, of this it may be, that all ſorts of beaſts are partakers, albeit the ſame is beſtowed more ſparingly vpon ſome, and more largely on otherſome. But verely, how far man in the way of reaſon outgoeth all the reſt, there is none who maketh queſtion. By theſe words *Galen* giues vs to vnderſtand (albeit with ſome fearefulneſſe) that bruit beaſts doe partake reaſon, one more, and another leſſe, and in their mind doe frame ſome ſillogiſmes and diſcourſes, though they cannot vtter them by way of ſpeech. And then the difference betweene them and man conſiſteth in being more reaſonable, and in vſing Prudence with greater perfection.

The ſame *Galen* prooues alſo by many reaſons and experiments, that Aſſes (being of all bruit beaſts the blunteſt) doe arriue with their wit to the moſt curious and nice points, which were deuiſed by *Plato* and *Ariſtotle*: and thereon he collects, ſaying; I am therefore ſo far from praiſing the ancient Philoſophers, in that they haue found out ſome ample matter and of rare inuention, (as when they ſay, We muſt hold that there is ſelfe, and diuers: one, and not one: not onely in number, but alſo in kind:) as I dare boldly affirme, that euen the very Aſſes (who notwithſtanding ſeeme moſt blockiſh of all beaſts) haue this from Nature.

This ſelfe-ſame meant *Ariſtotle*, when hee enquired the cauſe, Why man amongſt all liuing creatures is wiſeſt? and in another place he turnes to doubt, For what cauſe man is the moſt vniuſt of all liuing creatures? in which he giues vs to vnderſtand the ſelfe-ſame which *Galen* ſaid, That the difference which is found betweene

man

man and bruit beaſt, is the ſelfe-ſame which is found betweene a foole and a wiſe man; which is nought elſe than in reſpect of the more and the leſſe. This (truly) is not to be doubted, that bruit beaſts enioy memorie and imagination, and another power which reſembles vnderſtanding: as the Ape is very like a man, and that his ſoule takes vſe of the compoſition of the braine, it is a matter apparant: which being good, and ſuch as is behooffull, performes his works very well, and with much prudence, and if the braine be ill inſtrumentalized, it executes the ſame vntowardly. For which cauſe wee ſee, that there be Aſſes, which in their knowledge are properly ſuch: and others againe are found ſo quicke conceipted and malicious, that they paſſe the propertie of their kind. And amongſt Horſes are found many iadiſhneſſes, and good qualities, and ſome there are more trainable than the reſt: all which growes from hauing their braine well or ill inſtrumentalized. The reaſon and ſolution of this doubt, ſhall be placed in the Chapter which followeth, for there we returne to reaſon anew of this matter.

There are in the bodie ſome other parts, from whoſe temperature, as well the wit as the braine depend; of which wee will reaſon in the laſt Chapter of this worke. But beſides theſe and the braine, there is found in the bodie another ſubſtance, whoſe ſeruice the reaſonable ſoule vſeth in his operations, and ſo requireth the three laſt qualities which we haue aſſigned to the braine, that is, quantitie ſufficient, delicat ſubſtance, and good temperature. Theſe are the vitall ſpirits, and arteriall bloud, which goe wandering through the whole bodie, and remaine euermore vnited to the imagination, following his contemplation. The office of this ſpirituall ſubſtance

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is, to ſtir vp the powers of man, and to giue them force and vigour that they may bee able to worke. This ſhall euidently be knowne to be their manner, if we take conſideration of the motions, of the imaginations, and of that which after ſucceeds in working. For if a man begin to imagine vpon any iniurie that hath beene profered him, the bloud of the arteries runs ſodainly to the heart, and ſtirs vp the wrathfull part, and giues the ſame heat and forces for reuenge.

If a man ſtand contemplating any faire woman, or ſtay in giuing and receiuing by that imagination touching the venerious act, theſe vitall ſpirits run forthwith to the genitall members, and raiſe them to the performance. The like befalls when we remember any delicat & ſauourie meat, which once called to mind, they ſtraight abandon the reſt of the bodie, and flie to the ſtomacke, and repleniſh the mouth with water. And this their motion is ſo ſwift, that if a woman with child long for any meat whatſoeuer, and ſtill retaine the ſame in her imagination, we ſee by experiẽce that ſhe looſeth her burthen, if ſpeedily it be not yeelded vnto her. The naturall reaſon of this, is, becauſe theſe vitall ſpirits before the woman conceiued this longing, made abode in the bellie, helping her there to retaine the creature; and through this new imagination of eating, they hie to the ſtomacke to raiſe the appetite, and in this ſpace, if the belly haue no ſtrong retentiue, it cannot ſuſtaine the ſame, and ſo by this meanes ſhe leeſeth her burthen.

Galen vnderſtanding this condition of the vitall ſpirits, counſaileth Phiſitions that they giue not ſicke folke to eat, when their humors are raw and vpon diſgeſtion, for when they firſt feele the meat in the ſtomacke, they ſtraightwaies abandon the worke about which before they

they were occupied, and come thereunto to helpe it. The like benefite and aid the braine receiues of these vitall spirits, when the reasonable soule is about to contemplate, vnderstand, imagine, or performe actions of memorie, without which it cannot worke. And like as the grosse substance of the braine, and his euill temperature brings the wit to confusion: so the vitall spirits and the arteriall bloud (not being delicat and of good temperature) hinder in a man his discourse and vse of reason. Wherefore *Plato* said, That the suppleneſſe and good temperature of the heart makes the wit sharp and quick-sighted. Hauing prooued before that the braine and not the heart is the principall seat of the reasonable soule. And the reason is, because these vitall spirits are ingendred in the heart, and partake of that substance and that temperature which rested in that which formed them. Of this arteriall bloud *Aristotle* meant, when he said, That those men are well compounded who haue their bloud hote, delicate, and pure; for they are also of good bodily forces, and of a wit well disposed. These vitall spirits are by the Phisitions termed Nature, for they are the principall instrument with which the reasonable soule performeth his works, and of these also may that sentence be verefied, *Nature makes able.*

CHAP. IIII.

It is prooued, that the soule vegetatiue, sensitiue, and reasonable, haue knowledge without that any thing bee taught them, if so be that they possesse that conuenient temperature which is requisit for their operation.

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He temperature of the foure first qualities (which wee heretofore tearmed Nature) hath so great force, to cause that of (plants, bruite beasts, and man) each one set himselfe to performe those workes which are proper to his kind, that they arriue to that vtmost bound of perfection which may be attained, suddainly and without any others teaching them: the plants know how to forme roots vnder ground, and by way of them to draw nourishment to retaine it, to digest it, and to driue foorth the excrements: and the brute beasts likewise so soone as they are borne, know that which is agreeable to their nature, and flie the things which are naughtie and noysome. And that which makes them most to maruell who are not seene in naturall Philosophie, is, that a man hauing his braine well tempered, and of that disposition which is requisit for this or that Science, suddainly and without hauing euer learned it of any, hee speaketh and vttereth such exquisit matters, as could hardly win credit. Vulgar Philosophers seeing the maruellous works which brute beasts performe, affirme it holds no cause of maruell, because they doe it by naturall instinct, in as much as nature sheweth and teacheth each in his kind what he is to doe. And in this they say very well, for wee haue alreadie alleaged and prooued, that Nature is nothing else than this temperature of the foure first qualities, and that this is the schoolemaister who teacheth the soules in what sort they are to worke: but they tearme instinct of Nature a certaine masse of things, which rise from the noddocke vpward, neither could they euer expound or giue vs to vnderstand, what

it is. The graue Philoſophers (as *Hippocrates*, *Plato*, and *Ariſtotle*) attribute all theſe maruellous works to heat, cold, moiſture, and drouth, and this they affirme of the firſt principle, and paſſe no farther. And if you aske who hath taught the brute beaſts to doe theſe works, (which breed vs ſuch maruell) and men to diſcourſe with reaſon; *Hippocrates* anſwereth, It is the natures of them all without any teacher: as if he ſhould ſay, The faculties or the temperature of which they conſiſt, are all giuen them without beeing taught by any other. Which is clearely diſcerned, if they paſſe on to conſider the workes of the ſoule vegetatiue, and of all the reſt which gouerne man, who if it haue a quantitie of mans ſeed well digeſted and ſeaſoned with good temperature, makes a body ſo ſeemely and duly inſtrumentalized, that all the caruers in the world cannot ſhape the like.

For which cauſe *Galen* woondring to ſee a frame ſo maruellous, the number of his ſeuerall parts, the ſeating, the figure, and the vſe of each one by it ſelfe, grew to conclude, It was not poſſible that the vegetatiue ſoule, nor the temperature, could faſhion a workmanſhip ſo ſingular, but that the author thereof was God, or ſome other moſt wiſe vnderſtanding. But this maner of ſpeech is alreadie by vs heretofore refuted: for it beſeemes not naturall Philoſophers to reduce the effects immediatly to God, and ſo to ſlip ouer the aſſigning of the ſecond reaſons, and eſpecially in this caſe, where wee ſee by experience, that if mans ſeed conſiſt of an euill ſubſtance, and enioy not a temperature conuenient, the vegetatiue ſoule runs into a thouſand diſorders: for if the ſame be cold and moyſt more than is requiſit, *Hippocrates* ſayth, that the men prooue Eunuches, or Hermofrodites; and if it be very hote and drie, *Ariſtotle* ſayth, that

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it makes them curle-pated, crooke-legged, and flat-nosed as are the *Æthiopians:* and if it be moyst, the same *Galen* sayth, That they grow long and lithie: and if it be drie, low of stature. All this is a great defect in mankind, and for such workes we find little cause to giue Nature any commendation, or to hold her for aduised; and if God were the author hereof, none of these qualities could diuert him. Onely the first men which the world possessed, *Plato* affirmes were made by God, but the rest were borne answerable to the discourse of the second causes, which if they be well ordered, the vegetatiue soule doth well performe his operations: and if they concur not in sort conuenient, it produceth a thousand dammageable effects.

What the good order of Nature for this effect must be, is, that the vegetatiue soule haue an endowment of a good temperature, or else, let *Galen,* and all the Philosophers in the world answer me, What the cause is that the vegetatiue soule possesseth such skill and power in the first age of man to shape his bodie, and to increase and nourish the same, and when old age groweth on, can yeeld the same no longer? For if an old man leese but a tooth, he is past remedie of recouering another; but if a child cast them all, wee see that Nature returnes to renew them againe. Is it then possible that a soule which hath done nought else in all the course of life, than to receiue food, retaine the same, digest it, and expell the excrements, new begetting the parts which faile, should towards the end of life forget this, and want abilitie to doe the same any longer? *Galen* (for certaine) will answere, that this skill and habilitie of the vegetatiue soule in youth, springs from his possessing much naturall heat and moysture, and that in age the same wants skill and

power to performe it, by meanes of the coldneſſe and drineſſe, to which a bodie of thoſe yeares is ſubiect. The knowledge of the ſenſitiue ſoule takes his dependance alſo from the temperature of the braine, for if the ſame be ſuch as his operations require that it ſhould be, it can performe with due perfection; otherwiſe, the ſame muſt alſo erre no leſſe than the ſoule vegetatiue. The manner which *Galen* held to behold and diſcerne by eieſight the wiſedome of the ſenſitiue ſoule, was to take a young kid, but newly kidded, which ſet on the ground, begins to goe (as if it had beene told and taught that his legs were made to that purpoſe) and after that, he ſhakes from his backe the ſuperfluous moyſture which he brought with him from his mothers bellie, and lifting vp the one foot, ſcrapes behind his eare; and ſetting before him ſundrie platters with wine, water, vineger, oile, and milke, after hee hath ſmelt them all, he fed onely on that of milke. Which being beheld by diuers Philoſophers there preſent, they all with one voyce cried out, That *Hippocrates* had great reaſon to ſay, That ſoules were skilfull without the inſtruction of any teacher. But *Galen* held not himſelfe contented with this one prooſe, for two moneths after he cauſed the ſame kid, being very hungrie, to bee brought into the field, where ſmelling at many hearbes, he did eat onely thoſe, whereon Goats accuſtomably feed.

But if *Galen*, as he ſet himſelfe to contemplate the demeanure of this Kid, had done the like with three or foure together, hee ſhould haue ſeene ſome gone better than otherſome, ſhrug themſelues better, ſcratch better, and performe better all the other actions which we haue recounted. And if *Galen* had reared two Colts, bred of one Horſe and Mare, hee ſhould haue ſeene the one to

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pace with more grace than the other, and to gallop and ſtop better, and ſhew more fidelitie. And if he had taken an ayrie of Faulcons, and manned them, he ſhould haue found the firſt good of wing, the ſecond good of prey, and the third rauening and ill conditioned. The like ſhall we find in hounds, who being whelpes of the ſame litter, the one for perfection of hunting, will ſeeme to want but ſpeech, and the other haue no more inclination thereunto, than if he had beene engendered by a heardmans bandog.

All this cannot be reduced to thoſe vaine inſtincts of Nature; which the Philoſophers faine. For if you aske for what cauſe one dog hath more inſtinct than another, both comming of one kind, and whelpes of one ſire, I cannot coniecture what they may anſwere, ſaue to flie backe to their old leaning poſt, ſaying, That God hath taught the one better than the other, and giuen him a more naturall inſtinct. And if wee demaund the reaſon, why this good hound, being yet but a whelpe, is a perfect hunter, and growing in age, hath no ſuch ſufficiencie: and contrariwiſe, another being young cannot hunt at all, and waxing old, is wilie and readie; I know not what they can yeeld in replie. My ſelfe at leaſt would ſay, that the towardly hunting of one dog more than an other, growes from the better temperature of his braine: and againe, that his well hunting whileſt he is young, and his decay in age, is occaſioned by meanes that in one age he partakes the temperature which is requiſit to the qualities of hunting, and in the other not. Whence wee infer, that ſithens the temperature of the foure firſt qualities is the reaſon and cauſe, for which one brute beaſt better performs the works of his kind than another, that this temperature is the ſchoolemaiſter which teacheth

the ſenſitiue ſoule what it is to doe.

And if *Galen* had conſidered the demeanure and voyages of the Ant, and noted his prudence, his mercie, his iuſtice, and his gouernment, he would haue taken aſtoniſhment to ſee a beaſt ſo little, endued with ſo great ſageneſſe, without the helpe of any maiſter or teacher to inſtruct him. But the temperature which the Ant hath in his braine, being knowne, and how aptly it is appropriated to wiſedome, (as hereafter ſhall be ſhowne) this woonderment will ceaſe; and wee ſhall conceiue, that brute beaſts with the temperature of their braine, and the fantaſmes which enter thereinto by the fiue ſences, make ſuch diſcourſes and partake thoſe abilities which we doe ſo note in them. And amongſt beaſts of one kind, he which is moſt ſchooleable and skilfull, is ſuch, becauſe he hath his braine better tempered, and if through any occaſion or infirmitie the temperature of his braine incur alteration, he will ſuddenly leeſe his skill and abilitie as men alſo doe.

But now we are to treat of a difficultie touching the reaſonable ſoule, which is, in what ſort he hath this naturall inſtinct for the operations of his kind, (namely, Sapience, and Prudence) and how on the ſuddaine, by meanes of his good temperature, a man can be skilled in the ſciences, without the inſtruction of any other: ſeeing experience telleth vs, that if they be not gotten by learning, no man is at his birth endued with them.

Betweene *Plato* and *Ariſtotle* there is a waighty queſtion, as touching the verefieng the reaſon or cauſe from whence the wiſedome of man may ſpring. One ſayth, That the reaſonable ſoule is more ancient than the bodie, for that before ſuch time as Nature endowed the ſame with theſe inſtruments, it made abode in heauen,

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in the companie of God, whence it issued full of science and sapience: but when it entered to forme this matter, through the euill temperature which it found therein, it forewent the whole, vntill by processe of time this ill temperature grew to amendment, and there succeeded another in steed thereof, with which (as more appliable to the sciences it had lost) it grew by little and little to call that to remembrance which before it had forgotten. This opinion is false, and I much maruell that *Plato* being so great a Philosopher, could not render the reasons of mans wisdome, considering that brute beasts haue their prudences and naturall habilities, without that their soule departs from their bodie, or flies vp to heauen to learne them. In which regard he cannot goe blameless, especially hauing red in Genesis (whereto he gaue so great credit) that God instrumentalized the bodie of *Adam*, before he created his soule. The selfe same befalls also now, saue that it is Nature who begets the bodie, and in the last disposing thereof, God createth the soule in the same body, without that it be sundred therefrom any time or moment.

Plato tooke out of the holy scripture the best sentences which are to be found in his works, in respect whereof, he was called Diuine.

Aristotle tooke another course, affirming, that euery doctrine and euery discipline comes from a fore-going knowledge, as if he would say, all that which men know and learne, springs from that they haue heard the same, seene it, smelt it, tasted it, or felt it: for there can grow no notice in the vnderstanding, which hath not first taken passage by some of the fiue sences: for which cause hee said, that these powers issue out of the hands of Nature, as a plaine table in which is no maner of painting. Which opinion is also false, as well as that of *Plato*. But that wee may the better prooue and make the same apparant, it behooues first to agree with the vulgar Philosophers,

that in mans body there rests but one soule, and that the same is reasonable, which is the originall of whatsoeuer we doe or effect: albeit there are opinions, and there want not, who against this defend, that in companie of the reasonable soule there are associated some two or three more.

Plato attributes three soules vnto man.

This then standing thus in the workes which the reasonable soule performes, as it is vegetatiue, we haue alreadie proued that the same knowes how to shape man, and to giue him the figure which he is to keepe, and knowes likewise how to receiue nourishment, to retaine it, to digest it, and to expell the excrements, and if any part of the bodie doe faile, she knowes how to supplie the same anew, and yeeld it that composition agreeable to the vse which it is to hold. And in the workes of the sensitiue and motiue, the child so soone as it is borne, knowes to sucke, and fashion his lips to draw forth the milke, and this so readily, as not the wisest man can doe the like. And herewithall it assures the qualities which are incident to the preseruation of his nature, shuns that which is noysome and dammageable thereunto, knowes to weepe and laugh, without being taught by any. And if this be not so, let the vulgar Philosophers tell me a while, who hath taught the children to do these things, or by what sence they haue learned it. Well I know they will answer, That God hath giuen them this naturall instinct as to the brute beasts, wherein they say not ill, if the naturall instinct be the selfe-same with the temperature.

The proper operations of the reasonable soule, namely, to vnderstand, to imagine, and to performe actions of memorie, a man cannot doe them forthwith so soone as he is borne, for the temperature of infancie serueth very vnfitly

vnfitly therefore, and is meerely appropriat to the vegetatiue and ſenſitiue, as that of old age is appropriat to the reaſonable ſoule, and contrary to the vegetatiue and ſenſitiue. And if as the temperature which ſerues for prudence, is gotten in the braine by little and little, ſo the ſame could all be ioyned together at one inſtant, man ſhould on the ſuddaine haue better skill to diſcourſe and play the Philoſopher, than if he had attained the ſame in the Schooles.

But becauſe Nature cannot performe this ſaue by proceſſe of time, a man growes to gather wiſedome by little and little, and that this is the reaſon and cauſe thereof, is manifeſtly prooued, if we conſider, that a man after he hath beene very wiſe, growes by little and little into folly, for that he dayly goes (till his decrepit age) accrewing a contrarie temperature. I for mine owne part am of opinion, that if Nature, as ſhe hath made man of ſeed hot and moyſt (and this is the temperature which directs the vegetatiue and the ſenſitiue what they are to effectuat) ſo ſhe had made him of ſeed cold and drie, euen after his birth, he ſhould ſtraightwayes haue beene able to diſcourſe and reaſon, and not haue attended to ſucke, in as much as this is the temperature agreeable to theſe operations. But for that we find by experience, that if the braine haue the temperature requiſit for naturall ſciences, he hath no need of a maiſter to teach him, it falls out neceſſarie that wee marke one thing, which is, that if a man fall into any diſeaſe, by which his braine vpon a ſuddaine changeth his temperature (as are madneſſe, melancholie, and frenzie) it happens, that at one inſtant he looſeth, if he were wiſe, all his knowledge, and vtters a thouſand follies; and if he were a foole, he accrues more wit and abilitie than he had before.

The ſeed and menſtruall bloud which are two materiall principles of which we be formed, are hot and moyſt, through which temperature children are ſo vnskilled.

I can ſpeake of a rude countrey fellow, who becomming franticke, made a very eloquent diſcourſe in my preſence, recommending his well dooing to the by-ſtanders, and that they ſhould take care of his wife and children (if it pleaſed God to call him away in that ſickneſſe) with ſo many flowers of Rhethorike, and ſuch apt choice of words, as if *Cicero* had ſpoken in the preſence of the Senate: whereat the beholders maruelling, asked mee whence ſo great eloquence and wiſedome might grow, in a man who in his health time could ſcantly ſpeake? and I remember I made anſwer, That the art of Oratorie was a ſcience, which ſprings from a certaine point or degree of heat, and that this country fellow, before found, had by meanes of this infirmitie attained thereunto.

I can alſo ſpeake of another frantike perſon, who for the ſpace of more than eight dayes neuer vttered word which I found not to carrie his iuſt quantitie, and moſtly he made couplements of verſes very well compoſed: whereat the by-ſtanders wondring to heare a man ſpeake in verſe, who in his health had neuer ſo much skill; I ſayd, It ſildome fell out, that he who was a Poet in his health time, ſhould be ſo alſo in his ſickneſſe: For the temperature of the braine, by which when a man is whole, he becommeth a Poet, in ſickneſſe altereth and brings forth contrarie operations. I remember that the wife of this frantike fellow, and a ſiſter of his, named *Margaret*, reprooued him, becauſe hee ſpake ill of the Saints; whereat the patient growing impatient, ſaid to his wife theſe words: I renounce God for the loue of you; and S. *Marie* for the loue of *Margaret*; and S. *Peter* for the loue of *Iohn* of *Olmedo*; and ſo he ran thorow a beadroll of many ſaints, whoſe names had conſonance with

with the other by-ſtanders there preſent.

But this is nothing, and a matter of ſmall importance, in reſpect of the notable ſpeeches vttered by a Page of one of the great ones of this realme, whilſt he was mad, who in his health was reputed a youth of ſlender capacitie; but falling into this infirmitie, hee deliuered ſuch rare conceits, reſemblances, and anſweres to ſuch as aſked him, and deuiſed ſo excellent manners of gouerning a kingdome (of which he imagined himſelfe to be ſoueraigne) that for great wonder people flocked to ſee him and heare him, and his very maiſter ſcarcely euer departed from his beds head, praying God that he might neuer be cured. Which afterwards plainly appeared, for beeing recouered, his Phiſition (who had healed him) came to take leaue of his lord, with a mind to receiue ſome good reward, if of nothing elſe, yet at leaſt in good words; but he encountred this greeting: I promiſe you maiſter doctor, that I was neuer more aggreeued at any ill ſucceſſe, than to ſee this my page recouered, for it was not behoofefull that he ſhould change ſo wiſe folly for an vnderſtanding ſo ſimple as is this which in his health he inioyeth; me thinks, that of one who tofore was wiſe and well aduiſed, you haue made him a foole againe, which is the greateſt miſerie that may light vpon any man. The poore Phiſition ſeeing how little thankfully his cure was accepted, went to take leaue of the page, who amongſt many other words that paſſed betweene them, told him this: Maiſter doctor, I kiſſe your hands for ſo great a benefit beſtowed on me, in reſtoring mine vnderſtanding, but I aſſure you on my faith, that in ſome ſort it diſpleaſeth me to haue beene cured; for whileſt I reſted in my follie, I led my life in the deepeſt diſcourſes of the world, and imagined my ſelfe ſo great a lord as

there

there raigned no king on the earth, who was not my vassall, and were this a ieast or a lie, what imported that, whileſt I conceiued thereof ſo great a contentment, as if it had beene true? I reſt now in far worſe caſe, finding my ſelfe in troth to be but a poore Page, and to morrow I muſt begin againe to ſerue one, who whileſt I was in mine infirmitie, I would haue diſdained for my foot-man.

This Page was not yet perfectly cured.

It skils not much, whether the Philoſophers admit all this, and beleeue that it may be ſo or not; but what if I ſhould prooue by very true ſtories, that ignorant men ſtrooken with this infirmitie, haue ſpoken Latine, which they neuer learned in their health; and that a franticke woman told all perſons who came to viſit her, their vertues and vices, and ſometimes reported matters with that aſſurance which they vſe to giue who ſpeake by coniectures and tokens: and for this cauſe, none almoſt durſt come in to viſit her, fearing to heare of thoſe true tales which ſhe would deliuer? and (which is more to be maruelled at) when a Barber came to let her bloud, Friend (quoth ſhe) haue regard what you doe, for you haue but few dayes to liue, and your wife ſhall marrie ſuch a man: and this, though ſpoken by chance, fell out ſo true, as it tooke effect before halfe a yeare came to an end.

Me thinks I heare them who flie naturall Philoſophy, to ſay that this is a foule leaſing, and that (put caſe it were true) the diuell as hee is wiſe and craftie by Gods ſufferance, entred into this womans bodie, and into the reſt of thoſe frantike perſons whom I haue mentioned, and cauſed them to vtter thoſe ſtrange matters, and yet euen to confeſſe this, they are very loath; for the diuell foreknoweth not what is to come, becauſe he hath no prophetical

pheticall ſpirit. They hold it a very ſufficient argument to auouch, This is falſe, becauſe I cannot conceiue how it may be ſo: as if difficult and quaint matters were ſubiect to blunt wits, and came within the reach of their capacities. I pretend not hereby to take thoſe to taske who haue defect of vnderſtanding, for that were a bootleſſe labour, but to make *Ariſtotle* himſelfe confeſſe, That men endowed with the temperature requiſit for ſuch operations, may conceiue many things without hauing receiued thereof any particular perſeuerance, or learned the ſame at the hands of any other. Sundry alſo, becauſe this heate is a neighbour to the ſeat of the minde, are wrapped in the infirmitie of ſottiſhneſſe, or are heated by ſome furious inſtinct, whence grew the *Sibils* and *Bacchants*, and all thoſe, who men thinke are egged on by ſome diuine inſpiration, whereas this takes his originall, not from any diſeaſe, but from a naturall diſtemperature. *Marcus* a citizen of *Siracuſa* was excellenteſt Poet after he loſt his vnderſtanding. And thoſe in whom this abated heat approcheth leaſt to mediocritie, are (verely) altogether melancholike, but thereby much the wiſer. In theſe words *Ariſtotle* cleerely confeſſeth, That when the braine is exceſſiuely heated, many thereby attaine the knowledge of things to come, (as were the *Sibils*) which *Ariſtotle* ſayth, growes not by reaſon of any diſeaſe, but thorow the inequalitie of the naturall heat: and that this is the very reaſon and cauſe thereof, he prooues apparantly by an example; alleaging that *Mark* a citizen of *Siracuſa*, was a Poet in moſt excellencie, at ſuch time as through exceſſiue heate of the braine he fell beſides himſelfe, and when he returned to a more moderat temperature, he loſt his verſifying, but yet remained more wiſe and aduiſed. Inſomuch that *Ariſtotle* not onely admits

mits the temperature of the braine, for the principall occasion of these extrauagant successes, but also reproues them who hold the same for a diuine reuelation, and no naturall cause.

When the diseased diuine thus, it is a signe that the reasonable soule is now awearie of the bodie, and so none such recouer.

The first who tearmed these maruellous matters by the name of diuinesse, was *Hippocrates*; and that if any such point of diuinesse bee found in the disease, that it manifesteth also a prouidence. Vpon which sentence, he chargeth Phisitions, that if the diseased vtter any such diuine matters, they may therby know in what case they rest, and prognosticate what will become of them. But that which in this behalfe driues mee to most woonder, is, that demaunding of *Plato* how it may come to passe, that of two sonnes begotten by one father, one hath the skill of versifying, without any other teaching, and the other toyling in the art of Poetrie, can neuer beget so much as one verse: hee answereth, That hee who was borne a Poet, is possessed, and the other not. In which behalfe, *Aristotle* had good cause to find fault with him, for that he might haue reduced this to the temperature, as elsewhere he did.

The frantike persons speaking of Latine, without that he euer learned the same in his health time, shewes the consonance which the Latin toong holds with the reasonable soule, and (as we will prooue hereafter) there is to be found a particular wit, appliable to the inuention of languages, and Latine words; and the phrases of speech in that toong are so fitting with the eare, that the reasonable soule possessing the necessarie temperature for the inuention of some delicat language, suddainly encounters with this. And that two deuisers of languages may shape the like words (hauing the like wit and habilitie) it is very manifest, presupposing that when God created

Adam,

Adam, and ſet all things before him, to the end he might beſtow on each his ſeuerall name, whereby it ſhould be called, hee had likewiſe at that inſtant molded another man with the ſame perfection and ſupernaturall grace; now I demaund, if God had placed the ſame things before this other man, that he might alſo ſet them names whereby they ſhould be called, of what manner thoſe names ſhould haue beene? for mine owne part I make no doubt, but he would haue giuen theſe things thoſe very names which *Adam* did: and the reaſon is very apparant, for both carried one ſelfe eye to the nature of each thing, which of it ſelfe was no more but one. After this manner might the frantike perſon light vpon the Latine toong, and ſpeake the ſame without euer hauing learned it in his health, for the naturall temperature of his braine, conceiuing alteration, through the infirmitie it might (for a ſpace) becóme like his who firſt inuented the Latine toong, and faine the like words, but yet not with that concert and continued fineneſſe, for this would giue token that the diuell mooued that toong, as the church teacheth her exorciſts. This ſelfe (ſaith *Ariſtotle*) befell ſome children, who at their birth-time ſpake ſome words very plainely, and afterward kept ſilence: and he finds fault with the vulgar Philoſophers of his time, who for that they knew not the naturall cauſe of this effect, imputed it to the diuell.

The cauſe why children ſpeake ſo ſoone as they are borne, and after foorth-with turne to hold their peace, *Ariſtotle* could neuer find out, though he went much about it; but yet it could neuer ſinke into his braine, that it was a deuice of the Diuels, nor an effect aboue nature, as the vulgar Philoſophers held opinion; who ſeeing themſelues hedged in with the curious and nice points

of

of naturall Philoſophie, make them beleeue who know little, that God or the diuell are authours of the prodigious and ſtrange effects, of whoſe naturall cauſe they haue no knowledge and vnderſtanding.

Children which are engendred of ſeed cold and drie, (as are thoſe begotten in old age) ſome few dayes and moneths after their birth, begin to diſcourſe and philoſophize; for the temperature cold and drie (as we will hereafter prooue) is moſt appropriat to the operations of the reaſonable ſoule, and that which proceſſe of time, and manie daies and months ſhould bring about, is ſupplied by the preſent temperature of the braine, which for many cauſes anticipateth what it was to effect. Other children there are (ſayth *Ariſtotle*) who as ſoone as they are borne, begin to ſpeake, and afterwards hold their peace vntill they attaine the ordinarie and conuenient age of ſpeaking: which effect floweth from the ſame originall and cauſe that we recounted of the page, and of thoſe furious and franticke perſons, and of him who ſpake Latine on a ſudden, without haning learned it in his health. And that children whileſt they make abode in their mothers bellie, and ſo ſoone as they are borne, may vndergoe theſe infirmities, is a matter paſt deniall. But whence that diuining of the franticke woman proceeded, I can better make *Cicero* conceiue, than theſe naturall Philoſophers: for he deſcribing the nature of man, ſaid in this manner: The creature foreſightfull, ſearchfull, apt for many matters, ſharpe conceited, mindfull, repleniſhed with reaſon and counſell, whome we call by the name of a Man. And in particular he affirmeth, that there is found a certaine nature in ſome men, which in foreknowing things to come, exceedeth other mens, and his words are theſe: For there is found a certaine

force

force and nature, which foretels things to come, the force and nature of which, is not by reason to be vnfolded. The error of the naturall Philosophers consisteth, in not considering (as *Plato* did) that man was made to the likenesse of God, and that hee is a partaker of his diuine prouidence, and that the power of discerning all the three differences of time, (Memorie for the passed, conceiuing for the present, and imagination and vnderstanding for those that are to come.) And as there are men superior to others in remembring things past, and others in knowing the present, so they are also manie, who partake a more naturall habilitie for imagining of what shall come to passe. One of the greatest arguments which forced *Cicero* to thinke, that the reasonable soule is vncorruptible, was to see the certainetie with which the diseased tell things to come, and especially when they are neere their end. But the difference which rests betweene a propheticall spirit and this naturall wit, is, that that which God speakes by the mouth of his Prophets, is infallible, for it is the expresse word of God: but that which man prognosticateth by the power of his imagination holds no such certaintie.

Those who say, that the discouering of their vertues and vices by the franticke woman to the persons who came to visit her, was a tricke of the deuils playing; let them know, that God bestowes on men a certaine supernaturall grace, to attaine and conceiue, which are the workes of God, and which of the deuill: the which Saint *Paul* placeth amongst the diuine guifts, and calls it, The imparting of spirits. Whereby wee may discerne, whether it be the diuell or some good Angell that intermedleth with vs. For many times the deuill sets to beguile vs vnder the cloke of a good Angell, and wee haue

need of this grace and supernaturall guift, to know him, and difference him from the good. From this guift they are fartheſt ſundered, who haue not a wit capable of naturall Philoſophie: for this ſcience, and that ſupernaturall infuſed by God, fall vnder one ſelfe abilitie, to weet, the vnderſtanding at leaſt; if it be true, that God in beſtowing his graces, doeth apply himſelfe to the naturall good of euery one, as I haue afore rehearſed.

Iacob lying at the point of death, (at which time the reaſonable ſoule is moſt at libertie, to ſee what is to come) all the twelue children entred to viſit him, and he to each of them in particular recited their vertues and vices, and propheſied what ſhould befall, as touching them and their poſteritie. Certaine it is, that he did all this inſpired by God, but if the diuine ſcripture, and our faith, had not aſcertained vs hereof, how would theſe naturall Philoſophers haue knowne this to be the worke of God: and that the vertues and vices which the franticke woman told to ſuch as came to viſit her, were diſcouered by the power of the deuill, whilſt this caſe in part reſembles that of *Iacob*?

They reckon that the nature of the reaſonable ſoule, is far different from that of the deuill, and that the powers thereof (vnderſtanding, imagination, and memorie,) are of another very diuers kind, and herein they bee deceiued. For if a reaſonable ſoule informe a well inſtrumentalized bodie (as was that of *Adam*) his knowledge comes little behind that of the ſubtilleſt deuill, and without the bodie he partakes as perfect qualities as the other. And if the deuils foreſee things to come, coniecturing and diſcourſing by certaine tokens, the ſame alſo may a reaſonable man doe when he is about to be freed from his bodie, or when he is endowed with that difference

rence of temperature, which makes a man capable of this prouidence. For it is a matter as difficult for the vnderſtanding to conceiue how the deuill can know theſe hidden things, as to impute the ſame to the reaſonable ſoule. It will not fall in theſe mens heads, that in naturall things there may be found out certaine ſignes, by meanes of which they may attaine to the knowledge of matters to come. And I affirme, there are certaine tokens to be found, which bring vs to the notice of things paſſed and preſent, and to forecaſt what is to follow, yea, and to coniecture ſome ſecrets of the heauen: Therefore we ſee that his things inuiſible are vnderſtood by the creatures of the world, by meanes of the things which haue bene created. Whoſoeuer ſhall haue power to accompliſh this, ſhall attaine thereunto, and the other ſhall be ſuch as *Homer* ſpake of, The ignorant vnderſtandeth the things paſſed, but not the things to come. But the wiſe and diſcreet is the Ape of God, for he immitates him in many matters, and albeit he cannot accompliſh them with ſo great perfection, yet he carries ſome reſemblance vnto him by following him.

CHAP. V.

It is prooued that of the three qualities, hot, moyſt, and drie, proceed all the differences of mens wits.

THe reaſonable ſoule making abode in the bodie, it is impoſſible that the ſame can performe contrarie and different operations, if for each of them it vſe not a particular inſtrument. This is plainly ſeene in the power of the ſoule, which performeth diuers operations in the

outward ſences, for euery one hath his particular compoſition; the eyes haue one, the eares another, the ſmelling another, and the feeling another: and if it were not ſo, there ſhould be no more but one ſort of operations, and that ſhould all be Seeing, Taſting, or Feeling, for the inſtrument determins and ruleth the power of one action, and for no more.

By this ſo plaine and manifeſt a matter, which paſſeth through the outward ſences, we may gather what that is in the inward. With this ſelfe power of the ſoule, we vnderſtand, imagine, and remember. But if it be true, that euery worke requires a particular inſtrument, it behoueth of neceſſitie, that within the braine there be one inſtrument for the vnderſtanding; one for the imagination, and another different from them for the memorie: for if all the braine were inſtrumentalized after one ſelfe manner, either the whole ſhould be memorie, or the whole vnderſtanding, or the whole imagination. But we ſee that theſe are very different operations, and therefore it is of force that there be alſo a varietie in the inſtruments. But if we open by skill, and make an anotomie of the braine, we ſhall find the whole compounded after one maner, of one kind of ſubſtance, and alike, without parts of other kinds, or a different ſort; onely there appeare foure little hollowneſſes, who (if we will marke them) haue all one ſelfe compoſition and figure, without any thing comming betweene which may breed a difference.

What the vſe and profit of theſe may be, and whereto they ſerue in the head, is not eaſily decidable: for *Galen* and the Anotomiſts, as well new as ancient, haue laboured to find out the trueth, but none of them haue preciſely nor in particular expreſſed whereto the right

ventricle

ventricle ſerueth, nor the left, nor that which is placed in the middeſt of theſe two, nor the fourth, whoſe ſeat in the braine keepes the hinder part of the head. They affirme onely (though with ſome doubt) that theſe foure concauities are the ſhops where the vitall ſpirits are digeſted, and conuerted into animals, ſo to giue ſence and motion to all the parts of the body. In which operation, *Galen* ſaid once, That the middle ventricle was the principall, and in another place he vnſayes it againe, affirming, that the hindermoſt is of greateſt efficacie and valure.

But this doctrine is not true, nor founded on good naturall Philoſophie, for in all mans bodie there are not two ſo contrarie operations, nor that ſo much hinder one another, as are diſcourſing, and digeſtion of nouriſhment: and the reaſon is, becauſe contemplation requireth quiet, reſt, and a cleereneſſe in the animall ſpirits; and digeſtion is performed with great ſtirring and trauaile, and frō this action riſe vp many vapours, which trouble and darken the animall ſpirits, ſo as by meanes of them, the reaſonable ſoule cannot diſcerne the figures. And Nature was not ſo vnaduiſed, as in one ſelfe place to conioine two actions, which are performed with ſo great repugnancie. But *Plato* highly commends the wiſdome and knowledge of him who ſhaped vs, for that he ſeuered the liuer from the braine by ſo great a diſtance, to the end, that by the rumbling there made, whileſt the nouriſhments are mingled, and by the obſcureneſſe and darkeneſſe occaſioned through the vapours in the animall ſpirits, the reaſonable ſoule might not be troubled in his diſcourſes and conſiderations. But though *Plato* had not touched this point of Philoſophie, we ſee houerly by experience, that becauſe the liuer and the ſtomacke

are so far from the braine, presently vpon meat, and some space thereafter, there is no man that can giue himselfe to studie.

The truth of this matter is, that the fourth ventricle hath the office of digesting and altering the vitall spirits, and to conuert them into animall, for that end which we haue before remembred. And therefore Nature hath seuered the same by so great a distance from the other three, and made that braine sundred apart, and so far off (as appeareth) to the end, that by his operation he hinder not the contemplation of the rest. The three ventricles placed in the forepart, I doubt not, but that Nature made them to none other end than to discourse and philosophise. Which is apparantly proued, for that in great studyings and contemplations, alwaies that part of the head finds it selfe agreeued which answereth these three concauities. The force of this argument is to be knowne by consideration, that when the other powers are wearie of performing their workes, the instruments are alwaies agreeued, whose seruice they vsed; as in our much looking, the eyes are pained; and with much going the soles of the feet wax sore.

Now the difficultie consists, to know in which of these ventricles the vnderstanding is placed, in which the memorie, and in which the imagination; for they are so vnited and neere neighboured, that neither by the last argument, nor by any other notice, they can be distinguished or discerned. Then considering that the vnderstanding cannot worke without the memorie be present, representing vnto the same the figures and fantasies agreeable thereunto, it behoueth that the vnderstanding part busie it selfe in beholding the fantasmes, and that the memorie cannot doe it, if the imagination doe not

not accompany the ſame (as we haue alreadie heretofore declared) we ſhall eaſily vnderſtand, that all the powers are vnited in euery ſeuerall ventricle, and that the vnderſtanding is not ſolely in the one, nor the memory ſolely in the other, nor the imagination in the third, as the vulgar Philoſophers haue imagined, but that this vnion of powers is accuſtomably made in mans bodie, in as much as the one cannot worke without the aid of the other, as appeareth in the foure naturall abilities, digeſtiue, retentiue, attractiue, and expulſiue, where, becauſe each one ſtands in need of all the reſidue, Nature diſpoſed to vnite them in one ſelfe place, and made them not deuided or ſundered.

But if this be true, then to what end made Nature thoſe three ventricles, and ioyned together the three reaſonable powers in euery of them, ſeeing that one alone ſufficed to vnderſtand and to performe the actions of memorie? To this may be anſwered, that there riſeth a like difficultie, in skanning whence it commeth, that Nature made two eyes and two eares, ſithens in each of them is placed the whole power of ſight and hearing, and we can ſee, hauing but one eye? Whereto may be ſaid, that the powers ordained for the perfection of a creature, how much the greater number they carrie, ſo much the better aſſured is that their perfection, for vpon ſome occaſion one or two may faile, and therefore it ſerues well to the purpoſe, that there remaine ſome others of the ſame kind, which may be applied to vſe.

In an infirmitie which the Phiſitions tearme Reſolution, or Palſie of the middle ſide, the operation is ordinarily loſt of that ventricle which is ſtrucken on that ſide, and if the other two remained not ſound, and without endammageance, a man ſhould thereby become witleſſe,

and void of reaſon. And yet for all this, by wanting that onely ventricle, there is a great abatement diſcerned in his operations, as well in thoſe of the vnderſtanding, as of the imaginatiue and memorie, as they ſhall alſo find in the loſſe of one ſight, who were woont to behold with two; whereby we cleerely comprize, that in euery ventricle are all the three powers, ſithens by the annoyance of any one, all the three are weakened. Seeing then all the three ventricles are of one ſelfe compoſition, and that there reſts not amongſt them any varietie of parts, we may not leaue to take the firſt qualities for an inſtrument, and to make ſo many generall differences of wits, as they are in number. For to thinke that the reaſonable ſoule being in the bodie, can worke without ſome bodily inſtrument to aſſiſt her, is againſt all naturall Philoſophie. But of the foure qualities, heat, cold, moyſture, and drouth: all Phiſitions leaue out cold, as vnprofitable to any operation of the reſonable ſoule, where-through it is ſeene by experience in the other habilities, that if the ſame mount aboue heat, all the powers of man doe badly performe their operations, neither can the ſtomacke digeſt his meat, nor the cods yeeld fruitfull ſeed, nor the muſcles mooue the bodie; nor the braine diſcourſe. For which cauſe *Galen* ſaid, Coldneſſe is apparantly noyſome to all the offices of the ſoule; as if he ſhould ſay, Cold is the ruine of all the operations of the ſoule, onely it ſerues in the bodie to temper the naturall heat, and to procure that it burne not ouermuch: and yet *Ariſtotle* is of a contrary opinion, where he affirmeth, it is a matter certaine, That that bloud carrieth moſt forcible efficacie, which is thickeſt and hotteſt, but the coldeſt and thinneſt hath a more accompliſhed force to perceiue and vnderſtand; as if he would ſay, the thicke and hot bloud

makes

makes great bodily forces, but the pure and cold is cauſe that man poſſeſſeth great vnderſtanding. Whereby we plainely ſee, that from coldneſſe ſpringeth the greateſt difference of wit that is in any man, namely in the vnderſtanding.

Ariſtotle moreouer moues a doubt, and that is, Why men who inhabite very hote countries (as *Ægypt*) are more wittie and aduiſed than thoſe who are borne in cold regions. Which doubt he reſolues in this manner: That the exceſſiue heat of the countrey fretteth and conſumeth the naturall heat of the braine, and ſo leaues it cold, whereby man growes to be full of reaſonableneſſe. And that contrariwiſe, the much cold of the aire fortifieth the much naturall heat of the braine, and yeelds it not place to reſolue. For which cauſe (ſayth he) ſuch as are very hot brained, cannot diſcourſe nor philoſophize, but are giddie headed, and not ſetled in any one opinion. To which opinion it ſeemes that *Galen* leaneth, ſaying, That the cauſe why a man is vnſtable, and changeth opinion at euery moment, is, for that hee hath a hote braine: and contrariwiſe, his beeing ſtable and firme, ſprings from the coldneſſe of his braine. But the truth is, that from this heat there groweth not any difference of wit: neither did *Ariſtotle* meane, that the cold bloud by his predominance did better the vnderſtanding, but that which is leſſe hote. True it is, that mans variableneſſe ſprings from his partaking of much heate, which lifts vp the figures that are in the braine, and makes them to boyle, by which operation there are repreſented to the ſoule many images of things, which inuite him to their contemplation, and the ſoule to poſſeſſe them all, leaues one and takes another. Contrariwiſe it befalls in coldneſſe, which for that it imprints inwardly theſe figures,

figures, and ſuffers them not to riſe, makes a man firme in one opinion, and it prooues ſo, becauſe none other preſents it ſelfe to call the ſame away. Coldneſſe hath this qualitie, that it not onely hindereth the motions of bodily things, but alſo makes that the figures and ſhapes which the Philoſophers call ſpirituall, be vnmooueable in the braine. And this firmeneſſe ſeemeth rather a negligence, than a difference of habilitie. Alike true it is, that there is found another diuerſitie of firmeneſſe, which proceeds from poſſeſſing an vnderſtanding well compacted together, and not from the coldneſſe of the brain. So there remaine drouth, moyſture, and heat for the ſeruice of the reaſonable facultie. But no Philoſopher as yet wiſt to giue to euery difference of wit determinately that which was his. *Heraclitus* ſaid, *A drie brightneſſe makes a moſt wiſe mind*: by which ſentence he giues vs to vnderſtand, that drineſſe is the cauſe why a man becomes very wiſe, but he declares not in what kind of knowledge.

The ſelfe-ſame meant *Plato*, when he ſaid, That the ſoule deſcended into the bodie endowed with great wiſdome, and through the much moyſture which it there found, grew to become dull and vntoward. But this wearing away in the courſe of age, and purchaſing drineſſe, the ſoule grew to diſcouer the knowledge which he tofore enioyed. Amongſt brute beaſts, ſaith *Ariſtotle*, thoſe are wiſeſt whoſe temperature is moſt enclined to cold and drie, as are the Ants and Bees, who for wiſedome concurre with thoſe men that partake moſt of reaſon. Moreouer, no brute beaſt is found of more moyſture, or leſſe wit than a Hog, where-through the Poet *Pindare*, to gibe at the people of *Beotia*, and to handle them as fooles, ſaid thus:

Th'vn-

Th'vntoward folke which now is nam'd
Beotia, were once cal'd Hogs.

Moreouer, bloud through his much moysture, sayth *Galen*, makes men simple. And for such, the same *Galen* recounts, that the Commicks ieasted at *Hippocrates* children, saying of them, That they had much naturall heat, which is a substance moyst and very vaporous. This is ordinarily incident to the children of wise men, and hereafter I will make report of the cause whence it groweth. Amongst the foure humours which we enioy, there is none so cold and drie as that of melancholie, and whatsoeuer notable men for learning haue liued in the world sayth *Aristotle)* they were all melancholike. Finally, all agree in this point, that drineſſe makes a mã very wise: but they expresse not to which of the reasonable powers it affoordeth greatest helpe; onely *Esay* the Prophet calls it by his right name, where he sayth, *That trauaile giues vnderstanding*: for sadnesse and affliction not onely diminisheth and consumeth the moisture of the brain, but also drieth vp the bones, with which qualitie the vnderstanding groweth more sharp and sightfull. Whereof we may gather an example very manifest by taking into consideration many men, who cast into pouertie and affliction, haue therethrough vttered and written sentences worth the maruelling at, & afterwards rising to better fortune, to eate and drinke well, would neuer once open their mouths. For a delicious life, contentment, and good succesſe, and to see that all things fall out after our liking, looseneth and maketh the braine moyst. And this is it which *Hippocrates* said, *Mirth looseneth the heart*, as if he would haue said, That the same enlargeth and giueth it heat and grossenesse.

And the same may easily be prooued another way, for

for if sadnesse and affliction drie vp and consume the flesh, and for that reason man gaineth more vnderstanding, it fals out a matter certaine, that his contrarie, namely mirth, will make the braine moyst, and diminish the vnderstanding. Such as haue purchased this manner of wit, are suddenly enclined to pastimes, to musicke, and to pleasant conuersations, and flie the contrarie, which at other times gaue them a relish and contentment. Now by this, the vulgar sort may conceiue whence it growes, that a wise and vertuous man attaining to some great dignitie (whereas at first he was but poore and base) sodainly changeth his manners and his fashion of speech: and the reason is, because he hath gotten a new temperature, moyst and full of vapours, whence it followes, that the figures are cancelled which tofore he had in his brain, and his vnderstanding dulled.

From moysture it is hard to know what difference of wit may spring, sithens it is so far contrarie to the reasonable facultie. At least (after *Galens* opinion) all the humours of our bodie, which hold ouer-much moysture, make a man blockish and foolish, for which cause hee said, The readinesse of mind and wisdome growes from the humour of choler: the humour of melancholie is author of firmenesse and constancie; bloud, of simplicitie and dulnesse; the flegmaticke complexion auaileth nothing to the polishing of mans attributes. Insomuch, that bloud with his moystures, and the flegme, cause an impairing of the reasonable facultie.

But this is vnderstood of the faculties or reasonable wits, which are discoursiue and actiue, and not of the passiue, as is the memorie, which depends as well on the moyst, as the vnderstanding doth on the drie. And wee call memorie a reasonable power, because without it the vnder-

vnderſtanding and the imaginatiue are of no valure. It miniſtreth matter and figures to them all, whereupon they may ſyllogiſe conformably to that which *Ariſtotle* ſayth, It behooues that the vnderſtander goe beholding the fantaſmes; and the office of the Memorie is, to preſerue theſe fantaſmes, to the end that the vnderſtanding may contemplat them, and if this be loſt, it is impoſſible that the powers can worke; and that the office of memorie is none other, than to preſerue the figures of things, without that it appertaines therto to deuiſe them. *Galen* expreſſeth in theſe words, Memorie (verely) laies vp and preſerueth in it ſelfe the things knowne by the ſence, and by the mind, and is therein as it were their ſtore-houſe and receiuing place, and not their inuenter. And if this be the vſe thereof, it falls out apparant, That the ſame dependeth on moyſture, for this makes the brain pliant, and the figure is imprinted by way of ſtrayning. To prooue this, we haue an euident argument in boyes age, in which any one ſhall better conne by heart, than in any other time of life, and then doth the braine partake greateſt moyſture. Whence *Ariſtotle* moueth this doubt, Why in old age we haue better wit, and in yoong age we learne more readily? as if he ſhould ſay, What is the cauſe, that when we are old we haue much vnderſtanding, and when we are yoong we learne with more towardlineſſe? Whereto he anſwereth, That the memorie of old men is full of ſo many figures of things which they haue ſeene and heard in the long courſe of their life, that when they would beſtow more therein, it is not capable thereof, for it hath no void place where to receiue it. But the memorie of yoong folke, when they are newly borne, is full of plaits, and for this cauſe they receiue readily whatſoeuer is told or taught them. And he makes

Where-through *Cicero* defining the nature of wit, placeth memorie in his definition: Docilitie and Memorie, which as it were by one name are tearmed wit.

makes this playner, by comparing the memorie of the morning with that of the euening, saying, That in the morning we learne best, because at that time our memorie is emptie, and at the euening illy, because then it is full of those things which wee encountred during the day. To this Probleme *Aristotle* wist not how to answere, and the reason is very plaine: for if the spices and figures which are in the memorie, had a bodie and quantitie to occupie the place, it would seeme that this were a fitting answere; but being vndeuided and spirituall, they cannot fill nor emptie any place where they abide: yea, wee see by experience, that by how much more the memorie is exercised euery day receiuing new figures, so much the more capable it becommeth. The answere of this Probleme is very euident after my doctrine, and the same importeth, that old men partake much vnderstanding, because they haue great drinesse, and faile of memorie, for that they haue little moysture, and by this meanes the substance of the braine hardneth, and so cannot receiue the impression of the figures, as hard waxe with difficultie admitteth the figure of the seale, and the soft with easinesse. The contrary befalls in children, who through the much moysture wherewith the braine is endowed, faile in vnderstanding, and through the great suppleneſse of their braine abound in memorie: wherein, by reason of the moysture, the shapes and figures that come from without, make a great, easie, deepe, and well formed impression.

That the memorie is better in the morning than the euening, cannot be denied, but this springeth not from the occasion alleaged by *Aristotle*, but the sleepe of the night passed hath made the braine moyst, and fortified the same, and by the waking of the whole day, it is dried

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and hardened. For which cauſe *Hippocrates* affirmeth, thoſe who haue great thirſt at night, ſhall doe well to drinke, for ſleepe makes the fleſh moyſt, and fortifieth all the powers which gouerne man: and that ſleepe ſo doth, *Ariſtotle* himſelfe confeſſeth.

By this doctrine is perfectly ſeene, that the vnderſtanding and memorie are powers oppoſit and contrarie, in ſort, that the man who hath a great memorie, ſhall find a defect in his vnderſtanding, and hee who hath a great vnderſtanding, cannot enioy a good memorie; for it is impoſſible that the braine ſhould of his owne nature be at one ſelfe time drie and moyſt. On this maxime *Ariſtotle* grounded himſelfe, to prooue, that memorie is a power different from remembrance, and he frames his argument in this manner: Thoſe who haue much remembrance, are men of great vnderſtanding, and thoſe who poſſeſſe a great memorie, find want of vnderſtanding; ſo then memorie and remembrance are contrarie powers. The former propoſition, after my doctrine, is falſe; for thoſe who haue much remembrance, are of little vnderſtanding, and haue great imaginations, as ſoone hereafter I will prooue: but the ſecond propoſition is very true, albeit *Ariſtotle* knew not the cauſe, whereon was founded the enmitie which the vnderſtanding hath with the memorie.

From heat, which is the third qualitie, groweth the imaginatiue, for there is no other reaſonable power in the braine, nor any other qualitie to which it may be aſſigned; beſides that, the ſciences which appertaine to the imaginatiue, are thoſe, which ſuch vtter as dote in their ſickneſſe, and not of thoſe which appertaine to the vnderſtanding, or to the memorie. And frenzie, peeuiſhneſſe, and melancholie, being hot paſſions of the braine,

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it yeelds a great argument, to prooue that imagination consists in heat. One thing breeds me a difficultie herein, and that is, That the imagination carrieth a contrarietie to the vnderstanding, as also to the memorie, and the reason hereof is not to be gotten by experience, for in the braine may very well be vnited much heat and much drinesse; and so likewise, much heat and much moysture, to a large quantitie: and for this cause, a man may haue a great vnderstanding and a great imagination, and much memorie with much imagination: and verely, it is a miracle to find a man of great imagination, who hath a good vnderstanding, and a sound memorie. And the cause thereof behooues to bee, for that the vnderstanding requires that the braine be made of parts very subtile and delicate, as we haue prooued heretofore out of *Galen*, and much heat frets and consumes what is dedicate, and leaues behind the parts grosse and earthly. For the like reason, a good imagination cannot bee vnited with much memorie; for excessiue heat resolueth the moysture of the braine, and leaueth it hard and drie, by meanes whereof it cannot easily receiue the figures. In sort, that in man there are no more but three generall differences of wits, for there are no more but three qualities whence they may grow. But vnder these three vniuersall differences, there are contained many other particulars, by meanes of degrees of accesse, which heat, moysture and drinesse may haue.

Anie distemperature whatsoeuer, cannot anie long time endure alone.

Notwithstanding there springs a difference in wits from euery degree of these three qualities, for the drie, the hot, and the moyst, may exceede in so high a degree, that it may altogether disturbe the animall power, conformable to that sentence of *Galen*, Euery excessiue distemperature resolues the forces; and so it is. For albeit drinesse

drineſſe giue helpe to the vnderſtanding, yet it may be that the ſame ſhall conſume his operations. Which *Galen* and the ancient Philoſophers would not admit, but affirme, that if old mens brains grew not cold, they ſhould neuer decay, though they became drie in the fourth degree. But they haue no reaſon for this, as we will prooue in the imaginatiue; for albeit his operations be performed with heat, yet if it paſſe the third degree, forthwith the ſame begins to reſolue, and the like doth the memorie through ouermuch moyſture.

How many differences of wits grow by meanes of the ſuperabounding of each of theſe three qualities, cannot for this preſent be particularly recited, except tofore we recount all the operations and actions of the vnderſtanding, the imagination, and the memorie. But the whileſt we are to know, that the principall workes of the vnderſtanding are three: the firſt, to diſcourſe; the ſecond, to diſtinguiſh; and the third, to chuſe. Hence comes it, that they place alſo three differences in the vnderſtanding: into three other is the memorie deuided: one receiues with eaſe, and ſuddenly forgetteth; another is ſlow to receiue, but a long time retaineth; and the laſt receiueth with eaſe, and is very ſlow to forget.

The imagination containeth many more differences, for he hath three, no leſſe than the vnderſtanding and memorie, and from each degree ariſeth three other. Of theſe we will more diſtinctly diſcourſe hereafter, when we ſhall aſſigne to each the ſcience which anſwereth it in particular.

But hee that will conſider three other differences of wit, ſhall find, that there are habilities in thoſe who ſtudie, ſome which haue a diſpoſition for the cleare and eaſie contemplations of the Art which they learne, but if

you set them about matters obscure and verie difficult, it will prooue a lost labour for the teacher to shape them a figure thereof by fit examples, or that they frame themselues the like by their owne imagination, for they want the capacitie.

In this degree are all the bad schollers of whatsoeuer faculties, who beeing demaunded touching the easie points of their art, answer to the purpose: but comming to matters of more curiousnesse, they will tell you a hundred follies. Other wits aduance themselues one degree higher, for they are pliant and easie in learning things, and they can imprint in themselues all the rules and considerations of art, plaine, obscure, easie, and difficult; but as for doctrine, argument, doubting, answering, and distinguishing, they are all matters wherewith they may in no wise be compred: these need to learne Sciences at the hands of good teachers, well skilled in knowledge, and to haue plentie of Bookes, and to studie them hard; for so much the lesse shall their knowledge be, as they forbeare to reade and take paines. Of these may be verefied that so famous sentence of *Aristotle*: Our vnderstanding is like a plaine table, wherin nothing is pourtraied. For whatsoeuer they are to know and attaine, it behooues that first they heare the same of some other, and are barren of all inuention themselues. In the third degree, Nature maketh some wits so perfect, that they stand not in need of teachers to instruct them, nor to direct in what sort they are to philosophise, for out of one consideration endicted to them by their Schoolemaister, they will gather a hundred, and without that ought be bestowed vnto them, they fill their wit with science and knowledge. These wits beguiled *Plato*, and made him to say, That our knowledge is a certaine spice

of

of remembrance, when hee heard them ſpeake and ſay that which neuer fell into conſideration with other men.

To ſuch it is allowable that they write bookes, and to others not: for the order and concert which is to be held, to the end that ſciences may dayly receiue increaſe and greater perfection, is to ioine the new inuention of our ſelues, who liue now, with that which the Auntients left written in their bookes. For dealing after this manner, each in his time, ſhall adde an increaſe to the Arts, and men who are yet vnborne, ſhall enioy the inuention and trauell of ſuch as liued before. As for ſuch who want inuention, the common-wealth ſhould not conſent that they make bookes, nor ſuffer them to be printed, becauſe they doe nought elſe ſaue heape vp matters alreadie deliuered, and ſentences of graue authours, returning to repeat the ſelfe things, ſtealing one from hence, and taking another from thence; and there is no man, but after ſuch a faſhion may make a booke.

Wits full of inuention are by the *Tuſcanes* called goatiſh, for the likeneſſe which they haue with a Goat in their demeanure and proceeding. Theſe neuer take pleaſure in the plaines, but euer delight to walke alone thorow dangerous and high places, and to approch neere ſteepe downe falls, for they will not follow any beaten path, nor goe in companie. A propertie like this is found in the reaſonable ſoule, when it poſſeſſeth a braine well inſtrumentalized and tempered, for it neuer reſteth ſetled in anie contemplation, but fareth forthwith vnquiet, ſeeking to know and vnderſtand new matters. Of ſuch a ſoule is verefied the ſaying of *Hippocrates*, The going of the ſoule is the thought of men. For there are ſome, who neuer paſſe out of one contemplation, and thinke

not that the whole world can discouer another such. These haue the propertie of a beast, who neuer forsakes the beaten path, nor careth to walke through desart and vnhaunted places, but onely in the high market way, and with a guide before him. Both these diuersities of wits are ordinarie amongst professors of learning. Some others there are of high searching capacities, and estranged from the common course of opinions, they iudge and entreat of matters with a particular fashion, they are franke in deliuering their opinion, and tye not themselues to that of any other. Some sorts are close, moyst, and very quiet, distrusting themselues, and relying vpon the iudgement of some graue man whom they follow, whose sayings and sentences they repute as sciences and demonstrations, and all things contrarying the same, they reckon vanitie and leasings.

These two differences of wits are very profitable, if they be vnited; for as amongst a great droue of Cattell the Heards-men accustome to mingle some dozen of Goats to lead them and make them trot apace, to enioy new Pastures, that they may not suffer scarcitie; so also it behoueth, that in humane learning there be some Goat-like wits, who may discouer to the cattell like vnderstanding, thorow secrets of Nature, and deliuer vnto them contemplations not heard of, wherein they may exercise themselues, for after this manner Arts take increase, and men dayly know more and more.

CHAP. VI.

Certaine doubts and arguments are propounded against the doctrine of the last Chapter, and their answer.

One

ONe of the causes for which the wisdome of *Socrates* hath beene so famous till this day, is, for that after he was adiudged by the oracle of *Apollo*, to be the wisest man of the world, he said thus: *I know this onely, that I know nothing at all:* which sentence, all those that haue seene and read, passed it ouer, as spoken by *Socrates*, for that he was a man of great humblenesse, a despiser of worldly things, and one to whom, in respect of diuine matters, all else seemed of no valure. But they vtterly are beguiled, for none of the ancient Philosophers possessed the vertue of humilitie, nor knew what thing it was, vntill God came into the world and taught the same.

The meaning of *Socrates* was, to giue to vnderstand how little certaintie is contained in humane sciences, and how vnsetled and fearefull the vnderstanding of a Philosopher in that which he knoweth, seeing by experience, that all is full of doubts and arguments, and that we can yeeld assent to nothing, without fearing that it may be contrarie. For it was said, The thoughts of men are doubtfull, and our foreseeings vncertaine. And he who will attaine to the true knowledge of things, it behooues that hee rest setled and quiet without feare or doubt of being deceiued, and the Philosopher who is not thus wise grounded, may with much trueth affirme, that he knoweth nothing.

This same consideration had *Galen*, when hee sayd, Science is a conuenient and firme notice, which neuer departeth from reason; therefore thou shalt not find it amongst the Philosophers, especially when they consi-

der the nature of things: but verely much leſſe in matters of Phiſicke; nay rather (to ſpeake all in one word) it neuer makes his full arriuall where men are.

Hereby it ſeemeth that the true notice of things failes to come this way, and to man arriueth onely a certaine opinion, which makes him to walke vncertaine, and with feare, whether the matter which he affirmeth be ſo or no. But that which *Galen* noteth more particularly, touching this, is, that Philoſophie and Phiſicke are the moſt vncertaine of all thoſe wherewith men are to deale. And if this be true, what ſhall we ſay touching the Philoſophie whereof we now intreat, where with the vnderſtanding we make an anotomie of a matter ſo obſcure and difficult, as are the powers and faculties of the reaſonable ſoule? In which point are offered ſo many doubts and arguments, that there remaines no cleare doctrine vpon which we may relie.

One of which, and the principall, is, that wee haue made the Vnderſtanding an inſtrumentall power, as the Imagination, and the Memorie, and haue giuen drineſſe to the braine, as an inſtrument with which it may worke: a thing far repugnant to the doctrine of *Ariſtotle* and all his followers; who placing the vnderſtanding ſeuered from the bodily inſtrument, prooue eaſily the immortalitie of the reaſonable ſoule, and that the ſame iſſuing out of the bodie, endureth for euer. Now the contrarie opinion being diſputable, the way hereby is ſtopped vp, ſo that this cannot be prooued. Moreouer, the reaſons on which *Ariſtotle* groundeth himſelfe, to proue that the vnderſtanding is not an inſtrumentall power, carrie ſuch efficacie, as other than that cannot bee concluded. For to this power appertaineth the knowing and vnderſtanding the nature and beeing of whatſoeuer materiall

teriall things in the world, and if the same should be conioyned with anie bodilie thing, that selfe would hinder the knowledge of the residue: as wee see in the outward sences, that if the tast be bitter, all the things which the tongue toucheth partake the same sauour: and if the christaline humour be greene or yellow, all that the eye seeth, it iudgeth to be of the same colour. The reason of this is, for that the thing within breeds an impediment to that without.

Aristotle sayth moreouer, That if the vnderstanding were mingled with any bodily instrument, it would retaine some qualitie, for whatsoeuer vniteth it selfe with heat or cold, it is of force that it partake of the same qualitie. But to say that the vnderstanding is hot, cold, moyst, or drie, is to vtter a matter abhominable to the eares of all naturall Philosophers.

The second principall doubt is, that *Aristotle* and all the *Peripateticks* bring in two other powers besides the Vnderstanding, the Imagination, and the Memorie; namely, Remembrance, and common sence, grounding vpon that rule, That the powers are knowne by way of the actions. They said, That besides the operations of the Vnderstanding, the Imagination, and the Memorie, there are also two other different. So then the wit of man taketh his originall from fiue powers, and not from three onely, as we did prooue.

We said also in the last Chapter, after the opinion of *Galen*, that the Memorie doth none other worke in the braine, saue onely to preserue the shapes and figures of things, in such sort, as a chest preserueth and keepeth apparell, and what so else is put thereinto. And if by such a comparison, wee are to vnderstand the office of this power, it is requisit also to prooue another reasonable fa-

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cultie, which may fetch out the figures from the memorie, and represent them to the vnderstanding, euen as it is necessarie that there be one to open the cheſt, and to take out what hath beene laid vp therein.

Beſides this, we ſaid, that the vnderſtanding and the memorie are contrarie powers, and that the one chaſeth away the other, for the one loueth great drineſſe, and the other much moyſture, and a ſuppleneſſe of the braine. And if this be true, wherefore ſaid *Ariſtotle* and *Plato*, That men who haue their fleſh tender, enioy great vnderſtanding, ſeeing this ſuppleneſſe is an effect of moyſture.

We ſaid alſo, that for effecting that a memorie may be good, it was neceſſarie the braine ſhould be endowed with moyſture, for the figures ought to be printed therein by way of compreſſion, and the ſame being hard, they cannot ſo eaſily make a ſigne therein. True it is, that to receiue figures with readineſſe, it requireth that the braine be pliant, but to preſerue the ſhapes ſome long time, all affirme, that it is neceſſarie the ſame be hard and drie, as it appeareth in outward things, where the figure printed in a pliant ſubſtance, is eaſily cancelled, but in the drie and hard, it neuer periſheth. Where-through we ſee many men who con by heart with great readineſſe, but forget againe verie ſpeedilie. Of which *Galen* rendering a reaſon, ſayth, that ſuch through much moyſture, haue the ſubſtance of their braine tender and not ſetled, for the figure is ſoone cancelled, as if it were ſealed in water. And contrariwiſe, other learne by heart with difficultie, but what they haue once learned, they neuer forget againe. Where-through it ſeemeth a matter impoſſible, that there ſhould be that difference of memorie which wee ſpeake of, which ſhould learne with eaſe,

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and preſerue a long time.

It is alſo hard to vnderſtand how it is poſſible that ſo many figures being ſealed together in the braine, the one ſhould not cancell the other, for if in a piece of ſoftned wax there be printed many ſeales of diuers figures, it falls out certaine, that ſome cancell other ſome, by the intermingling of theſe figures.

And that which breedeth no leſſe difficultie, is, to know whence it proceedeth, that the memorie by exerciſing it ſelfe, becommeth the more eaſie to receiue figures, it being certaine, that not onely bodilie exerciſe, but ſpirituall much more, drieth and ſoketh the fleſh.

It is alſo hard to conceiue, in what ſort the imagination is contrarie to the vnderſtanding, if there be none other more vrgent cauſe, than to ſay, That exceſſiue heat reſolueth the ſubtile partes of the braine, leauing an earthlie and groſſe remnant, ſeeing the Melancholie is one of the groſeſt and earthlieſt humours of our bodie. And *Ariſtotle* ſayth, That the vnderſtanding vſeth the ſeruice of none ſo much, as of that. And this difficultie is encreaſed, conſidering that melancholie is a groſſe humour, cold and drie; and choler is of a delicat ſubſtance, and of temperature hot and drie, and yet for all this, melancholie is more appropriat to the vnderſtanding than choler. Which ſeemeth repugnant to reaſon, for this humour aideth the vnderſtanding with two qualities, and gainſetteth it ſelfe only with one, which is heat. But melancholie aideth it with his drineſſe, and with none other, and oppoſeth it ſelfe by his cold, and by his groſſe ſubſtance, which is a thing that the vnderſtanding moſt abhorreth. For which cauſe, *Galen* aſſigneth more wit and prudẽce to choler, than to melancholie, ſaying thus; Readineſſe and Prudence ſpring from the humour of choler,

choler, and the melancholicke humour is author of integritie and constancie.

Lastly, the cause may be demaunded, whence it may grow, that toyling, and continuall contemplation of studie maketh many wise, in whome at the beginning, the good nature of these qualities, which wee speake of, was wanting: and so by giuing and receiuing with the imagination, they come to make themselues capable of manie verities, which tofore they knew not, nor had the temperature which thereto was requisit. For if they had possessed the same, so much labour should not haue been needfull.

All these difficulties, and many other besides, are contrarie to the doctrine of the last Chapter. For naturall Philosophie hath not so certaine principles as the Mathematicall Sciences, wherein, the Phisition, and the Philosopher (if he be also a Mathematician) may alwayes make demonstration: but comming afterwards to the cure, which is conformable to the art of Phisicke, hee shall commit therein many errours, and yet not alwayes thorow his owne fault (sithens in the Mathematicks he alwayes followed a certaintie) but through the little assurance of the art, for which cause *Aristotle* said, The Phisition though he alwayes cure not, is not therefore a bad one, prouided, that he foreslow not to performe any of those points which appertaine to the art. But if he should commit anie errour in the Mathematicks, he would be void of excuse: for performing in this Science all the diligences which it requireth, it is impossible that the trueth should not appeare. In sort, that albeit we yeeld not a manifest demonstration of this doctrine, yet the whole fault is not to be laid on our want of capacitie, neither may it straightwayes be recounted as false that

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we deliuer.

To the first principall doubt, we answer, that if the vnderstanding were seuered frõ the bodie, and had nought to doe with heat, cold, moyst, and drie, nor with the other bodilie qualities, it would follow that all men should partake equall vnderstanding, and that all should equally discourse. But wee see by experience, that one man vnderstandeth and discourseth better than another; then this groweth, for that the vnderstanding is an instrumentall power, and better disposed in one than in another, and not from any other occasion. For all reasonable soules and their vnderstandings (sundered from the bodie) are of equall perfection and knowledge. Those who follow *Aristotles* doctrine, seeing by experience, that some discourse better than other some, haue found an excuse in apparence; saying; That the discoursing of one better than another, is not caused, for that the vnderstanding is an instrumentall power, and that the brain is better disposed in some than in othersome: but for that the vnderstanding (whilst the reasonable soule remaineth in the bodie) standeth in need of the fantasmes and figures which are in the imagination, and in the memorie; through default whereof, the vnderstanding falls to discourse illy, and not through his owne fault, nor for that it is ioyned with a matter badly instrumentalized. But this answere is contrarie to the doctrine of *Aristotle* himselfe, who prooueth, that by how much the memorie is the worse, by so much the vnderstanding is the better; and by how much the memorie is bettered, by so much the vnderstanding is impaired: and the same we haue heretofore prooued as touching the imagination, in confirmation of that which *Aristotle* demaundeth, What the cause is, that we waxing old, haue

so

ſo bad a memorie, and ſo good an vnderſtanding: and when we are yoong, it falls out contrarie, that we poſſeſſe a great memorie and ſmall vnderſtanding. Hereof, in one thing we ſee the experience, and *Galen* noteth it, that when in a diſeaſe the temperature and good diſpoſition of the braine is impaired, many times the operations of the vnderſtanding are thereby loſt, and yet thoſe of the memorie and the imagination remaine ſound, which could not come to paſſe, if the vnderſtanding enioyned not a particular inſtrument for it ſelfe, beſides this which the other powers doe partake.

To this I know not what may be yeelded in anſwere, vnleſſe it be by ſome metaphyſicall relation, compounded of action and power, which neither themſelues know what it meaneth, nor is there any other man that vnderſtands it. Nothing more endammageth mans knowledge than to confound the ſciences: and what belongs to the Metaphyſicks, to entreat thereof in naturall Philoſophie; and matters of naturall Philoſophie in the Metaphyſicks.

The reaſons whereupon *Ariſtotle* grounded himſelfe are of ſmall moment, for the conſequence followeth, not to ſay, that the vnderſtanding, becauſe it muſt know materiall things, ſhould not therefore enioy a bodily inſtrument: for the bodily qualities which ſerue for the compoſition of the inſtrument, make no alteration of the power; nor from them doe the fantaſmes ariſe, euen as the ſenſible, placed aboue the ſence, cauſeth not the ſelfe ſence. This is plainly ſeene in touching, for notwithſtanding that the ſame is compounded of foure materiall qualities: and that the ſame hath in it quantitie, and hardneſſe of ſoftneſſe; for all this, the hand deſcerneth whether a thing be hot or cold, hard or ſoft, great

or

or little. And if you aske in what sort the naturall heat which is in the hand hindereth not the touching, that it may discerne the heat which is in the stone; we answere, that the qualities which serue for the composition of the instrument, doe not alter the instrument it selfe, neither from them doe there issue any shapes whereby to know them. Euen as it appertaineth to the eye to know all figures and qualities of things, and yet we see that the eye it selfe hath his proper figure and quantitie, and of the humours and skins which goe to his composition, some haue colours, and some are *diaphane* and transparant, all which hindereth not, but that we with our sight may discerne the figures and quantities of all the things which shall appeare before vs: and the reason is, for that the humours, the skins, the figure, and the quantitie, serue for the composition of the eye, and such things cannot alter the sightfull power, and therefore trouble not nor hinder the knowledge of the outward figures. The like we affirme of the vnderstanding, that his proper instrument (though the same be materiall and ioyned with it) cannot enlarge it, for from it issue no vnderstandable shapes, which haue force to alter it: and the reason is, For that the vnderstandable placed aboue the vnderstanding, causeth not the vnderstanding; and so it remaineth at libertie to vnderstand all the outward materiall things, without that it encounter ought to hinder the same. The second reason wherein *Aristotle* grounded himselfe, is of lesse importance than the former, for neither the vnderstanding nor any other accident can bee qualiti-like, for of themselues they cannot be the subiect of any qualitie. For which cause it little skilleth that the vnderstanding possesse the braine for an instrument togither with the temperature of the foure first qualities, that

therefore

therefore it may be called qualitie-like, in as much as the braine and not the vnderſtanding, is the ſubiect of the heat, the cold, the moyſt, and the drie.

To the third difficultie which the *Peripateticks* alleage, ſaying, That by making the vnderſtanding an inſtrumentall power, we reaue one of thoſe principles which ſerue to prooue the immortalitie of the reaſonable ſoule: we anſwere, That there are other arguments of more ſoundneſſe, whereby to prooue the ſame, whereof we will treat in the Chapter following.

To the ſecond argument we anſwere, that not euery difference of operations argueth a diuerſitie of powers: for (as we will prooue hereafter) the imaginatiue performeth matter ſo ſtrange, that if this *maxime* were true in ſort as the vulgar Philoſophers had it, or admitting the interpretation which they giue it, there ſhould be in the braine ten or twelue powers more. But becauſe all theſe operations are to be marſhalled vnder one generall reaſon, they argue no more than one imaginatiue, which is afterwards deuided into many particular differences, by the meanes of the ſundrie operations which it performeth: the compoſing of the ſhapes in the preſence or the abſence of the obiects, not onely argueth not a diuerſitie of the generall powers (as are the common ſence, and the imaginatiue) but euen not of the verie particulars.

To the third argument we anſwere, that the memorie is nothing els but a tenderneſſe of the braine, diſpoſed with a certaine kind of moyſture, to receiue and preſerue that which the imaginatiue apprehendeth: with the like proportion that white or blew paper holds with him who writeth: for as the writer writeth in the paper the things which he would not forget, and

after

after he hath written them, returnes to read them; euen so we ought to conceiue, that the imagination writeth in the memorie the figures of the things knowne by the fiue senses, and by the vnderstanding, as also some others of his owne framing: and when it will remember ought (saith *Aristotle*) it returneth to behold and contemplate them. With this maner of comparison *Plato* serued himselfe, when he said, That fearing the weake memorie of old age, he hastened to make another of paper (namely bookes) to the end his trauailes ought not to be lost, but that hee might haue that which might represent them vnto him, when he list to read them. This selfe doth the imaginatiue, of writing in the memorie, and returning to read it when it would remember the same. The first who vttered this point was *Aristotle*, and the second *Galen*, who said thus, For as much as that part of the soule which imagineth, whatsoeuer the same be, seemeth to be the selfe that also remembreth. And so verely it seemeth to be, for the things which wee imagine with long thinking, are well fixed in the memorie, and that which we handle with light consideration, also soone we forget the same againe. And as the writer when he writeth faire, the better assureth it to be read: so it befalls to the imaginatiue, that if it seale with force, the figure remaineth well imprinted in the braine, otherwise it can scarcely be discerned. The like also chanceth in old deedes, which being found in part, and in part perished by time, cannot well be read, vnlesse we gather much by reason and coniecture. So doth the imaginatiue, when in the memorie some figures remaine, and some are perished, where *Aristotles* errour had his originall; who for this cause conceiued, that remembrance was a different power from the memorie. Moreouer, he affirmed, that

those

thoſe who haue great remembrance, are likewiſe of great vnderſtanding, which is alſo falſe: for the imaginatiue, which is that that makes the remembrance, is contrarie to the vnderſtanding; in ſort, that to gather memorie of things, and to remember them after they are knowne, is a worke of the imagination: as to write and returne to read it, is a worke of the Scriuener, and not of the paper. Whereby it falleth out that the memorie remaineth a power paſſiue, and not actiue: euen as the blew and the white of the paper is none other than a commoditie whereby to write.

To the fourth doubt may be anſwered, That it maketh little to the purpoſe, as touching the wit, whether the fleſh be hard or tender, if the braine partake not alſo the ſame qualitie, the which we ſee many times hath a diſtinct temperature from all the other parts of the bodie. But when they concurre in one ſelfe tenderneſſe, it is an euill token for the vnderſtanding, and no leſſe for the imagination. And if wee conſider the fleſh of women and children, wee ſhall find that in tenderneſſe it exceedeth that of men, and this notwithſtanding, commonly men haue a better wit than women: and the naturall reaſon hereof is, For that the humours, which make the fleſh tender, are fleagme and bloud, becauſe they are both moyſt (as wee haue aboue ſpecified) and of them *Galen* ſaid, That they make men ſimple and dullards: and contrariwiſe, the humours which harden the fleſh, are choller and melancholie: and hence grow the prudence and ſapience which are found in man. In ſort, that it is rather an ill token to haue the fleſh tender, than drie and hard. And ſo in men who haue an equall temperature throughout their whole bodie, it is an eaſie matter to gather the qualitie of their wit by the tenderneſſe or

hard-

hardneſſe of their fleſh: For if it be hard and rough, it giueth token either of a good vnderſtanding, or a good imagination; and if ſmooth and ſupple, of the contrarie, namely of good memorie, and ſmall vnderſtanding, and leſſe imagination: and to vnderſtand whether the braine haue corteſpondence, it behoooueth to cõſider the haire, which being big, black, rough, and thick, yeeldeth token of a good imagination, or a good vnderſtanding: and if ſoft and ſmooth, they are a ſigne of much memorie, and nothing els. But who ſo will diſtinguiſh and know, whether the ſame be vnderſtanding or imagination (when the haire is of this ſort) it muſt be conſidered of what forme the child is in the act of laughter: for this paſſion diſcouereth much, of what qualitie hee is in the imagination.

What the reaſon and cauſe of laughter ſhould bee, manie Philoſophers haue laboured to conceiue, and none of them hath deliuered ought that may well bee vnderſtood: but all agree, that the bloud is an humour, which prouoketh a man to laugh, albeit none expreſſe with what qualitie this humour is indewed, more than the reſt, why it ſhould make a man addicted to laughter. The follies which are committed with laughing, are leſſe dangerous: but thoſe which are done with labour are more perillous: as if he ſhould ſay, When the diſeaſed become giddie and doting, doe laugh, they reſt in more ſafetie, than if they were in toyle and anguiſh: for the former commeth of bloud, which is a moſt mild humour, and the ſecond of melancholie: but we grounding vpon the doctrine whereof we intreat, ſhall eaſily vnderſtand all that which in this caſe may bee deſired to be knowne. The cauſe of laughter (in my iudgement) is nought els but an approoouing, which is made by the

imagination, seeing or hearing some-what done or said, which accordeth verie well: and this power remaineth in the braine, when anie of these things giue it contentment, suddainly it mooueth the same, and after it all the muscles of the bodie, and so manie times we doe allow of wittie sayings, by bowing downe of the head. When then the imagination is verie good, it contents not it selfe with euerie speech, but onely with those which please verie well: and if they haue some little correspondence, and nothing els, the same receiueth thereby rather paine than gladnesse. Hence it groweth, that men of great imagination laugh verie seldome, and the point most worthie of nothing, is, that ieasters and naturall counterfeiters neuer laugh at their owne meriments, nor at that which they heare others to vtter: for they haue an imagination so delicat, that not euen their owne pleasanteries, can yeeld that correspondence which they require.

Hereto may bee added, that merriments (besides that they must haue a good proportion, and be vttered to the purpose) must be new, and not tofore heard or seene. And this is the propertie not onely of the imagination, but also of all the other powers which gouerne man: for which cause we see, that the stomacke when it hath twice fed vpon one kind of meat, straight waies loatheth the same: so doth the sight one selfe shape and colour; the hearing one concordance, how good soeuer; and the vnderstanding one selfe contemplation. Hence also it proceedeth, that the pleasant conceiued man laugheth not at the ieastes which himselfe vttereth: for before he send them forth from his lips, hee knew what he would speake. Whence I conclude, that those who laugh much, are all defectiue in their imagi-

nation,

nation, wherethrough whatsoeuer meriment and pleasanterie, (how cold soeuer) with them carrieth a verie good correspondencie: And becauſe the bloud partaketh much moyſture (wherof we ſaid before, that it breedeth dammage to the imagination) thoſe who are verie ſanguine, are alſo great laughters. Moyſture holdeth this propertie, that becauſe the ſame is tender and gentle, it abateth the force of heat, and makes that it burne not ouer-much. For which cauſe it partakes better agreement with drineſſe, becauſe it ſharpeneth his operations. Beſides this, where there is much moyſture, it is a ſigne that the heat is remiſſe, ſeeing it cannot reſolue nor conſume the ſame: and the imagination cannot performe his operations with a heat ſo weake. Hence wee gather alſo, that men of great vnderſtanding are much giuen to laughter, for that they haue defect of imagination, as we read of the great Philoſopher *Democritus*, and many others, whom my ſelfe haue ſeene and noted. Then by meanes of this laughter we ſhall know, if that which men or boyes haue of fleſh hard and tough, and of haire black, thick, hard, and rough, betoken either the imagination, or the vnderſtanding. In ſort, that *Ariſtotle* in this doctrine was ſome-what out of the way.

To the fifth argument we anſwere, that there are two kinds of moyſture in the braine, one, which groweth of the aire (when this element predominateth in the mixture) and another, of the water, with which the other elements are amaſſed. If the braine be tender by the firſt moyſture, the memorie ſhall be verie good: eaſie to receiue, and mightie to retaine the figures for a long time. For the moyſture of the aire is verie ſupple and full of fatneſſe, on which the ſhapes are tacked with ſure hold-faſt, as wee ſee in Pictures which are lymmed in oyle,

who being set against the sunne and the water, receiue thereby no dammage at all: and if we cast oyle vpon any writing, it will neuer bee wiped out, but marreth the same: and that which cannot be read, with oyle is made legible, by yeelding thereto a brightnesse and transparence. But if the difference of the braine spring from the second kind of moysture, the argument frameth verie well: For if it receiue with facilitie, with the same readinesse it turneth againe to cancell the figure, because the moysture of the water hath no fatnesse, wherein the figures may fasten themselues. These two moystures are knowne by the haire: for that which springs from the aire, maketh them to proue vnctious, and full of oyle and fat, and the water maketh them moyst, and verie supple.

To the sixth argument may bee answered, that the figures of things are not printed in the braine, as the figure of the seale is in waxe, but they pearce thereinto, to remain there affixed, in sort as the Sparrowes are attached to bird-lime, or the Flies sticke in honnie: for these figures are bodilesse, and cannot be mingled, nor corrupt one the other.

To the seuenth difficultie we answer, that the figures amasse and mollifie the substance of the braine, in such sort as wax groweth soft by plying the same betweene our fingers: besides that, the vitall spirits haue vertue to make tender and supple the hard and drie members, as the outward heat doth the yron. And that the vitall spirits ascend to the braine, when any thing is learned by heart, we haue prooued heretofore. And euery bodily and spirituall exercise doth not drie: yea the Phisitions affirme, that the moderat fatteneth.

To the eight argument wee answere, that there are

two

two ſpices of melancholie: one naturall, which is the droſſe of the bloud, whoſe temperature is cold and drie, accompanied with a ſubſtance verie groſſe, this ſerues not of anie value for the wit, but maketh men blockiſh, ſluggards, and grinnars, becauſe they want imagination. There is another ſort which is called *choler aduſt*, or *atra bile*, of which *Ariſtotle* ſaid, That it made men exceeding wiſe: whoſe temperature is diuers, as that of vineger; ſometimes it performeth the effects of heat, lightning the earth; and ſometimes it cooleth, but alwaies it is drie, and of a verie delicat ſubſtance. *Cicero* confeſſeth, that he was ſlow witted, becauſe he was not melancholike aduſt, and he ſaid true, for if he had beene ſuch, he ſhould not haue poſſeſſed ſo rare a gift of eloquence. For the melancholike aduſt want memorie, to which appertaineth the ſpeaking with great preparation. It hath another qualitie which much aideth the vnderſtanding, namely, that it is cleere like the Agat ſtone, with which cleereneſſe it giueth light within to the braine, and maketh the ſame to diſcerne well the figures. And of this opinion was *Heraclitus*, when he ſaid, *A drie cleereneſſe maketh a moſt wiſe mind*, with which cleereneſſe naturall melancholie is not endowed, but his blacke is deadly: and that the reaſonable ſoule there within the braine, ſtandeth in need of light to diſcerne the figures & the ſhapes, we will prooue hereafter.

To the ninth argument we anſwere, that the prudence and readineſſe of the mind which *Galen* ſpeaketh of, appertaineth to the imagination, whereby we know that which is to come, whence *Cicero* ſaid, Memorie is of things paſſed, and Prudence of thoſe to come. The readineſſe of the mind is that, which commonlie they call a ſharpeneſſe in imagining, and by other names, craftineſſe,

ſubtiltie, cauelling, wilineſſe: wherefore *Cicero* ſayth, Prudence is a ſubtiltie, which with a certaine reaſon can make choice of good things and of euill. This ſort of Prudence and readineſſe, men of good vnderſtanding doe want, becauſe they lack imagination. For which reaſon wee ſee by experience in great ſchollers in this ſort of learning, which appertaineth to the vnderſtanding, that taking them from their bookes, they are not woorth a ruſh to yeeld or receiue in trafficke of worldlie affaires. This ſpice of Prudence, *Galen* ſaid verie well, that it came of choller: for *Hippocrates* recounting to *Damagetus* his friend, in what caſe he found *Democritus*, when he went to viſit him for curing him, writeth, that he lay in the field vnder a Plane tree, bare legged, and without breeches, leaning againſt a ſtone, with a Booke in his hand, and compaſſed about with brute beaſts, dead, and diſmembred. Whereat *Hippocrates* maruailing, asked him whereto thoſe beaſts of that faſhion ſerued? and he then anſwered, that he was about to ſearch what humour it was which made a man to be headlong, craftie, readie, double, and cauillous, and had found (by making an anatomie of thoſe wild beaſts) that choller was the cauſe of ſo diſcommendable a propertie: and that to reuenge himſelfe of craftie perſons, he would handle them as he had done the Fox, the Serpent, and the Ape. This manner of Prudence is not onely odious to men, but alſo S. *Paule* ſayth of it, The wiſedome of the fleſh is enemie to God. The cauſe is aſſigned by *Plato*, who affirmeth, that knowledge which is remooued from iuſtice, ought rather to be tearmed ſubtiltie, than prudence, as if he ſhould haue ſaid, It is no reaſon, that a knowledge which is ſeuered from iuſtice, ſhould be called wiſdome, but rather craft, or malicioufneſſe: Of this the diuell euermore

ſerueth

ſerueth himſelfe to doe men dammage, and S. *Iames* ſaid, that this wiſdome came not from heauen, but is earthly, beaſtly, and diueliſh.

There is found another ſpice of wiſedome, conioyned with reaſon and ſimplicitie, and by this men know the good, and ſhun the euill: the which *Galen* affirmeth doth appertaine to the vnderſtanding, for this power is not capable of maliciouſneſſe, doubleneſſe, and ſubtiltie, nor hath the skill how to doe naught, but is whollie vpright, iuſt, gentle, and plaine. A man endowed with this ſort of wit, is called vpright and ſimple, where-through when *Demoſthenes* went about to creepe into the good liking of the iudges in an oration which he made againſt *Eſchines*, he tearmed them vpright and ſimple, in reſpect of the ſimplicitie of their dutie: concerning which, *Cicero* ſayth, Dutie is ſimple, and the onely cauſe of all good things. For this ſort of wiſedome, the cold and drie of Melancholie is a ſeruing inſtrument, but it behoueth that the ſame bee compoſed of parts verie ſubtile and delicate.

To the laſt doubt may be anſwered, that when a man ſetteth himſelfe to contemplate ſome truth, which hee would faine know, and cannot by and by find it out, the ſame groweth, for that the braine wanteth his conuenient temperature; but when a man ſtandeth rauiſhed in a contemplation, the naturall heat that is in the vitall ſpirits, and the arteriall bloud run forth-with to the head, and the temperature of the braine enhaunceth it ſelfe, vntill the ſame arriue to the tearme behoofefull. True it is, that much muzing, to ſome doth good, and to ſome harme: for if the braine want but a little to arriue to that point of conuenient heat, it is requiſit that he make but ſmall ſtay in the contemplation: and if it paſſe that point,

straightwaies the vnderstanding is driuen into a garboile, by the ouer-plentifull presence of the vitall spirits, and so he cannot attaine to the notice of the truth. For which cause, we see manie men, who vpon the suddaine speake verie well, but with aduisemēt are nothing worth. Others haue their vnderstanding so base, either through too much coldnesse, or too much drouth, that it is requisit the naturall heat abide a long time in the head, to the end the temperature may lift it selfe vp to the degrees which are wanting, where-through they speake better vpon deliberation than on the suddaine.

CHAP. VII.

It is shewed, that though the reasonable soule haue need of the temperature of the foure first qualities, as well for his abiding in the bodie, as also to discourse and syllogize: yet for all this it followeth not that the same is corruptible and mortall.

IT was held by *Plato* for a matter verie certaine, that the reasonable soule is a substance bodilesse and spirituall: not subiect to corruption or mortalitie, as that of brute beasts: the which departing from the bodie, possesseth another better and more quiet life. But this is to be vnderstood (sayth *Plato*) if a man haue led his life conformable to reason, for otherwise, it were better that the soule had remained still in the bodie, there to suffer the torments, with which God chastiseth the wicked. This conclusion is so notable and catholicke, that if he attained

ned the knowledge thereof by the happineſſe of his wit, with a iuſt title he came to be called the diuine *Plato*. But albeit the ſame is ſuch as we ſee, yet for all this *Galen* could neuer bring within his conceit, that it was true, but held it alwaies doubtfull, ſeeing a wiſe man through the heat of his braine, to dote, and by applying cold medicines vnto him, hee commeth to his wits againe. In reſpect whereof, he ſaid, he could wiſh that *Plato* were now liuing, to the end he might aske him how it was poſſible that the reaſonable ſoule ſhould be immortall, ſeeing it altered ſo eaſily with heat, with cold, with moiſture, and with drouth: and principally, conſidering that the ſame departs from the bodie through ouermuch heat, or when a man giueth ouer himſelfe exceſſiuely to laſciuiouſneſſe, or is forced to drinke poyſon, and ſuch other bodily alterations, which accuſtomably bereaue the life? For if it were bodileſſe and ſpirituall (as *Plato* affirmeth) heat, being a materiall qualitie, could not make the ſame to leeſe his powers, nor ſet his operations in a garboile.

Galen dying, went to hell, and ſaw by experience that materiall fire burned the ſouls, and could not conſume them: this Phyſition had knowledge of that Euangelicall doctrine, and could not receiue it.

Theſe reaſons brought *Galen* into a confuſion, and made him wiſh, that ſome *Platoniſt* would reſolue him theſe doubts, aud I beleeue, that in his life time he met not with anie, but after his death experience ſhewed him that which his vnderſtanding could not conceiue. For it is a thing certaine, that the infallible certainetie of our immortall Soule is not gathered from humane reaſons, or from arguments which prooue that it is corruptible, for to the one and the other an anſwere may eaſily be ſhaped, it is onely our faith which maketh vs certaine and aſſured, that the ſame endureth for euer. But *Galen* had ſmall reaſon to intricate himſelfe in arguments of ſo ſlight conſe-

consequence, for the workes which seeme to bee performed by meanes of some instrument, it cannot well be gathered in naturall Philosophie, that it proceedeth from a defect in the principall agent, if they take not perfection. That Painter who portraieth well when he hath a pensill requisit for his art, falleth not in blame, if with a bad pensill he draw ill fauoured shapes, and of bad delineation: and it is no good argument to say, that the writer had an imperfection in his hand, when through default of a well made penne he is forced to write with a sticke. *Galen* considering the maruellous works which are in the vniuerse, and the wisedome and prouidence by which they were made and ordained, concluded thereof, That in the world there was a God, though we behold him not with our corporall eyes, of whom hee vttered these words; God was not made at anie time, in as much as he is euerlastinglie vnbegotten. And in another place he sayth, That the frame and composition of mans bodie was not made by the reasonable soule, nor by the naturall heat, but by God, or by some verie wise vnderstanding.

Out of which there may bee framed an argument against *Galen*, and his false consequence be ouerthrowne, and it is thus: Thou hast suspected that the reasonable soule is corruptible, because if the braine be well tempered, it fitteth well to discourse and philosophise, and if the same grow hot or cold beyond due, it doteth, and vttereth a thousand follies; the same may be inferred, considering the workes which thou speakest of, as touching God: for if hee make a man in places temperat (where the heat exceedeth not the cold, nor the moyst the drie) he produceth him verie wittie and discreet, and if the countrie bee vntemperate, hee breedeth them all fooles

fooles and doltish. For the same *Galen* affirmeth, that it is a miracle to find a wise man in *Scythia*, and in *Athens* they are all borne Philosophers. To suspect then that God is corruptible, because with one qualitie hee performeth these works well, and with the contrarie they proue ill, *Galen* himselfe would not confesse, for as much as he said before, that God was euerlasting.

Plato held another way of more certaintie, saying, That albeit God be euerlasting, almightie, and of infinit wisedome: yet he proceedeth in his workes as a naturall agent, and makes himselfe subiect to the disposition of the foure first qualities: in sort, that to beget a man verie wise, and like to himselfe, it behoooueth that he prouide a place the most temperate of the whole world, where the heat of the aire may not exceed the cold, nor the moyst the drie, and therefore he said, But God as desirous of warre, and of wisedome, hauing chosen a place which should produce men like vnto himselfe, would that the same should be first inhabited: and though God would shape a man of great wisedome in *Scythia*, or in anie other temperate countrey, and did not herein imploy his omnipotencie, he should of necessitie yet prooue a foole, through the contrarietie of the first qualities. But *Plato* would not haue inferred (as *Galen* did) that God was alterable and corruptible: for that the heat and coldnesse would haue brought an impediment to his worke. The same may be collected, when a reasonable soule, for that it is seated in a braine inflamed, cannot vse his discretion and wisdome; and not to thinke, that in respect thereof the same is subiect to mortalitie and corruption. The departure out of the bodie, and the not being able to support the great heate, nor the other alterations which are woont to kill men, shew-

eth

eth plainly, that the same is an act and substantiall forme of mans bodie, and that to abide therein, it requireth certaine materiall dispositions, fitted to the being which it hath of the soule, and that the instruments with which it must worke, be well composed, and well vnited, and of that temperature which is requisit for his operations, all which failing, it behoueth of force, that it erre in them, and depart from the bodie.

The error of *Galen* consisted, in that he would verifie by the principles of naturall Philosophie, Whether the reasonable soule, issuing out of the bodie, doe forthwith die or not: this being a question which appertaineth to another superiour science, and of more certaine principles; in which wee will proove, that it is no good argument, nor concludeth well, that the soule of man is corruptible, because the same dwelleth quietlie in a bodie endowed with these qualities, and departeth when they doe faile. Neither is this difficult to be prooued: for other spirituall substances, of greater perfection than the reasonable soule, doe make choice of place, altered with materiall qualities, in which it seemeth they take abode with their content: and if there succeed anie contrarie dispositions, forthwith they depart, because they cannot endure it: for it is a thing certaine, that there are to be found some dispositions in a mans bodie, which the Diuell coueteth with so great eagernesse, as to enioy them, he entereth into the man where they rested, wherethrough he becommeth possessed: but the same being corrupted and changed by contrarie medicines, and an alteration beeing wrought in these blacke, filthie, and stinking humours, he naturally comes to depart. This is plainely discerned by experience: for if there be in a house, great, darke, foule, putrified, melancholicke, and

void

void of dwellers to make abode therein, the diuels soone take it vp for their lodging: but if the same bee cleansed, the windowes opened, and the sunne-beames admitted to enter, by and by they get them packing, and specially if it be inhabited by much companie, and that there be meetings and pastimes, and playing on musicall instruments. How greatlie harmonie and good proportion offendeth the diuell, is apparantlie seene by the authoritie of the diuine Scripture: where wee find recounted, That *Dauid* taking a Harpe, and playing there upon, straightwaies made the diuels runne away, and depart out of *Saule* his bodie. And albeit this matter haue his spirituall vnderstanding: yet I conceiue thereby, that musicke naturally molesteth the Diuell, where-through he cannot in anie sort endure it. The people of Israell knew before by experience, that the diuell was enemie to musicke, and because they had notice thereof, *Sauls* seruants spake these words: Behold, the euill spirit of the Lord tormenteth thee, let my Lord the king therefore commaund, that thy seruants who wait in thy presence search out a man who can play vpon the Citherne, to the end that when the euill spirit of the Lord taketh thee, he may play with his hand, that thou thereby mayst receiue ease. In the selfe same manner as there are found out words and coniurations, which making the diuell to tremble, and not to heare them: hee abandoneth the place which he chose for his habitation. So *Ioseph* recounteth that *Salomon* left in writing certaine manners of coniuration, by which hee not onely chased away the diuell for the present time, but hee neuer had the hardinesse to returne againe to that bodie from whence hee was once so expelled. The same *Salomon* shewed also a roote of so abhominable sauour in the diuels nose,

that

that if it were applied to the nosthrils of the possessed, he would forth-with shake his eares and runne away. The Diuell is so slouinly, so melancholike, and so much an enemie to things neat, cheerefull, and cleere, that when Christ entered into the region of *Genezaret*, S. *Matthew* recounteth, how certaine diuels met him in dead carcases, which they had caught of their graues, crying and saying, *Iesu* thou sonne of *Dauid* what hast thou to doe with vs, that thou art come before hand to torment vs? we pray thee, that if thou be to driue vs out of this place where wee are, thou wilt let vs enter into that Heard of Swine which is yonder. For which reason, the holie Scripture tearmeth them vncleane spirits. Whence we plainely discerne, that not onely the reasonable soule requireth such dispositions in the bodie, that they may informe it, and bee the beginning of all his operations, but also hath need to soiourne therein, as in a place befitting his nature.

The Diuels then (being a substance of more perfection) abhorre some bodilie qualities, and in the contrarie take pleasure & contentment. In sort, that this of *Galen* is no good argument, The reasonable soule through excesse of heat departs from the bodie, *ergo* it is corruptible, in as much as the diuell doth the like (as wee haue said) and yet for all this is not mortall.

But that which to this purpose deserueth most note, is, that the Diuell not onely coueteth places alterable with bodilie qualities, to soiourne there at his pleasure: but also when he will worke anie thing which much importeth him, he serues himselfe with such bodilie qualities as are aidable to that effect. For if I should demaund now, wherein the Diuell grounded himselfe, when minding to beguile *Eue*, he entered rather into a venemous serpent,

ſerpent, than into a Horſe, a Beare, a Woolfe, or anie other beaſt, which were not of ſo ghaſtly ſhape? I wot not what might be giuen in anſwere: well I know that *Galen* admitteth not the ſentences of *Moſes*, nor of Chriſt our redeemer, becauſe (ſayth hee) they both ſpeake without making demonſtration: but I haue alwayes deſired to learne from ſome Catholike the ſolution of this doubt, and none hath yet ſatisfied mee.

This is certaine (as alreadie wee haue prooued) that burnt and inflamed choller, is an humour which teacheth the reaſonable ſoule in what ſort to practiſe treaſons and trecheries; and amongſt brute beaſts, there is none which ſo much partaketh of this humour as the ſerpent, where-through more than all the reſt (ſayth the ſcripture) he is craftie and guilefull. The reaſonable ſoule although it be the meaneſt of all the intelligences, partakes yet the ſame nature with the diuell and the angels. And in like manner, as there it takes the ſeruice of venemous choller, to make a man wilie and ſubtile: ſo the diuell (being entered into the bodie of this cruell beaſt) made himſelfe the more cunning and deceitfull. This manner of Philoſophiſing will not ſticke much in the naturall Philoſophers ſtomacks, becauſe the ſame carrieth ſome apparance that it may be ſo: but that which will breed them more aſtoniſhment, is, that when God would draw the world out of errour, and eaſily teach them the truth (a worke contrarie to that which the diuell went about) he came in the ſhape of a Doue, and not of an Eagle, nor a Peacocke, nor of any other birds of fairer figure: and the cauſe knowne, is this, that the Doue partaketh much of the humour which enclineth to vprightneſſe, to plainneſſe, to truth, and to ſimplicitie; and wanteth choller, the inſtrument of guile & malicioufnes.

None

None of these things are admitted by *Galen*, nor by the naturall Philosophers: for they cannot conceiue, how the reasonable soule and the diuell (being spirituall substances) can be altered by materiall qualities, as are heat, coldnesse, moysture, and drouth. For if fire bring in heat to the wood, it is because they both possesse a bodie and a quantitie, whereof they are the subiect: the which faileth in spirituall substances, and admit (as a thing yet impossible) that bodilie qualities might alter a spirituall substance, what eyes hath the diuell or the reasonable soule, wherewith to see the colours and shapes of things? or what smelling, to receiue sauours? or what hearing, for musicke? or what feeling, to rest offended with much heat, seeing that for all these, bodily instruments are behooffull? And if the reasonable soule, being seuered from the bodie, remaine agreeued, and receiue anguish and sadnesse, it is not possible that his nature should rest free from alteration, or not come to corruption. These difficulties and arguments perplexed *Galen* and the other Philosophers of our times, but with me they conclude nothing. For when *Aristotle* affirmed, That the chiefest propertie which substance had, was to be subiect to accidents, he restrained the same neither to bodily nor to spirituall: for the propertie of the generall is equally partaked by the speciall, and so he said, that the accidents of the bodie passe to the substance of the reasonable soule, and those of the soule to the bodie: on which principle he grounded himselfe, to write all that which he vttered as touching *Phisnomie*, especiallie, that the accidents by which the powers receiue alteration, are all spirituall, without bodie, and without quantitie or matter: and so they grow to multiplie in a moment, through their meane, and passe through a glasse-window with-

without breaking the same. And two contrarie accidents may be extended in one selfe subiect as much as possibly they can be. In respect of which selfe qualitie, *Galen* tearmeth them vndiuidable, and the vulgar Phisophers intentionall: and the matter being in this sort, they may be verie well proportioned with the spirituall substance.

I cannot forgoe to thinke, that the reasonable soule seuered from the bodie, as also the diuell, hath a power sightfull, smelling, hearing, and feeling. The which (me seemeth) is easie to be prooued: For if it be true, that their powers be knowne by meanes of their actions, it is a thing certaine, that the diuell had a smelling power, when he smelled that root which *Salomon* commaunded should be applied to the nosthrils of the possessed: And likewise that he had a hearing power, seeing he heard the musicke which *Dauid* made to *Saule*. To say then, that the diuell receiued these qualities by his vnderstanding, it is a matter not auouchable in the doctrine of the vulgar Philosophers: For this power is spirituall, and the obiects of the fiue sences are materiall: and so it behooueth to seeke out some other powers in the reasonable soule, and in the diuell, to which they may carrie proportion. And if not, put case that the soule of the rich glutton had obtained at the hands of *Abraham*, that the soule of *Lazarus* should returne to the world, to preach to his brethren, and perswade them that they should become honest men, to the end they might not passe to that place of torments where himselfe abode: I demaund now, in what manner the soule of *Lazarus* should haue knowne to goe to the citie, and to those mens houses; and if the same had met them by the way, in companie with others, whether it could haue

knowne them by sight, and beene able to diuersifie them from those who came with them? and if those brethren of the rich glutton, had inquired of the same who it was, and who had sent it: whether the same did partake anie power to heare their words? The same may be demaunded of the diuell when he followed after Christ our redeemer, hearing him to preach, and seeing the miracles which he did, and in that disputation which they had togither in the wildernesse, with what eares the diuell receiued the words and the answeres which Christ gaue vnto him.

Verily, it betokens a want of vnderstanding, to thinke that the diuell or the reasonable soule (sundered from the bodie) cannot know the obiects of the fiue sences, albeit they want the bodily instruments. For by the same reason I will proove vnto them, that the reasonable soule, seuered from the bodie, cannot vnderstand, imagine, nor performe the actions of memorie. For if whileſt the same abideth in the bodie, it cannot see being depriued of eies: neither can it discourse or remember, if the braine be inflamed. To say then, that the reasonable soule, seuered from the bodie, cannot discourse, becauſe it hath no braine, is a follie verie great, the which is proued by the selfe historie of *Abraham*: Sonne remember, that thou hast enioyed good things in thy life time, and *Lazarus* likewise euill, but now he is comforted, and thou art tormented; and besides all this, there is placed betwixt you and vs a great *Chaos*, in sort that those who would passe from hence to you, cannot, nor from you to vs. And he said, I pray thee then, O father, that thou wilt send to my fathers house, for I haue fiue brothers, that he may yeeld testimonie vnto them, so as they come not also to this place of torments.

Whence

Whence I conclude, that as these two soules discoursed betweene themselues, and the rich glutton remembred, that he had fiue brothers in his fathers house, and *Abraham* brought to his remembrance the delicious life which he had liued in the world, together with *Lazarus* penance, and this without vse of the braine: so also the soules can see without bodily eyes, heare without eares, tast without a tongue, smell without nosthrils, and touch without sinewes and without flesh, and that much better beyond comparison. The like may be vnderstood of the Diuell, for he partaketh the same nature with the reasonable soule.

All these doubts the soule of the rich glutton will verie well resolue: of whom S. *Luke* recounteth, That being in hell, he lifted vp his eyes and beheld *Lazarus*, who was in *Abrahams* bosome, and with a loud voyce said: Father *Abraham* haue mercie on me, send *Lazarus*, that he may dip the point of his finger in water, and coole my tongue, for I am tormented in this flame. Out of the passed doctrine, and out of that which is there read, we gather, that the fire of hell burneth the soules, and is materiall as this of ours, and that the same annoyed the rich glutton and the other soules (by Gods ordinance) with his heat, and that if *Lazarus* had carried to him a pitcher of fresh water, hee should haue taken great refreshment thereof: and the reason is verie plaine, for if that soule could not endure to abide in the bodie, through excessiue heat of the Feauer, and when the same dranke fresh water, the soule felt refreshment, why may not wee conceiue the like, when the soule is vnited with the flames of the fire infernall? The rich Gluttons lifting vp of his eyes, his thirstie tongue, and *Lazarus* finger, are all names of the powers of the soule, that so the Scriptures might

expresse them. Those who walke not in this path, and ground not themselues on naturall Philosophie, vtter a thousand follies. But yet hence it cannot be concluded, that if the reasonable soule partake griefe and sorrow (for that his nature is altered by contrary qualities) therefore the same is corruptible or mortall: For ashes, though they be compounded of the foure elements, and of action and power, yet there is no naturall agent in the world which can corrupt them, or take from them the qualities that are agreeable to their nature. The naturall temperature of ashes, we all know to be cold and drie, but though wee cast them neuer so much into the fire, they will not leese their radicall coldnesse which they enioy: and albeit they remaine a hundred thousand yeares in the water, it is impossible that (being taken thence) they hold anie naturall moisture of their owne: and yet for all this, we cannot but grant, that by fire they receiue heat, and by water moisture. But these two qualities are superficiall in the ashes, and endure a small time in the subiect; for taken from the fire, forth-with they become cold, and from the water they abide not moist an houre.

But there is offered a doubt in this discourse and reasoning of the rich glutton with *Abraham*, and that is, How the soule of *Abraham* was indowed with better reason than that of the rich man: it being alleadged before, that all reasonable soules (issued out of the bodie) are of equall perfection and knowledge? whereto wee may answere in one of these two manners. The first is, that the Science and knowledge which the soule purchaseth, whilest it remaineth in the bodie, is not lost when a man dieth, but rather groweth more perfect, for he is freed from some errors. The soule of *Abraham*, departed out of this life, repleniſhed with wisedome, and

with

with manie reuelations and secrets which God communicated vnto him, as his verie friend: but that of the rich glutton, it behooued that of necessitie it should depart away ignorant: first, by reason of his sinne, which createth ignorance in a man: and next, for that riches herein worke a contrarie effect vnto pouertie: this giueth a man wit, as hereafter we may well proue, and prosperitie reaueth it away. There may also another answere be giuen after our doctrine, and it is this, that the matter of which these two soules disputed, was schoole-diuinitie: For, to know whether abiding in hell there were place for mercie, and whether *Lazarus* might passe vnto hell, and whether it were conuient to send a deceased person to the world, who should giue notice to the liuing of the torments which the damned there indured, are all schoole points; whose decision appertaineth to the vnderstanding, as hereafter I will make proofe. And amongst the first qualities, there is none which so much garboileth this power, as excessiue heat, with which the rich Glutton was so tormented. But the soule of *Abraham* made his abode in a place most temperate, where it enioyed great delight and refreshment: and therefore it bred no great woonder, that the same was better able to dispute. I concluding then, that the reasonable soule and the diuell in their operations vse the seruice of materiall qualities, and that by some they rest agreeued, and by other some they receiue contentment. And for this reason they couet to make abode in some places, and flie from some other, and yet notwithstanding are not corruptible.

CHAP. VIII.

How there may be assigned to euerie difference of wit, his Science, which shalbe correspondent to him in particular: and that which is repugnant and contrarie, be abandoned.

ALl artes (saith *Cicero*) are placed vnder certaine vniuersall principles: which being learned with studie and trauaile, finally wee so grow to attaine vnto them: but the art of Poesie is in this so speciall, as if God or Nature make not a man a Poet, little auailes it to deliuer him the precepts and rules of versifying. For which cause he said thus, The studying and learning of other matters consisteth in precepts and in artes: but a Poet taketh the course of Nature it selfe, and is stirred vp by the forces of the mind, and as it were enflamed by a certaine diuine spirit. But herein *Cicero* swarued from reason: for verily, there is no Science or Art deuised in the commonwealth, which if a man wanting capacitie for himselfe to applie, he shall reape anie profit thereof; albeit he toile all the daies of his life in the precepts and rules of the same: but if he applie himselfe to that which is agreeable with his naturall abilitie, wee see that he will learne in two daies. The like we say of Poesie without any difference, that if he who hath any answerable nature, giue himselfe to make verses, hee performeth the same with great perfection, and if otherwise, he shal neuer be good Poet.

This being so, it seemeth now high time to learne by way

way of Art, what difference of Science is answerable in particular to what difference of wit, to the end, that euerie one may vnderstand with distinction (after he is acquainted with his owne nature) to what Art hee hath a naturall disposition. The Arts and Sciences which are gotten by the memorie, are these following, *Latine, Grammar*, or of whatsoeuer other language, the *Theorike* of the lawes, Diuinitie positiue, *Cosmographie*, and *Arithmeticke*.

Those which appertaine to the vnderstanding, are Schoole-diuinitie, the *Theoricke of Phisicke, Logicke, naturall and morall Philosophie*, and the practicke of the lawes, which we tearme pleading. From a good imagination spring all the Arts and Sciences, which consist in figure, correspondencie, harmonie, and propottion: such are Poetrie, Eloquence, Musicke, and the skill of preaching: the practise of Phisicke, the Mathematicals, Astrologie, and the gouerning of a Common-wealth: the art of Warfare, Painting, Drawing, Writing, Reading, to be a man gratious, pleasant, neat, wittie in managing, and all the engines and deuices which artificers make: besides a certaine speciall gift, whereat the vulgar maruelleth, and that is, to endite diuers matters, vnto foure, who write together, and yet all to be penned in good sort. Of all this we cannot make euident demonstration, nor proue euerie point by it selfe: For it were an infinit peece of worke, notwithstanding by making proofe thereof in three or foure Sciences, the same reason will afterwards preuaile for the rest.

In the catalogue of Sciences which we said appertained to the memorie, we placed the Latine tongue, and such other, as all the nations in the world doe speake: the which no wise man will denie: for tongues were deuised

by men; that they might communicate amongst themselues, and expresse one to another their conceits, without that in them there lie hid anie other misterie or naturall principles: for that the first deuisers agreed togither, and after their best liking (as *Aristotle* saith) framed the words, and gaue to euerie each his signification. From hence arose so great a number of words, and so manie manners of speech so farre besides rule and reason, that if a man had not a good memorie, it were impossible to learne them with anie other power. How little the vnderstanding and the imagination make for the purpose, to learne languages and manners of speech, is easily prooued by childhood: which being the age wherein man most wanteth these two powers, yet (saith *Aristotle*) children learne anie language more readily than elder men, though these are endowed with a better discourse of reason. And without further speech, experience plainly prooueth this, for so much as we see, that if a Biscane of thirtie or fortie yeares age come to dwell in *Castilia*, hee will neuer learne this language: but if hee be but a boy, within two or three yeares you would thinke him borne in *Toleda*. The same befals in the Latine tongue, and in those of all the rest of the world: for all languages hold one selfe consideration. Then if in the age when memorie chiefly raigneth, and the vnderstanding and the imagination least, languages are better learned than when there growes defect of memorie, and an encrease of vnderstanding; it fals out apparant, that they are purchased by the memorie, and by none other power. Languages (saith *Aristotle*) cannot be gathered out by reason, nor consist in discourse or disputations, for which cause it is necessarie to heare the word from another, and the signification which it beareth, and to keepe the

ſame in mind, and ſo he prooueth, that if a man be borne deafe, it followes of neceſſitie that he be alſo dumbe, for hee cannot heare from another the alteration of the names, nor the ſignification which was giuen them by the firſt deuiſer.

That languages are at pleaſure, and a conceit of mens braines, and nought elſe, is plainely prooued; for in them all may the ſciences be taught, and in each is to bee ſaid and expreſſed that which by the other is inferred. Therefore none of the graue authors attended the learning of ſtrange tongues, thereby to deliuer their conceits: but the Greekes wrot in Greecke, the Romanes in Latine, the Hebrues in the Hebrue language, and the Moores in Arabique, and ſo doe I in my Spaniſh, becauſe I know this better than anie other. The Romans as lords of the world, finding it was neceſſarie to haue one common language, by which all nations might haue commerce together, and themſelues be able to heare and vnderſtand ſuch as came to demaund juſtice, and things appertaining to their gouernment, commanded that in all places of their Empire there ſhould ſchooles be kept, where the Latine tongue might be taught, and ſo this vſage hath endured euen to our time.

Schoole-diuinitie, it is a matter certaine that it appertaineth to the vnderſtanding, preſuppoſing that the operations of this power are to diſtinguiſh, conclude, diſcourſe, iudge, and make choice; for nothing is done in this facultie, which is not to doubt for inconueniences, to anſwere with diſtinction, and againſt the anſwere to conclude that which is gathered in good conſequence, and to returne to replication, vntill the vnderſtanding find where to ſettle. But the greateſt proofe which in this caſe may bee made, is to giue to vnderſtand with

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how great difficultie the Latine tongue is ioyned with *Schoole diuinitie*, and how ordinarily it falleth not out, that one ſelfe man is a good Latiniſt, and a profound ſcholler: at which effect, ſome curious heads, who haue lighted hereon, much maruelling, procured to ſearch out the cauſe from whence the ſame might ſpring, and by their conceit found, that *Schoole diuinitie* being written in an eaſie and common language, and the great *Latiniſts* hauing accuſtomed their eare to the well ſounding and fine ſtile of *Cicero*, they cannot applie themſelues to this other. But well ſhould it fall out for the Latiniſts, if this were the cauſe: for, forcing their hearing by vſe, they ſhould meet with a remedie for this infirmitie: but to ſpeake truth, it is rather an head-ach than an eare-ſore. Such as are skilfull in the Latine tongue, it is neceſſarie that they haue a great memorie: for otherwiſe, they can neuer become ſo perfect in a tongue which is not theirs: and becauſe a great and happie memorie is as it were contrarie to a great and high raiſed vnderſtanding, in one ſubiect, where the one is placed, the other is chaſed away.

Hence remaineth it, that he who hath not ſo deepe and loftie an vnderſtanding (a power whereto appertaineth, to diſtinguiſh, conclude, diſcourſe, iudge, and chuſe) cannot ſoone attaine the skill of *Schoole diuinitie*. Let him that will not allow this reaſon for currant payment, read *S. Thomas*, *Scot*, *Durand*, and *Caietane*, who are the principall in this facultie, and in them he ſhall find manie excellent points endited and written, in a ſtile verie eaſie and common. And this proceeded from none other cauſe, than that theſe graue authours had from their childhood a feeble memorie, for profiting in the Latine tongue. But comming to *Logicke*, *Metaphiſick*, and

Schoole

Schoole diuinitie, they reaped that great fruit which wee see, because they had great vnderstanding.

I can speake of a *Schoole diuine* (and manie other can verefie the same, that knew and conuersed with him) who beeing a principall man in this facultie, not onely spake not finely, nor with well shaped sentences, in imitation of *Cicero*: but whilest he read in a chaire, his schollers noted in him, that he had lesse than a meane knowledge in the Latine tongue: Therefore they councelled him (as men ignorant of this doctrine) that he should secretlie steale some houre of the day from *Schoole diuinitie*, and employ the same in reading of *Cicero*. Who knowing this counsell to proceed from his good friends, not onely procured to remedie it priuily, but also publickly, after he had read the matter of the trinitie, and how the diuine word might take flesh, he meant to heare a Lecture of the Latine tongue: and it fell out a matter worthie consideration, that in the long time while he did so, hee not onely learned nothing of new, but grew welneere to leese that little Latine which hee had before, and so at last was driuen to reade in the vulgar. *Pius* the fourth enquiring what Diuines were of most speciall note at the Counsell of *Trent*, he was told of a most singular *Spanish* Diuine, whose solutions, answeres, arguments, and distinctions, were worthie of admiration: the Pope therefore desirous to see and know so rare a man, sent word vnto him that he should come to *Rome*, and render him account of what was done in the Councell. Hee came, and the Pope did him manie fauours, amongst the rest commaunded him to be couered, and taking him by the hand, led him walking to *Castle* S. *Angelo*, and speaking verie good Latine, shewed him his deuice touching certaine fortifications which he was then about

about to make the Castle stronger, asking his opinion in some particulars: but he answered the Pope so intricately, for that he could not speake Latine, that the Spanish Embassadour, who at that time was *Don Lewes de Requesens*, great Commander of *Castilia*, was faine to step forth to grace him with his Latine, and to turne the Popes discourse into another matter. Finally, the Pope said to his Chamberlains, it was not possible that this man had so much skill in diuinitie, as they made report, seeing he had so little knowledge in the Latine tongue. But if as he proued him in this toung, which is a worke of memorie, and in platforming, and building, which belong to the imagination, so he had tried him in a matter appertaining to the vnderstanding, he would haue vttered diuine considerations. In the Catalogue of Sciences, which appertaine to the imagination, we placed Poetrie amongst the first, and that not by chance nor for want of consideration, but thereby to giue notice, how farre off those who haue a speciall gift in Poetrie, are from vnderstanding. For wee shall find, that the selfe difficultie which the Latine tongue holdeth in vniting with *Schoole diuinitie*, is also found (yea and beyond comparison farre greater) betweene this facultie and the art of versifying: and the same is so contrarie to the vnderstanding, that by the selfe reason for which man is likely to proue singular therein, hee may take his leaue of all the other sciences which appertaine to this power, and also to the Latine tongue, through the contrarietie which a good imagination beareth to great memorie.

For the first of these two, *Aristotle* found not the reason, but yet confirmed mine opinion by experience, saying: *Marke*, a Citizen of *Siracusa*, was best Poet, when he lost his vnderstanding, and the cause is, for that

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the difference of the imagination to which Poetrie belongeth, is that which requireth three degrees of heat, and this qualitie so extended (as wee haue before expressed) breeds an vtter losse of the vnderstanding, the which was obserued by the same *Aristotle*. For he affirmeth, that this *Marke* the *Siracusane* growing to more temperature, enioyed a better vnderstanding, but yet he attained not to versifie so well, through default of heat, with which, this difference of the imagination worketh. And this *Cicero* wanted, when going about to describe in verse the Heroicall actions of his Consulship, and the happie birth of Rome, in that she was gouerned by him, he said thus, *O fortunatam natam me consule Romam*. For which cause, *Iuuenall* not conceiuing, that to a man endowed with so rare a wit, as *Cicero*, Poetrie was a matter repugnant, did Satirically nip him, saying, If thou hadst rehearsed the *Philippicks* against *Marke Antony*, answereable to the tune of so bad a verse, it should not haue cost thy life.

But worse did *Plato* vnderstand the same, when hee said, that Poetrie was no humane Science, but a diuine reuelation. For if the Poets were not rauished besides themselues, or full of God, they could not make nor vtter anie thing worthie regard. And he prooueth it by a reason, auouching, that whilest a man abideth in his sound iudgement, he cannot versifie. But *Aristotle* reprooueth him, for affirming that the art of Poetrie is not an abilitie of man, but a reuelation of God: And he admitteth, that a wise man, and who is free possessed of his iudgement, cannot bee a Poet: and the reason is, because where there resteth much vnderstanding, it behoueth of force, that there befall want of the imagination, whereto appertaineth the art of versifying: which may

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the more apparently be prooued, knowing that *Socrates* after he had learned the art of Poetrie, for all his precepts and rules, could not make so much as one verse: and yet notwithstanding, he was by the oracle of *Apollo* adiudged the wisest man of the world.

I hold it then for certaine, that the boy who will prooue of a notable vaine for versifying, and to whom, vpon euerie sleight consideratn, consonances offer themselues, shall ordinarily incurre hazard not to learne well the Latine tongue, Logicke, Philosophie, Phisicke, Schoole-diuinitie, and the other artes and sciences, which appertaine to the vnderstanding, and to the memorie. For which cause wee see by experience, that if wee charge such a boy to forme a *nominatiue* without booke, he will not learne it in two or three dayes: but if there be a leafe of paper written in verse, to be recited in anie Comedie, in two turnes he fixeth them in his memorie. These loose themselues by reading bookes of Chiualrie: *Orlando, Boccace, Diana of Monte maggior*, and such other deuices: for all these are workes of the imagination. What shall wee say then of the harmonie of the Organs, and of the singing men of the Chappell, whose wits are most vnprofitable for the Latine tongue, and for all other Sciences which appertaine to the vnderstanding and to the memorie? the like reason serueth in playing on instruments, and all sorts of musicke. By these three examples which wee haue yeelded, of the Latine, of Schoole-diuinitie, and of Poetrie, we shall vnderstand this doctrine to be true, and that we haue duly made this partition, albeit we make not the like mention in the other arts.

Writing also discouereth the imagination, and so we see, that few men of good vnderstanding doe write a faire

faire hand, and to this purpose I haue noted manie examples: and specially I haue knowne a most learned Schoole-diuine, who shaming at himselfe to see how bad a hand he wrote, durst not write a letter to anie man, nor to answere those which were sent to him: so as he determined with himselfe, to get a Scriuener secretly to his house, who should teach him to frame a reasonable letter that might passe, and hauing for manie dayes taken paines herein, it prooued lost labour, and hee reaped no profit thereby. Wherefore, as tyred out, he forsooke the practise: and the teacher, who had taken him in hand, grew astonished, to see a man so learned in his profession, to be so vntoward for writing. But my selfe, who rest well assured, that writing is a worke of the imagination, held the same for a naturall effect. And if anie man bee desirous to see and note it, let him consider the Schollers, who get their liuings in the Vniuersities, by copying out of writings in good forme, and he shall find, that they can little skill of Grammer, Logicke, and Philosophie, and if they studie Phisicke or Diuinitie, they fish nothing neere the bottome. The boy then, who with his pen can tricke a Horse to the life, and a man in good shape, and can make a good paire of it serues little to employ him in anie sort of learning, but will doe best, to set him to some Painter, who by art may bring forward his nature.

To reade well and with readinesse, discouereth also a certaine spice of the imagination, and if the same be verie effectuall, it booteth little to spend much time at his booke, but shall doe better to set him to get his liuing by reading of processes. Here a thing note worthie offereth it selfe, and that is, that the difference of the imagination, which maketh men eloquent and pleasant, is

contrarie

contrarie to that which is behoofefull for a man to read with facilitie, wherethrough none who is prompt-witted can learne to read without ſtumbling, and putting too ſomewhat of his owne head.

To play well at *Primero*, and to face and vie, and to hold and giue ouer when time ſerueth, and by coniectures to know his aduerſaries game, and the skill of diſcarding, are all workes of the imagination. The like wee ſay of playing at *Cent*, and at Triumph, though not ſo far forth as the *Primero* of *Almaigne*: and the ſame not onely maketh proofe and demonſtration of the difference of the wit, but alſo diſcouereth all the vertues and vices in a man. For at euerie moment there are offered occaſions in this play, by which a man ſhall diſcouer, what he would doe in matters of great importance, if oportunitie ſerued.

Cheſſe-play is one of the things which beſt diſcouereth the imagination: for hee that makes ten or twelue faire draughts one after another on the Cheſſe-boord, giues an euill token of profiting in the Sciences which belong to the vnderſtanding, and to the memorie, vnleſſe it fall out, that he make an vnion of two or three powers, as we haue alreadie noted. And if a verie learned Schoole-diuine (of mine acquaintance) had been skilled in this doctrine, he ſhould haue got notice of a matter, which made him verie doubtfull. He vſed to play often with a ſeruant of his, and lighting moſtly on the loſſe, told him, much mooued: Sirha, how comes it to paſſe, that thou who canſt skill neither of Latine, nor Logicke, nor Diuinitie, though thou haſt ſtudied it, yet beateſt me that am full of *Scot* and S. *Thomas*? Is it poſſible that thou ſhouldeſt haue a better wit than I? verily I cannot beleeue it, except the Diuell reueale vnto thee what

draughts

draughts thou ſhouldſt make: and the miſterie was, that he had great vnderſtanding, with which he attained the delicacies of *Scot* and *Thomas*, but wanted that difference of imagination, which ſerueth for Cheſſe-play, whereas his ſeruant had an ill vnderſtanding, and a bad memorie, but a good imagination. The Schollers who haue their bookes well righted, and their Chamber well dreſſed, and cleane kept, euerie thing in his due place and order, haue a certaine difference of imagination, verie contrarie to the vnderſtanding, and to the memorie.

Such a like wit haue men who goe neat and handſomely apparelled, who looke all about their cape for a mote, and take diſlike at anie one wrie plait of their garment, this (aſſuredly) ſpringeth from their imagination. For if a man that had no skill in verſifying, nor towardlineſſe thereunto, chance to fall in loue, ſodainly (ſayth *Plato*) he becomes a Poet, and verie trim and handſome: for loue heateth and drieth his braine, and theſe are qualities which quicken the imagination: the like (as *Iuuenall* noteth) anger doth effect, which paſſion heateth alſo the braine:

Anger makes verſe, if Nature but denie.

Gracious talkers and imitaters, and ſuch as can hold at bay, haue a certaine difference of imagination, verie contrarie to the vnderſtanding and to the memorie. For which cauſe they neuer prooue learned in Grammar, Logicke, Schoole-diuinitie, Phiſicke, or the lawes. If then they be wittie in managing, toward for euerie matter they take in hand, readie in ſpeech, and anſwering to the purpoſe: theſe are fit to ſerue in courts of Iuſtice, for ſollicitors, atturnies, marchants, and factors to buy and ſell, but not for learning. Herein the vulgar is much deceiued, ſeeing them ſo readie at all hands, and them

ſeeneth, that if ſuch gaue themſelues to learning, they would proue notable fellowes: but in ſubſtance there is no wit more repugnant in matters of learning, than theſe. Children that are ſlow of ſpeech, haue a moyſtneſſe in their tongue, and alſo in their braine: but that wearing away, in proceſſe of time they become verie eloquent, and great talkers, through the great memorie which they get when that moyſture is tempered.

This we know by the things tofore rehearſed, befell that famous Orator *Demoſthenes*, of whom we ſaid, that *Cicero* maruelled, how being ſo blunt of ſpeech when he was a boy, growing greater, he became ſo eloquent. Children alſo, who haue a good voyce, and warble in the throat, are moſt vntoward for all Sciences, and the reaſon is, for that they are cold and moyſt. The which two qualities beeing vnited, wee ſaid before, that they breed a dammage in the reaſonable part. Schollers who learne their leſſon in ſuch manner as their Maiſter deliuereth it, and ſo recite the ſame, it ſhewes a token of a good memorie, but the vnderſtanding ſhall abie the bargaine. There are offered in this doctrine ſome problemes and doubts: the anſwere whereunto will perhaps yeeld more light to conceiue, than what wee haue propounded doth carrie truth. The firſt is, whence it groweth that great Latiniſts are more arrogant and preſumptuous on their knowledge, than men verie well skilled in that kind of learning which appertaineth to the vnderſtanding? in ſort, that the prouerbe, to let vs know what manner of fellow a Grammarian is, ſayth; That a Grammarian is arrogancie it ſelfe. The ſecond is, whence it commeth, that the Latine tongue is ſo repugnant to the Spaniſh capacities, and ſo naturall to the French, Italian, Dutch, Engliſh, and other Northernly nations, as we ſee in their workes,

workes, which by their good Latine phraſe ſtraightwaies prooue the authour to haue beene a ſtranger, and by the barbarouſneſſe and ill compoſition wee know the ſame for a *Spaniards*. The third is, for what reaſon the things that are ſpoken and written in the Latine tongue, ſound better, carrie a more loftineſſe, and haue greater delicacie than anie other language how good ſoeuer? wee hauing auouched before, that all languages are nought els, but a conceit at pleaſure of thoſe who firſt deuiſed them, without holding anie foundation in nature. The fourth doubt is, ſeeing all Sciences, which appertaine to the vnderſtanding, are written in Latin, how it can frame, that ſuch as want memorie, may read and ſtudie them in thoſe bookes, whileſt the Latine is (by this reaſon) ſo repugnant vnto them.

To the firſt probleme we anſwere, that to know whether a man haue defect of vnderſtanding, there falls out no token more certaine, than to ſee him loftie, big-looked, preſumptuous, deſirous of honour, ſtanding on tearmes, and full of ceremonies: And the reaſon is, for that all theſe be workes, of a difference of the imagination, which requireth no more but one degree of heat, wherewith the much moyſture (which is requiſit for the memorie) accordeth verie fitly: for it wanteth force to reſolue the ſame. Contrariwiſe, it is an infallible token, that if a man be naturally lowly, deſpiſer of himſelfe, and his owne matters, and that not only he vaunteth not, nor praiſeth himſelfe, but feeles diſpleaſure at the commendations giuen him by others, and takes ſhame of places and ceremonies pertaining to honour, ſuch a one may well bee pointed at for a man of great vnderſtanding, but of ſmall imagination and memorie. I ſaid naturally lowly: for if he be ſo by cunning, this is no certain

ſigne. Hence it commeth, that as the Grammarians are men of great memorie, and make an vnion with this difference of the imagination: ſo it is of force, that they faile in vnderſtanding, and be ſuch as the prouerbe paints them forth.

To the ſecond probleme may be anſwered, that *Galen* enquiring out the wit of men by way of the temperature of the region where they inhabit, ſayth, That thoſe who made abode vnder the North, haue all of them want of vnderſtanding: but thoſe who are ſeated betweene the North and the burned Zone, are of great wiſedome: which ſituation anſwereth directly to our region. And verily ſo it is: for *Spaine* is not ſo cold as the places ſubiected to the Pole, nor ſo hot as the burned Zone. The ſame ſentence doth *Ariſtotle* produce, demaunding, for what cauſe ſuch as inhabit verie cold regions partake leſſe vnderſtanding, than thoſe who are born in the hotter? and in the anſwere he verie homely handles the *Flemmiſh*, *Dutch*, *Engliſh*, and *French*, ſaying, that their wits are like thoſe of drunkards, for which cauſe they cannot ſearch out nor vnderſtand the nature of things: and this is occaſioned by the much moyſture wherewith their braine is repleniſhed, and the other parts of the bodie: the which is knowne by the whiteneſſe of the face, and the golden colour of the haire, and by that it is a miracle, to find a Dutchman bald: and aboue this they are generally great, and of tall ſtature, through the much moyſture, which breedeth encreaſe of fleſh. But in the Spaniards we diſcerne the quite contrarie: they are ſomewhat brown, they haue black haire, of mean ſtature, and for the moſt part we ſee them bald. Which diſpoſition (ſayth *Galen*) groweth, for that the braine is hot and drie. And if this be true, it behoueth of force, that they

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be endowed with a bad memorie, and a good vnderſtanding, but the *Dutchmen* poſſeſſe a great memorie, and ſmall vnderſtanding: for which cauſe, the one can no skill of Latine, and the other eaſily learne the ſame. The reaſon which *Ariſtotle* alleaged, to proue the ſlender vnderſtanding of thoſe who dwell vnder the North, is, that the much cold of the countrey calleth backe the naturall heat inward by counterpoſition, and ſuffereth not the ſame to ſpread abroad: for which cauſe, it partaketh much moyſture, and much heat, and theſe vnite a great memorie for the languages, and a good imagination; with which they make Clocks, bring the water to *Toledo*, deuiſe engins, and works of rare skill, which the *Spaniards* through defect of imagination cannot frame themſelues vnto: But ſet them to Logicke, to Philoſophie, to Schoole-diuinitie, to Phiſicke, or to the Lawes, and beyond compariſon a *Spaniſh* wit, with his barbarous tearmes, will deliuer more rare points than a ſtranger. For if you take from them this fineſſe and quaint phraſe of writing, there is nothing in them of rare inuention or exquiſit choice.

For confirmation of this doctrine *Galen* ſaid, that in *Scythia* one onely man became a Philoſopher; but in *Athens* there were manie ſuch: as if he ſhould ſay, that in *Scythia*, which is a Prouince vnder the North, it grew a myracle to ſee a Philoſopher, but in *Athens* they were all borne wiſe and skilfull. But albeit Philoſophie and the other Sciences rehearſed by vs, be repugnant to the Northren people; yet they profit well in the Mathematicals, and in Aſtrologie, becauſe they haue a good imagination.

The anſwere of the third probleme dependeth vpon a queſtion, much hammered betweene *Plato* and *Ariſtotle*:

the one sayth that there are proper names, which by their nature carrie signification of things, and that much wit is requisit to deuise them. And this opinion is fauoured by the diuine Scripture, who affirmeth, that *Adam* gaue euery of those things which God set before him, the proper name that best was fitting for them. But *Aristotle* will not graunt, that in anie tongue there can bee found anie name, or manner of speech, which can signifie ought of it owne nature, for that all names are deuised and shaped after the conceit of men. Whence we see by experience, that Wine hath aboue threescore names, and Bread as manie, in euery language his, and of none we can auouch that the same is naturall and agreeable thereunto, for then all in the world would vse but that. But for all this, the sentence of *Plato* is truer: for put case that the first deuisers fained the words at their pleasure and will, yet was the same by a reasonable instinct communicated with the eare, with the nature of the thing, and with the good grace and well sounding of the pronuntiation, not making the words ouer short or long, nor enforcing an vnseemely framing of the mouth in time of vtterance, setling the accent in his conuenient place, and obseruing the other conditions which a tongue should possesse, to be fine, and not barbarous.

Of this selfe opinion with *Plato*, was a *Spanish* Gentleman; who made it his pastime to write bookes of Chiualrie, because he had a certaine kind of imagination, which entiseth men to fayning and leasings. Of him it is reported, that being to bring into his workes a furious Giant, he went manie dayes deuising a name, which might in all points be answerable to his fiercenesse: neither could he light vpon anie, vntill playing one day at cards in his friends house, he heard the owner of the house say, Ho, sirha,

ſirha, boy, *tra qui tantos*; the Gentleman ſo ſoone as he heard this name *Traquitantos*, ſodainly he tooke the ſame for a word of full ſound in the eare, and without anie longer looking aroſe, ſaying; Gentleman I wil play no more: for manie dayes are paſt ſithence I haue gone ſeeking out a name, which might fit well with a furious Giant, whom I bring into thoſe volumes which I now am making, and I could not find the ſame, vntill I came to this houſe, where euer I receiue all courteſie. The curioſitie of this Gentleman in calling the Giant *Traquitantos*, had alſo thoſe firſt men, who deuiſed the Latine tongue, in that they found out a language of ſo good ſound to the eare. Therefore wee need not maruell, that the things which are ſpoken and written in Latine, doe ſound ſo well, and in other tongues ſo ill: for their firſt inuenters were barbarous.

The laſt doubt I haue been forced to alleage, for ſatiſfying of diuers who haue ſtumbled thereon, though the ſolution be verie eaſie: for thoſe who haue great vnderſtanding, are not vtterly depriued of memorie, in as much as if they wanted the ſame, it would fall out impoſſible that the vnderſtanding could diſcourſe or frame reaſons; for this power is that which keepeth in hand the matter and the fantaſies, whereon it behoueth to vſe ſpeculation. But for that the ſame is weake of three degrees of perfection, whereto men may attaine in the Latine tongue, (namely, to vnderſtand, to write, and to ſpeake the ſame perfitly) it can hardly paſſe the firſt without fault and ſtumbling.

CHAP. IX.

How it may be prooued, that the eloquence and fineneſſe of ſpeech cannot find place in men of great vnderſtanding.

ONe of the graces by which the vulgar is beſt perſuaded, and thinketh that a man hath much knowledge and wiſedome, is, to heare him ſpeake with great eloquence, to haue a ſmooth tongue, plentie of ſweet and pleaſant words, and to alleage manie examples fit for the purpoſe that is in hand: but this (verily) ſpringeth from an vnion which the memorie maketh with the imagination, in a degree and meaſure of heat, that cannot reſolue the moiſture of the braine, and ſerueth to lift vp the figures, and cauſe them to boile, where-through are diſcouered manie conceits and points to be vttered. In this vnion it is impoſſible that diſcourſe may bee found; for wee haue alreadie ſaid and prooued heretofore, that this power greatly abhorreth heat, and moiſture cannot ſupport it. Which doctrine if the *Athenians* had knowne, they would not ſo much haue maruelled to ſee ſo wiſe a man as *Socrates* not to haue the gift of vtterance; of whom, thoſe who vnderſtood how great his knowledge was, ſaid, that his words and his ſentences were like a wodden cheſt knobbie and nothing trimmed on the outſide, but that in opening the ſame, within it held lineaments and portraitures of rare admiration. In the ſame ignorance reſt they, who attempting to render a reaſon of *Ariſtotles* bad ſtile and obſcureneſſe, ſaid: That

of

of set purpose, and because hee would that his works should carrie authoritie, he wrote vnder riddles, and with so slender ornament of words, and simple manner of deliuerance. And if we consider also the so harsh proceeding of *Plato*, and the breefenesse with which he writeth, the obscuritie of his reasons, and the ill placing of the parts of his tale, we shall find, that nought else saue this occasioned the same. For such also we find the workes of *Hippocrates*, the thefts which he committeth of Nownes and Verbes, the ill disposition of his sentences, and the weake foundation of his reasons, to stuffe out the emptie places of his doctrine: What will you more? vnlesse, that when he would yeeld a verie particular reckoning to his friend *Damagetus*, how *Artaxerxes* king of *Persia* had sent for him, promising him as much gold and siluer as he list himselfe, and to make him one of the great ones of his kingdome: hauing plentie of answeres to so manie demaunds, he writ onely thus; The king of *Persia* hath sent for me, not knowing that with me the respect of wisdome is greater than that of gold. Farewell. Which matter if it had passed through the hands of anie other man of good imagination and memorie, a whole leafe of paper would not haue sufficed to set it forth.

But who would haue beene so hardie to alleage for the purpose of this doctrine, the example of S. *Paule*, and to affirme, that he was a man of great vnderstanding and little memorie, and that with these his forces, he could not skill of tongues, nor deliuer his mind in them polished ly and with gracefulnesse, if himselfe had not so said; I reckon not my selfe to haue done lesse than the greatest Apostles, for though I be ignorant of speech, yet I am not so in vnderstanding: as if he should say; I confesse that I haue not the gift of vtterance, but for science

ence and knowledge, none of the greateſt Apoſtles goeth beyond me. Which difference of wit was ſo appropriat to the preaching of the Goſpell, that choice could not be made of a better, for, that a Preacher ſhould bee eloquent, and haue great furniture of queint tearmes, is not a matter conuenient: for the force of the Oratours of thoſe dayes, appeared, in making the hearers repute things falſe for true; and what the vulgar held for good and behoofefull, they, vſing the precepts of their art, perſuaded the contrarie, and maintained, that it was better to be poore than rich, ſicke than whole, fond than wiſe, and other points manifeſtly repugnant to the opinion of the vulgar. For which cauſe the Hebrues tearmed them *Geragnin*, that is to ſay, Deceiuers. Of the ſame opinion was *Cato* the more, and held the abode of theſe in Rome for verie dangerous, in as much as the forces of the Romane Empire were grounded on armes: and they began then to perſuade, that the Romane youth ſhould abandon thoſe, and giue themſelues to this kind of wiſdome; therefore (in breefe) he procured them to be baniſhed out of Rome, forbidding them euer to returne againe. If God then had ſought out an eloquent Preacher, who ſhould haue vſed ornament of ſpeech, and that he had entered into Athens or Rome, auouching that in Hieruſalem the Iewes had crucified a man, who was verie God, and that he died of his owne accord to redeeme ſinners, and roſe againe the third day, and aſcended into heauen, where he now ſitteth; what would the hearers haue thought, ſaue that theſe things were ſome of thoſe follies and vanities which the Oratours were wont to perſuade by the force of their art? For which cauſe, S. *Paul* ſaid: For Chriſt ſent me not to baptiſe, but to preach the goſpell, and that not in wiſdome of words,

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least the crosse of Christ might proue in vaine. The wit of S. *Paule* was appropriat to this seruice, for hee had a large discourse to proue in the Synagogues and amongst the Gentiles, That Iesus Christ was the Messias promised in the law, and that it was bootlesse to looke for anie other: and herewithall he was of slender memorie, and therefore he could not skill to speake with ornament and sweet and well relished tearmes, and this was that which was behoofefull for preaching of the Gospell. I will not maintaine (for all this) that S. *Paule* had not the gift of tongues, but that he could speake all languages as he did his owne: neither am I of opinion, that to defend the name of Christ, the forces of his great vnderstanding sufficed, if there had not beene ioyned therewithall the meane of grace, and a speciall ayd which God to that purpose bestowed vpon him: it sufficeth me onely to say, That supernaturall gifts worke better, when they light vpon an apt disposition, than if a man were of himselfe vntoward and blockish. Hereto alludeth that doctrine of S. *Hierome*, which is found in his Proeme vpon *Esay* and *Hieremie*; where asking what the cause is, that it being one selfe holy ghost which spake by the mouth of *Hieremie* and of *Esay*, one of them propounded the matters which he wrote with so great elegancie, and *Hieremie* scarcely wist how to speake: to which doubt he answereth, That the holy ghost applieth it selfe to the naturall manner of proceeding of each Prophet, without that his grace varieth their nature, or teacheth them the language wherin they are to publish their propheſie. Therefore we must vnderstand, that *Esay* was a noble Gentleman brought vp in court, & in the citie of *Hierusalem*, and for this cause had ornament and polishednesse of speech: But *Hieremie* was borne and reared in a village of *Hierusalem*,

lem, called *Anathochites*, blunt and rude in behauiour, as a countrey person, and of such a stile the holy ghost vsed the seruice in the prophecie which he commanded vnto him. The same may be said of S. *Pauls* Epistles, that the holy Ghost dwelled in him, when he wrote them, to the end he might not erre, but the language and manner of speech was S. *Pauls* naturall, applied to the doctrine which he wrote; for the truth of Schoole-diuinitie abhorreth manie words. But the practise of languages, and the ornament and polishment of speech may verie well be ioyned with positiue diuinitie: for this facultie appertaineth to the memorie, and is nought els saue a masse of words and catholicke sentences, taken out of the holie Doctors, and the diuine Scripture, and preserued in this power, as the *Grammarian* doth with the flowers of the Poets, *Virgill*, *Horace*, *Terence*, and other Latine authors whom he readeth: who meeting occasion to rehearse them, he comes out straight-waies with a shred of *Cicero*, or *Quintilian*, whereby he makes his hearers know what he is able to doe.

Those that are endowed with this vnion of the imagination and of the memorie, and trauaile in gathering the fruit of whatsoeuer hath been said or written in their profession, and serue themselues therewith at conuenient occasions, with great ornament of words and gratious fashions of speech, for that so manie things are alreadie found out in all the Sciences, it seemeth to them who know not this doctrine, that they are of great profoundnesse; whereas in truth they hold much of the Asse: for if you grow to trie thē in the foundations of that which they alleadge and affirme, they then discouer their wants. And the reason is, because so great a flowing of speech cannot be vnited with the vnderstanding, whereto appertaineth

pertaineth to ſearch out the bottome of the truth. Of theſe the diuine Scripture ſaid, Where there is plentie of words, there raigneth great ſcarſitie: as if he had ſaid, that a man of manie words ordinarily wanteth vnderſtanding and wiſedome.

Thoſe who are endowed with this vnion of the imagination and memorie, enter with great courage to interpret the diuine ſcripture, it ſeeming to them, that becauſe they vnderſtand well the Hebrue, Greeke, and Latine tongues, they haue the way made ſmooth to gather out the verie ſpirit of the letter: but verily they ruinate themſelues; firſt, becauſe the words of the diuine text and his manners of ſpeech haue manie other ſignifications, beſides thoſe which *Cicero* vnderſtood in Latine. And then becauſe their vnderſtanding is defectiue, which power verifieth whether a ſence be Catholicke, or depraued: and this is it which may make choice by the grace ſupernaturall, of two or three ſences, that are gathered out of the letter, which is moſt true and Catholicke.

Beguilings (ſayth *Plato*) neuer befall in things vnlike and verie different, but when manie things meet which carrie neere reſemblance. For if wee ſet before a ſharpe ſight, a little ſalt, ſugar, meale, and lyme, all well pounded and beaten to powder, and each one ſeuerally by it ſelfe: what ſhould hee doe who wanted taſt, if with his eyes he ſhould be ſet to diſcerne euerie of theſe powders from other without erring, ſaying, this is Salt, this Sugar, this Meale, and this Lyme? For my part, I beleeue he would be deceiued through the great reſemblance, which theſe things haue betweene themſelues. But if there were a heape of ſalt, one of ſugar, one of corne, one of earth, and one of ſtones, it is certaine he would not be deceiued in giuing each of theſe heapes his name, though his

ſight

ſight were dimme, for each is of a diuers figure. The ſame wee ſee befalleth euerie day in the ſences and ſpirits, which the Diuines giue to the holie Scripture, of which two or three being looked on, at firſt ſight they all carrie a ſhew to be Catholicke, and to agree well with the letter, but yet in the truth are not ſo, neither the holy Ghoſt ſo meant. To chuſe the beſt of theſe ſences, and to refuſe the bad, it is a thing aſſured, that the diuine employeth not his memorie nor his imagination, but his vnderſtanding. Wherefore I auouch, that the poſitiue diuine ought to conferre with the Schoole-man, and to enquire at his hands, that of theſe ſences he may chuſe that which ſhall appeare to be ſoundeſt, vnleſſe he wil be ſent to the holie houſe. For this cauſe doe Hereticks ſo much abhorre Schoole-diuinitie, and learne to baniſh it out of the world: for by diſtinguiſhing, inferring, framing of reaſons, and iudging, wee attaine to vnderſtand the truth, and to diſcouer falſhood.

CHAP. X.

How it is prooued, that the Theericke of Diuinitie appertaineth to the vnderſtanding: and Preaching (which is his practiſe) to the imagination.

IT is a probleme often demaunded, not only by folke learned and wiſe, but alſo the vulgar will put in their oare, and euerie day bring in queſtion, For what cauſe a Diuine being a great man in the Schooles, ſharpe in diſputing, readie in anſwering, and in writing and lecturing of rare learning; yet getting

getting vp into the Pulpit, cannot skill of preaching: and contrariwise, if one prooue a gallant preacher, eloquent, gratious, and that drawes the people after him, it seemes a myracle, if he be deepely seene in Schoole diuinitie. Wherefore they admit not for a sound consequence, such a one is a great Schoole-diuine, therefore hee will prooue a good Preacher: and contrarise, they will not graunt; he is a good Preacher, therefore he hath skill in Schoole-diuinitie. For to reuerse the one and other of these consequences, there may be alleaged for each, more instances than are haires on our head.

No man hitherto hath beene able to answere this demaund, saue after the ordinarie guise, *viz.* to attribute the whole to God, and to the distribution of his graces: and to my liking they doe verie well, in as much as they know not anie more particular occasion thereof. The answere of this doubt in (some sort) is giuen by vs in the foregoing Chapter, but not so particularly as is requisit; and it was, that Schoole-diuinitie appertaineth to the vnderstanding: but now we affirme and will prooue, that Preaching, and his practise, is a work of the imagination. And as it falls out a difficult matter, to ioyne in one selfe braine a good vnderstanding and much imagination: so likewise it will hardly fall, that one selfe man bee a great Schoole-diuine, and a famous Preacher: and that Schooldiuinitie is a worke of the vnderstanding, hath tofore been prooued, when we prooued the repugnancie which it carried to the Latine tongue. For which cause it shall not now be necessarie to prooue the same anew, onely it shall suffice to giue to vnderstand, that the grace and delightfulnesse which good Preachers haue, whereby they draw their audience vnto them, and hold them well pleased, is altogether a worke of the imagination,

and

and part thereof of a good memorie, and to the end I may better expound my ſelfe, and cauſe it as it were to be felt with the hand, it behoooueth firſt to preſuppoſe that man is a liuing creature, capable of reaſon, of companie, and of ciuilitie, and to the end that his nature might be the more abled by art, the ancient Philoſophers deuiſed Logicke to teach him how he might frame his reaſons with thoſe precepts and rules, how hee ſhould define the nature of things, diſtinguiſh, deuide, conclude, argue, iudge, and chuſe, without which workes it growes impoſſible that the Artiſt can goe forward: and that he might be companiable and ciuile, it behooued him to ſpeake, and to giue other men to weet the conceits which he framed in his mind. And for that he ſhould not deliuer them without diſpoſition and without order, they deuiſed another Art which they tearmed Rhethoricke, which by his precepts and rules might beautifie the ſpeech with poliſhed words, with fine phraſes, and with ſtirring affections and gratious colours. But as Logicke teacheth not a man to diſcourſe and to argue in one Science alone; but without difference in all alike: ſo alſo Rhethoricke inſtructeth how to ſpeake, in Diuinitie, in Phiſicke, in skill of the Lawes, and in all other Sciences and conuerſations which men entermedled withall. In ſort, that if wee will faine a perfect Logician, or an accompliſhed Oratour, he cannot fall into due conſideration, vnleſſe he be ſeene in all the Sciences, for they all appertaine to his iuriſdiction, and in which ſoeuer of them he may exerciſe his rules without diſtinction: not as Phiſicke, which hath his matter limitted whereof it muſt intreat: and ſo likewiſe naturall Philoſophie, and morall, Metaphiſick, Aſtrologie, and the reſt: and therefore *Cicero* ſayd, The Oratour whereſoeuer he abideth, dwelleth

dwelleth in his owne. And in another place he affirmeth, in a perfect Oratour is found all the knowledge of the Philosophers, and therefore the same *Cicero* auouched, That there is no art more difficult than that of a perfect Oratour: and with more reason he might so haue said, if he had knowne with how great hardnesse all the Sciences are vnited in one particular subiect.

Anciently the doctors of the law were adorned with the name of Oratour: for the perfection of pleading required the notice and furniture of all the arts in the world, for the lawes doe iudge them all. Now to know the defence reserued for euery art by it selfe, it was necessarie to haue a particular knowledge of them all; for which cause *Cicero* said, No man ought to be reputed in the number of Oratours, who is not well seene in all the Arts. But seeing it was impossible to learne all Sciences (first, through the shortnesse of life, and then because mans wit is so bounded) they let them passe, and of necessitie held themselues contented to giue credit to the skilfull in that art whereof they made profession, and no farther.

After this manner of defending causes, straightwaies succeeded the Euangelicall doctrine, which might haue been perswaded by the art of Oratorie, better than all the Sciences of the world besides, for that the same is the most certaine and trueſt: but Christ our redeemer charged S. *Paule*, That he should not preach it with wisdome of words, to the end the Gentiles should not think it was a well couched leasing, as are those which the Oratours vse to perswade by the force of their art. But when the faith had beene receiued, manie yeares after it was allowed to preach with places of Rhetoricke, and to vse the seruice of eloquent speech; for that then the incon-

uenience fell not in consideration, which was extant when S. *Paul* preached. Yea we see that the preacher reapeth more fruit, who hath the conditions of a perfect Orator, and is more haunted than he that wanteth them: and the reason is verie plaine. For if the antient Oratours gaue the people to vnderstand things false for true (vsing those their precepts and rules) more easily shall the Christian auditorie be drawne, when by art they are perswaded to that which alreadie they vnderstand and beleeue. Besides that, the holie Scripture (after a sort) is all things; and to yeeld the same a true interpretation, it behoooueth to haue all the Sciences conformable to that so oft said saw, He sent his damsels to call to the Castle. This fitteth not to be remembred to the Preachers of our time, nor to aduise them, that now they may doe it: for their particular studie (besides the fruit which they pretend to bring with their doctrine) is to seeke out a good text, to whose purpose they may applie manie fine sentences taken out of the diuine Scripture, the holie Doctors, Poets, Historians, Phisitians, and Lawyers, without forbearing anie Science, and speaking copiouslie with quietnesse and pleasant words; and with all these things they goe amplifying and stuffing their matter an houre or two if need be. Of this, sayth *Cicero*, the Oratours of his time made profession: The force of an Oratour (sayth he) and the selfe art of well speaking, seemeth, that it vndertaketh and promiseth to speake with copiousnesse and ornament of whatsoeuer matter that shall be propounded. Then if we shall prooue, that the graces and conditions which a perfect Oratour ought to haue, doe all appertaine to the imagination and to the memorie; we shall also know, that the Diuine who is endowed with them, wil be an excellent Preacher: but being set to

the doctrine of S. *Thomas* and *Scotus*, can little skill thereof, for that the same is a science belonging to the vnderstanding, in which power of necessitie it holdeth little force.

What the things bee which appertaine to the imagination, and by what signes they are to be knowne, wee haue heretofore made mention: now we will returne to a replication of them, that they may the better be refreshed to the memorie. All that which may be tearmed good figure, good purpose and prouision, comes from the grace of the imagination, as are merrie ieasts, resemblances, quips, and comparisons.

The first thing which a perfect Orator is to goe about (hauing matter vnder hand) is to seeke out arguments and conuenient sentences, whereby he may dilate and prooue, and that not with all sorts of words, but with such as giue a good consonance to the eare: and therefore *Cicero* sayd: I take him for an Orator, who can vse in his discourses words well tuning with the eare, and sentences conuenient for proofe. And this (for certaine) appertaineth to the imaginations, sithens therein is a consonance of well pleasing words, and a good direction in the sentences.

The second grace which may not be wanting in a perfect Orator, is, to possesse much inuention, or much reading, for if hee rest bound to dilate and confirme anie matter whatsoeuer with manie speeches and sentences applied to the purpose, it behoooueth, that he haue a verie swift imagination, and that the same supplie (as it were) the place of a breach, to hunt and bring the game to his hand, and when he wants what to say, to deuise somewhat as if it were materiall. For this cause we said before, that heat was an instrument with which the ima-

gination worketh, for this qualitie lifteth vp the figures, and maketh them to boile. Heere is diſcouered all that which in them may be ſeene, and if there fell out nought elſe to be conſidered, this imagination hath force not onely to compound a figure poſſible with another, but doth ioyne alſo (after the order of nature) thoſe which are vnpoſſible, and of them growes to ſhape mountaines of gold, and calues that flie. In lieu of their owne inuention, Oratours may ſupplie the ſame with much reading, for as much as their imagination faileth them: but in concluſion, whatſoeuer bookes teach, is bounded and limitted; and the proper inuention is a good fountaine which alwaies yeeldeth forth new and freſh water. For retaining the things which haue beene read, it is requiſit to poſſeſſe much memorie; and to recite them in the preſence of the audience with readineſſe, cannot be done without the ſame power. For which cauſe *Cicero* ſaid, He ſhall (in mine opinion) be an Oratour worthie of ſo important a name, who with wiſdome, with copiouſneſſe, and with ornament, can readily deliuer euerie matter that is worth the hearing. Heretofore wee haue ſaid and prooued, that wiſedome appertaineth to the imagination, copiouſneſſe of words and ſentences to the memorie, ornament and poliſhment to the imagination: to recite ſo manie things without faltring or ſtopping, for certaine it is atchieued by the goodneſſe of the memorie. To this purpoſe *Cicero* auouched, that the good Oratour ought to rehearſe by heart, and not by booke. It falleth not beſides the matter to let you vnderſtand, that *M. Antony* of Lebriſſa through old age grew to ſuch a decay of memorie, that he read his Rhetoricke lecture to his ſchollers out of a paper, and for that he was ſo excellent in his profeſſion, and with good proofes confirmed

med his points propounded, it passed for currant; but that which might be no way tollerated, was, that where he died sodainly of an Apoplexie, the Vniuersitie of *Alcala* recommended the making of his funerall Oration to a famous Preacher, who inuented and disposed what he had to say the best he could: but time so pressed him, as it grew impossible for him to con the same without booke: Wherefore getting vp into the Pulpit with his paper in his hand, he began to speake in this sort. That which this notable man vsed to doe whilest he read to his Schollers, I am now also resolued to doe in his imitation; for his death was so sodaine, and the commaundement to me of making his funerall Sermon so late, as I had neither place nor time to studie what I might say, nor to con it by heart. Whatsoeuer I haue been able to gather with the trauell of this night, I bring heere written in this paper, and beseech your Maisterships, that you will heare the same with patience, and pardon my slender memorie.

This fashion of rehearsing with paper in the hand, so highly displeased the audience, as they did nought els than smile and murmure: Therefore verie well sayd *Cicero*, that it behooued to rehearse by heart, and not by booke. This Preacher verily was not endowed with anie inuenton of his owne, but was driuen to fetch the same out of his bookes; and to performe this, great studie and much memorie were requisite. But those who borrow their conceits out of their owne braine, stand not in need of studie, time, or memorie: for they find all readie at their fingers ends. Such will preach to one selfe audience all their life long, without repeating anie point touched in twentie yeares before; whereas those that want inuention, in two Lents cull the flowers out of all

the bookes in a whole world, and ranſack to the bottome all the writings that can be gotten; and at the third Lent muſt go and get themſelues a new auditorie, except they will heare caſt in their teeth, This is the ſame which you preached vnto vs in the yeare before.

The third propertie that a good Orator ought to haue, is, that he know how to diſpoſe his matter, placing euerie word and ſentence in his fit roome, in ſort that the whole may carrie an anſwerable proportion, and one thing bring in another. And to this purpoſe *Cicero* ſaid: Diſpoſition is an order and diſtribution of things, which ſheweth, what ought in what places to be beſtowed; which grace when it is not naturall, accuſtomably breedeth much cumber to the Preachers, For after they haue found in their books manie things to deliuer, all of them cannot skill to applie this prouiſion readily to euerie point. This propertie of ordering and diſtributing, is for certaine a worke of the imagination, ſince (in effect) it is nought els but a figure and correſpondence.

The fourth propertie wherewith good Oratours ſhould be endowed, and the moſt important of all, is action, wherewith they giue a being and life to the things which they ſpeake, and with the ſame doe moue the heareres, and ſupple them to beleeue how that is true which they goe about to perſwade. For which cauſe *Cicero* ſaid, Action is that which ought to be gouerned by the motion of the bodie, by the geſture, by the countenance, and by the confirmation and varietie of the voyce. As if hee ſhould ſay: Action ought to be directed in making the motions and geſtures, which are requiſite for the things that are ſpoken, lifting vp and falling with the voyce, growing paſſionate, and ſuddainly turning to appeaſement; one while ſpeaking faſt, another while leiſurely,

reproouing, and cherishing, moouing the bodie, sometimes to the one side, sometimes to the other, plucking in the armes, and stretching them out, laughing and weeping: and vpon some occasions beating the hands togither. This grace is so important in Preachers, that by the same alone (wanting both inuention and dispositiō) of matters of small value and ordinarie, they make a Sermon, which filleth the audience with astonishment, for that they haue this action, which otherwise is tearmed spirit, or pronuntiation. Herein falleth a thing worth the marking, whereby is discouered, how much this grace can preuaile; and it is, that the Sermons which through the much action and much spirit doe please much, when they be set downe in writing, are nothing worth, nor will anie welneere vouchsafe their reading: and this groweth, because with the pen it is impossible to pourtray those motions and those gestures, which in the Pulpit so far wan mens likings. Other Sermons shew verie well in paper; but at their preaching no man listeth to giue eare, becausse that action is not giuen them, which is requisite at euerie close. And therefore *Plato* said, that the stile wherewith we speake, is far different from that which we write well, wherethrough wee see manie men who can speake very well, do yet endite but meanely, and others contrariwise, endite verie well, and discourse but harshly: all which is to be reduced to action, and action (for certaine) is a worke of the imagination, for all that which we haue vttered thereof, maketh figure, correspondence, and good consonance.

The fift grace, is, to know how to assemble and alleage good examples and comparisons, which better contenteth the hearers humour than anie thing els: For by a fit example they easily vnderstand the doctrine, and with-

one the same it soone slippeth out of their mind: whereon *Aristotle* propoundeth this question, Whence it riseth, that men (in making speeches) are better pleased with examples and fables than with conceits, as if he should say, For what occasion doe such as come to heare Oratours, make more reckoning of the examples and fables which they alleage, to prooue the things that they striue to perswade, than of the arguments and reasons which they frame? and to those he answereth, That by examples & fables men learne best, because it is a proofe which appertaineth to the sence, but arguments and reasons hold not the like reason, for that they are a worke whereto is requisit much vnderstanding. And for this cause Christ our redeemer in his sermons vsed so manie parables and comparisons, because by them he gaue to vnderstand manie diuine secrets. This point of deuising fables and comparisons, it is a thing certaine, that the same is performed by the imagination, for it is figure, and denoteth good correspondence and similitude.

The sixth propertie of a good Oratour, is, to haue a readie tongue of his own, and not affected, choice words, and manie gratious sorts of vtterance: of which graces we haue entreated oftentimes heretofore, prooving, that the one part of them appertaineth to the imagination, and the other to a good memorie.

The seuenth propertie of a good Oratour, is that which *Cicero* speaketh of: furnished with voyce, with action, and with comelinesse, the voyce full and ringing, pleasing to the hearers, not harsh, not hoarse, nor sharpe: and although it be true, that this springeth from the temperature of the breast and the throat, and not from the imagination; yet sure it is, that from the same temperature from which a good imagination groweth, namely,

heat,

heat, a good voice also fetcheth his originall, and to know this, importeth much for our purpose: For the Schoole-diuines in that they are of a cold and drie complexion, cannot haue their voice a good instrument: and this is a great defect in a pulpit.

This same *Aristotle* also proueth, alleaging the example of old men, by reason of their coldnesse and drinesse. To haue a full and cleare voice, much heat is requisit to enlarge the passages and measurable moisture, which may supple and soften them. And also *Aristotle* demandeth why all who by nature are hot, are also big voiced? For which cause we see the contrarie in women and Eunuches, who through the much coldnesse of their complexion (saith *Galen*) haue their throat and voice verie delicat, in sort, that when wee heare a good voice, we can straightwaies say, it comes of much heat and moisture in the breast: which two qualities, if they passe so far as the braine, make the vnderstanding to decay, & the memorie and imagination to increase, which are the two powers whereof the good Preacher serueth himselfe to content his auditorie.

The eight propertie of a good Oratour (saith *Cicero*) is to haue tongue at will, ready, and well exercised: which grace cannot befall men of great vnderstanding, for, that it may be readie, it behooueth the same to partake much heat, and much drouth; and this cannot light in the melancholicke, either naturall, or by adustion. *Aristotle* proueth it, by asking this question, Whence commeth it, that such as haue an impediment in their speech, are reputed to be of complexion melancholicke? To which probleme hee answereth very vntowardly, saying, That the melancholicke haue a great imagination, and that the tongue cannot hast to vtter so fast as the imagination

conceiueth, wherethrough they ſtammer and ſtumble: which yet proceedeth from nought elſe, ſaue that the melancholicke haue euer their mouth full of froath and ſpittle, through which diſpoſition their tongue is moyſt and ſlipper; which thing may euidently bee diſcerned, conſidering the often ſpitting of ſuch. This ſelfe reaſon did *Ariſtotle* render, when he demaunded, Whence it groweth, that ſome are ſo ſlow tongued? and he anſwereth, That ſuch haue their tongue verie cold and moyſt, which two qualities breed an impediment therein, and make it ſubiect to the Palſie; and ſo you ſee his conceit of the imagination cannot follow: for this he yeeldeth a profitable remedie, *viz.* to drinke a little wine, or at firſt to hallow ſomewhat lowd, before they ſpeake in the preſence of their audience, for thereby the tongue getteth heat, and drieth.

But *Ariſtotle* ſayth further, That not to ſpeake plaine, may grow from hauing the tongue verie hot and verie drie, and voucheth the example of chollericke perſons, who growing in choller, cannot ſpeake, and when they are void of paſſion and choller, they are verie eloquent: the contrarie betideth to the flegmaticke, who being quiet, cannot talke, and when they are angred, vtter ſpeeches of great eloquence. The reaſon of this is verie manifeſt, for although it is true, that heat aideth the imagination, and the tongue alſo, yet the ſame may alſo breed them dammage: firſt, for that they want ſupplie of replies and wittie ſentences, as alſo becauſe the tongue cannot pronounce plainely, through ouer-much drineſſe; wherethrough wee ſee, that after a man hath drunke a little water, he ſpeaketh better.

The chollericke (being quiet) deliuer verie well, for they then retaine that point of heat which is requiſit for the

the tongue, and the good imagination; but in anger, the heat groweth beyond due, and turneth the imagination topsie turuie: The flegmaticke vnincensed, haue their braine verie cold & moyst, and therefore are set a ground what to say, and their tongue is ouer-slipper through too much moysture; but when they are set on fire and in choller, the heat forthwith getteth vp, and so lifteth vp the imagination; by which meanes there comes to their mind much what to deliuer, and the tongue giueth no hinderance, for that it is heated: these haue no great vaine in versifying, for that they are cold of braine, who yet (once angred) doe then make verses best, and with most facilitie, against such as haue stirred them: and to this purpose *Iuuenall* said:

Anger makes verse, if Nature but denie.

Through the defect of tongue, men of great vnderstanding cannot be good Orators or Preachers, and specially for that action requireth a speech sometimes high, and sometimes low, and those who are slow tongued, cannot pronounce but with loud voyce, and in a manner crying out, and this is one of the things which sooneſt cloyeth the hearers: whereon *Aristotle* moueth this doubt: Whence it springeth, that men of slow tongue cannot speake soft? To which probleme he answereth verie well, saying, That the tongue which is fastened to the roofe of the mouth, by reason of much moysture, is better loosened with a force, than if you put thereto but little might: as if one would lift vp a Launce, taking the same by the point, he shal sooner raise it at one push and with a force, than taking it vp by little and little.

Me seemeth, I haue sufficiently proued, that the good naturall qualities which a perfect Orator ought to haue, spring for the most part from a good imagination, and

ſome from the memorie. And if it be true that the good Preachers of our time content their audience, becauſe they haue theſe gifts; it followeth verie well, that whoſoeuer is a great Preacher, can ſmall skill of Schoole-diuinitie, and a great Scholler, will hardly away with preaching, through the contrarietie which the vnderſtanding carrieth to the imagination and to the memorie. Well knew *Ariſtotle* by experience, that although the Oratour learned Naturall and Morall Philoſophie, Phiſicke, Metaphiſicke, the Lawes, the Mathematicals, Aſtrologie, and all the Arts and Sciences; notwithſtanding he was ſeene of all theſe but in the flowers & choice ſentences, without piercing to the root of the reaſon and occaſion of anie of them: But he thought, that this not knowing the Diuinitie, nor the cauſe of things, which is tearmed *Propter quid*, grew, for that they bent not themſelues thereunto, and therefore propounded this demand: Why doe wee imagine, that a Philoſopher is different from an Oratour? To which probleme he anſwereth, that the Philoſopher placeth all his ſtudie in knowing the reaſon and cauſe of euery effect, and the Oratour in knowing the effect, and no farther. And verily it proceedeth from nought els, than for that naturall Philoſophie appertaineth to the vnderſtanding, which power the Orators doe want; and therefore in Philoſophie they can pierce no farther than into the vpper skin of things. This ſelfe difference there is betweene the Schoole-diuine and the Poſitiue, that the one knoweth the cauſe of whatſoeuer importeth his facultie; and the other, the propoſitions which are verefied, and no more. The caſe then ſtanding thus, it falleth out a dangerous matter, that the Preacher enioyeth an office and authoritie to inſtruct Chriſtian people in the truth, and that their auditorie is

bound

bound to beleeue them, and yet they want that power, through which the truth is digged vp from the root, wee may say of them (without lying) those words of Christ our redeemer, Let them goe, they are blind, and do guide the blind; and if the blind guide the blind, both fall into the ditch. It is a thing intollerable to behold, with how great audacitie such set themselues to preach, who cannot one iot of Schoole diuinitie, nor haue any naturall abilitie to learne the same.

Of such S. *Paul* greatly cõplaineth, saying; But the end of the commandement is charitie from a pure heart and good conscience, and faith vnfained, from which (verily) some straying, haue turned aside to vaine babling: who would be doctors in the Law, and yet vnderstand not the things which they speake, nor which they auouch.

Besides, this, we haue proued tofore, that those who haue much imagination, are cholericke, subtile, malignant, and cauillers, and alwaies enclined to euill, which they can compasse with much readinesse and craft. Touching the Oratours of his time, *Aristotle* propoundeth this demand, Why we vse to call an Oratour craftie, and giue not this name to a musitian, nor to a comicall poet? And more would this difficultie haue growne, if *Aristotle* had vnderstood, that musicke and the stage appertaine to the imagination. To which probleme he answereth, That Musitians and stage players shoot at none other Butte, than to delight the hearers; but the Oratour goes about to purchase somewhat for himselfe, and therefore it behoueth him to vse rules and readinesse, to the end the hearers may not smell out his fetch and bent.

Such properties as these be, had those false preachers, of whom S. *Paul* spake, writing to the Corinthians: But I feare, that as the serpent beguiled *Eue* with his subtiltie;

so

ſo their ſences are led aſtray: for theſe falſe Apoſtles are guileſull workemen, who transforme themſelues into the Apoſtles of Chriſt; and this is no wonder: for Sathan transformed himſelfe into an Angell of light, and therefore it is no great matter for his miniſters to transforme themſelues as miniſters of iuſtice, whoſe end ſhall be their worke: as if he ſhould ſay; I haue great feare (my brethren) that as the ſerpent beguiled *Eue* with his ſubtiltie and mallice, ſo they alſo intricate their iudgement and perſeuerance: for theſe falſe Apoſtiles are like pottage made of a foxe. Preachers who ſpeake vnder wiles, repreſent very perfectly a kind of holineſſe, ſeeme the Apoſtles of Ieſus Chriſt, and yet are diſciples of the diuell, who can skill ſo well to repreſent an Angell of light, that there needeth not a ſupernaturall gift to diſcouer what he is: and ſince the maiſter can play his part ſo well, it is not ſtrange, that they alſo who haue learned his doctrine, practiſe the ſemblable, whoſe end ſhall be none other than their workes. All theſe properties are well knowne to appertaine to the imagination, and that *Ariſtotle* ſaid very well, That Orators are ſubtile and readie, becauſe they are euer in hand to get ſomewhat for themſelues.

Such as poſſeſſe a forcible imagination, wee ſaid before, that they are of complexion very hote, and from this qualitie ſpring three principal vices in a man; Pride, Gluttonie, and Letcherie: for which cauſe the Apoſtle ſaid: Such ſerued not our Lord Ieſus Chriſt, but their bellie.

And that theſe three euill inclinations ſpring from heat, and the contrarie vertues from cold, *Ariſtle* proueth, ſaying thus: And therefore it holdeth the ſame force to ſhape conditions, for heat and cold (more than any thing

thing els which is in the bodie) doe seaſon manners, and therefore printeth and worketh in vs the qualities of manners: as if he ſhould ſay, from heat and cold ſpring all the conditions of man: for theſe two qualities doe more alter our nature than anie other: For which cauſe, men of great imagination are ordinarily bad and vitious: for they abandon themſelues to be guided by their naturall inclination, and haue wit and abilitie to doe lewdly. For which cauſe the ſame *Ariſtotle* asketh, Whence it groweth, that a man being ſo much inſtructed, is yet the moſt vniuſt of all liuing creatures? To which probleme hee maketh anſwere, that a man hath much wit, and a great imagination, and for this he findeth manie waies to doe ill, and (as by his nature he coueteth delights, and to be ſuperiour to all, and of great happineſſe) it is of force that he offend; for theſe things cannot be atchieued, but by doing wrong to manie: but *Ariſtotle* wiſt not how to frame this probleme, nor to yeeld a fitting anſwere.

Better might hee haue enquired, for what cauſe the worſt people are commonly of greateſt wit, and amongſt thoſe, ſuch as are beſt furniſhed with abilitie, commit the lewdeſt prancks: whereas of due, a good wit and ſufficiencie ſhould rather encline a man to vertue and godlineſſe, than to vices and miſdoing. The anſwere hereto is, for that thoſe who partake much heat, are men of great imagination, and the ſame qualitie which maketh them wittie, traineth them to be naughtie and vicious. But when the vnderſtanding ouerruleth, it ordinarily inclineth a man to vertue, becauſe this power is founded on cold and drie: From which two qualities bud manie vertues, as are Continencie, Humilitie, Temperance: and from heat the contrarie. And if *Ariſtotle* had knowne this point of Philoſophie, he ſhould haue

been

been able to answer this probleme, which saith, Whence may it proceed, that that sort of men whom we cal craftsmen of *Bacchus*, or stage-players, are for the most part ill conditioned? as if he should say: for what cause are such as gaine their liuing on the stage, Inne-keepers, and Butchers, and those whose seruice is vsed about feasts and banquets to order the cates, ordinarily naught and vitious? To which probleme hee answereth, saying; That such by being occupied in these belly cheare offices, leaue themselues no leisure to studie, and therefore passe ouer their life in incontinencie. And hereto is pouertie also aiding, which accustomably bringeth with it manie euils: but (verely) this is not the reason; but playing on the stage and ordering of feasts springeth from the difference of the imagination, which inuiteth a man to this manner of life. And because this difference of imagination consisteth in heat, all of them haue verie good stomackes and great appetite to eat and drinke. These although they gaue themselues to learning, should therby reape little fruit; and had they beene neuer so wealthie, yet would they (howsoeuer) haue cast their affection to these seruices, were they euen baser than they are: for the wit and abilitie draweth euery one to that art, which answereth it in proportion.

For this cause *Aristotle* demaunded, what the reason was, why there are men who more willingly addict thē-selues to the profession of which they haue made choice, (though somwhiles vnworthie) than to the more honorable? As for exāple, to be rather a iugler, a stage-player, or a trumpeter, than an Astrologer or an Orator? To which probleme he answereth very well, saying; That a man soone discerneth to what art hee is disposed and inclined of his owne nature, because hee hath somewhat within

within that teacheth him, and Nature can doe so much with her pricks, that albeit the art and office be vnseemely for the calling of the learner, yet he cleaueth vnto that, and not to others of great imagination. But sithence we haue put by this manner of wits from the function of preaching, and that wee are bound to giue and bestow vpon euerie difference of abilitie, that sort of learning which is answerable thereto in particular: we must likewise determin what sort of wit he ought to be endowed withall, vnto whose charge the function of preaching is to be committed, which is the thing that most importeth the Christian common-wealth: For we must conceiue, that albeit we haue proued heretofore, that it is a matter repugnant in nature, to find a great wit accompanied with much imagination and memorie. Notwithstanding, this rule holdeth not so vniuersally in all Arts, but that it admitteth his exceptions, and sometimes commeth short.

In the last Chapter of this worke saue one, wee will prooue at full, that if Nature be possessed of her due force, and haue no impediment cast athwart to stop her, she maketh so perfect a difference of wit, as the same vniteth in one selfe subiect a great vnderstanding, with much imagination and memorie, as if they were not contrarie, nor held anie naturall opposition.

This should be a fitting abilitie, and conuenient for the function of preaching, if there could be found manie subiects to be endowed therewith; but (as we will shew in the place alleaged) they are so few, that of 100000. whom I haue measured, I can meet but with one of the size. Therefore it behoueth to seeke out another more familiar difference of wit, though not so far stept in perfection as the former. We must then weet, that between

the Phisitians and Philosophers riseth a great diuersitie in opinions, for resoluing the temperature and the qualitie of vinegar, of choller adust, and of ashes; in as much as these things sometimes worke the effect of heat, and sometimes of cold; and thereon they deuided themselues into diuers sects: but the truth is, that all these things which suffer adustion, and are consumed and burned by the fire, haue a variable temperature. The greater part of the subiect is cold and drie, but there are also other parts entermingled, so subtile and delicate, and of such feruencie and heat, that albeit they contain little in quantitie, yet they carie more efficacie in working than all the rest of the subiect.

So we see that vineger and melancholie through adustion open and leauen the earth by meanes of the heat, and close it not, though the more part of these humours be cold. Hence is gathered, that the melancholicke by adustion, accompanie great vnderstanding with much imagination; but they are all weake of memorie, for the much adustion much also drieth and hardeneth the brain. These are good preachers, or (at least) the best that may be found, sauing those perfect ones of whom we spake: for although memorie faile them, they enioy of themselues such inuention, that the verie imagination serueth them in stead of memorie and remembrance; and ministreth vnto them figures and sentences to deliuer, without that they stand in need of ought besides. Which these cannot bring about, who haue conned bosome-sermons, and swarming from that byas, are straight set a ground, without hauing the furniture of anie second meanes, to bring themselues aflote againe. And that melancholie by adustion hath this varietie of temperature; namely, cold and drie for the vnderstanding, and heat

for

for the imagination, *Aristotle* declareth in these words: Melancholicke men are variable and vnequall: for the force of choller aduſt is variable and vnequall; as if the ſame might be greatly both hot and cold, and as if he had ſaid, Melancholike men by aduſtion are variable and vnequall in their complexion: for that choller aduſt is verie vnequall, in as much as ſometimes it is exceeding hot, and ſometimes cold beyond meaſure.

The ſignes by which men of this temperature may be knowne, are verie manifeſt: they haue the colour of their countenance a darke greene, or ſallow, their eyes verie fierie; of whom it was ſaid, he is a man that hath blood in his eyes, their haire blacke and bald, their fleſh leane, rough and hairie, their veines big, they are of verie good conuerſation, and affable, but letcherous, proud, ſtately, blaſphemers, wilie, double, iniurious, friends of ill doing; and deſirous of reuenge: this is to be vnderſtood when melancholie is kindled, but if it be cooled, foorthwith there grow in them the contrarie vertues, chaſtitie, humilitie, feare and reuerence of God, charitie, mercie, and great acknowledgement of their ſins, with ſighings and teares, for which cauſe they liue in continuall warre and ſtrife, without euer enioying eaſe or reſt. Sometimes vice preuaileth in them, ſometimes vertue: but with all theſe defects, they are wittieſt, and moſt able for the function of preaching, and for all matters of wiſdome which befall in the world; for they haue an vnderſtanding to know the truth, and a great imagination to be able to perſuade the ſame.

Wherethrough wee ſee that which God did when hee would faſhion a man in his mothers wombe, to the end that he might be able to diſcouer to the world, the comming of his Son, and haue the way to prooue and perſuade,

ſuade that Chriſt was the Meſſias, and promiſed in the law. For making him of great vnderſtanding, and of much imagination, it fell out of neceſſitie (keeping the naturall order) that hee ſhould alſo make him cholericke and aduſt. And that this is true, may eaſily be vnderſtood by him, who conſidereth the great fire and furie with which Paule. he perſecuted the Church, the griefe conceiued by the Synagogues, when they ſaw him conuerted, as they who had forgone a man of high importance, and of whom the contrarie partie had made a gainefull purchaſe. It is alſo knowne by the tokens of the reaſonable choller, with which he ſpake and anſwered the Deputie, Conſuls, and the Iudges who had arreſted him: defending his owne perſon and the name of Chriſt with ſo great art and readineſſe, as he conuinced them all: yet he had an imperfection in his tongue, and was not verie prompt of ſpeech, which *Ariſtotle* affirmeth to be a propertie of the melancholicke by aduſtion. The vices whereto he confeſſed himſelfe to be ſubiect before his conuerſion, ſhew him to haue been of this temperature: he was a blaſphemer, a wrong doer, and a perſecutor: all which ſpringeth from abundance of heat. But the moſt euident ſigne which ſhewed that he was cholericke aduſt, is gathered from that battaile which himſelfe confeſſeth hee had within himſelfe, betwixt his part ſuperiour and inferiour, ſaying; I ſee another law in my members ſtriuing againſt the law of my mind, which leadeth me into the bondage of ſinne. And this ſelfe contention haue wee prooued (by the mind of *Ariſtotle*) to be in the melancholicke by aduſtion.

True it is that ſome expound (verie well) that this battaile groweth from the diſorder which originall ſinne made betweene the ſpirit and the fleſh; albeit being ſuch

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and so great, I beleeue also that it springs from the choller aduſt, which he had in his naturall conſtitution: for the royall Prophet *Dauid* participated equally of originall ſinne, and yet complained not ſo much as did *S. Paul*; but ſaith, That he found the inferiour portion accorded with his reaſon, when he would reioyce with God: My heart (ſaith he) and my fleſh ioyed in the liuing God. And (as we will touch in the laſt Chapter ſaue one) *Dauid* poſſeſſed the beſt tẽperature that Nature could frame: & hereof we will make proofe by the opinion of all the Philoſophers, that the ſame ordinarily enclineth a man to be vertuous without anie great gaine-ſtriuing of the fleſh. The wits then which are to be ſorted out for Preachers, are firſt theſe who vnite a great vnderſtanding with much imagination and memorie, whoſe ſignes ſhall be expreſſed in the laſt Chapter ſaue one. Where ſuch want, there ſucceed in their roome the melancholicke by aduſtion. Thoſe vnite a great vnderſtanding with much imagination, but ſuffer defect of memorie; wherethrough they are not ſtored with copie of words, nor can preach with full ſtore in preſence of the people.

In the third rancke ſucceed men of great vnderſtanding, but defectiue in their imagination and memorie. Theſe ſhall haue but a bad grace in preaching; yet will preach ſound doctrine. The laſt whom I would not charge with preaching at all, are ſuch as vnite much memorie with much imagination, and haue defect of vnderſtanding. Theſe draw the auditorie after them, and hold them in ſuſpence and well pleaſed: but when they leaſt miſdoubt it, they fetch a turne to the holie houſe: for by way of their ſweet diſcourſes and bleſſings they beguile the innocent.

CHAP. XI.

That the Theoricke of the lawes appertaineth to the memorie, and pleading and iudging (which are their practise) to the vnderstanding, and the gouerning of a common-wealth to the imagination.

IN the Spanish tongue, it is not void of a mysterie, that this word (Lettered) being a common tearme for all men of letters or learning, as well Diuines, as Lawyers, Phisitions, Logicians, Philosophers, Orators, Mathematicians, and Astrologers, yet in saying that such a one is learned, we all vnderstand it by common sence, that he maketh profession of the lawes, as if this were their proper and peculiar title, and not of the residue.

The answere of this doubt, though it be easie, yet to yeeld the same such as is requisit, it behoooueth first to be acquainted what law is, and whereunto they are bound, who set themselues to studie that profession, that afterwards they may employ the same to vse, when they are iudges or pleaders. The law (who so well considereth thereof) is nought else, but a reasonable will of the law-maker, by which he declareth, in what sort he will that the cases which happen dayly in the common-wealth, be decided, for preseruing the subiects in peace, and directing them in what sort they are to liue, & what things they are to refraine.

I sayd, a reasonable will, because it sufficeth not, that the King or Emperour (who are the efficient cause of the lawes) declaring his will in what sort soeuer, doth there-

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by make it a law, for if the same be not iust, and grounded vpon reason, it cannot be called a law, neither is it: euen as he cannot be tearmed a man who wanteth a reasonable soule. Therefore it is a matter established by common accord, that Kings enact their lawes with assent of men verie wise and of sound iudgement, to the end they may be right, iust, and good, and that the subiects may receiue them with good will, and be the more bound to obserue and obey them. The materiall cause of the law is, that it consist of such cases as accustomably befall in the common-wealth, according to the order of nature, and not of things impossible, or such as betide verie sildome. The finall cause is, to order the life of man, and to direct him what he is to doe, and what to forbeare, to the end that being conformed to reason, the common-wealth may be preserued in peace. For this cause wee see, that the lawes are written in plaine words, not doubtfull, nor obscure, nor of double vnderstanding, without ciphers, and without abbreuiations, and so easie and manifest, that whosoeuer shall read them, may readily vnderstand and retaine them in memorie. And because no man should pretend ignorance, they are publickly proclaimed, that whosoeuer afterward breaketh them, may be chastised.

In respect therefore of the care and diligence which the good law-makers vse, that their lawes may be iust and plaine, they haue giuen in charge to the iudges and pleaders, that in actions or iudgements none of them follow his owne sence, but suffer himselfe to be guided by the authoritie of the lawes: as if they should say, We commaund, that no iudge or aduocate imploy his conceit, nor intermeddle in deciding whether the law be iust or vniust, nor yeeld it anie other sence than that that

is contained in the text of the letter. So it followeth, that the Lawyers are to construe the text of the law, and to take that sence which is gathered out of the construction thereof, and none other.

This doctrine thus presupposed, it falleth out a matter verie manifest, for what reason the Lawyers are termed lettered, and other men of learning not so, for this name is deriued from the word letter, which is to say, a man who is not licenced to follow the capacitie of his owne vnderstanding, but is enforced to ensue the sence of the verie letter. And for that the well practised in this profession haue so construed it, they dare not denie or affirme any thing which appertaineth to the determination of anie case whatsoeuer, vnlesse they haue lying before them some law, which in expresse tearmes decideth the same. And if sometimes they speake of their owne head, interlacing their conceit and reason, without grounding vpon some law, they doe it with feare and bashfulnesse: for which cause is a much worne prouerbe, We blush when we speake without law. Diuines cannot call themselues lettered in this signification, for in the holie Scripture the letter killeth, and the spirit giueth life; it is full of mysteries, repleniſhed with figures and cyphers, obscure, and not vnderstood by all readers, the vowels and phrases of speech hold a verie different signification from that which the vulgar and three-tongued men doe know. Therefore whosoeuer shall set himselfe to construe the letter, and take the sence which riseth of that Grammaticall construction, shall fall into manie errours.

The Phisitions also haue no letter whereto to submit themselues, for if *Hippocrates* and *Galen*, and the other graue authors of this faculties, say and affirme one thing, and that experience and reason approue the contrarie,

they are not bound to follow them: for in Phiſicke, experience beareth more ſway than reaſon, and reaſon more than authoritie: but in the lawes it betideth quite contrarie, for their authoritie and that which they determine, is of more force and vigour than all the reaſons that may be alleaged to the contrarie. Which being ſo, wee haue the way laied open before vs, to aſſigne what wit is requiſit for the lawes. For if a Lawier haue his vnderſtanding and imagination tied to follow that which the law auouched, without aiding or diminiſhing, it falleth out apparant, that this facultie appertaineth to the memorie, that the thing wherein they muſt labour, is, to know the number of the lawes, and of the rules which are in the text, and to call to remembrance each of them in particular, and to rehearſe at large his ſentence and determination, to the end, that when occaſion is miniſtred, we may know there is a law which giueth deciſion, and in what forme and manner. Therefore to my ſeeming, it is a better difference of wit for a lawier to haue much memorie and little vnderſtanding, than much vnderſtanding and little memorie. For if there fall out no occaſion of employing his wit and abilitie, and that hee muſt haue at his fingers ends ſo great a number of lawes as are extant, and ſo far different from the other, with ſo many exceptions, limitations, and enlargements; it ſerues better to know by heart what hath beene determined in the lawes for euery point which ſhall come in queſtion, than to diſcourſe with the vnderſtanding in what ſort the ſame might haue beene determined: for the one of theſe is neceſſarie, and the other impertinent, ſince none other opinion than the verie determination of the law muſt beare the ſtroke.

So it fals out for certaine, that the Theoricke of the law

law appertaineth to the memorie and not to the vnderstanding, nor to the imagination: for which reason, and for that the lawes are so positiue, and that because the Lawyers haue their vnderstanding so tied to the will of the law-maker, and cannot entermingle their owne resolution, saue in case where they rest vncertaine of the determination of the law, when any client seeketh their iudgement, they haue authoritie and licence to say, I will looke for the case in my booke: which if the Phisition should answere when he is asked a remedie for some disease, or the Diuine in cases of conscience; wee would repute them for men but simply seene in the facultie whereof they make profession. And the reason hereof is, that those sciences haue certaine vniuersall principles and definitions, vnder which the particular cases are contained; but in the law facultie euery law containeth a seuerall particular case, without hauing any affinitie with the next, though they both be placed vnder one title. In respect whereof, it is necessarie to haue a notice of all the lawes, and to studie each one in particular, and distinctly to lay them vp in memorie. But here against, *Plato* noteth a thing worthie of great consideration; and that is, how in his time a learned man was held in suspition that he knew many lawes by heart, seeing by experience that such were not so skilfull iudges and pleaders, as this their vaunt seemed to pretend. Of which effect it appeareth he could not find out the cause, seeing in a place so conuenient he did not report the same; onely he saw by experience, that Lawyers endowed with good memorie, being set to defend a cause, or to giue a sentence, applied not their reasons so well as was conuenient.

The reason of this effect may easily be rendered in my doctrine, presupposing that memorie is contrarie to

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the vnderſtanding, and that the true interpretation of the lawes, to amplifie, reſtraine, and compound them, with their contraries and compoſitions, is done by diſtinguiſhing, concluding, arguing, iudging, and chuſing: which workes wee haue often ſaid heretofore belong to diſcourſe, and the learned man poſſeſſing much memorie, cannot by poſſibilitie enioy them.

Wee haue alſo noted heretofore, that memorie ſupplieth none other office in the head, than faithfully to preſerue the figures and fantaſies of things: but the vnderſtanding and the imagination, are thoſe which worke therewithall.

And if a learned man haue the whole art of memory, and yet want vnderſtanding and imagination, he hath no more ſufficiencie to iudge or plead, than the verie *Code* or *Digeſt*, which compaſſing within them all the lawes and rules of reaſon, for all that cannot write one letter. Moreouer, albeit it be true that the law ought to be ſuch as wee haue mentioned in his definition; yet it falleth out a miracle to find things with all the perfections, which the vnderſtanding attributeth vnto them. That the law be iuſt and reaſonable, and that it proceed fully to all that which may happen, that it be written in plaine termes, void of doubt and oppoſitions, and that it receiue not diuerſe conſtructions, we ſee not alwaies accompliſhed: for in concluſion, it was eſtabliſhed by mans counſell, and that is not of force ſufficient to giue order for all that may betide: and this is daily ſeene by experience, for after a law hath beene enacted with great aduiſement and counſell, the ſame (in ſhort ſpace) is abrogated againe; for when it is once publiſhed and put in practiſe, a thouſand inconueniences diſcouer themſelues: whereof (when it was perſwaded) no man tooke regard: and therefore

fore Kings & Emperours are aduiſed by the ſame lawes, that they ſhame not to amend and correct their lawes: for, in a word, men they are, and maruell there is none if they commit an error, ſo much the rather, for that no law can comprehend in words and ſentences all the circumſtances of the caſe which it decideth: for the craft of bad people is more wily to find holes than that of good men to foreſee how they are to be gouerned; and therefore it was ſaid, Neither the lawes nor the reſolutions of the Senate can be ſet downe in writing in ſuch ſort, that all the caſes which ſeuerally chance, may be compriſed therein; but it ſufficeth to comprehend the things which fall out oftenеſt: and if other caſes ſucceed afterward, for which no law is enacted, it decideth them in proper tearmes.

The law facultie is not ſo bare of rules and principles, but that if the iudge or pleader haue a good diſcourſe, to know how to applie them, they may find their true determination and defence, and whence to gather the ſame. In ſort, that if the caſes be more in number than the lawes, it behoooueth, that in the iudge and in the pleader there be much diſcourſe to make new lawes, and that not at all aduentures: but ſuch as reaſon (by his conſonance) may receiue them without contradiction. This the Lawyers of much memorie cannot doe: for if the caſes which the law thruſteth into their mouth, bee not ſquared and chewed to their hands, they are to ſeeke what to doe. Wee are woont to reſemble a Lawyer, who can rehearſe many lawes by heart, to a regrater or hoſier that hath many paires of hoſen readie made in his ſhop, who, to deliuer you one that may fit you, muſt make you to aſſay them all: and if none agree with the buiers meaſure, hee muſt ſend him away hoſeleſſe. But a learned

learned man of good vnderſtanding, is like a good Tailor, who hath his ſheares in his hand, and his peece of cloth on the table, and taking meaſure, cutteth his hoſen after his ſtature that demandeth them.

The ſheares of a good pleader is his ſharpe vnderſtanding, with which he taketh meaſure of the caſe, and apparelleth the ſame with that law which may decide it: and if he find not a whole one that may determine it in expreſſe tearmes, he maketh one of manie peeces, and therewith vſeth the beſt defence that he may. The Lawyers who are endowed with ſuch a wit and abilitie, are not to be tearmed lettered: for they conſtrue not the letter, neither bind themſelues to the formall words of the law; but it ſeemeth they are law makers or counſellors at law, of whom the lawes themſelues enquire and demaund how they ſhall determine: for if they haue power and authoritie to interpret them, to reaue, to adde, and to gather out of them exceptions, and fallacies, and that they may correct and amend them; it was not vnfitly ſaid, That they ſeeme to be law-makers.

Of this ſort of knowledge it was ſpoken: By the knowledge of the lawes it is not meant to con their words by rote; but to take notice of their force and power: as if he ſhould ſay, Let no man thinke, that to know the lawes, is to beare in mind the formall words with which they are written; but to vnderſtand how far their forces extend, and what the point is which they may decide: for their reaſon is ſubiect to manie varieties, by meanes of the circumſtances aswell of time as of perſon, of place, of manner, of matter, of cauſe, and of the thing it ſelfe. All which breedeth an alteration in the deciſion of the law, and if the iudge or pleader bee not endowed with diſcourſe, to gather out of the law, or to take

take away or adioine that which the law selfe doth not expresse in words, he shall commit manie errors in following the letter: for it hath been said, that the words of the law are not to be taken after the Iewish manner, that is, to construe onely the letter, and so take the sence thereof.

On the things alreadie alleaged, wee conclude, that pleading is a worke of discourse, and that if the learned in the lawes possesse much memorie, he shall be vntoward to iudge or plead through the repugnancie of these two powers. And this is the cause for which the learned of so ripe memorie (whom *Plato* mentioneth) could not defend well their clients causes, nor applie the lawes. But in this doctrine there presents it selfe a doubt, and that (in mine opinion) not of the lightest: for if the discourse be that which putteth the case in the law, and which determineth the same by distinguishing, limiting, amplifying, inferring, and answering the arguments of the contrarie partie, how is it possible that the discourse may compasse all this, if the memorie set not downe all the lawes before it? for (as we haue aboue remembred) it is commanded, that no man in actions or iudgements shall vse his owne sence, but leaue himselfe to be guided by the authoritie of the lawes. Conformable hereunto, it behooueth first to know all the lawes and rules of the law facultie, ere we can take hold of that which maketh to the purpose of our case. For albeit we haue said, that the pleader (of good vnderstanding) is lord of the lawes: yet it is requisit that all his reasons and arguments be grounded on the principles of this facultie, without which they are of none effect or valure. And to be able to doe this, it behoueth to haue much memorie that may preserue and retaine so great a number of

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lawes which are written in the bookes.

This argument prooueth it to be neceſſarie, to the end a pleader may be accompliſhed, that there be vnited in him a great diſcourſe and much memorie. All which I confeſſe, but that which I would ſay, is, that ſince we cannot find great diſcourſe vnited with much memorie, through the repugnancie which they carrie ech to other, it is requiſit that the pleader haue much diſcourſe and little memorie, rather than much memorie and little diſcourſe: for to the default of memorie are found manie remedies; as bookes, tables, alphabets, and other things deuiſed by men: but if diſcourſe faile, there can nothing be found to remedie the ſame.

Beſides this, *Ariſtotle* ſaith, that men of great diſcourſe though they haue a feeble memorie, yet they haue much remembrance, by which they retaine a certaine diffuſe notice of things they haue ſeene, heard, and read: whereupon diſcourſing, they call them to memorie. And albeit they had not ſo manie remedies to preſent vnto the vnderſtanding the whole bodie of the ciuile law: yet the lawes are grounded on ſo great reaſon, as *Plato* reporteth, that the antients termed the law Wiſdom and Reaſon. Therefore the iudge or pleader, of great diſcourſe, though iudging or counſelling he haue not the law before him; yet ſeldome ſhall he commit an error: for he hath with him the inſtrument, with which the Emperours made the lawes. Whence oftentimes it falleth out, that a Iudge of good wit giueth a ſentence, without knowing the deciſion of the law; and afterwards findeth the ſame ſo ruled in his bookes: and the like we ſee ſometimes betideth the pleaders when they giue their iudgement in a caſe without ſtudying. The lawes and rules of reaſon, whoſeuer well marketh them, are the fountaine

taine and originall, whence the pleaders gather their arguments and reasons, to prooue what they vndertake. And this worke (for certaine) is performed by the discourse: which power if the pleader want, he shall neuer skill to shape an argument, though he haue the whole ciuill law at his fingers ends. This we see plainely to befall in such as studie the art of Oratorie, when the aptnesse thereunto is failing: for though they learne by art the Topicks of *Cicero*, being the spring from which flow the arguments that may be inuented to prooue euerie probleme, both on the affirmatiue and the negatiue part: yet they cannot there-out shape a reason. Againe, there come others of great wit and towardnesse; who without looking in booke, or studying the Topicks, make a hundred arguments seruing for the purpose, as occasion requireth.

This selfe falleth out in the Lawyers of good memorie, who will recite you a whole text verie perfectly, and yet of so great a multitude of lawes as are comprised therein, cannot collect so much as one argument to prooue their inuention. And contrariwise, others who haue studied simply without bookes, and without allowance, worke miracles in pleading of causes. Hence wee know, how much it importeth the common-wealth, that there may be such an election and examination of wits for the sciences; in as much as some without art know and vnderstand what they are to effect: and others loaden with precepts and rules, for that they want a conuenient towardlinesse for practise, commit a thousand absurdities, which verie ill beseeme them. So then, if to iudge and plead, be effected by distinguishing, inferring, arguing, and chusing, it standeth with reason, that whosoeuer setteth himselfe to studie the lawes, enioy a good

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vnderſtanding, ſeeing that ſuch actions appertaine to this power, and not to the memorie or to the imagination. How we may finde whether a child be endowed with this difference of wit or no, it would doe well to vnderſtand: but firſt it behoooueth to lay downe what are the qualities of diſcourſe, and how manie differences it compriſeth in it ſelfe, to the end we may likewiſe know with diſtinction, to which of theſe the lawes appertaine: for the firſt, we muſt weet, that albeit the vnderſtanding be the moſt noble power, and of greateſt dignitie in man: yet there is none which is more eaſily led into errour (as touching the trueth) than the vnderſtanding. This *Ariſtotle* attempted to prooue when he ſaid, That the ſenſe is euer true, but the vnderſtanding (for the moſt part) diſcourſeth badly: the which is plainly ſeen by experience: for if it were not ſo amongſt the Diuines, the Phiſitions, the Philoſophers, and the Lawyers, there would not fall out ſo manie weightie diſſentions, ſo diuers opinions, and ſo manie iudgements and conceits vpon euery point, ſeeing the truth is neuer more than one. Whence it groweth, that the ſences hold ſo great a certainetie in their obiects, and the vnderſtanding is ſo eaſily beguiled in his; may well be conceiued, if we conſider that the obiects of the fiue ſences, and the ſpices by which they are knowne, haue their being reall, firme, and ſtable by nature, before they are knowne: but that truth which is to be contemplated by the vnderſtanding, if it ſelfe doe not frame and faſhion the ſame, it hath no formall being of his owne; but is wholly ſcattered and loſe in his materials, as a houſe conuerted into ſtones, earth, timber, and tiles, with which ſo manie errors may be committed in building, as there ſhall men ſet themſelues to build with ill imagination.

The like befalleth in the building which the vnderstanding raiseth when it frameth a truth: for if the wit be not good, all the residue will worke a thousand follies with the selfe-same principles. Hence springs it that amongst men there are so sundrie opinions touching one selfe matter: for euery one maketh the composition and figure such as is his vnderstanding.

From these errours and opinions are the fiue sences free: for neither the eyes make the colour, nor the tast the sauours, nor the feeling the palpable qualities; but the whole is made and compounded by nature before anie of them be acquainted with his obiect. Men because they carrie not regard to this bad operation of the vnderstanding, take hardinesse to deliuer confidently their owne opinion, without knowing (in certainetie) of what sort their wit is, and whither it can fashion a truth well or ill. And if we be not resolued herein, let vs aske some of these learned men, who after they haue set downe in writing, and confirmed their opinions with manie arguments and reasons, and haue another time changed their opinions and conceit, when or how they can assure themselues, that (now at last) they haue hit the naile on the head? themselues will not denie, but that they erred the first time, seeing they vnsay what they said tofore.

Secondly, I auouch, that they ought to haue the lesse confidence in their vnderstanding, becauſe the power which once ill compoundeth the truth, whilest his patrone placed so much assurance in his arguments and reasons, should therefore the sooner take suspect, that he may once againe slide into error whilest he worketh with the selfe-same instrument of reason; and so much the rather, for that it hath beene seene by experiences, that the

first opinion hath borne most truth, and afterwards he hath relied vpon a worse, and of lesse probabilitie. They hold it for a sufficient token, that the vnderstanding compoundeth well a truth, when they see it enamoured of such a figure; and that there are arguments and reasons which moue it to conclude in that sort: and verily they misse their cushion, for the same vnderstanding carrieth the same proportion to his false opinions, that the inferiour powers haue each with the differences of their obiect: for if we demand of the Phisitions, what meat is best and most sauourie of all that men accustomably feed vpon? I beleeue they will answere, that for men who are distempered and of weake stomacke, there is none absolutely good or euill, but such as the stomacke is that shall receiue it: for there are stomacks (saith *Galen*) which better brooke Beefe than Hennes or Cracknels, and othersome abhorre Egges and Milke: and others againe haue a longing after them: and in the maner of vsing meates, some like rost, and some boild: and in rost, some loue to haue the bloud run in the dish, & some to haue it browne and burned. And (which is more worthie of consideration) that meat which this day is sauourly eaten, and with good appetite, to morrow will be lothed, and a farre worse longed for in his roome. All this is vnderstood when the stomacke is good and sound: but if it fall into a certaine infirmitie, which the Phisitions call Pica, or Malacia, then arise longings after things which mans nature abhorreth: so as they eat earth, coales, and lime, with greater appetite than Hennes or Trouts. If we passe on to the facultie generatiue, we shall find as manie appetites & varieties: for some men loue a foule woman and abhorre a faire: others cast better liking to a foole than her that is wise: a fat wench is fulsome, and a leane

haue their liking, silks and braue attire offend some mens fancies, who leese themselues after one that totters in her ragges. This is vnderstood, when the genitall parts are in their soundnesse: but if they fall into their infirmitie of stomacke, which is termed Malacia, they couet detestable beastlinesse. The same befalleth in the facultie sensitiue: for of the palpable qualities, hard and soft, rough and smooth, hot and cold, moist and drie, there is none of them which can content euerie ones feeling: for there are men who take better rest on a hard bed than a soft, and othersome better on a soft than a hard. All this varietie of strange tasts and appetites is found in the compositions, framed by the vnderstanding: for if we assemble a hundred men of learning, and propound a particular question, each of them deliuereth a seuerall iudgement, and discourseth thereof in different manner. One selfe argument to one seemeth a sophisticall reason, to another probable; and some you shall meet with, to whose capacitie it concludeth as if it were a demonstration. And this is not onely true in diuerse vnderstandings, but wee see also by experience, that one selfe reason concludeth to one selfe vnderstanding, at one time thus-wise, and at another time otherwise: so much, that euery day men varie in opinion; some by processe of time purging their vnderstanding, know the default of reason, which first swayed them, and others leesing the good temperarure of their braine, abhorre the truth, and giue allowance to a leasing. But if the braine fall into the infirmitie, which is termed Malacia, then we shall see strange iudgements and compositions, arguments false and weake, to prooue more forcibly than such as carrie strength and truth; to good arguments, an answere shaped, and to bad a condescending from the premisses, whence a right

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concluſion may be collected, they gather a wrong, and by ſtrange arguments, and fond reaſons, they prooue their bad imaginations. This, graue and learned men duely aduiſing, labour to deliuer their opinion, concealing the reaſons whereon they ground: for men perſuade themſelues, that ſo farre mans authoritie auaileth, as the reaſon is of force on which he buildeth, and the arguments reſting ſo indifferent, for concluding through the diuerſitie of vnderſtandings, euerie man giueth a iudgement of the reaſon conformably to the wit which he poſſeſſeth: for which cauſe it is reputed greater grauitie to ſay, This is mine opinion, for certaine reaſons which mooue me ſo to thinke; than to diſplay the arguments whereon he relieth. But if they bee enforced to render a reaſon of their opinion, they ouerſlip not anie argument, how ſlight ſoeuer: for that which they leaſt valued, with ſome concludeth and worketh more effect, than the moſt vrgent. Wherein the great miſerie of our vnderſtanding is diſcouered, which compoundeth and diuideth, argueth and reaſoneth, and at laſt (when it is growne to a concluſion) is void of proofe or light, which may make it diſcerne whether his opinion be true or no.

This ſelfe vncertainetie haue the Diuines in matters which appertaine not to the faith: for after they haue argued at full, they cannot then aſſure themſelues of anie infallible proofe or euident ſucceſſe that may diſcouer, which reaſons carried greateſt weight; and ſo euerie Diuine caſteth how he may beſt ground himſelfe, and anſwere with moſt apparence to the aduerſe parties arguments, his owne reputation ſaued, and this is all whereabouts he muſt beſtow his endeuour. But the charge of a Phiſition, and a Generall in the field, after he hath well

discourſed and refuted the grounds of the contrarie partie, is to marke the ſucceſſe, which if it be good, he ſhall be held for diſcreet; if bad, all men will know that he relied vpon guilefull reaſons.

In matters of faith propounded by the Church, there can befall none errour: for God, beſt weeting how vncertaine mens reaſons are, and with how great facilitie they runne headlong to be deceiued, conſenteth not, that matters ſo high and of ſo weightie importance, ſhould reſt vpon our onely determination: but when two or three are gathered togither in his name, with the ſolemnitie of the Church, he forthwith entreth into the midſt of them, as preſident of the action, and ſo giueth allowance to that which they ſay well, and reaueth their errours, and of himſelfe reuealeth that, to whoſe notice by humane forces wee cannot attaine. The proofe then which the reaſons formed in matters of faith muſt receiue, is to aduiſe well whether they prooue or inferre the ſame, which the Catholicke Church ſaith and declareth: for if they collect ought to the contrarie, then (without doubt) they are faultie: but in other queſtions where the vnderſtanding hath libertie of diſcourſe, there hath not yet anie maner bin aduiſed to know what reaſons conclude, nor when the vnderſtanding doth well compound a truth: onely we relie vpon the good conſonance which they make, and that is an argument which may erre: for manie falſe points carrie better apparence and likelier proofe of truth, than the true themſelues.

Phiſitions, and ſuch as commaund in martiall affaires, haue ſucceſſe and experience for proofe of their reaſons. For if ten Captains prooue by manie reaſons, that it is beſt to ioyne battaile, and ſo manie (on the other ſide) defend

fend the contrarie, that which ſucceedeth, will confirme the one opinion, and conuince the other. And if two Phiſitions diſpute, whether the patient ſhall die or liue; after he is cured or deceaſed, it will appeare whoſe reaſon was beſt. But for all this, the ſucceſſe is yet no ſufficient proofe: for whereas an effect hath manie cauſes, it may verie well betide happily for one cauſe, and yet the reaſons (perhaps) were grounded on a contrarie. *Ariſtotle* moreouer affirmeth, That to know what reaſons conclude, it is good to enſue the common opinion; for if manie wiſe men ſay and affirme one ſelfe thing, and all conclude with the ſame reaſons, it is a ſigne (though topicall) that they are concluſiue, and that they compound well the truth. But who ſo taketh this into due conſideration, ſhall find it a proofe ſubiect alſo vnto beguiling; for in the forces of the vnderſtanding, waight is of more preheminence than number: for it fareth not in this, as in bodily forces, that when manie ioyne together to lift vp a waight, they preuaile much, and when few, but little: but to attaine to the notice of a truth deeply hidden, one high vnderſtanding is of more value than a hundred thouſand which are not comparable thereunto; and the reaſon is, becauſe the vnderſtandings helpe not each other, neither of manie make one, as it falls out in bodily powers. Therefore well ſayd the wiſe man, Haue manie peace-makers, but take one of a thouſand to be thy counſellour; as if he ſhould ſay, Keepe for thy ſelfe manie friends, who may defend thee when thou ſhalt bee driuen to come to hand ſtrokes, but to aske counſell, chuſe onely one amongſt a thouſand. Which ſentence was alſo expreſſed by *Heraclitus*, who ſayd, One with me is worth a thouſand. In contentions and cauſes, euerie learned man bethinketh how he may beſt ground himſelfe

on reaſon, but after he hath well reuolued euerie thing, there is no art which can make him know with aſſurance whether his vnderſtanding haue made that compoſition which in iuſtice is requiſit: for if one pleader prooue with law in hand, That reaſon ſtandeth on the demandants ſide; and another by way alſo of the law, prooueth the like for the defendant: what remedie ſhall we deuiſe, to know which of the two pleaders hath formed his reaſons beſt? The ſentence of the Iudge maketh no demonſtration of true iuſtice, neither can the ſame be tearmed a ſucceſſe, for his ſentence (alſo) is but an opinion, and he doth none other than cleaue to one of the two pleaders: and to increaſe the number of learned men in one ſelfe opinion, is no argument to perſuade, that what they reſolue vpon, is therefore true: for we haue alreadie affirmed and prooued, that manie weake capacities (though they ioyne in one, to diſcouer ſome darke conceiued truth) ſhall neuer arriue to the power and force of ſome one alone, if the ſame be an vnderſtanding of high reach. And that the ſentence of the Iudge maketh no demonſtration, is plainely ſeene, in that at another higher ſeat of iuſtice they reuerſe the ſame and giue a diuerſe iudgement: and (which is worſt) it may ſo fall, that the inferiour iudge was of an abler capacitie than the ſuperiour, and his opinion more conformable vnto reaſon. And that the ſentence of the ſuperiour iudge, is not a ſufficient proofe of iuſtice neither, it is a matter verie manifeſt; for in the ſame actions, and from the ſame iudges, without adding or reauing anie one iot, we ſee dayly contrarie ſentences to iſſue. And he that once is deceiued by placing confidence in his owne reaſons, falleth duly into ſuſpect, that he may be deceiued of new. Wherethrough we ſhould the leſſe relie vpon his opinion, For

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he that is once naught (ſaith the wiſe man) chaſe him from thee. Pleaders ſeeing the great varietie of vnderſtandings which poſſeſſe the judges, and that each of them is affectionate to the reaſon which beſt ſquareth with his wit, and that ſometime they take ſatisfaction at one argument, & ſometimes aſſent to the contrary, they thereupon boldly thruſt themſelues foorth to defend euery cauſe in controuerſie, both on the part affirmatiue and the negatiue; and this ſo much the rather, becauſe they ſee by experience, that in the one manner and the other, they haue a ſentence in their fauour, and ſo that comes very rightly to be verefied, which wiſdome ſaid, The thoughts of mortall men are timorous, and their foreſights vncertaine. The remedie then which wee haue againſt this, ſeeing the reaſons of the Lawyer faile in proofe and experience, ſhall be, to make choice of men of great vnderſtanding, who may be Iudges and Pleaders; For the reaſons and arguments of ſuch (ſaith *Ariſtotle*) are no leſſe certaine and firme, than experience it ſelfe. And by making this choice, it ſeemeth, that the cõmonwealth reſteth aſſured, that her officers ſhall adminiſter iuſtice. But if they giue them all ſcope to enter without making triall of their wit, as the vſe is at this day, the inconueniences (which we haue noted) will euermore befall.

By what ſignes it may be knowne, that he who ſhall ſtudie the lawes, hath the difference of wit requiſit to this facultie, heretofore (after a ſort) we haue expreſſed: but yet, to renew it to the memorie, and to prooue the ſame more at large, wee muſt know, that the child who being ſet to read, ſoone learneth to know his letters, and can pronounce euery one with facilitie, according as they be placed in the A B C, giueth token, that he ſhal be endowed

endowed with much memorie, for such a worke as this (for certaine) is not performed by the vnderstanding, nor by the imagination, but it appertaineth vnto the office of the memorie, to preserue the figures of things, and to report the natures of each, when occasion so requireth: and where much memorie dwelleth, we haue prooued before, that default of vnderstanding also raigneth.

To write also with speed, and a faire hand, we sayd, that it bewraied an imagination, wherethrough the child who in few dayes will frame his hand, and write his lines right, and his letters euen, and with good forme and figure, yeeldeth signe of meane vnderstanding: for this worke is performed by the imagination, and these two powers encounter in that contrarietie which wee haue alreadie spoken of and noted.

And if being set to Grammer, he learne the same with little labour, and in short time make good Latines, and write fine Epistles, with the well ruled closes of *Cicero*, he shall neuer be good Iudge nor pleader, for it is a signe that he hath much memorie, and (saue by great miracle) he will be of slender discourse. But if such a one wax obstinat in plodding at the Lawes, and spend much time in the Schooles, he will prooue a famous Reader, and shall haue a stint of manie hearers; for the Latine tongue is verie gratious in Chaires, and to read with great shew, there are requisit manie allegations, and to fardell vp in euerie law, whatsoeuer hath beene written touching the same; and to this purpose, memorie is of more necessitie than discourse. And albeit it is true, that in the Chaire he be to distinguish, inferre, argue, iudge, and chuse, to gather the true sence of the law; yet in the end he putteth the case as best liketh himselfe, he mooues doubts, maketh

keth obiections, and giueth ſentence after his owne will, without that anie gaineſay him: for which a meane diſcourſe is ſufficient. But when one pleader ſpeaketh for the plaintife, and another for the defendant, and a third Lawyer ſupplieth the Iudges place; this is a true controuerſie, and men cannot ſpeake ſo at randon, as when they skirmiſh without an aduerſarie. And if the child profit ſlenderly in Grammer, we may thereby gather, that he hath a good diſcourſe: I ſay we may ſo coniecture, becauſe it followeth not of neceſſitie, that whoſoeuer cannot learne Latine, hath therefore ſtraightwaies a good diſcourſe, ſeeing we haue prooued tofore, that children of great imagination neuer greatly profit in the Latine tongue; but that which may beſt diſcouer this, is Logicke: for this ſcience carrieth the ſame proportion with the vnderſtanding, as the touchſtone with gold. Wherethrough it falleth out certaine, that if he who taketh leſſon in the Arts, begin not within a moneth or two to diſcourſe and to caſt doubts; and if there come not in his head arguments and anſweres in the matter which is treated of, he is void of diſcourſe: but if he prooue towardly in his ſcience, it is an infallible argument, that he is endued with a good vnderſtandig for the lawes, and ſo he may forthwith addict himſelfe to ſtudie them without longer tarrying. Albeit I would hold it better done, firſt to run through the Arts, becauſe Logicke, in reſpect of the vnderſtanding, is nought els than thoſe ſhackles which we clap on the legs of an vntrained Mule, which going with them many dayes, taketh a ſteddie and ſeemly pace. Such a march doth the vnderſtanding make in his diſputations, when it firſt bindeth the ſame with the rules and precepts of Logicke: but if this child, whom we goe thus-wiſe examining, reape no profit in the Latine

tine tongue, neither can come away with Logicke as were requisit, it behoueth to trie whether he possesse a good imagination, ere we take him from the lawes; for herein is lapped vp a very great secret, and it is good that the commonwealth be done to ware therof; & it is, that there are some Lawyers, who getting vp into the chaire, worke miracles in interpreting the texts, and others in pleading: but if you put the staffe of justice into their hands, they haue no more abilitie to gouerne, than as if the lawes had neuer beene enacted to any such end: and contrariwise, some other there are, who with three misvnderstood lawes, which they haue learned at all aduentures; being placed in any gouernment, there cannot more be desired at any mans hands than they will performe. At which effect, some curious wits take wonder, because they sincke not into the depth of the cause, from whence it may grow: and the reason is, that gouernment appertaineth to the imagination, and not to the vnderstanding nor the memorie. And that this is so, the matter may verie manifestly be prooued, considering that the commonwealth is to be compounded with order and concert, with euery thing in his due place, which al put togither, maketh good figure and correspondence. And this (sundrie times heretofore) wee haue prooued to be a worke of the imagination: and it shall prooue nought else to place a great Lawyer to be a gouernour, than to make a deafe man a Iudge in musicke; but this is ordinarily to be vnderstood, and not as an vniuersal rule: for we haue alreadie prooued, it is possible that Nature can vnite great vnderstanding with much imagination; so shall there follow no repugnancie to be a good pleader and a famous gouernour: and wee heretofore discouered, that Nature being endowed with all the forces

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which she may possesse, and with matter well seasoned, will make a man of great memorie, and of great vnderstanding, and of much imagination; who studying the lawes, will prooue a famous reader, a great pleader, and no lesse gouernour: but Nature makes so few such, as this cannot passe for a generall rule.

CHAP. XII.

How it may be prooued, that of Theoricall Phisicke, part appertaineth to the memorie, and part to the vnderstanding, and the practicke to the imagination.



What time the *Arabian* Phisicke flourished, there was a Phisition very famous, as well in reading, as in writing, arguing, distinguishing, answering, and concluding; who, men would thinke (in respect of his profound knowledge) were able to reuiue the dead, and to heale any disease whatsoeuer, and yet the contrarie came to passe: for hee neuer tooke anie patient in cure, who miscarried not vnder his hand. Whereat greatly shaming, and quite out of countenance, hee went and made himselfe a Frier, complaining on his euill fortune, being not able to conceiue the cause how hee came so to misse. And because the freshest examples affoord surest proofe, and doe most sway the vnderstanding, it was held by many graue Phisitions, that *Iohn Argentier*, a Phisition of our time, farre surpassed *Galen*, in reducing the art of Phisicke to a better method: and yet for all this, it is reported of him, that hee was so infortunate in practise, as no patient of his countrie durst take Phisicke

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at his hands, fearing some dismall succesſe. Hereat it seemeth the vulgar haue good reason to maruell, seeing by experience (not onely in those rehearsed by vs, but also in manie others with whom men haue dayly to deale) that if the Phisition be a great clearke, for the same reason he is vnfit to minister.

Of this effect *Aristotle* procured to render a reason, but could not find it out. He thought, that the cause why the reasonable Phisitions of his time failed in curing, grew, for that such men had onely a generall notice, and knew not euerie particular complexion; contrarie to the Empericks, whose principall studie bent it selfe to know the properties of euerie seuerall person, and let passe the generall: but he was void of reason, for both the one and the other exercised themselues about particular cures, and endeuoured (so much as in them lay) to know each ones nature singly by it selfe. The difficultie then consisteth in nothing els, than to know for what cause so well learned Phisitions, though they exercise themselues all their life long in curing; yet neuer grow skilfull in practise, and yet other simple soules with three or foure rules, learne verie soone: and the schollers can more skill of ministring than they.

The true answere of this doubt holdeth no little difficultie, seeing that *Aristotle* could not find it out, nor render (at least in some sort) anie part thereof. But grounding on the principles of our doctrine, we will deliuer the same: for we must know, that the perfection of a Phisition consisteth in two things, no lesse necessarie to attaine the end of his art, than two legs are to goe without halting. The first is, to weet, by way of method, the precepts and rules of curing men in generall, without descending to particulars. The second, to be long time exercised

exercised in practise, and to haue visited manie patients: for men are not so different each from other, but that in diuers things they agree; neither so conioyned, but that there rest in them particularities of such condition, as they can neuer bee deliuered by speech, nor written, nor taught, nor so collected, as that they may be reduced into art: but to know them, is onely granted to him, who hath often seene and had them in handling. Which may easily be conceiued, considering that mans face, being composed of so small a number of parts, as are two eyes, a nose, two cheekes, a mouth, and a forehead. Nature shapeth yet therein so manie compositions and combinations, as if you assemble togither an hundred thousand mē, each one hath a countenance so different from other, and proper to himselfe, that it falleth out a miracle to find two who do altogither resemble. The like betideth in the foure elements, and in the foure first qualities, hot, cold, moyst, and drie, by the harmonie of which, the life and health of man is compounded: and of so slender a number of parts, Nature maketh so manie proportions, that if a hundred thousand men be begotten, each of them comes to the world with a health so peculiar and proper to himselfe, that if God should on the sudden miraculously change their proportion of these first qualities, they would all become sick, except some two or three, that by great dispositon had the like consonance & proportion. Whence two conclusions are necessarily inferred. The first is, that euerie man who falleth sicke, ought to be cured conformable to his particular proportion; in sort, that if the Phisition restore him not to his first consonance of humours, he cannot recouer. The second, that to performe this as it ought, is requisit, the Phisition haue first seen & dealt with the patient sundrie times in his health,

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by feeling his pulse, perusing his state, and what manner countenance and complexion hee is of, to the end that when he shall fall sicke, he may iudge how farre hee is from his health, and in ministring vnto him, may know to what point he is to restore him. For the first, (namely to weet and vnderstand the Theoricke and composition of the art) saith *Galen*, it is necessarie to be endowed with great discourse and much memorie: for the one part of Phisicke consisteth in reason, and the other in experience and historie. To the first is vnderstanding requisite, and to the other memorie, and it resting a matter of so great difficultie, to vnite these two powers in a large degree; it followeth of force, that the Phisition become vnapt for the Theoricke. Wherethrough we behold many Phisitions, learned in the Greeke and Latine tongue, and great Anotomists and Simplicists (all workes of the memorie) who brought to arguing or disputation, or to find out the cause of anie effect that appertaineth to the vnderstanding, can small skill thereof.

The contrarie befalleth in others, who shew great wit and sufficiencie in the Logicke and Philosophie of this art, but being set to the Latine and Greeke tongue, touching simples and anotomies, can doe little, because memorie in them is wanting: for this cause *Galen* said very well, That it is no maruell, if among so great a multitude of men, who practise the exercise and studie of the art of Phisicke and Philosophie, so few are found to profit therein, and yeelding the reason, he saith, It requires a great toile to find out a wit requisite for this Science; or a maister who can teach the same with perfection, or can studie it with diligence and attention. But with all these reasons *Galen* goeth groping, for hee could not hit the cause whence it comes to passe, that few persons profit

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in Phisick. Yet in saying it was a great labour to find out a wit requisit for this science, he spake truth; albeit he did not so far-forth specifie the same, as we will: namely, for that it is so difficult a matter to vnite a great vnderstanding with much memorie, no man attaineth to the depth of Theoricall Phisick. And for that there is found a repugnancie betweene the vnderstanding and the imagination (whereunto we will now prooue, that practise and the skill to cure with certaintie, appertaineth) it is a miracle to find out a Phisition, who is both a great Theorist, and withall a great practitioner, or contrariwise a great practitioner, and verie well seene in Theorick. And that the imagination, and not the vnderstanding, is the power wherof the Physition is to serue himselfe in knowing and curing the diseases of particular persons, may easily be prooued.

First of all presupposing the doctrine of *Aristotle*, who affirmeth, That the vnderstanding cannot know particulars, neither distinguish the one from the other, nor discerne the time and place, and other particularities which make men different ech from other: and that euerie one is to be cured after a diuers maner; and the reason is (as the vulgar Philosophers auouch) for that the vnderstanding is a spirituall power, and cannot be altered by the particulars, which are repleniſhed with matter. And for this cause *Aristotle* said, That the sence is of particulars, and the vnderstanding of vniuersals.

If then medicines are to worke in particulars, and not in vniuersals (which are vnbegotten, and vncorruptible) the vnderstanding falleth out to be a power impertinent for curing. Now the difficultie consisteth in discerning why men of great vnderstanding cannot possesse good outward sences for the particulars, they be-

ing powers so repugnant: and the reason is verie plaine, and this is it, That the outward senses cannot well performe their operations, vnlesse they be assisted with a good imagination: and this we are to prooue by the opinion of *Aristotle*, who going about to expresse what the imagination was, sayth, it is a motion caused by the outward sence, in sort, as the colour which multiplieth by the thing coloured, doth alter the eye. And so it fareth that this selfe colour, which is in the christallin humour, passeth farther into the imagination, and maketh therein the same figure which was in the eie. And if you demand of which of these two kinds the notice of the particular is made, all Philosophers auouch (and that verie truely) that the second figure is it which altereth the imagination, and by them both is the notice caused, conformable to that so common speech, From the obiect, and from the power the notice springeth. But from the first which is in the christallin humour, and from the sightful power, groweth no notice, if the imagination be not attentiue thereunto, which the Phisitions doe plainly prooue, saying, That if they lance or seare the flesh of a diseased person, who for all that feeleth no paine, it shewes a token that his imagination is distracted into some profound contemplation: whence we see also by experience in the sound, that if they be raught into some imagination, they see not the things before them, nor heare though they be called, nor tast meat sauorie or vnsauorie, though they haue it in their mouth. Wherefore it is a thing certaine, that not the vnderstanding or outward sences, but the imagination, is that which maketh the iudgement, and taketh notice of particular things.

It followeth then, that the Phisition who is well seene in Theoricke, for hee is indowed with great vnder-

standing,

ſtanding, or great memorie, muſt of force prooue a bad practitioner, as hauing defect in his imagination. And contrariwiſe, he that prooueth a good practitioner, muſt of force be a bad Theoriſt: for much imagination cannot be vnited with much vnderſtanding and much memorie. And this is the cauſe for which ſo few are thoroughly ſeene in Phiſicke, or commit but ſmall errors in curing: for, not to halt in the worke, it behooueth to know the Art, and to poſſeſſe a good imagination, for putting the ſame in practiſe, and we haue prooued that theſe cannot ſticke togither.

The Phiſition neuer goeth to know and cure a diſeaſe, but that ſecretly to himſelfe he frameth a *Syllogiſme in Darij*, though hee bee neuer ſo well experienced, and the proofe of his firſt proportion belongeth to the vnderſtanding, and of the ſecond to the imagination: for which cauſe, the great Theoriſts doe ordinarily erre in the *Minor*, and the great practitioners in the *Maior*: as if we ſhould ſpeake after this manner, Euerie feauer which ſpringeth from cold and moyſt humours, ought to bee cured with medicines hot and drie. (Taking the tokening of the cauſe) this feauer which the man endureth, dependeth on humors cold and moyſt: therefore the ſame is to bee cured with medicines hot and drie. The vnderſtanding will ſufficiently prooue the truth of the *Maior*, becauſe it is an vniuerſall ſaying; That cold and moyſt require for their temperature hot and drie: for euerie qualitie is abated by his cõtrarie. But comming to prooue the *Minor*, there the vnderſtanding is of no value: for that the ſame is particular and of another iuriſdiction, whoſe notice appertaineth to the imagination, borowing the proper and particular tokens of the diſeaſe from the fiue outward ſences.

And if the tokening is to be taken from the feauer, or from his cauſe, the vnderſtanding cannot reach thereunto: onely it teacheth the tokening is to be taken from that which ſheweth greateſt perill; but which of thoſe tokenings is greateſt, is only knowne to the imagination, by counting the damages which the feauer produceth, with thoſe of the *Syntones* of the euill, and the cauſe, and the ſmall or much force of the power. To attaine this notice, the imagination poſſeſſeth certaine vnutterable properties, with which the ſame cleereth matters that cannot bee expreſſed nor conceiued, neither is there found anie art to teach them. Where-through wee ſee a Phyſition enter to viſit a patient, and by meanes of his ſight, his hearing, his ſmelling, and his feeling, he knoweth things which ſeeme impoſſible. In ſort, that if we demaund of the ſame Phyſition, how he could come by ſo readie a knowledge, himſelfe cannot tell the reaſon: for it is a grace which ſpringeth from the fruitfulneſſe of the imagination, which by another name is tearmed a readineſſe of capacitie, which by common ſignes, and by vncertaine coniectures, and of ſmall importance, in the twinckling of an eye knoweth a hundred differences of things, wherein the force of curing and prognoſticating with certainetie conſiſteth.

This ſpice of promptneſſe, men of great vnderſtanding doe want, for that it is a part of the imagination: for which cauſe, hauing the tokens before their eyes (which giue them notice how the diſeaſe fareth) it worketh no manner alteration in their ſences, for that they want imagination. A Phyſition once asked me in great ſecreſie, What the cauſe was, that he hauing ſtudied with much curioſitie all the rules and conſiderations of the art prognoſticatiue; and being therein throughly inſtructed,

yet

yet could neuer hit the truth in anie Prognoſtication which he made. To whom (I remember) I yeelded this anſwer, that the art of Phiſick is learned with one power, and put in execution with another. This man had a verie good vnderſtanding, but wanted imagination: but in this doctrine there ariſeth a difficultie verie great, and that is, how Phiſitions of great imagination can learne the art of Phiſicke, ſeeing they want that of vnderſtanding: and if it be true, that ſuch were better than thoſe who were well learned, to what end ſerueth it to ſpend time in the Schooles? to this may be anſwered, that firſt to know the art of Phiſicke, is a matter verie important: for in two or three yeares a man may learn all that which the ancients haue bin getting in two or three thouſand. And if a man ſhould herein aſcertaine himſelfe by experience, it were requiſit that he liued ſome thouſands of yeeres, and in experimenting of medicines, hee ſhould kill an infinit number of perſons, before he could attaine to the knowledge of their qualities: from whence wee are freed, by reading the bookes of reaſonable experienced Phiſitions, who giue aduertiſement of that in writing, which they found out in the whole courſe of their liues; to the end that the Phiſitions of theſe dayes may miniſter ſome receits with aſſurance, and take heed of otherſome as venomous.

Beſides this, we are to weet, that the common and vulgar points of all arts are very plain and eaſie to learne, and yet the moſt important of the whole worke. And contrariwiſe, the moſt curious and ſubtile, are the moſt obſcure, and of leaſt neceſſitie for curing. And men of great imagination, are not altogither depriued of vnderſtanding, nor of memorie. Wherethrough, by hauing theſe two powers in ſome meaſure, they are able to learne the

moſt neceſſarie points of Phiſicke: for that they are plaineſt, and with the good imagination which they haue, can better looke into the diſeaſe and the cauſe therof, than the cunningeſt Doctors. Beſides that, the imagination is it which findeth out the occaſion of the remedie that ought to be applied, in which grace the greateſt part of practiſe conſiſteth: for which cauſe *Galen* ſaid, That the proper name of a Phiſition, was, The finder out of occaſion.

Now to be able to know the place, the time, and the occaſion, for certaine, is a worke of the imagination, ſince it toucheth figure and correſpondence; but the difficultie conſiſteth in knowing (amongſt ſo manie differences as there are of the imagination) to which of them the practiſe of Phiſicke appertaineth, for it is certaine, that they all agree not in one ſelfe particular reaſon: which contemplation hath giuen me much more toile and labour of ſpirit than all the reſidue; and yet for all that, I cannot as yet yeeld the ſame a fitting name, vnleſſe it ſpring from a leſſe degree of heat, which partaketh that difference of imagination, wherewith verſes and ſongs are endited. Neither doe I relie altogether on this, for the reaſon whereon I ground my ſelfe, is, that ſuch as I haue marked to be good practitioners, do all piddle ſomewhat in the art of verſifying, and raiſe not vp their contemplation verie high, and their verſes are not of anie rare excellencie, which may alſo betide, for that their heat exceedeth that tearme which is requiſit for Poetrie: and if it ſo come to paſſe for this reaſon, the heat ought to hold ſuch qualitie, as it ſome-what drie the ſubſtance of the braine, and yet much reſolue not the naturall heat, albeit (if the ſame paſſe further) it breedeth no euill difference of the wit for Phiſicke, for it vniteth the vnderſtanding

ding to the imagination by aduſtion. But the imagination is not ſo good for curing, as this which I ſeeke, which inuiteth a man to be a witch, ſuperſtitious, a magician, a deceiuer, a palmiſter, a fortune teller, and a calker: for the diſeaſes of men are ſo hidden, and deliuer their motions with ſo great ſecrecie, that it behoooueth alwaies to goe calking what the matter is.

This difference of imagination may hardly be found in Spaine, for tofore we haue proued, that the inhabitants of this region want memorie and imagination, and haue good diſcourſe: neither yet the imagination of ſuch as dwell towards the North, is of auaile in Phiſicke, for it is verie ſlow and ſlacke, onely the ſame is towardly to make clockes, pictures, poppets, and other ribaldries which are impertinent for mans ſeruice.

Ægypt alone is the region which ingendereth in his inhabitants this difference of imagination, wherethrough the Hiſtorians neuer make an end of telling, how great Enchaunters the Ægyptians are, and how readie for obtaining things, and finding remedies to their neceſſities. *Ioſeph* to exaggerat the wiſedome of *Salomon*, ſayd in this manner, So great was the knowledge and wiſedome which *Salomon* receiued of God, that he outpaſſed all the ancients, and euen the verie Egyptians, who were reputed the wiſeſt of all others. And *Plato* alſo ſayd, that the Ægyptians exceeded all the men of the world in skill how to get their liuing; which abilitie appertaineth to the imagination. And that this is true, may plainely appeare, for that all the ſciences belonging to the imagination, were firſt deuiſed in Ægypt, as the Mathematickes, Aſtrologie, Arithmeticke, Perſpectiue, Iudiciarie, and the reſt. But the argument which moſt ouerruleth me in this behalfe, is, that when *Francis* of *Valois* King of France,

was molested by a long infirmitie, and saw that the Phisitions of his houshold and court, could yeeld him no remedie, he would say euery time whē his feauer increased, It was not possible that any Christian Phisition could cure him, neither at their hands did he euer hope for recouerie: where-through one time agreeued to see himselfe thus vexed with his feauer, he dispatched a Post into Spaine, praying the Emperour *Charles* the fifth, that he would send him a Iew Phisition, the best of his court, touching whom he had vnderstood, that he was able to yeeld him remedie for his sickneſſe, if by art it might be effected. At this request the Spaniards made much game, and all of them concluded it was an humorous conceit of a man, whose braines were turmoiled with the feauer. But for all this, the Emperour gaue commandement, that such a Phisition should be sought out, if anie there were, though to find him, they should be driuen to send out of his dominions: and when none could be met withall, he sent a Phisition newly made a Christian, supposing that he might serue to satisfie the Kings humour. But the Phisition being arriued in France, and brought to the Kings presence; there passed betweene them a gratious discourse, in which it appeared, that the Phisition was a Christian: and therefore the King would receiue no Phisicke at his hands. The King with opinion which he had conceiued of the Phisition, that he was an Hebrue, by way of passing the time, asked him whether he were not as yet wearie in looking for the Messias promised in the law? The Phisition answered; Sir, I expect not anie Messias promised in the Iewes law. You are verie wise in that (replied the King:) for the tokens which were deliuered in the diuine Scripture, whereby to know his comming, are all fulfilled manie dayes agoe.

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This number of dayes (reioyned the Phiſition) wee Chriſtians doe well reckon: for there are now finiſhed 1542 yeares, that hee came and conuerſed in the world 33 yeares; in the end of which he died on the Croſſe, and the third day roſe againe, and afterwards aſcended into heauen, where he now remaineth. Why then (quoth the King) you are a Chriſtian? Yea Sir, by the grace of God I am a Chriſtian (quoth the Phiſition:) then (anſwered the King) returne you home to your owne dwelling in good time: for in mine owne houſe and court I haue Chriſtian Phiſitions verie excellent, and I held you for a Iew, who (in mine opinion) are thoſe that haue beſt naturall abilitie to cure my diſeaſe. After this manner he licenced him to depart, without once ſuffering him to feele his pulſe, or ſee his ſtate, or telling him one word of his griefe. And forthwith he ſent to Conſtantinople for a Iew, who healed him with the onely milke of a ſhee Aſſe.

This imagination of king *Francis* (as I thinke) was verie true, and I haue ſo conceiued it to be, for that in the great hot diſtemperatures of the braine, I haue prooued tofore, how the imagination findeth out that, which (the partie being ſound) could neuer haue done. And becauſe it ſhall not ſeeme that I haue ſpoken in ieaſt, and without relying herein vpon a materiall ground, you ſhall vnderſtand, that the varieties of men, as well in the compoſitions of the bodie, as of the wit and conditions of the ſoule, ſpring from their inhabiting countries of different temperature, from drinking diuers waters, and from not vſing all of them one kind of food. Wherein *Plato* ſaid, Some through variable windes and heats, are amongſt themſelues diuers in manner and kinds: others through the waters and food which ſpring of the earth,

who

who not onely in their bodies, but in their minds also can skill to doe things better and worse: as if he should say, some men are different from others, either by reason of the contrarie aire, or through drinking seuerall waters, or for that they feed not all vpon one kind of meat, and this difference is discerned not onely in the countenance and demeanure of the bodie, but also in the wit of the soule.

If I then shall now prooue, that the people of Israell dwelt manie yeares in Ægypt, and that departing from thence, they did eat and drinke waters and meats, which are appropriat to make this difference of imagination; I shall then yeeld a demonstration for the opinion of the king of France, and by consequence we shall vnderstand what wits of men are in Spaine to be made choice of, for studying the art of Phisicke. As touching the first, we must know, that *Abraham* asking tokens whereby to be assured, that he or his descendents should possesse the land of promise; the text sayth, that whilest he slept, God made him answere, saying, Know that thy seed shall be a stranger in a countrey not his owne, and they shall make them vnderlings in bondage, and afflict them for 400 yeares, notwithstanding I will iudge that nation whom they serue, and after this, they shall depart from thence with great substance; which prophesie was accomplished: albeit God for certaine respects, added thereunto 30 yeares more, for which cause the Scripture sayth, But the abode of the children of Israell in Ægypt, was 430 yeares, which being finished, that verie day the whole armie of the Lord departed out of the land of Ægypt. But although this text say manifestly, that the people of Israell abode in Ægypt 400 yeares, a glosse declareth, that these yeares were the whole time which Israell went on pilgri-

pilgrimage, vntill he poſſeſſed his owne countrey. In as much as he remained in Ægypt but 210 yeares, which declaration agreeth not well with that which S. *Stephen* the Prothomartyr made in his diſcourſe to the Iewes, namely, that the people of Iſrael was 430 yeares in the bondage of Ægypt.

And albeit the abode of 210 yeares ſufficed, that the qualities of Ægypt might take hold in the people of Iſrael, yet the times whiles they liued abroad, was no loſt ſeaſon, in reſpect of that which appertaineth to the wit: for thoſe who liue in bondage, in miſerie, in affliction, and in ſtrange countries, engender much choller aduſt, becauſe they want libertie of ſpeech, and of reuenging their iniuries: and this humour, when the ſame is growne drie, becommeth the inſtrument of ſubtiltie, of craft, and of mallice: whence we ſee by experience, that if a man rake hell for bad manners and conditions, he cannot find worſe than in a ſlaue, whoſe imagination alwaies occupieth it ſelfe, in deuiſing how to procure dammage to his maiſter, and freedome to himſelfe. Moreouer, the land which the people of Iſrael walked through, was not much eſtranged nor different from the qualities of Ægypt: for in reſpect of the miſerie thereof, God promiſed *Abraham* to giue him another, much more aboundant and fruitfull. And this is a matter greatly verefied, as well in good naturall Philoſophie, as in experience, that barraine and beggerly regions, not fat, nor plentifull of fruit, engender men of verie ſharpe wit. And contrariwiſe, abundant and fertile ſoiles bring foorth perſons big limmed, couragious, and of great bodily forces, but verie ſlow of wit.

Touching Greece, the Hiſtorians neuer make an end to recount, how appropriat that region is to breed men

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of great habilitie, and particularly *Galen* auoucheth, that it is held a miracle for a man to find a foole in Athens. And we must note, that this was a citie the most miserable and most barren of all the rest in Greece. Whence we collect, that through the qualities of Egypt, and of the prouinces where the Hebrue people liued, they grew verie thick of capacitie. But it behoueth likewise to vnderstand, for what cause the temperature of Ægypt produceth this difference of imagination. And this will fall out a plaine matter when you are done to ware, that in this region the Sunne yeeldeth a feruent heat: and therefore the inhabitants haue their braine dried, and choller adust, the instrument of wilinesse and aptnesse. In which sence, *Aristotle* demandeth, why the men of Æthyopia & Ægypt haue their feet crooked, and are commonly curlepated and flat nosed? to which probleme he answereth, That the much heat of the country rosteth the substance of these members, and wryeth them, as it draweth togither a peece of leather set by the fire; and for the same cause their haire curleth, and themselues also are wilie. And that such as inhabit hot countries, are wiser than those who are borne in cold regions, we haue alreadie prooued by the opinion of *Aristotle*: who demandeth whence it growes, that men are wiser in hot climats than in cold? But he wist not to answere this probleme, nor make distinction of wisedome: for wee haue prooued heretofore, that in man there rest two sorts of wisdome; one whereof *Plato* said, Knowledge which is seuered from Iustice, ought rather to be tearmed craft than wisedome: another there is found accompanied with iustice and simplicitie, without doubleneſſe, and without wiles; and this is properly called Wisedome: for it goeth alwaies guided by iustice and dutie. They who inhabit

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verie hot countries, are wise in the first kind of wisdome, and such as are those of Ægypt.

Now let vs see when the people of Israel was departed out of Ægypt, and come into the desart, what meat they did eat, what water they dranke, and of what temperature the aire was where they trauelled? that we may know whether vpon this occasion, the wit with which they issued out of bondage, tooke exchange; or whether the same were more confirmed in them? Fortie yeares (saith the text) God maintained this people with Manna, a meat so delicat and sauourie, as anie might be that euer men tasted in the world. In sort, that *Moses* seeing the delicacie and goodnesse thereof, commanded his brother *Aaron* to fill a vessell, and place the same in the Arke of confederacie, to the end the descendents of this people, when they were setled in the land of promise, might see the bread with which God had fed their fathers, whiles they liued in the wildernesse, and how bad payment they yeelded him in exchange of such cherishments. And to the end that we, who haue not seene this meat, may know of what manner the same was: it will do well that we describe the Manna which Nature maketh; and so adioyning thereunto the conceit of a great delicacie, we may wholly imagine his goodnesse. The materiall cause of which Manna is engendred, is a verie delicat vapour, which the Sunne, with the force of his heat, draweth vp from the earth; the which taking stay aloft, is concocted, and made perfect: and then the cold of the night comming on, it congealeth, and through his weightinesse, turneth to fall vpon the trees and stones, where men gather the same, and preserue it in vessels to serue for food. It is called Deawy, and Airy honny, through the resemblance which it beareth to the Deaw, and for

that

that it is made in the aire. His colour is white, his sauour sweet as honny: his figure like that of Coriander, which signes the holie Scripture placeth also in the Manna, which the people of Israel did eat: and therefore I carrie an imagination, that both were semblable in nature. But if that which God created were of more delicat substance, so much the better shall we confirme our opinion. But I am euer of opinion, that God applied himselfe to naturall meanes, when with them he could performe what he meant; and where nature wanted, his omnipotencie supplied. This I say, because to giue them Manna to eat in the desart (besides that which hereby he would signifie) me seemeth was founded in the selfe disposition of the earth, which (euen at this day) produceth the best Manna in the world: through which *Galen* affirmeth, That on Mount Libanus (which is not far distant from this place) there is great and verie choice abundance: in sort, that the countrey people are wont to sing in their pastimes, That *Iupiter* raineth honny in that region. And though it be true, that God miraculously created that Manna in such quantitie, at such time, and on speciall dayes: yet it may bee that it partaked the same nature with ours, as had also the water which *Moses* drew forth of the rocke; and the fire which *Elias* with his word caused to raine from heauen; all of them naturall things, though miraculously brought to passe.

The Manna described by the holie Scripture, it sayth was as deaw, and as the seed of Coriander, white, and in tast like Honnie, which conditions are also in the Manna produced by nature. The temperature of this meat, the Phisitions say, is hot, and consisting of subtile and verie delicat parts, which composition the Manna eaten by the Iewes, should also seeme to haue: whereon (complaining

ning of his tenderneſſe) they ſaid in this manner, Our ſoule hath a fulſomneſſe at this ſlight meat; as if they ſhould ſay, that they could no longer endure nor brooke ſo light a meat in their ſtomacke: and the Philoſophie of this was, that their ſtomacks had been made ſtrong by Onions, Chibals, and Leeks; and comming to eat a meat of ſo ſmall reſiſtance, it wholly with them turned into choler. And for this cauſe, *Galen* gaue the charge, that men endowed with much naturall heat, ſhould forbeare to eate Honnie, or other light meates: for they would turne to corruption, and in ſteed of digeſtion, would partch vp like ſoot.

The like hereof befell to the Hebrues, as touching Manna, which with them wholly turned into choller aduſt, and therefore they were altogither drie and thin: for this meat had no corpulencie to fatten them. Our ſoule (ſaid they) is drie, and our eyes ſee nothing but Manna. The water which they dranke after this meat, was ſuch as they would deſire; and if they could not find anie ſuch, God ſhewed to *Moſes* a wood of ſo diuine vertue, that dipping the ſame in groſſe and ſalt waters, it made them to become delicat and of good ſauor: and when they had no ſort of water at all, *Moſes* took the rod with which he had parted the red Sea, and ſtriking therewith the rocks, there iſſued ſprings of waters ſo delicat and ſauourie, as their taſt could deſire. In ſort, that S. *Paule* ſayth, The rocke followed them: as if he ſhould ſay, The water of the rocke ſeconded their taſt, iſſuing delicat, ſweet, and ſauourie. And they had accuſtomed their ſtomacks before, to drinke waters thicke and briniſh: for in Ægypt (ſayth *Galen*) they boyled them ere they could ſerue for drinke, for that they were naughtie and corrupt, ſo as afterwards drinking waters ſo delicat,

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it could not fall out otherwiſe, but that they ſhould turne into choller, for that they found ſmall reſiſtance. Water requireth the ſame qualities, to digeſt well in our ſtomack (ſaith *Galen*) and not to corrupt, that the meat hath wheron we accuſtomably feed. If the ſtomack be ſtrong, it behooueth to giue the ſame ſtrong meat, which may anſwer in proportion: if the ſame be weake and delicate, ſuch alſo the meat ought to be. The like regard is to be held as touching the water: where-through wee ſee by experience, that if a man vſe to drinke groſſe water, he neuer quencheth his thirſt with the purer, neither feeleth it in his ſtomacke. Rather the ſame encreaſeth his thirſt: for the exceſſiue heat of the ſtomacke burneth and reſolueth it ſo ſoone as it is receiued, becauſe therein is no reſiſtance.

The aire which they enioyed in the deſart, wee may alſo ſay, that it was ſubtile and delicat: for iourneying ouer mountaines, and through vninhabited places, they had the ſame alwaies freſh, cleanſed, and without anie corruption: for they neuer made long ſtay in anie one place. So did it alwaies carrie a temperature: for by day a cloud was ſet before the Sun, which ſuffered him not to ſcorch ouer vehemently; and by night, a pillar of fire, which moderated the ſame. And to enioy an aire of this manner (*Ariſtotle* affirmeth) doth much quicken the wit. We may conſider then, that the men of this folke muſt needs haue a ſeed very delicat and aduſt, eating ſuch meat as Manna was, and drinking the waters aboue ſpecified, and breathing and enioying an aire ſo cleanſed and pleaſant: as alſo that the Hebrew women bred flowers verie ſubtile and delicat.

Againe, let vs call to mind, that which *Ariſtotle* ſaid, That the flowers being ſubtile and delicat, the child who

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is bred of them, ſhall be a man of great capacitie. How much it importeth, that for begetting children of great ſufficiencie, the fathers do feed on delicat meats, we will prooue at large in the laſt Chapter of this worke. And becauſe all the Hebrues did eat of one ſelfe ſo ſpirituall and delicat meat, and dranke of one ſelfe water, all their children and poſteritie prooued ſharpe and great of wit in matters appertaining to this world.

Now then, when the people of Iſraell came into the land of Promiſe, with ſo great wit as we haue expreſſed, there befell vnto them afterwards ſo manie trauails, dearths, ſieges of enemies, ſubiections, bondages, and ill intreatings: that though they had not brought from Ægypt and the wilderneſſe, that temperature, hot, drie, and aduſt before ſpecified, they would yet haue made it ſo by this diſmall life: for continuall ſadneſſe and toile vniteth the vitall ſpirits and the arteriall blood in the brain, in the liuer, and in the heart: and there ſtaying one aboue another, they grow to drineſſe and aduſtion. Where-through oft times they procure the feauer, and their ordinarie is to make melancholie by aduſtion, wherof they (in maner) do all partake euen to this day, in reſpect of that (which *Hippocrates* ſaith) Feare and ſadneſſe continuing a long time, ſignifieth melancholie. This choler aduſt (we ſaid before) to be the inſtrument of promptneſſe, craftineſſe, ſharpneſſe, ſubtiltie, and malicioſneſſe. And this is applied to the coniectures of Phiſicke, and by the ſame a man getteth notice of the diſeaſes their cauſes and remedies. Wherfore king *Francis* vnderſtood this maruellous well, and it was no lightneſſe of the braine, or inuention of the diuell which he vttered. But through his great feauer laſting ſo manie dayes, and with the ſadneſſe to find himſelfe ſicke and

without remedie, his braine grew dry, and his imagination roſe to ſuch a point, of which we made prooſe tofore, that if it haue the temperature behooffull, a man will on a ſodaine deliuer that which he neuer learned. But there preſents it ſelfe a difficultie verie great againſt all theſe things rehearſed by vs, and that is, that if the children or nephewes of thoſe who were in Ægypt, and enioyed the Manna, the waters, and the ſubtle aire of the wilderneſſe, had been made choice of for Phiſitions, it might ſeeme, that king *Francis* opinion were in ſome part probable, for the reaſons by vs reported. But that their poſteritie ſhould preſerue till our dayes thoſe diſpoſitions of the Manna, the water, the aire, the afflictions, and the trauailes, which their anceſtours endured in the priſon of Babylon, it is a matter hard to be conceiued: for if in 430 yeares, during which the people of Iſraell liued in Ægypt, and 40 in the Deſart, their ſeed could purchaſe thoſe diſpoſitions of abilitie, better and with more facilitie could they leeſe it againe in 2000 yeares, whileſt they haue beene abſent. And ſpecially ſithence their comming into Spaine, a region ſo contrarie to Ægypt, and where they haue fed vpon different meats, and drinke waters of nothing ſo good temperature and ſubſtance as thoſe other.

This is agreeable to the nature of man, and what ſo other liuing creature and plant, which forthwith partaketh the conditions of the earth where they liue, & leeſe thoſe which they brought with them from elſewhere. And whatſoeuer inſtance they can alleage, the like will betide it within few dayes, beyond all gainſaying.

Hippocrates recounteth of a certaine ſort of men, who to be different from the vulgar, choſe for a token of their nobilitie, to haue their head like a ſugar-loafe. And to

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ſhape this figure by art, when the child was borne, the Midwiues tooke care to bind their heads with ſweaths and bands, vntill they were faſhioned to the forme. And this artificialneſſe grew to ſuch force, as it was conuerted into nature: for in proceſſe of time, all the children that were borne of nobilitie, had their head ſharpe from their mothers wombe. So from thenceforth, the art and diligence of the Midwiues herein, became ſuperfluous. But ſo ſoone as they left nature to her libertie, and her owne ordering, without oppreſſing her anie longer with art, ſhe turned by little and little to recouer againe the figure which ſhe had before.

In like ſort might it befall the children of Iſrael, who notwithſtanding the region of Ægypt, the Manna, the delicat waters, and their ſorrowfulneſſe, wrought thoſe diſpoſitions of wit in that ſeed: yet thoſe reaſons and reſpects ſurceaſing, and other contrarie growing on, it is certain, that by little and little the qualities of the Manna would haue worne away, and other far different therefrom haue growne on, conformable to the countrey where they inhabited, to the meats which they fed vpon, to the waters which they drank, and to the aire which they breathed. This doubt in naturall Philoſophie holdeth little difficultie: for there are ſome accidents to be found, which are brought in at a moment, and afterwards endure for euer in the ſubiect, without poſſibilitie of corrupting. Others there are, which waſt as much time in vndoing, as they occupied in engrafting, and ſome more, ſome leſſe, according to the action of the agent, and the diſpoſition of the patient. For example of the firſt, we muſt know, That a certaine man through a great feare whereinto he was driuen, reſted ſo transformed and changed in colour, that he ſeemed dead; and the ſame

lasted not onely during all the time of his owne life, but also the children which he begat had the same colour: without that he could find anie remedie to take it away. Conformable hereunto it may be, that in 430 yeares, whilest the people of Israel led their liues in Ægypt 40 in the wildernesse, and 60 in the bondage of Babylon, there needed more than 3000 yeares, that this seed of *Abraham* should take a full losse of their disposition of wit, occasioned by this Manna, seeing to reforme the bad colour, setled vpon a sodaine through feare, more than 100 yeares were requisit. But because the truth of this doctrine may be vnderstood from the root, it behoueth to resolue two doubts which serue to the purpose, and as yet I haue not cleered. The first is, whence it commeth, that meats, by how much the more delicat and sauourie they are, as Hennes, and Partridge, so much the sooner the stomacke doth abhorre and loath them? and contrariwise, wee see that a man eateth Beefe all the yeare long, without receiuing anie annoyance thereby, and if he eat Hennes flesh but three or foure dayes together, the fifth he cannot abide the sauour thereof; but that it will turne his stomacke vpside downe. The second is, whence it commeth, that bread of Wheat, and flesh of Mutton, not being of substance so good and sauourie, as Hen and Partridge; yet the stomacke neuer loatheth them, though wee feed thereon all our liues long? But wanting bread, we cannot eat other meats, neither doe they content vs.

He that can shape an answer to these two doubts, shall easily vnderstand for what cause the descendents of the people of Israell haue not yet lost the dispositions and accidents which Manna brought into that seed: neither will the promptnesse of wit, and subtletie whereof they

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then poſſeſſed themſelues, ſo ſoone take an end. Two certaine and very true principles there are in naturall philoſophie, on which the anſwere and reſolution of theſe doubts dependeth. The firſt is, That all powers (whatſoeuer) which gouerne man, are naked, and depriued of the conditions and qualities which reſt in their obiect, to the end that they may know and giue iudgement of all the differences. The eyes partake this propertie, who being to receiue into themſelues all figures and colours, it was of neceſſitie, vtterly to depriue them of figures and colours. For if they were pale, as in thoſe who are ouercome with the yellow laundize, all things whereon they looked, would appeare to them of the ſame colour. So the tongue, which is the inſtrument of taſt, ought to be void of all ſauours: and if the ſame be ſweet or bitter, wee know by experience, that whatſoeuer wee eat or drinke hath the like taſt. And the ſame may be auouched of hearing, of ſmelling, and of feeling. The ſecond principle is, that all things created, naturally couet their preſeruation, and labour to endure for euer, and that the being which God and Nature haue giuen them, may neuer take end: notwithſtanding that afterward they are to poſſeſſe a better nature. By this principle, all naturall things endowed with knowledge and ſence, abhorre and flie from that which altereth and corrupteth their naturall compoſition.

The ſtomacke is naked, and depriued of the ſubſtance and qualities of all meats in the world, as the eye is of colours and figures, and when wee eat oft, though the ſtomacke ouercome it, yet the meat turneth againſt the ſtomacke, for that the ſame is of a contrarie principle, and altereth and corrupteth his temperature and ſubſtance: for no agent is of ſuch force, but that in doing, it

alſo ſuffereth. Meats that are verie delicat and pleaſing, doe much alter the ſtomacke; firſt, becauſe it digeſteth and embraceth them with great appetite and liking, and then, through their being ſo ſubtle and void of excrements, they pierce into the ſubſtance of the ſtomacke, from whence they cannot depart againe: the ſtomacke then feeling that this meat altereth his nature, and taketh away the proportion which he carrieth to other meats, groweth to abhorre the ſame, and if he muſt needs feed thereon, it behoueth to vſe manie ſallets and ſeaſonings, thereby to beguile him.

All this Manna had euen from the beginning: for though the ſame were a meat of ſuch delicacie and pleaſing relliſh, yet in the end, the people of Iſraell found it fulſome, and therefore ſayd, Our ſoule loatheth this ouer light meat. A complaint far vnworthie of a people ſo ſpecially fauoured by God, who had pretended a remedie in that behalfe, which was, that Manna had thoſe relliſhes and taſts which well agreed with them, to the end they might eat thereof. Thou ſenteſt them bread from heauen, which had in it all pleaſingneſſe; for which cauſe, manie amongſt them fed thereon with good appetite, for they had their bones, their ſinewes, and their fleſh, ſo imbewed with Manna and his qualities, that by meanes of the reſemblance from each to other, they longed after nothing elſe. The like befalleth in bread of wheat, and weathers fleſh, whereon we accuſtomably feed.

Groſſe meats and of good ſubſtance, as Beefe, haue much excrements, and the ſtomacke receiueth them not with ſuch deſire, as thoſe that are delicat and of good relliſh, and therefore is longer ere the ſame take alteration by them. Hence commeth it, that to corrupt the alterati-

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on which Manna made in one day, it behooueth to feed a whole moneth vpon contrarie meats. And (after this reckoning) to deface the qualities that Manna brought into the ſeed in the ſpace of 40 yeares, there need 4000 and vpward. And if anie man will not herewith reſt ſatisfied, let vs ſay, that as God brought out of Ægypt the 12 tribes of Iſraell, ſo he had taken then 12 male, and 12 female Moores of Æthyopia, and had placed them in our countrey, in how manie yeares thinke we, would theſe Moores and this poſteritie linger to leaue their natiue colour, not mixing themſelues the while with white perſons? to me it ſeemeth a long ſpace of yeares would be requiſit. For though 200 yeares haue paſſed ouer our heads, ſithens the firſt Ægyptians came out of Ægypt into Spaine, yet their poſteritie haue not forlorne that their delicacie of wit and promptneſſe, nor yet that roſted colour which their aunceſtors brought with them from Ægypt. Such is the force of mans ſeed, when it receiueth thereinto anie well rooted qualitie. And as in Spaine the Moores communicat the colour of their elders, by means of their ſeed, though they be out of Æthiopia, ſo alſo the people of Iſrael comming from thence, may communicate to their deſcendents their ſharpeneſſe of wit, without remaining in Ægypt, or eating Manna: for to be ignorant or wiſe, is as well an accident in man, as to be blacke or white. True it is, that they are not now ſo quicke and prompt, as they were a thouſand yeares ſince: for from the time that they left to eat Manna, their poſteritie haue euer leſſened hitherto, becauſe they vſed contrarie meats, and inhabited countries different from Ægypt: neither dranke waters of ſuch delicacie as in the wilderneſſe. As alſo by mingling with thoſe who deſcended from the Gentiles, who wanted this difference

of wit: but that which cannot be denied them, is, that as yet they haue not loſt it altogither.

CHAP. XIII.

By what meanes it may be ſhewed, to what difference of abilitie the art of warfare appertaineth, and by what ſignes the man may be knowne, who is endowed with this manner of wit.

WHat is the cauſe (ſaith *Ariſtotle*) that ſeeing Fortitude is not the greateſt of all vertues, but Iuſtice and Prudence are greater than it: yet the commonwealth, and in a manner all men with a common conſent doe make greater account, and within themſelues doe more honour a valiant man, than either the iuſt or wiſe; though placed in neuer ſo high callings or offices? To this probleme *Ariſtotle* anſwereth, ſaying; there is no king in the world who doth not either make war, or maintaine war againſt ſome other: and for ſo much as the valiant procure them glorie and empire, take reuenge on their enemies, and preſerue their eſtate; they yeeld chiefeſt honour, not to the principall vertue, which is Iuſtice, but to that by which they reape moſt profit and aduantage. For if they did not in this wiſe intreat the valiant, how were it poſſible, that kings ſhould find Captaines and Souldiours, who would willingly ieopard their liues to defend their goods and eſtates?

Of the Aſiaticans it is recounted, that there was a people inhabiting a part thereof, who bare themſelues verie couragiouſly: and being asked why they had neither king, nor law: they made anſwere, That lawes made men

men cowards: and seeing it was necessarie to vndergoe the hazard of the warres, for depriuing another of his estate, they made choice to fight for their owne behoofe, and themselues to reape the benefit of the victorie. But this was an answere rather of barbarous men than reasonable people, who well know, that without a king, without a commonwealth, and without lawes, it is impossible to preserue men in peace. That which *Aristotle* sayd, serueth verie well to the purpose, though there be a better answere to be framed, namely, That when Rome honoured her Captaines with those triumphs and solemnities, she did not onely reward the courage of the triumpher, but also the iustice with which he maintained his armie in peace and concord, the wisedome with which he performed his enterprises, and their temperancie vsed in abstaining from wine, women, and meat, which trouble the iudgement, and turne counsels into errour. Yea, wisedome is more highly to be regarded and rewarded in a Generall, than courage and manlinesse: for as *Vegetius* well said, Few ouer couragious captaines bring their enterprises to luckie passe. Which groweth, for that wisedome is more necessarie in warre, than courage in bickering. But *Vegetius* could neuer attaine to the notice what maner of wisdome this is, neither could plot down, with what difference of wit he ought to be endowed, who taketh charge in war: neither doe I ought maruell thereat, for the manner of Philosophie whereon this dependeth, was not then deuised. True it is, that to verefie this point, answereth not our first intent, which purporteth to make choice of apt wits for learning. But martiall affaires are so dangerous, and of so deep counsell, and it falleth out a matter so important for a king to know well vnto whom he credit his power and state, that we

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ſhall performe no leſſe thanks-worthie a part of ſeruice to the commonwealth, to teach this difference of wit and his ſignes, than in the other which we haue alreadie deſcribed. For which cauſe we muſt note, that *malitia* and *militia*, *viz.* martiall matters, and malice, haue as it were one ſelfe name, and likewiſe one ſelfe definition. For changing *a* into *i*, of *malitia* you make *militia*, and of *militia*, *malitia*, with great facilitie. What the nature and propertie of malice is, *Cicero* teacheth, ſaying, Malice is a way of hurting, craftie, and full of guile. In warre (likewiſe) nothing falleth ſo much into conſideration, as how to offend the enemie, and defend our ſelues from his entrappings. Therefore the beſt propertie whereof a Generall can be poſſeſſed, is, to be malitious with his enemie, and neuer to conſtrue anie his demeanures to a good ſence, but to the worſt that may be, and to ſtand on his guard.

Beleeue not (ſayth *Eccleſiaſticus*) thine enemie, with his lips he ſweeteneth, and in his heart he betraieth thee, to make thee fall into the dike: he weepeth with his eyes, and if he light vpon a fit occaſion, he will not be ſatisfied with thy blood. Hereof we find a manifeſt example of the holie Scripture: for the people of Iſrael being beſieged in Bethulia, and ſtraightened with hunger and thirſt, that famous Ladie *Iudith* iſſued out with a reſolution to kill *Holofernes*, and going towards the armie of the Aſſyrians, ſhe was taken by the Sentinels and Guards, and being asked whether ſhe was bound, made anſwere with a two-fold mind; I am a daughter of the Hebrues, whom you hold beſieged, and flie vnto you, for I haue learned that they ſhall fall into your hands, and that you ſhall euill intreat them, becauſe they would not yeeld themſelues to your mercie: therefore I determined to flie vn-

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to *Holofernes*, and to discouer vnto him the secrets of this obstinat people, shewing him how he may enter without the losse of anie one souldior.

So *Iudith* being brought to *Holofernes* presence, threw her selfe downe to the ground, and with closed hands began to worship him, and vtter words full of deceit, the most craftily that might be, in sort, that *Holofernes* and all his Counsell verely beleeued, she sayd nothing but truth: but she not forgetfull what in heart she had purposed, found a conuenient occasion, and chopped off his head.

Contrarie hereunto are the conditions of a friend, and therefore it behoooueth euer to yeeld him credit, wherethrough *Holofernes* should haue done better to beleeue *Achior*, seeing he was his friend, and on zeale that he should not leaue the siege with dishonour, sayd vnto him: Sir, first informe your selfe whether this people haue sinned against God, for if it be so, himselfe will deliuer them into your hands, without that you shall need to conquer them; but if he hold them in grace, know for certaine, that he will defend them, and we shall not be able to vanquish them. *Holofernes* conceiued displeasure at this aduertisement, as a man confident, lasciuious, and a wine-bibber, which three things turne topsie turuie that counsell which is requisit for the art of war. For which cause *Plato* sayd, he liked verie well of a law which the Carthaginians had, by which they commaunded, that the Generall whilest he had charge of the armie, should drinke no wine, for this licour (as *Aristotle* affirmeth) maketh a man of wit be quite burned vp with choler (as *Holofernes* shewed in those so furious words which he spake to *Achior*.)

Now that wit which is requisit for ambushes and stratagems,

tagems, as well to prepare them as to perceiue them, and to find out such remedie as appertaineth, *Cicero* describeth, drawing his descent from this Nowne *Versutia*, which he saith is deriued from this Verbe *Versor*: for those who are winding, craftie, double, and cauillers, vpon a suddaine contriue their wiles, and employ their conceit with facilitie: and so the same *Cicero* exemplified it, saying; *Chrisippus* a man doubtlesse winding and craftie. I call those winding, whose mind is suddainely winded about. This propertie to attaine suddainely the meanes is *solertia* (quickneſſe) and appertaineth to the imagination: for the powers which consist in heat, performe speedily their worke. And for this cause, men of great vnderstanding are little worth for the war, for this power is very slow in his operation, and a friend of vprightneſſe, of plaineneſſe, of simplicitie and mercie: all which is woont to breed much dammage in warre. These are good to treat with friends, with whom the wisedome of the imagination is not needfull; but onely the rightfulneſſe and singleneſſe of the vnderstanding, which admitteth no doubleneſſe, nor doth anie wrong: therefore with the enemie it booteth nothing; for he alwayes studieth to offend with wiles, and such wit is requisit wherewith to countergard our selues. And so Christ our redeemer aduised his disciples, saying, Behold, I send you as sheepe amongst woolues: be you therefore wise as serpents, and simple as doues. With our enemies we must practise wisedome, and with our friends plaineneſſe and simplicitie.

Now if the captaine be not to giue credit to his enemie, but is alwayes to misdoubt that he will goe beyond him, it is necessarie that he hold a difference of imagination, fore-castfull, warie, and which can skill to discerne the

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wiles which come vailed with anie couerture: for the ſelfe power which finds them out can onely deuiſe the remedies which are behoofefull in that behalfe: that ſeemeth to be another difference of the imagination which deuiſeth the engins and warlike inſtruments, whereby vnuincible fortreſſes are woon, which pitcheth the camp, and marſhalleth euery ſquadron in his due place, and which knoweth the occaſions of ioyning and retiring; which plotteth treaties, conſortments and capitulations with the enemie: for all which the vnderſtanding is impertinent, as are the eares to ſee withall. And therefore I nothing doubt, but that the art of warre appertaineth to the imagination, for all whatſoeuer a good Captaine is to performe, importeth conſonance, figure, and correſpondence.

Now the difficultie reſteth to ſet downe with what difference of the imagination in particular, war is to bee mannaged. And in this I cannot reſolue with certaintie, becauſe the knowing thereof is verie nice: yet I conieƈture, that it requireth a degree more of heat than the practiſe of Phiſicke, and that it allay choller, but not vtterly quench it.

This is verie manifeſt: for thoſe Captaines who are full of promptneſſe & ſubtletie, are not verie couragious, nor deſirous of bickering, neither couet to come to handyſtrokes; but by ſtratagems and fetches, without aduenturing a broken pate, doe bring their purpoſes to paſſe. Which propertie better pleaſed *Vegetius* than any other. Good captains (ſaith he) not by open war, in which the perill is common, but by ſecret practiſes, euer aſſay with the ſafetie of their owne ſouldiors, to cut their enemies in peeces, or at leaſt to make them afraid. The fruit of this manner of wit, the Roman Senat very wiſely looked into:

into: for though they had manie famous Captaines, who atchieued sundrie warres, yet returning to Rome to receiue the triumph and glorie due to their enterprise, so great were the plaints which the parents made for their children, the children for the parents, the wiues for their husbands, and brothers for brethren, that through the sorrow for them who perished in the warres, they could take little pleasure in the sports and pastimes. Wherefore the Senat tooke a resolution not to seeke out so couragious captaines, wholly desirous to come to handystrokes: but men somwhat timorous, & verie readie, as *Q. Fabius*, of whom it is written, that it was a wonder to see him offer a pitched battaile in the open field, and specially when he was far from Rome, whereby in ill successes he could not readily be relieued, and he did nought els but giue way to the enemie, and deuise stratagems and wiles, with which he exploited great enterprises, and obtained manie victories, without the losse of anie one souldiour. He was receiued into Rome with great ioy of all men: for if he carried forth a hundred thousand souldiours, he returned with as manie, vnlesse some perhaps miscarried by sickneſſe. The shout which the people gaue at his returne, was (as *Ennius* reporteth) of this tenour.

One man by lingring, onely vs releeu'd.

As if they had said, This man with giuing way to our enemies, hath made vs lords of the world, and brought backe our souldiours to their houses in safetie. Some Captaines haue since that time endeuoured to imitate him: but because they wanted his wit and readinesse, they sundrie times let slip manie fit occasions of fighting, whence greater dammages and inconueniences arose, than if they had speedily ioyned battaile. We may also take example of that famous Carthaginian captaine, of whom

whom *Plutarch* writeth these words, *Anniball* after he had attained this so great a victorie, commanded that manie Italian prisoners should freely be set at libertie without ransome, to the end the fame of his courtesie and pardoning might be dispersed among the people; albeit of disposition he were verie wide from this vertue: for of his owne nature he was fell and vnmercifull, and in such sort was trained vp from the tender yeares of his youth, that he neuer learned laws or ciuile conditions, but wars, slaughters, and betrayings of the enemie. Wherethrough he grew to be a captaine very cruell, and malicious in beguiling men, and alwaies deuising how he might entrap his enemie. And when he saw he could not preuaile by open war, he sought to get the vpper hand by policies, as was plainly seene in this deed of arms by vs rehearsed, and by the battaile which he found against *Sempronius*, neere the riuer Trebia. The tokens to know a man that is possessed of this difference of wit, are verie strange and well worthie of contemplation. Wherethrough *Plato* saith, That the man who is verie wise (in this sort of abilitie which we trace out) cannot be couragious nor well conditioned: for *Aristotle* saith, That wisdome consisteth in cold, and stomacke and manlinesse in heat. Therefore these two qualities being repugnant and contrarie, it is impossible that a man be verie full of hardinesse, and also of wisedome therewithall. For which cause it is necessarie that choller be burned, and become choller adust, to the end that a man may prooue wise: but where this spice of melancholie is found, in as much as the same is cold, feare and cowardize are straightwaies entertained. In sort, that craft and readinesse require heat, for that the same is a worke of the imagination, but not in such degree as courage, wherethrough they repugne each to other

ther in extenſion. But herein befalleth a matter worth the noting, that of the foure morall vertues, Iuſtice, Prudence, Fortitude, and Temperance; the two firſt require a wit and good temperature, to the end that they may be put in practiſe: for if a Iudge be not endowed with vnderſtanding, to make himſelfe capable of the point of iuſtice, little auailes it that he carrie a good will to render euery man his due. Since this his good meaning may wander out of the way, and wrong the true proprietarie. The like is to be vnderſtood of wiſdome: for if the onely will ſufficed to ſet things in good order, then in no work, good or euill, ſhould anie error be committed. There is no theefe whatſoeuer who ſeeketh not to rob in ſuch manner as he may not bee eſpied, and there is no Captaine, who deſireth not to be owner of ſo much wiſedome, as may ſerue to vanquiſh his enemie. But a theefe that is not his crafteſmaiſter in filching, ſoon falleth to be diſcouered; and the Captaine that wanteth imagination, ere long is ouercome. Fortitude and Temperance are two vertues, which men carrie in their fiſt, though they want a naturall diſpoſition: for if a man be diſpoſed to ſet little of his life, and ſhew hardineſſe, he may well do it: but if he be couragious of his owne naturall diſpoſition, *Ariſtotle* and *Plato* affirme verie truly, it is not poſſible that he can be wiſe though he would. In ſort, that by this reaſon there groweth no repugnancie to vnite the wiſedome of the mind with courage: for a wiſe and skilfull man hath the vnderſtanding to hazard his honour in reſpect of his ſoule, and his life in reſpect of his honour, and his goods in reſpect of his life, and ſo he doth. Hence it comes, that Gentlemen for that they are ſo much honoured, are ſo couragious; and there is none who will endure more hardneſſe in the wars, for

that

that they are brought vp in so manie pleasures, to the end they may not be termed ribalds. Hereon is that by-word grounded, God keepe me from a Gent. by day, and a Theefe by night; for the one, because he is seene, and the other that he may not be knowne, do fight with double resolution: on this selfe reason is the religion of *Malta* grounded, who knowing how much it importeth Nobilitie, to be a man of valure, haue a firme law, that all those of their order shall be issued from Gentilitie, both on the fathers side and the mothers: for so each of them must in the combat shew himselfe worth two of a baser progenie. But if a Gentleman had the charge giuen him, to encampe an armie, and the order whereby he should put the enemie in rout, if he had not a wit appropriat hereunto, he would commit and vtter a thousand disorders: for wisdome lieth not in mens disposition. But if there were recommended vnto him the guard of a gate, they might soundly sleepe on his eyes, although by nature he were a baggage. The sentence of *Plato* is to be construed, when a wise man followeth his owne naturall inclination, and doth not correct the same by reason. And in that sort it is true, that a verie wise man cannot of his naturall disposition be couragious: for choler adust (which maketh men wise) maketh him also, saith *Hippocrates*, timorous and fearefull. The second propertie, wherewith a man possessed of this difference of wit, cannot be endowed, is to be pleasant and of quaint behauiour: for which his imagination he frameth manie plots, and weeteth, that whatsoeuer error or negligence, are the way to cast away an armie, wherethrough he euer carieth an eye to the maine chance. But people of little worth call carefulnesse a toile, chastisement crueltie, and mercie softnesse, suffering and dissembling of lewd parts a good

diſpoſition. And this verily ſpringeth, becauſe men are ſots, who pierce not into the true value of things, nor in what ſort they ought to be managed: but the wiſe and skilfull cannot hold patience, nor beare to ſee matters ill handled, though they nothing appertaine vnto themſelues, and therefore liue a ſmall while, and with much trouble of ſpirit. Whence *Salomon* ſaid, I gaue alſo my mind to vnderſtand wiſdome, doctrine, errors, and follie; and found that in theſe alſo, there is wearineſſe and affliction of ſpirit: for into much wiſedome entreth much diſpleaſure, and who ſo attaineth Science, getteth ſorrow. In which words it ſeemeth that *Salomon* gaue vs to vnderſtand, that he liued better contented being ignorant, than after he had receiued wiſedome. And ſo verily it came to paſſe: for the ignorant liue moſt careleſſe, in as much as nothing giueth them paine and vexation, and they little recke who haue a better capcaſe than themſelues. The vulgar accuſtometh to call ſuch the Angels of heauen: for they ſee how they take nothing at heart; neither find fault with any thing ill done, but let all paſſe: but if they conſidered the wiſedome and condition of the Angels, they ſhould ſee it were a word that carried euill conſonance, and a caſe for the inquiſition houſe: for from the day when we receiue the vſe of reaſon, vntill that of our death, they doe nought els ſaue reprooue vs for all our euill doings, and aduiſe vs to that which we ought to doe. And if as they ſpeake to vs in their ſpirituall language, by mouing our imagination, ſo they ſhould deliuer vs their opinion in materiall words, wee would hold them importunate and vnmannerly brought vp. And hee that beleeueth not this, let him marke that the Angel (of whom S. *Mathew* maketh mention) ſeemed ſuch a one to *Herod*, and to the wife of his

brother

brother *Philip*, seeing (because they would not heare his fault findings) they faire and well chopped off his head. Better were it, that these men, who by the vulgar are fondly termed Angels of heauen, were called Asses of the earth: for amongst brute beasts (saith *Galen*) there is none more blunt, or of lesse wit than the Asse; although in memorie he ouerreach all the rest. He refuseth no burden, he goeth whither he is driuen without anie gainestriuing he winceth not, he biteth not, hee is not fugitiue, nor iadish conditioned; if he be laboured with a cudgell, he setteth not by it, he is wholly made to the well liking and seruice of him that is to vse him: these selfe properties doe those men partake, whom the vulgar terme Angels of heauen; which sport-making springeth in them, for that they are blockheads and void of imagination, and haue their wrathfull power verie remisse, which tokeneth a great defect in a man, and argueth that he is ill compounded.

There was neuer Angell nor man in the world better conditioned than Christ our redeemer, and he entering one day into the temple, belaboured welfauoredly those whom he found there selling of merchandize: and this he did, because the irascible is the chastice giuer, and sword of reason, and the man who reproueth not things ill done, either sheweth himselfe but a foole, or is depriued of the wrathfull power. In sort, that it falls out a miracle to see a wise man of that gentlenesse or conditions, which are best liking to lewd mens fancies: wherethrough such as set downe in writing the actions of *Iulius Cæsar*, maruelled to see how his souldiors could support a man so rough and seuere, and this grew in him, because he lighted vpon a wit requisit for the warres. The third propertie of those who are endowed with this difference

of wit is, to be reckleſſe touching the attiring of their perſon, and in a manner all of them are ſlouinly, homely, with their hoſen hanging about their heeles, full of wrinckles, their cap ſitting vpon the one ſide, with ſome thredbare gabberdine on their backe, and neuer long to change ſuits.

This propertie, *Lucius Florus* recounteth, had that famous Captain *Viriatus*, by nation a Portuguiſe, of whom (exaggerating his great humilitie) he ſaith and affirmeth, that he deſpiſed ſo much all ornament of his perſon, as there was no priuat ſouldior in his armie that went worſe apparelled than himſelfe. And verily this was no vertue, neither did he the ſame artificially, but it is a naturall effect of thoſe, who are poſſeſſed with that difference of imagination after which we enquire.

This rechleſneſſe in *Iulius Cæſar* greatly deceiued *Cicero*: for being asked (after the battell) the cauſe which mooued him to follow the partie of *Pompey*; he anſwered (as *Macrobius* recounteth) His girding deceiued me: as if he had ſaid, It was my beholding of *Iulius Cæſar* to be a man ſomewhat ſlouinly, and who neuer wore his girdle handſomely, whom his ſouldiors in ſcoffe called Looſe-coat. But this ſhould haue mooued and made him to know, that he was endowed with a wit requiſit to the counſell of warre. Rightly did *Silla* hit the naile on the head, who (as *Suetonius Tranquillius* reporteth) ſeeing the rechleſneſſe of *Iulius Cæſar* in his apparelling himſelfe when he was a boy, aduertiſed the Romanes, ſaying, Take heed of this ill girded yong fellow. The Hiſtorians buſie themſelues much, in recounting how careleſly *Hannibal* bare him touching his apparell, and how little he reaked to goe neat and handſome. To grow in great diſlike at motes on the cape, to take much care that his

ſtockings

ſtockings ſit cleane, and his cloke handſome, without plaits, appertaineth to a difference of the imagination of verie baſe alloy, and gaineſayth the vnderſtanding, and that imagination which the war requireth. The fourth ſigne is, to haue a bald head, and the reaſon hereof may ſoone be learned: for this difference of imagination reſideth in the forepart of the head, as doe all the reſt, and exceſſiue heat burneth the skin of the head, and cloſeth the poares, through which the haire is to paſſe. Beſides that the matter whereof the haire is engendred (as the Phiſitions auouch) are thoſe excrements which the brain expelleth in time of his nouriſhing, and by the great fire that there is, they are conſumed and burned vp, and ſo the matter faileth whereof they may breed. And if *Iulius Cæſar* had beene ſeene in this point of Philoſophie, he would not ſo much haue ſhamed at his bald head, as that to couer the ſame, he cauſed the hinder part of his haire which ſhould hang downe on his necke, to be featly turned towards his forehead. And *Suetonius* maketh mention, that nothing ſo much contented him, as when the Senat enacted, that he might weare a Lawrell garland on his head, and that on none other ground, than becauſe thereby he might couer his badneſſe. Another ſort of baldneſſe groweth from hauing the haire hard and earthly, and of a groſſe compoſition, but that betokeneth a man void of vnderſtanding, imagination, and memorie. The fifth ſigne, whereby thoſe are known who haue this difference of imagination, is, that ſuch are ſpare in words and full of ſentences, and the reaſon importeth, becauſe the braine being hard, it followeth of neceſſitie, that they ſuffer a defect in memorie, to which copie of words appertaineth. To find much what to ſay, ſpringeth from a coniunction, which the memorie maketh with the ima-

gination, in his first degree of heat. Such as haue this conioyning of both powers, are ordinarily great liers, and neuer want words and tales, though you stand hearkening vnto them a whole day togither.

The sixt propertie of those who haue this difference of imagination, is, to be honest, and to take great dislike at filthie and baudie talke: and therefore *Cicero* saith, that men verie reasonable doe imitate the honestie of nature, who hath hidden the vnseemely and shamefull parts, which she made to prouide for the necessitie of mankind, and not to adorne it; and she consenteth not to fasten the eyes on these, nor that the eares should once heare them named. This we might well attribute to the imagination, and say, that the same resteth offended at the euill representation of these parts, but in the last Chapter wee rendered a reason of this effect, and reduced the same to the vnderstanding, and we adiudged him defectiue in this power, who tooke not offence at such dishonestie. And because to the difference of imagination, appurtenant to the art Militarie, there is ioyned this discourse, therfore are good Captains very honest. Wherethrough in the historie of *Iulius Cæsar* wee find an action of the greatest honestie that might be, and that is, whilest they murthered him with daggers in the Senate-house, hee (perceiuing it was impossible to escape death) gaue himselfe to fall to the ground, and so fitted his imperiall robe about him, that after his death they found him couched with great honestie, with his legs and other parts couered, that might anie way offend the sight.

The seuenth propertie, and of greatest importance, is, that the Generall haue good fortune, and be luckie: by which signe wee shall perfectly find, that he is seized of the wit and habilitie behooffull for the art Martiall, for in

ſubſtance and truth, there is nothing which ordinarily maketh men vnfortunat, and that their enterpiſes doe not alwaies take ſucceſſe after their deſire, ſaue that they are depriued of wiſedome, and lay not hold on the conuenient meanes for atchieuing their exploits. For that *Iulius Cæſar* ſhewed ſuch wiſdome in the affaires which he managed, he bare away the bell (in reſpect of fortunateneſſe) from all other Captaines of the world, ſo as in perils of importance he encouraged his ſouldiours, ſaying; Feare not, for you haue *Cæſars* good fortune to fight on your partie.

The Stoicks held opinion, that as there was a firſt cauſe, euerlaſting, almightie, and of infinite wiſedome, knowne by the order and concert of his maruellous works; ſo alſo there was another vnwiſe and vnconcerted, whoſe workes prooued without order, without reaſon, and void of diſcretion: for with an affection no way reaſonable, it giueth and reaueth from men riches, dignitie, and honour. This they tearmed Fortune, ſeeing her a friend to men who performe their buſineſſe by hap hazard, without forecaſting, without wiſedome, and without ſubmitting themſelues to the gouernment of reaſon. They pourtraied her (the better to make her manners and mallice knowne) in forme of a woman, a royall ſcepter in her hand, her eyes vailed, her feet vpon a round ball, accompanied with perſons ſottiſh and void of all trade of liuing. By painting her like a woman, they noted her great lightneſſe and little diſcretion; by her royall ſcepter, they acknowledged her ſoueraignetie ouer riches and honour; her vailed eyes, gaue to vnderſtand the ill faſhion which ſhe held in diſtributing her gifts; her feet ſtanding on the round ball, betokened the ſmall firmeneſſe in the fauours which ſhe imparted, for ſhe ſnat-

cheth them away with the like facilitie that she reacheth them foorth, without keeping stedfastnesse in ought whatsoeuer: but the worst part they found in her, was, that she fauoureth the wicked, and persecuteth the vertuous; loueth the foolish, and abhorreth the wise; abaseth the noble, & aduanceth the base: what is foule, pleaseth her, and what is faire, worketh her annoyance. Manie men placing confidence in these properties, because they know their owne good fortune, take hardinesse to vndertake fond and headlong enterprises, which yet prosper with them verie luckily: and yet other men, verie wise and aduised, dare not aduenture to execute those enterprises which they haue begun with great discretion, finding by experience that such find worst successe. How great a friend Fortune sheweth her selfe to bad people, *Aristotle* maketh knowne by this probleme, Whence groweth it, that riches (for the most part) are possessed rather by the wicked, than by men of worth? Whereto he shapeth answer, Perhaps because Fortune being blind, cannot know nor make choice of what is best. But this is an answere vnworthie of so great a Philosopher: for it is not Fortune that bestoweth wealth on men, and though it were, yet he yeeldeth no reason, why she alwayes cherisheth the bad, and abandoneth the good. The true solution of this demaund is, that the lewd sort are verie wittie, and haue a gallant imagination to beguile in buying and selling, and can profit in bargaining, and employing their stocke where occasion of gaine is offered. But honest men want this imagination: manie of whom had endeuoured to imitate these bad fellowes, and by trafficking and trucking, within few dayes haue lost their principall.

This, Christ our redeemer pointed at, considering the

the ſufficiencie of that ſteward, whom his maiſter called to account, who reſeruing a good portion of the goods to his owne behoofe, ſalued vp all his reckonings, and got his *quietus eſt*. Which wiſdome (though it were faultie) yet God commended, ſaying; The children of this world are more wiſe in their kind than the children of light. For theſe ordinarily enioy a good vnderſtanding, with which power they place their affection on their law, and haue want of imagination, whereto the knowledge how to liue in this world appertaineth; wherethrough manie are morally good, becauſe they lacke the wit how to be naught. This manner of anſwering is more eaſie and apparent. The naturall Philoſophers, becauſe they could not reach ſo far, deuiſed ſo fond and ill iointed a cauſe, as ladie Fortune, to whoſe power they might impute good and bad ſucceſſes, and not to the vnskilfulneſſe and little knowledge of men.

Foure ſorts of people there are in euerie commonwealth, if a man liſt to marke them, For ſome men are wiſe, and ſeeme not ſo; others ſeeme ſo, and are not; others neither are, nor ſeem; and ſome both are, and ſeem ſo. Some men there are ſilent, ſlow in ſpeech, ſtayed in anſwering, not curious nor copious of words: yet they retaine hidden within them, a naturall power appertaining to the imagination, whereby they know the fit time and occaſion to bring their purpoſe to paſſe, and how they are therein to demeane themſelues, without communicating or imparting their mind to anie other. Theſe by the vulgar are called happie and luckie, them ſeeming that with little knowledge and leſſe wit euerie thing falleth into their lap.

Others contrariwiſe are of much eloquence in words and diſcourſe, great conuerſers, men that take vpon them

to

to gouerne the whole world, who goe about hunting how with ſmall expence they may reape great gains, and therein (after the vulgars conceit) no man in iudgement can ſtep an ace beyond them, and yet, comming to the effect, all falleth to the ground betweene their hands. Theſe crie out vpon Fortune, and call her blind buzzard, and iade; for the matters which they diſſeigne and worke with much wiſdome, ſhe ſuffereth not to take good effect: but if there were a Fortune who might plead her owne defence, ſhe would tell them, Your ſelues are the buzzards, the ſots, and the doe noughts, whom you ſpeake of, that being vnskilfull, hold your ſelues wiſe, and vſing vnfit meanes, would yet reape good ſucceſſes. This ſort of people haue a kind of imagination which decketh vp and ſetteth foorth their words and reaſons, and maketh them ſeeme to bee what indeed they are not. Whereon I conclude, that the Generall who is endowed with a wit requiſit for the art Militarie, and doth duly forecaſt what he is to exploit, ſhall be fortunate and happie, otherwiſe it is loſt labour to looke that he euer preuaile to victorie, vnleſſe God doe fight for him, as he did for the armies of Iſraell, and yet withall, they choſe the wiſeſt and skilfulleſt amongſt them to be commanders, for we muſt not leaue all vpon Gods hands, neither yet may a man wholly affie on his owne wit and ſufficiencie, but it will doe beſt to ioine both together; for there is no other Fortune, ſaue God, and a mans owne good indeuour.

He who firſt deuiſed Cheſſe-play, made a modell of the art Militarie, repreſenting therein all the occurrents and contemplations of war, without leauing any one behind: and as in this game Fortune beareth no ſtroke, neither can the plaier who beateth the aduerſe partie be termed

med fortunat, nor he who is beaten vnfortunat. So the Captain that ouercommeth ought to be called wiſe, and the vanquiſhed, ignorant; and not the one happie, or the other vnhappie. The firſt thing which he ordained in this play, was, that when the king is mated, the contrarie partie is vanquiſher: thereby to let vs vnderſtand, that the chiefe force of an armie, conſiſteth in a good commaunder to gouerne and direct the ſame: and for proofe hereof, he lotted as manie chiefe men to the one ſide as to the other, to the end, that whoſoeuer loſt, might be aſcertained, it ſo fell out through default of his owne knowledge, and not of Fortune. And this is more apparantly ſeene, if we conſider, that a skilfull plaier will ſpare halfe his men to the other partie, and yet for all that get the game. And this was it which *Vegetius* noted, that often few ſouldiors and weake, vanquiſh manie and valiant, if they be gouerned by a Generall who can skill in ambuſhes and ſtratagems. He ordained alſo, that the pawnes might not turne backe, thereby to aduiſe the commaunder, that he duly forecaſt all chances, ere he ſend foorth his ſouldiors to the ſeruice, becauſe if anie miſchaunce alight, it behooues rather that they be cut in peeces where they were placed, than to turne their backes, for the ſouldior is not to know when time ſerueth to flie or to fight, ſaue by direction of his Captaine, and therefore ſo long as his life laſteth, he is to keepe his place, vnder paine of becomming infamous. Hereunto he adioyned another law, that the pawne which had made ſeuen draughts without being taken, ſhould be made a queene, & might make anie draught at pleaſure, and be placed next the king, as one ſet at libertie, and endowed with nobilitie; whereby he gaue vs to vnderſtand, how in the warre it importeth greatly for making the ſouldior valiant, to pro-

proclaime aduantages, free campes, and preferments, for such as shall haue done anie speciall peece of seruice. And principally, that the honour and profit passe to their posteritie: for then they will exploit with greater courage and gallantnesse. For which cause *Aristotle* affirmeth, that a man maketh more reake to be chiefe of his linage, than of his owne proper life. This *Saule* well perceiued, when he caused to be proclaimed in the army, Whosoeuer shal strike that man, (meaning, kill the Giant *Golias*) shall be made rich by the King, and shall haue his daughter to wife, and his house shall be enfranchised in Israel from all manner tribute. Conformable vnto this Proclamation, there was a Court in Spaine, which ordained, that whatsoeuer souldior, by his good vsage, deserued to receiue for his pay 500 Soldi (this was the greatest stipend allowed in the warres) should himselfe and his posteritie, be discharged for euer from all taxes and seruices. The Moores (as they are great players at Chesse) haue in their plaies set seuen degrees in imitation of the seuen draughts which the Pawne must make to be a Queene, and so they enlarge the play from one to the second, and from the second to the third, vntill they arriue to seuen, answerable to the proofe that the souldior shall giue of himselfe: and if he be so gallant as to inlarge his pay to the seuenth, they yeeld him the same: and for this cause they are termed Septerniers, or Seuenstears. These haue large liberties and exemptions, as in Spaine those Gentlemen who are called *Hidalgos*. The reason hereof, in naturall Philosophie is verie plaine: for there is no facultie of all those that gouerne man, which will willingly worke, vnlesse there be some interest to mooue the same: which *Aristotle* proueth in the generatiue power, and the selfe reason swayeth in the residue. The obiect of the wrathfull

full faculties (as we haue aboue ſpecified) is honour and aduantage; and if this ceaſe, ſtraightwaies courage and ſtomacke decay: by all this may be conceiued the great ſignification which it carrieth to make that pawne a queene, who hath made ſeuen draughts without taking: for whatſoeuer the greateſt nobilitie in the world, that hath been or ſhall be, hath ſprung and ſhall ſpring from pawnes, and priuat men, who by the valour of their perſon haue done ſuch exploits, as they deſerued for themſelues and their poſteritie the title of Gentlemen, Knights, Noblemen, Earles, Marqueſſes, Dukes, and Kings. True it is, that ſome are ſo ignorant and void of conſideration, as they will not graunt that their nobilitie had a beginning; but that the ſame is euerlaſting, and growne into their bloud, not by the grace of ſome particular king, but by the ſupernaturall and diuine reaſon. To the bent of this purpoſe (though we ſhall thereby ſomewhat lengthen our matter) I cannot but recount a verie wittie diſcourſe, which paſſed betweene our Lord the Prince *Don Carlos*, and the Doctor *Suares* of Toledo, who was Iudge of the Court of Alcala of Heuares. Prince. Doctor what thinke you of this people? Doctor. Very well (my Lord) for heere is the beſt aire, and the beſt ſoile of anie place in Spaine. *P.* For ſuch the Phiſitions made choice of to recouer my health: haue you ſeene the Vniuerſitie? *D.* No my *L.* *P.* See it then: for it is verie ſpeciall; and where they tell me the Sciences are verie learnedly read. *D.* Verily, for a colledge and particular ſtudie, it carrieth great fame, and ſhould be ſuch in effect, as your highneſſe ſpeaketh of. *P.* Where did you ſtudie? *D.* In Salamanca, my lord. *P.* And did you proceed Doctor in Salamanca? *D.* My lord, no. *P.* That me ſeemeth was euill done, to ſtudie in one Vniuerſitie, and take

take degree in another. *D.* May it pleaſe your highneſſe, that the charges of taking degrees in Salamanca, are exceſſiue; and therefore we poore men flie the ſame, and get vs to ſome other Vniuerſitie, knowing that we receiue our ſufficiencie and learning not from the degree, but from our ſtudie and paines, albeit my parents were not ſo poore, but if them liſted might haue borne the charge of my proceeding in Salamanca: but your highneſſe well knoweth, that the doctors of this Vniuerſitie haue the like franchiſes as the gentleman of Spaine, and to vs who are ſuch by nature, this exemption doth harm, at leaſt to our poſteritie. *P.* Which of the kings mine anceſtors gaue this nobilitie to your linage? *D.* None. And to this end your highneſſe muſt vnderſtand, there are two ſorts of gentlemen in Spain; ſome of bloud, and ſome by priuiledge: thoſe in bloud (as my ſelfe) haue not receiued their nobilitie at the kings hand, but thoſe by priuiledge haue. *P.* This matter is verie hard for me to conceiue, and I would gladly that you expreſſed it in plainer tearmes: for if my bloud royall, reckoning from my ſelfe to my father, and from him to my grandfather, and ſo by order from each to other, commeth to finiſh in *Pelagius:* to whom by the death of the king *Don Rodericke,* the kingdome was giuen, before which time he was not king. If we reckon vp after this ſort your pedigree, ſhall wee not come at laſt to end in one who was no gentleman? *D.* This diſcourſe cannot be denied, for all things haue had a beginning. *P.* I aske you then, from whence that firſt man had his nobilitie, who gaue beginning to your nobilitie? hee could not enfranchiſe himſelfe, nor plucke out his owne necke from the yoke of tributes and ſeruices, which before time hee paied to the kings my predeceſſors: for this were a kind of theft, and a preferring

ring himselfe by force with the kings patrimonie, and it foundeth not with reason, that gentlemen of bloud should haue so bad an originall as this: therefore it falleth out plaine, that the king gaue him freedome, & yeelded him the grace of that nobilitie. Now tell me from whom he had it. *D.* Your highnesse concludeth verie well, and it is true, that there is no true nobilitie saue of the kings grant: but we tearme those noble of blood, of whose originall there is no memorie, neither is it specified by writing, when the same began, nor what king yeelded them this fauour: and this obscureneſſe is receiued in the common wealth for more honourable, than distinctly to know the contrarie. The commonwealth also maketh gentlemen: for when a man groweth valorous, of great vertue, and rich, it dareth not to challenge such a one, as seeming thereby to doe him wrong, and that it is fit a man of that worth doe liue in all franchize. This reputation passing to the children, and to the nephewes, groweth to nobilitie, & so they get a pretence against the king. These are not therefore gentlemen, because they receiue 500 Soldi of pay; but when the contrarie cannot be prooued, they passe for such. That Spaniard, who deuised this name of a gentleman, *Hisiodalgos*, gaue verie well to vnderstand this doctrine which we haue set downe; for by his opinion men haue two kinds of birth, the one naturall, in which all are equall, the other spirituall. When a man performeth anie heroicall enterprise, or anie vertue or extraordinarie worke, then is he new borne, and procureth for himselfe other new parents, and leeseth that being which hee had tofore. Yesterday he was called the sonne of *Peter*, and nephew of *Sanchius*, and now he is named the sonne of his owne actions. Hence had that Castilian prouerbe

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his originall, which saith, Euery man is the son of his own workes. And because the good and vertuous workes, are in the holy scripture termed somwhat, and in the Spanish tongue it signifieth *algo*, and vices and sins nothing, which in the Spanish is tearmed *nada*. This Spaniard compounded this word *hijo dalgo* thereof, which importeth nought els, but that such a one is descended of him, who performed some notorious and vertuous action: for which he deserued to be rewarded by the King or commonwealth, togither with all his posteritie for euer. The law of the *Partita* sayth, That *hijo dalgo* signifieth the sonne of goods: But if we vnderstand the same of temporall goods, the reason was not good; for there are infinit gentlemen poore, and infinit rich men, who are no gentlemen: but if he meane the sonne of goods, that is to say, of good qualities, it carrieth the same sence which wee before expressed.

Of the second birth which men ought to haue besides their naturall, there is affoorded vs a naturall example in the Scripture, where Christ our redeemer reprehendeth *Nicodemus*, because he (being a doctor of the law) wist not yet, it was necessarie that a man should be borne of new, thereby to obtain a better being, and more honourable parents than his naturall: for which cause, all the time that a man performeth no heroicall enterprise, in this sence he is called *hijo de nada*, to weet the sonne of nothing; although by his aunceſtors he beare the name of *hijo dalgo*, that is, the sonne of somewhat, or a Gentleman. To the purpose of this doctrine, I will recite vnto you a discourse which passed betweene a verie honourable Captaine and a Caualiero, who stood much on the pantophles of his Gentilitie. Whereby shall be discouered, in what the honour of this second birth consisteth.

sisteth. This Captaine then falling in companie with a knot of Caualieros, and discoursing of the largesse and libertie, which Souldiors enioy in Italie, in a certaine demaund, which one of them made him, he gaue him the *you*, because he was natiue of that place, and the sonne of meane parents, borne in a village of some few houses: but the Captaine (aggreeued thereat) answered, saying; Signor, your signorie shall vnderstand, that Souldiors who haue enioyed the libertie of Italie, cannot content themselues to make abode in Spaine, because of the manie laws which are here enacted against such as set hand to their sword.

The other Caualieros hearing him vse the tearme of *Signoria*, could not forbeare laughter. The Caualiero blushing hereat, vsed these words, Your *mercede* may weet, that in Italie, to say *Signoria*, importeth so much as in Spaine to say *mercede*, and this Signor Capitano, being accustomed to the vse and manner of that countrie, giueth the tearme of *Signoria*, where he should doe that of *mercede*. Hereto the Captaine answered, saying; Let not your Signorie hold me to be a man so simple, but that I know when I am in Italie, to applie my selfe to the language of Italie, and in Spain, to that of Spain: but he that in Spain talking with me, may giue me the *you*, it behoueth at least that he haue a Signorie in Spain; and yet so I can scarse take it well: the Caualiero somwhat affronted made reply, saying; why Signor Capitano, are you not natiue in such a place, and sonne to such a man? And know you not againe who I am, and what mine ancestors haue been? Signor (answered the Captaine) I know right well, that your Signorie is a good Caualiero, and such haue been your elders: but I and my right arme (which now I acknowledge for my father) are better than you and all

your linage. This Captain meant to allude to the second birth, when hee said, I and my right arme, which now I acknowledge to be my father; and that not vnduly: for with his right arme, and with his sword he had performed such actions, as the valour of his person was equall to the nobility of that Caualiero. For the most part, the laws and nature (saith *Plato*) are contrary: for a man sometimes issueth out of natures hands, with a minde verie wise, excellent, noble, franke, and with a wit apt to command a whole world: yet because his hap was to be borne in the house of *Amiclas*, a base peasant, by the laws he remaineth depriued of that honour and libertie wherein nature placed him. And contrariwise we see others, whose wit and fashions were ordained to be slaues; and yet for that they were borne in noble houses, they come by force of the lawes to be great Lords. But one thing hath been noted manie daies ago, which is worthie of consideration, that those who are born in villages and thatched houses, prooue more sufficient men, and of greater towardnesse for the Sciences and armes, than such as haue great Cities for their birth-place. Yet is the vulgar so subiect to ignorance, as they gather a consequence to the contrarie, from birth in meane places: hereof the sacred Scripture affoordeth vs an example, where it is read, that the people of Israel much wondering at the great workes of our Sauiour Christ, said; Is it possible, that out of Nazareth can come ought that is good? But to returne to the wit of this Captaine, of whom we haue discoursed: he ought to be endowed with much vnderstanding, and with the difference of imagination, which is requisit for the art of war. Wherethrough, in this treatise wee deliuer much doctrine, whence wee may gather wherein the valour of men consisteth, that they may reap

estimation

eſtimation in the common-wealth.

Six things (me ſeemeth) a man ought to haue, to the end he may be tearmed honourable, and which of them ſoeuer want, his being is thereby impaired: but yet all of them are not placed in one ſelfe degree, nor partake a like value, or the ſelfe qualities.

The firſt and principall, is the valour of a mans owne perſon, as touching his wiſdome, iuſtice, mind, and courage. This maketh riches and birth-right, from hence grow honourable titles; from this beginning all the nobilitie in the world fetcheth his originall. And if anie be ſetled in a contrarie opinion, let him go to the great houſes in Spaine, and he ſhall find, that they all deriue their originall from particular men, who by the valour of their perſons attained to that, which now by their ſucceſſions is poſſeſſed.

The ſecond thing which honoureth a man, next to the valour of his perſon, is ſubſtance, without which we find not, that anie man carrieth eſtimation in the common-wealth.

The third is, the nobilitie and antiquitie of his anceſtors, to be well borne, and of honourable bloud, is a thing verie precious; but yet retaineth in it ſelfe a great defect: for by it ſelfe alone it yeeldeth a ſlender auaile, as well in regard of the gentleman himſelfe, as of others who ſtand in need thereof: for a man can neither eat nor drinke the ſame, nor apparrell himſelfe therewithall, nor giue nor beſtow the ſame: but it maketh a man to liue as dying, by depriuing him of the remedies which he might otherwiſe procure to ſupplie his neceſſities; but let him vnite the ſame with riches, and by no degree of honour it can be counteruailed. Some are wont to reſemble nobilitie to a cypher in numbring, which of it

ſelfe beareth no value, but vnited with another number, multiplieth the ſame.

The fourth point which maketh a man to be of account, is to haue ſome dignitie or honourable office, and contrariwiſe nothing ſo much abaſeth a man, as to get his liuing by ſome handycraft.

The fift thing which honoureth a man, is to be called by a good ſurname, and a gracious Chriſtian name, which may deliuer a pleaſing conſonance to the eare, and not to be termed a paſtie, or peſtell, as ſome that I know. We read in the generall hiſtorie of Spaine, that there came two Embaſſadours out of France vnto king *Alphonſe* the ninth, to demaund one of his daughters in mariage for their ſoueraigne king *Philip*: one of which Ladies was verie faire, and named *Vrraca*; the other nothing ſo gratious, and called *Blanche*. They both comming in preſence of the Embaſſadours, all men held it as a matter reſolued, that the choice would light vpon *Vrraca*, as the elder, and fairer, and better adorned: but the Embaſſadours enquiring each of their names, tooke offence at the name of *Vrraca*, and made choice of the Ladie *Blanche*: ſaying, that her name would be better receiued in France than the other.

The ſixt thing which honoureth a man, is the ſeemely ornament of his perſon, and his going well apparelled, and attended with manie waiters. The good diſcent of the Spaniſh nobilitie, is of ſuch as through the valour of their perſon, and through their honourable enterpriſes atchieued, grew in the wars to the pay of 500 Soldi. The originall whereof our late writers cannot verifie: for if they find not their matter laid downe in writing, and expreſſed to their hands by others, they are vnable to ſupplie the ſame with anie inuention of their owne. The dif-

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ference which *Aristotle* placeth betwixt memorie and remembrance is, that if the memorie haue loſt anie of thoſe things which at firſt it knew, it cannot call the ſame to mind, without new learning thereof: but remembrance enioyeth this ſpeciall grace, that if it forget ought, by ſtopping a while to diſcourſe thereupon, it turneth to find out that which was before loſt. Which may be the Court that ſpeaketh in fauour of good ſouldiours, we find at this day recorded neither in bookes, nor in the memorie of men, but there are left as reliques theſe words, *hijo dalgo*, in thoſe that receiue 500 Soldi of pay, after the Court of Spain, and their known wages. By making diſcourſe, and arguing whereon, it will fall out an eaſie matter to find out their aſſociats. *Antony* of Lebriſſa giuing the ſignification of this verbe, *vendico, cas*: ſaith, the ſame ſignifieth, to draw vnto it that which is due for pay, or by reaſon, as we ſay now adayes by a new phraſe of ſpeech, or to take pay from the king. And it is a thing ſo vſed in Caſtilia the old, to ſay ſuch a one hath well impaied his trauaile, when he is well paied, that amongſt the ciuiller ſort there is no manner of ſpeech more ordinarie.

From this ſignification, the word *vindicare* fetched his originall, namely, when anie one would ſtirre at the wrong offered him by another: for iniurie metaphorically is tearmed debt. After this ſort when we now ſay, ſuch a one is *hijo dalgo, de vengar quincentos ſueldos*, that is, a gentleman of the pay of 500 Soldi: we meane, that he is deſcended from a ſouldior ſo valiant, as for his prowеſſe he deſerued to receiue ſo large a pay, as is that of 500 Soldi: who by the court of Spaine was (with all his poſteritie) enfranchiſed from paying anie tallages or ſeruices to the king. This knowne pay is nought els, ſaue the

entrance which such a souldiour made into the number of those, whose stipend was 500 Soldi: for then were registred in the kings booke the name of the souldiour, the countrey where he was borne, and who were his parents and progenitors, for the more certainetie to him who receiued this benefit and stipend. Euen as at this day we read in the booke of *Bezerro*, which is kept at Salamanca, where are found written the beginning of welneere all the Spanish Nobilitie. The semblable diligence vsed *Saul*, when *Dauid* slew *Golias*: for forthwith he sent *Abner* his Captaine, to take information of what stocke the young man was descended. Antiently they termed *Solaro* the house of the Villaine, as well as of the Gentleman.

But sithens wee haue stepped aside into this digression, it behooueth to make returne to our purpose from whence we parted, and to know whence it groweth, that in play at Chesse, which we tearmed a counterfeit of warre, a man shameth more to loose, than at anie other game, albeit the same turne him to no dammage, neither is the play for money: and whence it may spring, that the lookers on see more draughts than the players themselues, though they are lesse seene in the play? and that which most importeth, is, that some gamesters play best fasting, and some better after meat? The first doubt holdeth like difficultie, for wee haue auouched, that in warre and in Chesse-play fortune hath nought to doe, neither may wee bee allowed to say, Who would euer haue thought this? but all is ignorance and careleſneſſe in him that leeseth, and wisedome and cunning in him that getteth. And when a man is ouercome in matters of wit and sufficiencie, and is cut off from all allegations of excuse or pretence, other than his owne ignorance, it follow-

followeth a matter of neceſſitie, that he wax aſhamed: for man is reaſonable, and a friend to his reputation, and cannot brooke that in the workes of this power anie other ſhould ſtep a foot before him. For which cauſe *Ariſtotle* demandeth, What the reaſon may be, why the antients conſented not, that ſpeciall rewards ſhould be aſſigned to thoſe, who ſurpaſſed the reſt in the Sciences, and yet ordained ſome for the beſt leaper, runner, thrower of the barre, and wreſtler? To which he frameth anſwere, That in wreſtling and bodily contentions, it is tollerated that there be Iudges aſſigned, who ſhall cenſure how far one man exceedeth another, to the end they may iuſtly yeeld prize to the vanquiſher, it falling out a matter of no difficultie, for the eye to diſcerne who leapeth moſt ground, or runneth with greateſt ſwiftneſſe: but in matters of Science it prooueth verie hard to trie by the vnderſtanding which exceedeth other, for that it is a thing appertaining to the ſpirit, and of much queintneſſe; and if the Iudge liſt to giue the prize maliciouſly, all men cannot looke thereunto, for it is a iudgement much eſtranged from the ſence of the beholders. Beſides this anſwere, *Ariſtotle* giueth another which is better, ſaying, That men make no great recke to be ouercome in throwing, wraſtling, running, and leaping, for that they are graces wherein the verie brute beaſts outpaſſe vs. But that which wee cannot endure with patience, is, to haue another adiudged more wiſe and aduiſed than our ſelues, wherethrough they grow in hatred with the Iudges, and ſeeke to be reuenged of them, thinking that of malice they went about to ſhame them. Therefore to ſhun theſe inconueniences, they would not yeeld conſent, that in workes appertaining to the reaſonable part, men ſhould be allowed either iudges or rewards.

Whence is gathered, that the Vniuersities doe ill, who assigne iudges and rewards of the first, second, and third degree, in licencing those that proone best at the examinations.

For besides that the inconueniences alleaged by *Aristotle* doe betide, it is repugnant to the doctrine of the Gospell, that men grow into contention who should be cheefe. And that this is true, we see manifestly, for that the disciples of our Sauiour Christ comming one day from a certaine voiage, treated amongst themselues, who should be the greatest, and being now arriued at their lodging, their maister asked them, whereof they had reasoned vpon the way? but they (though somewhat blunt) well vnderstood, how this question was not allowable; wherethrough the text saith, that they durst not tell him: but because from God nothing can bee concealed hee spake vnto them in this manner: If anie will be chiefe amongst you, he shall be the last of all, and seruant to the rest. The Pharisies were abhorred by Christ our redeemer, because they loued the highest seats at feasts, and the principall chaires in the Synagogues. The chiefe reason whereon they relie who bestow degrees after this manner, is, that when schollers know ech of them shall be rewarded according to the triall which they shall giue of themselues, they will scantly affoord themselues time from their studie, to sleepe or eat: which would cease, were there not a reward for him that taketh pains, or chastisement for him that addicteth himselfe to looseneſſe and loitering. But this is a slender reason, and so only in apparence, and presupposeth a great falshood, which is, that knowledge may be gotten by continuall plodding at the booke, and by hearing of good maisters, and neuer leesing a lesson. And they marke not, that if a scholler

ler want the wit and abilitie requisit for the learning which he applieth, it falleth out a lost labour, to beat his head day and night at his bookes. And the error is such, that if differences of wits, so far distant as these, doe enter into competencie, the one through his quicke capacitie, without studying or poaring in bookes, getteth learning in a trice, and the other for that he is block-headed and dull, after he hath toiled all his life long, can small skill in the matter.

Now the Iudges come, as men to giue the first price to him who was enabled by nature and tooke no trauell, and the last to him who was borne void of capacitie, yet neuer gaue ouer studying; as if the one had gotten learning by turning ouer his bookes, and the other lost the same through his owne sluggishnesse. And it fareth as if they ordained prices for two horses, of which the one had his legs sound and nimble, and the other halted downeright. If the Vniuersities did admit to the studie of the Sciences, none but such as had a wit capable thereof, and were all equall, it should seeme a thing well done to ordaine reward and punishment: for whosoeuer knew most, it would thereby appeare that he pained himselfe most, and who knew least, had giuen himselfe more to his ease.

To the second doubt we answer, that as the eyes stand in need of light and cleerenesse, to see figures and colours, so the imagination hath need of light in the braine, to see the fantasies which are in the memorie. This cleerenesse the Sunne giueth not, nor anie lampe or candle, but the vitall spirits which are bred in the heart, and disperſed throughout the bodie. Herewithall it is requisit to know that feare gathereth all the vitall spirits to the heart, and leaueth the braine darke, and all the other parts of the bodie

bodie cold. Whereupon *Aristotle* maketh this demaund, Whence commeth it, that who so feareth, his voice, his hands, and his nether lip doe tremble ? whereto he answereth, That through this feare the naturall heat hieth to the heart, and leaueth all the residue of the bodie acold, and the cold (as before is touched) by *Galens* mind, hindereth all the powers and faculties of the soule, and suffereth not them to worke.

Hence beginneth the answere of this second doubt, and it is, that those who play at Chesse, conceiue feare to loose, because the game standeth vpon tearmes of reputation and disgrace, and for that Fortune hath no stroke therein; so the vitall spirits assembling to the heart, the imagination is foreslowed by the cold, and the fantasmes in the darke: for which two reasons, he who playeth, cannot bring his purpose to effect. But the lookers on, in as much as this no way importeth them, neither stand in feare of loosing through want of skill, doe behold more draughts, for that their imagination retaineth his heat, and his figures are enlightened by the light of the vitall spirits. True it is, that much light reaueth also the light of the imagination, and it befalleth what time the player waxeth ashamed and out of countenance to see his aduersarie beat him; then through this aggreeuednesse the naturall heat encreaseth, and enlighteneth more than is requisit, of all which he that standeth by is deuoid. From hence issueth an effect verie vsuall in the world, that what time a man endeuoureth to make the best muster of himselfe, and his learning and sufficiencie most knowne, it prooueth worst with him: with others againe the contrarie betideth, who being brought to their triall, make a great shew, and passed out of the lists, appeare of little woorth: and of all this the reason is verie manifest, for he

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whose head is filled with much naturall heat, if you appoint him to doe an exercise of learning or disputation, within foure and twentie houres after, a part of that excessiue heat which he hath flieth to the heart, and so the braine remaineth temperat, and in this disposition (as we will prooue in the chapter ensuing) many points woorth the vtterance, present themselues to a mans remembrance. But he who is verie wise and endowed with a great vnderstanding, being brought to triall, by meanes of feare cannot retaine the naturall heat in his head, whereon through default of light, he findeth not in his memorie what to deliuer.

If this fell into their consideration, who take vpon them to controll the Generals of armies, blaming their actions, and the order which they set downe in the field, they should discerne how great a difference resteth betweene the giuing a looking on the fight out at a window, or the breaking of a Launce therein, and the feare to leese an arme, whose charge their soueraigne hath committed to their hands.

No lesse dammage doth feare procure the Physition in curing, for his practise (as we haue prooued heretofore) appertaineth to the imagination, which resteth more annoyed by cold than anie other power, for that his operation consisteth in heat. Whence wee see by experience, that Physitians can sooner cure the vulgar sort, than Princes and great personages. A Counsellor at law one day asked me (knowing that I handled this matter) what the cause might be, that in the affaires where he was well payed, manie cases and points of learning came to his memorie, but with such as yeelded not to his trauell what was due, it seemed that all his knowledge was shrunke out of his braine: whom I answered, that matters

ters of interest appertained to the wrathfull facultie, which maketh his residence in the heart, and if the same receiue not contentment, it doth not willingly send forth the vitall spirits, by whose light the figures which rest in the memorie may be discerned. But when that findeth satisfaction, it cheerefully affoordeth naturall heat: Wherethrough the reasonable soule obtaineth sufficient cleerenesse to see whatsoeuer is written in the head. This defect doe men of great vnderstanding partake, who are pinching, and relie much on their interest, and in such is the propertie of that counsellor best discerned. But who so falleth into due consideration hereof, shall obserue it to be an action of Iustice, that he who laboureth in another mans vineyard bee well payed his wages.

The like reason is currant for the Phisition, to whom (when they are well hired) manie remedies present themselues: otherwise the art (as well in them as the Lawyer) slippeth out of their fingers. But here a matter verie important is to be noted; namely, that the good imagination of the Phisition discouereth on a suddaine what is necessarie to be done. And if he take leisure and farther consideration, a thousand inconueniences come into his fancie, which hold him in suspence, and this while the occasion of the remedie passeth away. Therefore it is neuer good, to aduise the Phisition to consider well what he hath in haud, but that he forthwith execute what first he purposed. For we haue prooued heretofore, that much speculation maketh the naturall heat to auoid out of the head, and againe the same may encrease so far forth, as to turmoile the imagination. But the Phisition, in whom it is slacke, shall not doe amisse to vse long contemplation: for the heat aduancing it selfe vp

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to the braine, ſhall come to attaine that point, which to this power is behooffull.

The third doubt in the matters alreadie rehearſed, hath his anſwere verie manifeſt: for the difference of the imagination, with which we play at Cheſſe, requireth a certaine point of heat, to ſee the draughts, and he that plaieth well faſting, hath then the degree of heat requiſit thereunto: but through the heat of the meat, the ſame exceedeth that point which was neceſſarie, and ſo he plaieth worſe. The contrarie befalleth to ſuch as play well after meales, for the heat riſing vp togither with the meat and the wine, arriueth to the point, which wanted whiles he was faſting. It is therefore needfull to amend a place in *Plato*, who ſaith, That Nature hath with great wiſdome diſioyned the liuer from the braine, to the end, the meat with his vapours ſhould not trouble the contemplation of the reaſonable ſoule. But here if he meane thoſe operations which appertaine to the vnderſtanding, he ſpeaketh verie well, but it can take no place in anie of the differences of the imagination. Which is ſeene by experience in feaſts and banquets: for when the gueſts are come to mid meale, they begin to tell pleaſant tales, merriments, and ſimilitudes; where at the beginning none had a word to ſay; but at the end of the feaſt their tongue faileth them, for the heat is paſſed beyond the bound, requiſit for the imagination. Such as need to eat and drinke a little, to the end the imagination may lift vp it ſelfe, are melancholicke by aduſtion: for ſuch haue their braine like hot lime, which taken vp into your hand, is cold and drie in feeling; but if you bath the ſame in anie liquor, you cannot endure the heat which groweth thereof.

Wee muſt alſo correct that law of the Carthaginians, which

which *Plato* alleageth, whereby they forbad their Captaines to drinke wine, when they went to their wars, and likewise their gouernours, during the yeare of their office. And albeit *Plato* held the same for a verie iust law, and neuer maketh an end of commending the same; yet it behoooueth to make a distinction. We haue alleaged heretofore, that the worke of iudging appertaineth to discourse, and that this power abhorreth heat, and therefore receiueth much dammage by wine: but to gouerne a common-wealth (which is a distinct matter from taking into your hand a processe, and giuing sentence thervpon) belongeth to the imagination, and that requireth heat: and the gouernour not arriuing to the point which is requisit, may well drinke a little wine, so to attaine the same. The like may be said touching the Generall of an armie, whose counsell partaketh also with the imagination. And if the naturall heat be by anie hot thing to be aduanced, none performeth it so well as wine; but it is requisit, that the same be temperatly taken, for there is no nourishment which so giueth and reaueth a mans wit, as this liquor. Wherefore it behoooueth the Generall, to know the manner of his imagination, whether the same be of those which need meat and drinke to supplie the heat that wanteth, or to abide fasting: for in this onely, consisteth how to mannage his affaires well or euill.

CHAP. XIIII.

How we may know to what difference of abilitie the office of a King appertaineth, and what signes he ought to haue who enioyeth this manner of wit.

When

WHen *Salomon* was choſen King and head of ſo great and numberfull a people, as that of Iſraell; the text ſaith, that for gouerning and ruling them, he craued wiſedome from heauen, and nothing beſides. Which demaund ſo much pleaſed God, as in reward of hauing asked ſo well, he made him the wiſeſt king of the world: and not ſo contented, he gaue him great riches and glorie, euermore holding his requeſt in better price. Whence is manifeſtly gathered, that the greateſt wiſedome and knowledge which may poſſibly be in the world, is that foundation, vpon which the office of a king relieth. Which concluſion is ſo certaine and true, as it were but loſt labour to ſpend time in the proofe thereof. Onely it behoueth to ſhew to what difference of wit the art of being a king, and ſuch a one as is requiſit for the common-wealth, appertaineth: and to vnfold the tokens, whereby the man may bee knowne who is indowed with this wit and abilitie. Wherethrough it is certaine, that as the office of a king exceedeth all the arts in the world; ſo the ſame requireth a perfection of wit in the largeſt meaſure that nature can deuiſe. What the ſame is, wee haue not as yet defined: for we haue beene occupied in diſtributing to the other arts, their differences & manners. But ſince we now haue the ſame in handling, it muſt be vnderſtood, that of nine temperatures which are in mankind, one onely (ſaith *Galen*) maketh a man ſo ſurpaſſing wiſe, as by nature he can be. Wherein the firſt qualities are in ſuch waight and meaſure, that the heat exceedeth not the cold, nor the moiſt the drie, but are found in ſuch equalitie and conformitie, as if really they were not contraries, nor had anie naturall oppoſition. Whence reſulteth an inſtrument

ſtrument ſo appliable to the operations of the reaſonable ſoule, that man commeth to poſſeſſe a perfect memorie of things paſſed, and a great imagination to ſee what is to come, and a great vnderſtanding, to diſtinguiſh, inferre, argue, iudge, and make choice. The other differences of wit (by vs recounted) haue not anie one amongſt them of ſound perfection: for if a man poſſeſſe great vnderſtanding, he cannot (by meanes of much drineſſe) compriſe the ſciences which appertaine to the imagination and the memorie; and if he be of great imagination, by reaſon of much heat, he remaineth vnſufficient for the ſciences of the vnderſtanding and the memorie, and if he enioy a great memorie, we haue tofore expreſſed, how vnable thoſe of much memorie (through their exceſſiue moiſture) doe prooue for all the other ſciences. Onely this difference of wit which we now are a ſearching, is that which anſwereth all the arts in proportion. How much dammage the vnableneſſe of adioyning the reſt, breedeth to anie one knowledge, *Plato* noteth, ſaying; That the perfection of each in particular, dependeth on the notice and knowledge of them all in generall.

No ſort of knowledge is found ſo diſtinctly and ſeuered from another, but that the skill in the one much aideth to the others perfection. But how ſhall we doe, if hauing ſought for this difference of wit with great diligence in all Spaine, I can find but one ſuch? Whereby I conceiue, that *Galen* ſaid verie well, That out of Greece, nature not ſo much as in a dreame maketh anie man temperat, or with a wit requiſit for the ſciences. And the ſame *Galen* alleageth the reaſon hereof, ſaying; That Greece is the moſt temperat region of the world: where the heat of the aire exceedeth not the cold, nor the

moiſt

moist the drie. Which temperature maketh men verie wise and able for all the Sciences, as appeareth, considering the great number of famous men who thence haue issued, as *Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Hippocrates, Galen, Theophrastus, Demosthenes, Homer, Thales Milesius, Diogenes Cynicus, Solon,* and infinit other wise men mentioned in Histories, whose workes we find repleniſhed with all Sciences: not as the Writers of other Prouinces, who if they treat of Phisicke, or anie other Science, it prooues a miracle for them to alleage anie other sort of Science in their aid or fauour. All of them are beggerly and without furniture, as wanting a wit capable of all the arts. But which we may most maruell at in Greece, is, that whereas the wit of women is found so repugnant vnto learning (as hereafter we will prooue) yet there haue been so manie she Greekes, so specially seene in the Sciences, as they haue growne into competencie with the sufficienteſt men: as namely *Leontia*, a most wise woman, who wrote against *Theophrastus*, the greateſt Philosopher of his time, reprooving him for manie errors in Philosophie. But if we looke into other prouinces of the world, hardly shall we find sprung vp anie one wit that was notable. Which groweth, for that they inhabit places distempered, where men become brutish, slow of capacitie, and ill conditioned.

For this cause *Aristotle* moueth a doubt, saying; What meaneth it, that those who inhabit a countrey, either ouer cold, or ouer hot, are fierce and fell in countenance and conditions: to which probleme he answereth verie well, saying; That a good temperature not onely maketh a good grace in the bodie, but also aideth the wit and abilitie. And as the exceſſes of heat and cold do hinder nature, that she cannot shape a man in good figure;

so (also for the like reason) the harmonie of the soule is turned topsie turuie, and the wit prooueth slow and dull.

This the Greekes well wist, in as much as they termed all the nations of the world Barbarians, considering their slender sufficiencie and little knowledge. Whence wee see, that of so manie that are borne and studie out of Greece, if they be Philosophers, none of them arriueth to the perfection of *Plato* and *Aristotle:* if Phisitions, to *Hippocrates* and *Galen:* if Orators, to *Demosthenes:* if Poets, to *Homer:* and so in the residue of the Sciences parts, the Greeks haue euer held the formost ranke beyond all contradiction. At least the probleme of *Aristotle* is verie well verefied in the Greekes: for verily they are the men of most sufficiencie and loftiest capacitie in the world: were it not that they liue in disgrace, oppressed by force of armes in bondage, and all hardly intreated by the comming of the Turkes, who banished all learning, and caused the Vniuersitie of Athens to passe vnto Paris in France, where at this day the same continueth. And (thus through want of manurance) so manie gallant wits (as we haue before reported) are vtterly perished. In the other regions out of Greece, though Schools and exercise of learning are planted, yet no man hath proued in them of anie rare excellencie.

The Phisition holded he hath waded verie far, if with his wit he can attaine to that which *Hippocrates* and *Galen* deliuered, and the naturall Philosopher reckoneth himselfe so full of knowledge, as he can be capable of no more, if he once grow to the vnderstanding of *Aristotle.* But this notwithstanding, it goeth not for an vniuersall rule, that all such as haue Greece for their birth-place, must of force be temperat and wise, and all the residue

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distemperat and ignorant: for the same *Galen* recounteth of *Anacharsis*, who was borne in Scythia, that he carried the reputation of a rare wit amongst the Grecians, though himselfe a Barbarian. A Philosopher borne in Athens falling in contention with him, said vnto him; Get thee hence thou Barbarian. Then *Anacharsis* answered, My countrey is to me a shame, and so art thou to thine: for Scythia, being a region so distemperat, and where so manie ignorant persons liue, my selfe am grown to knowledge, and thou being borne in Athens, a place of wit and wisedome, wert neuer other than an Asse. In sort, that we need not vtterly despaire in regard of the temperature; neither thinke it a case of impossibilitie, to meet herewithall out of Greece, and especially in Spaine, a region not verie distemperat: for as I haue found one of these differences in Spaine, so it may well be, that there are manie others not yet come to knowledge, and which I haue not been able to find out. It shall doe well therefore, to intreat of the tokens, by which a temperat man may be discerned, to the end where such a one is, he may not be hidden.

Manie signes haue the Phisitions laid downe to discouer this difference of wit, but the most principall, and which affoord best notice, are these following.

The first (saith *Galen*) is to haue his haire abourne, a colour betweene white and red; and that passing from age to age, they euer become more golden. And the reason is verie cleere: for the materiall cause whereof the haire consisteth, the Phisitions say, is a grosse vapour which ariseth from the digestion that the braine maketh at the time of his nourishment; and looke what colour is of the member, such also is that of his excrements. If the braine in his composition partake much of fleagme,

the haire in growth is white, if much choller, saffron coloured: but if these two humours rest equally mingled, the braine becommeth temperat, hot, cold, moist, and drie; and the haire abourne partaking both the extremes. True it is *Hippocrates* saith that this colour in men, who liue vnder the North, as are the English, Flemmish, and Almaines, springeth, for that their whiteneſſe is parched vp with much cold, and not for the reason by vs alleaged. Wherefore in this token it behoueth to be well aduised: otherwise we may soone slip into error.

The second token which a man, who shalbe endowed with this difference of wit, must haue, is (saith *Galen*) to be well shaped, of good countenance, of seemely grace, and cheerefull: in sort, that the sight may take delight to behold him, as a figure of rare perfection. And the reason is verie plaine: for if nature haue much force, and a seed well seasoned, she alwayes formeth of things possible, the best and most perfect in his kind: but being purueied of forces, mostly she placeth her studie in fashioning the braine, for that amongst all other parts of the bodie, the same is the principall seat of the reasonable soule: whence we see manie men to be great and foule, and yet of an excellent wit.

The quantitie of bodie which a temperat man ought to haue (saith *Galen*) is not resolutely determined by nature, for he may be long, short, and of meane stature, conformable to the quantitie of the temperat seed, which it had when it was shaped. But as touching that which appertaineth to the wit in temperat persons, a mean stature is better than either a great or little. And if we must leane to either of the extreames, it is better to encline to the little than to the great: for the bones and superfluous flesh (as wee haue prooued heretofore by the opinion

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of *Plato* and *Aristotle)* bring great dammage to the wit. Agreeable hereunto, the naturall Philosophers are wont to demand, whence it proceedeth, that men of small stature are ordinarilie more wise than those of long stature. And for proofe hereof, they cite *Homer*, who saith, that *Vlisses* was verie wise, and little of bodie; and contrariwise *Aiax* verie foolish, and in stature tall. To this question they make verie simple answere, saying, that the reasonable soule gathered into a narrow roome, hath thereby more force to worke conformable to that old saw, Vertue is of more force vnited than dispersed: and contrariwise making abode in a bodie long and large, it wanteth sufficient vertue to moue and animate the same. But this is not the reason thereof: for we should rather say, That long men haue much moisture in their composition, which extendeth out their flesh, and ableth the same to that increase which the naturall heat doth euer procure. The contrarie betideth in little bodies: for through their much drinesse, the flesh cannot take his course, nor the naturall heat enlarge or stretch it out, and therefore they remaine of short stature. And we haue earst proued, that amongst the first qualities, none bringeth so great dammage to the operations of the reasonable soule, as much moisture, and that none so farre quickeneth the vnderstanding, as drinesse.

The third signe (saith *Galen)* by which a temperat man may be knowne, is, that he be vertuous and of good conditions: for if he be lewd and vitious, *Plato* affirmeth it groweth, for that in man there is some distemperat qualitie, which vrgeth him to offend: and if such a one will practise that which is agreeable to vertue, it behoooueth, that first he renounce his owne naturall inclination. But whosoeuer is absolutely temperat, standeth not in need

of anie ſuch diligence, for the inferiour powers require nothing at his hands that is contrarie to reaſon. Therefore *Galen* ſaith, That to a man who is poſſeſſed of this temperature, we need preſcribe no diet what he ſhall eat and drinke: for he neuer exceedeth the quantitie and meaſure which Phiſicke would aſſigne him. And *Galen* contenteth not himſelfe to tearme them moſt temperat: but moreouer auoucheth, that it is not neceſſarie to moderat their other paſſions of the ſoule: for his anger, his ſadneſſe, his pleaſure, and his mirth, are alwaies meaſured by reaſon. Whence it followeth, that they are euermore healthfull and neuer diſeaſed, and this is the fourth figure.

Bnt herein *Galen* ſwarueth from reaſon: for it is impoſſible to frame a man, that ſhall be perfect in all his powers, as the bodie is temperat, and that his wrathfull and concupiſcentiall power get not the ſoueraignetie ouer reaſon, and incite him to ſinne. For it is not fitting to ſuffer anie man (how temperat ſoeuer) to follow alwaies his owne naturall inclination, without gaine-ſetting and correcting him by reaſon. This is eaſily vnderſtood, conſidering the temperature which the braine ought to haue, to the end the ſame may be made a conuenient inſtrument for the reaſonable facultie: and that which the heart ſhould hold, to the end the wrathfull power may couet glorie, empire, victorie, and ſoueraigntie ouer all: and that which the liuer ought to haue for diſgeſting the meats, and that which ought to reſt in the cods, to be able to preſerue mankind, and to increaſe the ſame. Of the brain, we haue ſaid ſundrie times tofore, that it ſhould retaine moiſture for memorie, drineſſe for diſcourſe, and heat for the imagination: But for all this, his naturall temperature is cold and moiſt; and by reaſon of the

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more or lesse of these two qualities, somtimes we tearme it hot, and sometimes cold, now moist, then drie; but the cold and moist grow to predominat. The liuer, wherein the facultie of concupiscence resideth, hath for his naturall temperature heat and moisture to predominate; and from this it neuer altereth, so long as a man liueth: and if sometimes we say it is cold, it groweth, for that the same hath not all the degrees of heat requisit to his owne operations. As touching the heart, which is the instrument of the wrathfull facultie, *Galen* affirmeth it of his owne nature to be so hot, as if (while a creature liueth) wee put our finger into his hollownesse, it will grow impossible to hold the same there one moment without burning. And albeit somtime we terme it cold; yet we may not conceiue, that the same doth predominate, for this is a case impossible, but that the same consisteth not in such degree of heat as to his operation is behooffull.

In the cods, where the other part of the concupiscible maketh abode, the like reason taketh place, for the predomination of his naturall temperature is hot and drie. And if sometimes we say, that a mans cods are cold, we must not absolutely so vnderstand the same; neither to predomination: but that the degree of heat requisit for the generatiue vertue is wanting. Hereon we plainely inferre, that if a man be well compounded and instrumentalized, it behooueth of force, that hee haue excessiue heat in his heart; for otherwise the wrathfull facultie would grow verie remisse: and if the liuer be not exceeding hot, it cannot disgest the meat, nor make bloud for nourishment: and if the cods haue not more heat than cold, a man will prooue impotent, and without power of begetting. Wherefore these two members

(being of such force as we haue said) it followeth of necessitie, that the braine take alteration through much heat, which is one of the qualities that most paineth reason; and which is worst, the will being free, inciteth and enclineth it selfe to condiscend to the appetites of the lower portion.

By this reckoning it appeareth, that nature cannot fashion such a man as may be perfect in all his powers, nor produce him enclined to vertue. How repugnant it is vnto the nature of man, that he become inclined to vertue, is easily prooued, considering the composition of the first man, which though the most perfect that euer mankind enioyed, sauing that of Christ our redeemer, and shaped by the hands of so great an artificer; yet if God had not infused into him a supernaturall qualitie, which might keepe downe his inferiour part, it was impossible (abiding in the principles of his owne nature) that he should not be enclined to euill. And that God made *Adam* of a perfect power to wrath and concupiscence, is well to be vnderstood, in that he said and commaunded him, Encrease and multiplie, and to repleniſh the earth. It is certaine, that he gaue them an able power for procreation, and made them not of a cold complexion, in as much as he commaunded him, that he should people the earth with men; which worke cannot be accompliſhed without abundance of heat. And no lesse heat did he bestow vpon the facultie nutritiue: with which he was to restore his consumed substance, and renew another in lieu thereof. Seeing that he said to the man and the woman: Behold, I haue giuen you euerie hearbe that bringeth forth seed vpon the earth, and whatsoeuer trees haue seed of their kind, to the end they may serue you for food. For if God had giuen them a sto-

macke and liuer, cold, and of little heat, for certaine they could not haue digested their meat, nor preserue themselues 900 yeares aliue in the world. He fortified also the heart, and gaue the same a wrathfull facultie, which might yeeld him apt to be a king and lord, and to command the whole world, and said vnto them, Do you subdue the earth, and command ouer the fishes of the sea, and the foules of the aire, and all the beasts that mooue on the face of the earth. But if he had not giuen them much heat, they had not partaken so much viuacitie, nor authoritie of soueraigntie, of commandement, of glorie, of maiestie, and of honour.

How much it endammageth a Prince, to haue his wrathfull power remisse, cannot sufficiently be expressed: for thtough this only cause it befalleth, that he is not feared nor obeyed, nor reuerenced by his subiects. After hauing fortified the wrathfull and concupiscible powers, giuing vnto the forementioned members so much heat, he passed to the facultie reasonable, and shaped for the same a braine cold and moist, in such degree, and of a substance so delicat, that the soule might with the same discourse and philosophise, and vse his infused knowledge. For we haue alreadie auouched and heretofore prooued, that God to bestow a supernaturall knowledge vpon men, first ordereth their wit, and maketh them capable, by way of the naturall dispositions deliuered by his hand, that they may receiue the same: for which cause, the text of the holie Scripture affirmeth, that he gaue them a heart to conceiue, and repleniſhed them with the discipline of vnderstanding. The wrathfull and concupiscentiall powers, being then so mightie through great heat, and the reasonable so weake and remisse to resist, God made prouision of a supernaturall qualitie,

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and this is tearmed by the Diuines, Originall Iuſtice, by which they come to expreſſe the brunts of the inferiour portion, and the part reaſonable remaineth ſuperiour, and enclined to vertue. But when our firſt parents offended, they loſt this qualitie, and the irraſcible and concupiſcible remained in their nature, and ſuperiour to reaſon, in reſpect of the ſtrength of the three members that we ſpake of, and man reſted readie euen from his youth, vnto euill.

Adam was created in the age of youth, which (after the Phyſitions) is the moſt temperat of all the reſidue, and from that age foorth, he was enclined to euilneſſe, ſauing that little time whileſt he preſerued himſelf in grace by originall iuſtice. From this doctrine we gather in good naturall Philoſophie, that if a man be to performe anie action of vertue to the gaineſaying of the fleſh, it is impoſſible that he can put the ſame in execution, without outward aid of grace; for the qualities with which the inferiour power worketh, are of greater efficacie. I ſaid, with gainſaying of the fleſh, becauſe there are manie vertues in man, which grow, for that he hath his powers of wrath and concupiſcence feeble, as chaſtitie in a cold perſon; but this is rather an impotencie of operation, than a vertue: for which cauſe, had not the Catholicke Church taught vs, that without the ſpeciall aid of God, we could not haue ouercome our owne nature, Philoſophie naturall would ſo haue learned vs, namely, that grace comforteth our will. That then which *Galen* would haue ſayd, was, that a temperat man exceedeth in vertue all others who want this good temperature, for the ſame is leſſe prouoked by the inferiour part.

The fifth propertie which thoſe of this temperature poſſeſſe, is, to be verie long liued, for they are ſtrong to

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reſiſt the cauſes and occaſions which engender diſeaſes; and this was that which the royall Prophet *Dauid* meant, The dayes of our age in themſelues are ſeuentie yeares, but if in the Potentates there be eightie or more, it is their paine and ſorrow: as if he ſhould ſay, The number of yeares which men ordinarily doe liue, arriue vnto ſeuentie, and if Potentates reach vnto eightie, thoſe once paſſed, they are dead on their feet. He tearmeth thoſe men Potentates, who are of this temperature, for more than anie other they reſiſt the cauſes which abridge the life. *Galen* layeth downe the laſt token, ſaying, that they are verie wiſe, of great memorie for things paſſed, of great imagination to foreſee thoſe to come, and of great vnderſtanding to find out the truth of all matters. They are not malicious, not wily, not cauillers, for theſe ſpring from a temperature that is vicious. Such a wit as this aſſuredly was not framed by nature to addict it ſelfe vnto the ſtudie of the Latine tongue, Logicke, Philoſophie, Phiſicke, Diuinitie, or the Lawes: for put caſe he might eaſily attaine theſe ſciences, yet none of them can fullie repleniſh his capacitie; onely the office of a king is in proportion anſwerable thereunto, and in ruling and gouerning ought the ſame ſolely to be imployed. This ſhall eaſily be ſeene, if you run ouer the tokens and properties of a temperat man, which we haue laid down, by taking into conſideration, how fitly ech of them ſquareth with the royall ſcepter, and how impertinent they ſhew for the other arts and ſciences.

That a king be faire and gratious, is one of the things which moſt inuiteth his ſubiects to loue him and wiſh him well; For the obiect of loue (ſaith *Plato*) is beautie and a ſeemely proportion: and if a king be hardly fauoured, and badly ſhaped, it is impoſſible that his ſubiects

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can beare him affection, rather they reake it a ſhame, that a man vnperfect and void of the gifts of nature, ſhould haue ſway and commaundement ouer them. To be vertuous, and of good conditions, eaſily may wee gather how greatly it importeth; for he who ought to order the liues of his ſubiects, and deliuer vnto them rules and lawes to liue conformably to reaſon, it is requiſit that he performe the ſame alſo in his owne perſon: for as the king is, ſuch are the great, the meane, and the inferiour perſons.

Moreouer, by this meanes he ſhall make his commandements the more authenticall, and with the better title may chaſtiſe ſuch as doe not obſerue them. To enioy a perfection in all the powers which gouerne man, namely, the generatiue, nutritiue, wrathfull, and reaſonable, is more neceſſarie in a king, than in anie artiſt whatſoeuer. For (as *Plato* deliuereth) in a well ordered commonwealth, there ſhould be appointed certaine ſurueyours, who might with skill looke into the qualities of ſuch perſons as are to be married, and giue to him a wife anſwerable vnto him in proportion, and to euerie wife a conuenient husband. Through this diligence, the principall end of Matrimonie ſhould not become vaine; for wee ſee by experience, that a woman who could not conceiue of her firſt husband, marrying another, ſtraightwaies beareth children; and manie men haue no children by their firſt wife, taking another, ſpeedily come to be fathers.

Now this skill (ſaith *Plato*) is principally behooffull in the marriage of kings: for it being a matter of ſuch importance, for the peace and quiet of the kingdome, that the prince haue lawfull children to ſucceed in the eſtate, it may ſo fall, that the king marrying at all aduentures,

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ſhall take a barraine woman to wife, with whom he ſhall be combred all dayes of his life, without hope of iſſue. And if he deceaſe without heires of his bodie, ſtraightwayes it muſt be decided by ciuile wars, who ſhall commaund next after him. But *Hippocrates* ſaith, this art is neceſſarie for men that are diſtemperat, and not for thoſe who partake this perfect temperature by vs deſcribed. Theſe need no ſpeciall choice in their wife, nor to ſearch out which may anſwere them in proportion; for whom ſoeuer they marry withall (ſaith *Galen*) forthwith they beget iſſue: but this is vnderſtood, when the wife is ſound, and of the age wherein women by order of nature may conceiue aud bring foorth: in ſort, that fruitfulneſſe is more requiſit in a king than in anie artiſt whatſoeuer, for the reaſons tofore alleaged.

The nutritiue power (ſaith *Galen*) if the ſame be gluttonous, greedie, and bibbing, it ſpringeth, for that the liuer and ſtomack want the temperature which is requiſit for their operations: and for this cauſe men become riotous and ſhort liued. But if theſe members poſſeſſe their due temperature and compoſition, the ſelfe *Galen* affirmeth, that they couet no greater quantitie of meat and drinke than is conuenient for preſeruation of life. Which propertie is of ſo great importance for a king, that God holdeth that land for bleſſed, to whoſe lot ſuch a prince befalleth. Bleſſed is the land (ſaith he in *Eccleſiaſticus*) whoſe king is noble, and whoſe princes feed in due times for their refreſhment, and not for riotouſneſſe. Of the wrathfull facultie, if the ſame be extended or remiſſe, it is a token (ſaith *Galen*) that the heart is ill compoſed, and partaketh not that temperature which is requiſit for his operations. From which two extreames a king ought to be farther diſtant than anie other artiſt: for to ioyne wrath-

wrathfulneſſe with much power maketh finally for the ſubiects auaile. And as illy fitteth it for a king to haue his wrathfull power remiſſe: for if he ſlightly ſlip ouer bad parts and attempts in his kingdome, he groweth out of awe and reuerence amongſt his ſubiects? whence great dammages and verie difficult to be remedied, doe accuſtomably ariſe in the common-wealth. But the man who is temperat, groweth diſpleaſed vpon good ground, and can pacifie himſelfe as is requiſit: which propertie is as neceſſarie to be ſetled in a king, as anie of theſe which we haue before remembred. How much it importeth, that the facultie reaſonable, the imagination, the memorie, and the vnderſtanding, be of greater perfection in a king than in anie other, is eaſily to be prooued: for the other arts and ſciences (as it ſeemeth) may be obtained and put in practiſe by the force of mans wit: but to gouern a kingdome, and to preſerue the ſame in peace and concord, not onely requireth, that the king be endowed with a naturall wiſdome to execute the ſame: but it is alſo neceſſarie, that God particularly aſſiſt him with his vnderſtanding, and aid him in gouerning: whence it was well noted in the Scripture, The heart of the king is in the hand of God. To liue alſo manie yeares, and to enioy continuall health, is a propertie more conuenient for a good king than for anie other Artiſan. For his induſtrie and trauell, breedeth an vniuerſall good to all: and if he faile to hold out in healthfulneſſe, the commonwealth falleth to ruine.

All this doctrine here laid downe by vs, will be euidently confirmed, if we can find in anie hiſtorie, that at anie time there was anie king choſen, in whom anie of thoſe tokens and conditions by vs recited, were not wanting. And truth hath this as peculiar to her nature,

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that she neuer lacketh arguments, whereby to be confirmed.

The diuine Scripture recounteth, that God falling in dislike with *Saul*, for that he had spared *Amalecks* life; commanded *Samuel*, that he should go to Bethleem, and annoint for king of Israel one of the eight sonnes of *Iesse*. Now the holie man presuming, that God had a liking to *Eliab*, for that he was tall of stature, demanded of him; Is this man, here in the presence of my Lord, his Christ? to which question he was answered in this manner, Take not regard to his countenance, nor to the talnesse of his stature, for I haue refused him: I iudge not man by his looke, for man seeth the things outwardly apparent, but the Lord discerneth the heart. As if God should say: Marke not (O *Samuel*) the high stature of *Eliab*, nor that manly countenance which thou beholdest: for I haue tried that in *Saul*. You men iudge by the outward signes, but I cast mine eye vpon the iudgement and wisedome, wherewith a people is to be gouerned.

Samuel mistrusting his owne skill in chusing, passed on farther in the charge which was commanded him; asking still of God, vpon euery one, which of them he should annoint for king: and because God held himselfe contented with none of them, he said vnto *Iesse*; hast thou yet no more sonnes but those who stand before vs? Who answered, saying; That he had yet one more, who kept his beasts, but he was of little growth: him seeming, that therefore he was not sufficient to weeld the royall scepter. But *Samuel* now wisted, that a great stature was no sure token, caused him to be sent for. And it is a point worth the noting, that the holie Scripture before it expressed how he was annointed king, said in this manner; But he was abourne haired, and of a faire coun-

countenance, and a visage well shaped, arise and annoint him, for this is he. In sort, that *Dauid* had the two first tokens, of those which we recounted, abourne haired, handsome shaped, and of meane stature. To bee vertuous and well conditioned, which is the third signe, easily we may conceiue, that he was therewithall endowed, seeing that God said; I haue found a man after my heart: for albeit he sinned sundrie times, yet for all that, he lost not the name and habite of vertue. Euen as one by habite vicious, though he performe some good morrall workes, doth not therefore leese the name of lewd and vicious. That he led all the course of his life in health, it should seeme may be prooued; becausе in his whole historie mention is made of his sickneſſe but once (and this is a naturall disposition of all such as are long liued.) Now becausе his naturall heat was resolued, and that he could not take heat in his bed; to remedie this, they couched a verie faire Ladie by his side, who might foster him with heat. And herethrough he liued so manie yeares, that the text saith, he deceasеd in good age, full of dayes, of riches, and of glorie: as if it should say, *Dauid* died in a good old age, full of daies, of riches, and of glorie; hauing endured so manie trauailes in the wars, and vndergone great penance for his transgressions. And this grew, for that he was temperat, and of a good complexion: for he refusеd the occasions, which accustomably breed infirmitie and shortening of mans life. His great wisedome and knowledge was noted by that seruant of *Saul*, when he said; My lord, I know a cunning musition, the son of *Ieſſe*, born in *Bethleem*, couragious in fight, wise in discourse, and of seemely countenance. By which tokens (aboue specified) it is manifest, that *Dauid* was a temperat man, and to such is the royall scepter belonging:

ging: for his wit is of the best mould that nature could fashion. But there presenteth it selfe a verie great difficultie against this doctrine, namely; seeing God knew all the wits and abilities of Israel, and likewise wist, that temperat men are seized of the wisdome and knowledge requisit to the calling of a king: for what cause in the first election that he made, hee sought not out a man of this sort? Nay the text auoucheth, that *Saul* was so tall of stature, as he passed all the residue of Israel, by the head and shoulders. And this signe is not only an euill token of wit in naturall Philosophie, but euen God himselfe (as wee haue proued) reproued *Samuel*, because (mooued by the high growth of *Eliab*) he thereupon would haue made him king. But this doubt declareth that to be true, which *Galen* said, that out of Greece we shall not (so much as in a dreame) find out a temperat man, Seeing in a people so large (as that of Israel) God could not find one to chuse for a king: but it behooued him to tarrie till *Dauid* was growne vp, and the while made choice of *Saul*. For the text saith, that he was the best of Israel: but verely it seemed hee had more good nature than wisdome, and that was not sufficient to rule and gouerne. Teach me (saith the Psalme) goodnesse, discipline, and knowledge. And this the royall Prophet *Dauid* spake, seeing that it auaileth not for a king to be good and vertuous, vnlesse hee ioyne wisdome and knowledge therewithall. By this example of king *Dauid*, it seemeth we haue sufficiently approoued our opinion.

But there was also another king borne in Israel, of whom it was said, Where is he that is borne king of the Iewes? And if we can prooue, that he was abourne haired, towardly, of meane bigneſſe, vertuous, healthfull, and of great wisdome and knowledge, it will be no way

damageable to this our doctrine. The Euangelists busied not themselues, to report the disposition of Christ our redeemer: for it serued not to the purpose of that which they handled, but is a matter which may easily be vnderstood, supposing that for a man to bee temperat, as is requisit, compriseth all the perfection wherewith naturally he can be endowed. And seeing that the holy spirit compounded and instrumentalized him, it is certaine, that as touching the materiall cause, of which he formed him, the distemperature of Nazareth could not resist him, nor make him erre in his worke, as doe the other naturall agents: but hee performed what him best pleased: for hee wanted neither force, knowledge, nor will, to frame a man most perfect, and without any defect. And that so much the rather, for that his comming (as himselfe affirmed) was to endure trauels for mans sake, and to teach him the truth. And this temperature (as we haue before prooued) is the best naturall instrument that can be found for these two things. Wherethrough I hold that relation for true, which *Publius Lentulus*, vice-Consull, wrote from Hierusalem vnto the Roman Senat after this manner.

There hath beene seene in our time, a man who yet liueth, of great vertue, called Iesus Christ, who by the Gentiles is tearmed the Prophet of truth, and his disciples say, that he is the sonne of God. He raiseth the deceased, and healeth the diseased, is a man of meane and proportionable stature, and of very faire countenance, his looke carrieth such a maiestie, as those who behold him, are enforced both to loue and feare him. He hath his haire coloured like a nut full ripe, reaching downe to his eares; and from his eares to his shoulders they are of wax colour, but more bright: hee hath in the middle

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of his forehead a locke, after the manner of Nazareth: his forehead is plaine, but very pleasing: his face void of spot or wrinckle, accompanied with a moderat colour: his nosthrils and mouth cannot by any with reason bee reprooued, his beard thicke, and resembling his haire, not long, but forked; his countenance very gratious and graue, his eies gracefull and cleere; and when he rebuketh, he daunteth; and when he admonisheth, he pleaseth: he maketh himselfe to be beloued, and is cheerefull with grauitie: he hath neuer beene seene to laugh, but to weepe diuers times: his hand and armes are very faire: in his conuersation he contenteth very greatly, but is seldome in companie: but being in companie, is very modest: in his countenance and port he is the seemeliest man that may be imagined. In this relation are contained three or foure tokens of a temperat person.

The first, that he had his haire and beard of the colour of a nut fully ripe: which to him that considereth it well, appeareth to be a browne abourne; which colour God commaunded the heifer should haue, which was to bee sacrificed as a figure of Christ. And when he entred into heauen with that triumph and maiestie which was requisit for such a prince: some Angels who had not beene enformed of his incarnation, said, Who is this that commeth from Edon, with his garments died in Bozra? as if they had said, Who is he that commeth from the red Land, with his garment stained in the same die? in respect of his haire and his red beard, and of the blood with which he was tainted. The same letter also reporteth him to be the fairest man that euer was seene, and this is the second token of a temperat person, and so was it prophesied by the holy scripture as a signe whereby to know him. Of faire shape aboue all the children of men. And

in another place hee saith, His eyes are fairer than the wine, and his teeth whiter than milke. Which beautie and good disposition of bodie imported much to effect, that all men should beare him affection, and that there might be nothing in him worthie to be abhorred. For which cause, the letter deliuereth, that all men were enforced to loue him. It reciteth also, that he was meane of personage, and that not because the holy Ghost wanted matter to make him greater, if so it had seemed good: but (as we tofore haue prooued by the opinion of *Plato* and *Aristotle*) because when the reasonable soule is burdened with much bones and flesh, the same incurreth great dammage in his wit.

The third signe, namely, to be vertuous and well conditioned, is likewise expressed in this letter, and the Iewes themselues with all their false witnesses, could not proue the contrarie, nor replie when hee demanded of them, Which of you can reprooue me of sinne? And *Ioseph* (through the faithfulnesse which he owed to his historie) affirmed of him, that he partaked of another nature aboue man, in respect of his goodnesse and wisdome. Only long life could not be verified of Christ our redeemer, because they put him to death being yong; whereas if they had permitted him to finish his naturall course, the same would haue reached to 80 yeares and vpwards. For he who could abide in a wildernesse fortie daies and fortie nights without meat or drinke, and not be sicke nor dead therewithall, could better haue defended himselfe from other lighter things, which had power to breed alteration or offence. Howbeit this action was reputed miraculous, and a matter which could not light within the compasse of nature.

These two examples of kings, which we haue alleaged

ged, sufficeth to make vnderstood, that the scepter royall is due to men that are temperate; and that such are endowed with the wit and wisdome requisit for that office. But there was also another man, made by the proper hands of God, to the end he should be king and Lord of all things created, & he made him faire, vertuous, sound, of long life, and very wise: and to prooue this, shall not be amisse for our purpose. *Plato* holdeth it for a matter impossible, that God or Nature can make a man temperat in a countrie distemperat: wherethrough he affirmeth, that God to create a man of great wisdome and temperature, sought out a place where the heat of the aire should not exceed the cold, nor the moist the drie. And the diuine Scripture, whence he borrowed this sentence, saith not, that God created *Adam* in the earthly paradise, which was that most temperat place whereof he speaketh; but that after hee had shaped him, there he placed him. Then our Lord God (saith he) tooke man, and set him in the paradise of pleasure, to the end hee might there worke and take it in charge. For the power of God being infinit, and his knowledge beyond measure, when hee had a will to giue him all the naturall perfection that might be in mankind; we must thinke, that neither the peece of earth of which he was framed, nor the distemperature of the soile of Damascus where he was created, could so gainesay him, but that he made him temperat. The opinion of *Plato*, of *Aristotle*, and of *Galen*, take place in the workes of nature: and euen shee also can sometimes (euen in distemperat regions) engender a person that shall be temperat. But that *Adam* had his haire and his beard abourne, which is the first token of a temperat man, manifestly appeareth. For in respect of this so notorious signe, he had that name *Adam*, which is to say (as

S. *Hierom* interpreteth it) a red man. That he was faire and well fashioned, which is the second token, cannot in him be denied: for when God created him, the text saith; God saw all things which hee had made, and they were very good. Then it falleth out certaine, that hee issued not from the hands of God foule and ill shaped: for the workes of God are perfect. And so much the more, for that the trees (as the text saith) were faire to behold. Then what may we thinke of *Adam*, whom God created to this principall end, that hee might be Lord and president of the world? That he was vertuous, wise, and well conditioned (which are the third and sixth signes) is gathered out of these words, Let vs make a man after our owne image and likenesse: for by the auntient Philosophers, the foundation on which the resemblance that man hath with God is grounded, are vertue and wisdom. Therefore *Plato* auoucheth, that one of the greatest contenments which God receiued in heauen, is to see a vertuous and wise man praised and magnified vpon earth: for such a one is his liuely pourtraiture. And contrariwise, he groweth displeased, when ignorant and vicious persons are held in estimation and honour: which springeth from the vnlikenesse betweene God and them. That he liued healthfull and a long space (which are the fourth and fifth tokens) is nothing difficult to prooue, in as much as his daies were 930 yeares. Where through I may now conclude, that the man who is abourn haired, faire, of meane stature, vertuous, healthfull, and long liued, must necessarily be very wise, and endowed with a wit requisit for the scepter royall.

We haue also (as by the way) disclosed, in what sort great vnderstanding may be vnited with much imagination, and much memorie, albeit this may also come to

passe;

passe, and yet the man not be temperat. But nature shapeth so few after this modell, that I could neuer find but two amongst all the wits that I haue tried: but how it can come to passe, that great vnderstanding may vnite with much imagination and much memorie, in a man not temperat, is a thing which easily may be conceiued, if you presuppose the opinion of some Phisitions, who affirme, that the imagination resideth in the forepart of the braine, the memorie in the hinder part, and the vnderstanding in that of the middle. And the like may be said in our imagination, but it is a worke of great labour, that the braine, being (when nature createth the same) of the bignesse of a graine of pepper, it should make one ventricle of seed very hot, another very moist, and the middlemost of very drie: but in fine this is no impossible case. (Your king & your selfe,)

CHAP. XV.

In what manner Parents may beget wise children, and of a wit fit for learning.

IT falleth out a matter worthie of maruaile, that nature being such as wee all know her, wise, wittie, and of great art, iudgement, and force; and mankind a worke of so speciall regard, yet for one whom shee maketh skilfull and wise, she produceth infinit depriued of wit. Of which effect my selfe searching the reason and naturall causes, haue found (in my iudgement) that parents apply not themselues to the act of generation with that order and concert which is by nature

 establisshed,

eſtabliſhed: neither know the conditions which ought to be obſerued, to the end their children may prooue of wiſedome and iudgement. For by the ſame reaſon, for which in any temperat or diſtemperat region a man ſhould be borne very wittie (hauing alwaies regard to the ſelfe order of cauſes) there will 100000 prooue of ſlender capacitie: now if by art we may procure a remedie for this, we ſhall haue brought to the commonwealth the greateſt benefit that ſhe can receiue. But the knot of this matter conſiſteth, in that we cannot entreat hereof with tearmes ſo ſeemely and modeſt, as to the naturall ſhamefaſtneſſe of man is requiſit: and if for this reaſon I ſhould forbeare to note any part or contemplation that is neceſſarie, for certaine the whole matter would be marred, in ſort that diuers graue Philoſophers hold opinion, how wiſe men ordinarily beget fooliſh children, becauſe in the act of copulation, for honeſties ſake, they abſtaine from certaine diligences which are of importance, that the ſonne may partake of his fathers wiſedome. Some antient Philoſophers haue laboured to ſearch out the naturall reaſon of this naturall ſhame, which the eyes conceiue when the inſtruments of generation are ſet before them; and why the eares take offence to heare them named: and they maruell to ſee, that nature hath framed thoſe parts with ſuch diligence and carefulneſſe, and for an end of ſuch importance, as the immortalizing of mankind, and yet the wiſer a man is, the more hee groweth in diſlike to behold or heare them ſpoken of. Shame and honeſtie (ſaith *Ariſtotle*) is the proper paſſion of the vnderſtanding, and who ſo refuſeth not offended at thoſe tearmes and actions of generation, giueth a ſure token of his wanting that power, as if we ſhould ſay, that hee is blockiſh, who putting his

hand

hand into the fire, doth not feele the same to burne. By this token *Cato* the elder discouered, that *Manilius* (a noble man) was depriued of vnderstanding, because it was told him, that the other kissed his wife in presence of his daughter; for which cause hee displaced him out of the Senat, and *Manilius* could neuer obtaine at his hands to be restored.

Out of this contemplation, *Aristotle* frameth a probleme, demaunding whence it grew, that men who desire to satisfie their venerous lusts, doe yet greatly shame to confesse it, and yet coueting to liue, to eat, or to performe any other such action, they stagger not to acknowledge it? to which probleme he shapeth a very vntoward answere, saying; Perhaps it commeth, because the couetings of diuers things are necessarie, and some of them kill, if they be not accomplished, but the lust of venerous acts floweth from excesse, and is token of abundance. But in effect this probleme is false, and the answer none other: for a man not onely shameth to manifest the desire hee carrieth to companie with a woman, but also to eat, to drinke, and to sleepe; and if a will take him to send foorth any excrement, he dares not say it or doe it, but with cumber and shamefastnesse, and so gets him to some secret place out of sight. Yea, we find men so shamefast, as though they haue a great will to make water, yet cannot doe it if any looke vpon them, whereas if we leaue them alone, straightwaies the vrine taketh his issue. And these are the appetites to send foorth the superfluous things of the bodie, which if they were not effected, men should die, and that much sooner, than with forbearing meat or drink. And if there be any (saith *Hippocrates*) who speaketh or actuateth this in the presence of another, hee is not maister of his sound iudgement. *Galen* affirmeth, that

that the ſeed holdeth the ſemblable proportion with the ſeed veſſels, as the vrine doth with the bladder: for as much vrine annoyeth the bladder, ſo much ſeed endammageth the ſeed veſſels. And the opinion which *Ariſtotle* held, in denying that man and woman incur no infirmitie or death by retaining of ſeed, is contrarie to the iudgement of all Phiſitions, and eſpecially of *Galen*, who ſaith and auoucheth, that many women remaining widdowes in their youth, that there through loſt their ſence, motion, breathing, and finally their life. And the ſelfe *Ariſtotle* reckoneth vp many diſeaſes whereunto continent perſons are ſubiect in that behalfe. The true anſwere of this probleme cannot bee yeelded in naturall Philoſophie, becauſe it is not marſhalled vnder her iuriſdiction; for it behoueth to paſſe to an higher, namely Metaphiſicke, wherein *Ariſtotle* ſaith, That the reaſonable ſoule is the loweſt of all the intelligences, and for that it partaketh of the ſame generall nature with the Angels, it ſhameth to behold it ſelfe placed in a bodie which hath fellowſhip with brute beaſts: wherethrough the diuine Scripture noteth it as a myſterie, that the firſt man being naked, was not aſhamed, but ſo ſoone as he ſaw himſelfe to be ſo, forthwith he got a couering. At which time he knew, that through his owne fault hee had loſt immortalitie, and that his bodie was become ſubiect to alteration and corruption, and thoſe inſtruments and parts giuen him for that of neceſſitie hee muſt die and leaue another in his roome, and that to preſerue himſelfe in life that ſmall ſpace which reſted, it behooued him to eat and drinke, and to expell thoſe noiſome and corrupt excrements. And principally he ſhamed, ſeeing that the Angels, with whom hee had competence, were immortall, and ſtood not in need of eating, drinking, or ſleeping,

An high ſpeculation.

ping, for preseruation of their life: neither had the instruments of generation, but were created all at once, without matter, and without feare of corrupting. Of all these points were the eyes and the eares naturally done to ware. Where through the reasonable soule groweth displeased and ashamed, that these things giuen man to make him mortall and corruptible, are thus brought to his memorie. And that this is a well fitting answere, we euidently perceiue: for God to content the soule after the vniuersall iudgement, and to bestow vpon him entire glorie, will cause that her bodie shall partake the properties of an Angell, bestowing thereupon subtlenesse, lightnesse, immortalitie, and brightnesse: for which reason, he shall not stand in need to eat or drinke as the brute beasts. And when men shall thus-wise dwell in heauen, they will not shame to behold themselues clothed with flesh, euen as Christ our redeemer, and his mother, nothing shamed thereat. But it will breed an accidentall glorie, to see that the vse of those parts which were wont to offend the hearing and the eyes, is now surceased. I therefore making due reckoning of this naturall modestie of the eare, haue endeuoured to salue the hard and rough tearmes of this matter, and to fetch certain, not ill pleasing biasses of speech; and where I cannot throughly performe it, the honest reader shall affoord me pardon. For to reduce to a perfect manner the art which must be obserued, to the end men may prooue of rare capacities, is one of the things most requisit for the commonwealth. Besides that, by the same reason they shall proue vertuous, prompt, sound, and long liued.

Note here a signe which sheweth the immortalitie of the soule.

I haue thought good to seuer the matter of this chapter into foure principall parts, that thereby I may make plaine what shall be deliuered; and that the reader may not

not reſt in confuſion. The firſt is, to ſhew the naturall qualities and temperature which man and woman ought to poſſeſſe, to the end they may vſe generation. The ſecond, what diligence the parents ought to employ, that their children may be male and not female. The third, how they may become wiſe and not fooles. The fourth, how they are to be dealt withall after their birth, for preſeruation of their wit.

To come then to the firſt point wee haue alreadie alleaged, that *Plato* laieth downe, how in a well ordered commonwealth there ought to be aſſigned certaine ſurueyors of marriages, who by art might skill, to looke into the qualities of the perſons that are to bee married, and to giue each one the wife which anſwereth him in proportion, and to euery wife her conuenient husband. In which matter, *Hippocrates* & *Galen* began to take ſome pains, and preſcribed certaine precepts & rules, to know what woman is fruitfull, and who can beare no children; and what man is vnable for generation, and who able and likely to beget iſſue. But touching all this, they vttered verie little, and that not with ſuch diſtinction as was behooffull, at leaſt for the purpoſe which I haue in hand. Therefore it falleth out neceſſarie, to begin the art euen from his principles, and briefly to giue the ſame his due order and concert, that wee ſo may make plaine and apparant, from what vnion of parents wiſe children iſſue; and from what, fooles and do noughts: To which end it behoooueth firſt to know a particular point of Philoſophie; which although in regard of the practiſes of the art it bee very manifeſt and true, yet the vulgar make little reake thereof. And from the notice of this dependeth all that, which as touching this firſt point, is to bee deliuered: and that is, that man (though it ſeeme otherwiſe

wise in the composition which we see) is different from a woman in nought els (saith *Galen*) than only in hauing his genitall members without his bodie. For if we make anotomie of a woman, we shall find that she hath within her two stones, two vessels for seed, and her bellie of the same frame as a mans member, without that any one part is therein wanting. And this is so very true, that if when Nature hath finished to forme a man in all perfection, shee would conuert him into a woman, there needeth nought els to bee done, saue onely to turne his instruments of generations inward. And if she haue shaped a woman, and would make a man of her, by taking forth her belly and her cods, it would quickly be performed. This hath chanced many times in nature, as well whiles the creature hath been in the mothers wombe, as after the same was borne, whereof the histories are full; but some haue held them only for fables, because this is mentioned in the Poets, yet the thing carrieth meere truth: for diuers times nature hath made a female child, and she hath so remained in her mothers bellie for the space of one or two months: and afterwards, plentie of heat growing in the genitall members, vpon some occasion they haue issued forth, and she become a male. To whom this transformation hath befallen in the mothers wombe, is afterwards plainly discouered, by certaine motions which they retaine, vnfitting for the masculine sex, being altogether womanish, & their voice shrill & sweet. And such persons are enclined to performe womens actions, and fall ordinarily into vncouth offences. Contrariwise; Nature hath sundrie times made a male with his genetories outward, and cold growing on, they haue turned inward, and it became female. This is knowne after she is borne, for she retaineth a manniſh fashion, as

well

well in her words, as in all her motions and workings. This may seeme difficult to be prooued, but considering that which many authenticall Historians affirme, it is a matter not hard to be credited. And that women haue beene turned into men, after they were borne, the verie vulgar doe not much maruell to heare spoke of: for besides that which sundrie our elders haue laid downe for truth, it fell in Spaine but few yeares since; and that whereof we find experience, is not to be called in question or argument. What then the cause may be, that the genitall members are engendred within or without and the creature becommeth male or female, will fall out a plaine case, if we once know that heat extendeth and enlargeth all things, and cold retaineth and closeth them vp. Wherethrough it is a conclusion of all Philosophers and Phisitions, that if the seed be cold and moist, a woman is begotten, and not a man; and if the same be hot and drie, a man is begotten and not a woman. Whence we apparantly gather, that there is no man, who in respect of a woman, may be termed cold; nor woman hot, in respect of a man.

Aristotle saith, it is necessarie for a woman to be cold and moist, that she may be likewise fruitfull: for if she were not so, it would fall out impossible, that her monthly course should flow, or she haue milke to preserue the child nine moneths in her bellie, and two yeares after it is borne, but that the same would soone wast and consume.

All Philosophers and Phisitions auouch, that the bellie holdeth the same proportion with mans seed, that the earth doth with corne, and with any other againe. And we see, that if the earth want coldnesse and moisture, the husbandmen dareth not sow therein, neither will the

seed

ſeed proſper. But of ſoiles, thoſe are moſt fruitfull and fertile in rendering fruit, which partake moſt of cold and moiſt. As we ſee by experience in the regions towards the North: as England, Flanders, and Almaine, whoſe abundance of all fruits worketh aſtoniſhment in ſuch as know not the reaſon thereof. And in ſuch countries as theſe, no married woman was euer childleſſe; neither can they there tell what barreneſſe meaneth, but are all fruitfull, and breed children through their abundance of coldneſſe and moiſture. But though it is true, that the woman ſhould be cold and moiſt for conception, Yet ſhe may abound ſo much therein, that it may choke the ſeed; euen as we ſee exceſſe of raine ſpoileth the corne, which cannot ripen in ouermuch coldneſſe. Whereon wee muſt conceiue, that theſe two qualities ought to keepe a certaine meaſurableneſſe, which when they exceed, or reach not vnto, the fruitfulneſſe is ſpoiled. *Hippocrates* holdeth that woman for fruitfull, whoſe wombe is tempered in ſuch ſort, as the heat exceedeth not the cold, nor the moiſt the drie. Wherethrough hee ſaith, that thoſe women who haue their bellie cold, cannot conceiue, no more than ſuch as are very moiſt, or very cold and drie. But ſo, for the ſame reaſon that a woman and her genitall parts ſhould be temperat; it were impoſſible that ſhe could conceiue, or be a woman. For if the ſeed, of which ſhe was firſt formed, had beene temperat, the genitall members would haue iſſued forth, and ſhee haue beene a man. So ſhould a beard grow on her chin, and her floures ſurceaſe, and ſhe become as perfect a man, as nature could produce. Likewiſe the wombe in a woman cannot be predominately hot: For if the ſeed whereof ſhe was engendred had beene of that temperature, ſhe ſhould haue beene borne a man, and not a woman.

You are much miſtaken.

man. This is past all exception, that the qualities which yeeld a woman fruitfull, are cold and moisture: for the nature of man standeth in need of much nourishment, that hee may be able to vse procreation, and continue his kind. Wherethrough we see, that amongst all the females of brute beasts, none haue their monthly courses as a woman. Therefore it was requisit to make her altogither cold and moist, and that in such a degree, as that she might breed much flegmaticke bloud, and not be able to wast or consume the same. I said flegmaticke bloud, because this is seruiceable to the breeding of milke; by which *Hippocrates* and *Galen* auouch, the creature is relieued all the time it remaineth in the mothers bellie. Now if the same should be temperat, it would produce much bloud, vnfit for the engendering of milke, and would wholly resolue, as it doth in a temperat man, and so nothing be left for nourishing the babe. Therefore I hold it for certaine, and verily it is impossible that a woman can be temperat or hot; but they are all cold and moist. And if this be not so, let the Philosopher or Phisition tell me, for what cause all women are beardlesse, and haue their sickenesse whiles they are healthfull, and for what cause the seed of which she was formed, being temperat or hot, she was borne a woman, and not a man? Howbeit, though it bee true that they are all cold and moist: yet it followeth not, that they are all in one degree of coldnesse and moisture. For some are in the first, some in the second, and some in the third; and in each of these they may conceiue, if a man answere them in proportion of heat, as shall hereafter be expressed. By what tokens wee may know these three degrees of coldnesse and moisture in a woman, and likewise weet who is in the first, who is in the second, and who in the third:

there

there is no Philosopher or Phisition, that as yet hath vnfolded. But considering the effects which these qualities doe worke in women, we may part them, by reason of their being extended, and so wee shall easily get notice hereof. The first, by the wit and habilitie of the woman. The second, by her manners and conditions. The third, by her voice big or small. The fourth, by her flesh, much or little. The fifth, by her colour. The sixt, by her haire. The seuenth, by her faireneſſe or fouleneſſe. As touching the first, we may know, that though it be true (as tofore we haue prooued) that the wit and abilitie of a woman followeth the temperature of the brain, and of none other member: yet her wombe and cods are of so great force and vigour, to alter the whole bodie, that if these be hot and drie, or cold and moist, or of whatsoeuer other temperature, the other parts (saith *Galen*) will be of the same tenour: but the member which most partaketh the alterations of the bellie, all Phisitions say, is the braine, though they haue not set downe the reason whereon they ground this correspondencie. True it is, *Galen* prooueth by experience, that by speying a Sow, she becommeth faire and fat, and her flesh verie sauourie: and if she haue her cods, shee tasteth little better than dogs flesh. Whereby we conceiue, that the belly and the cods carrie great efficacie, to communicat their temperature to all the other parts of the bodie; especially to the brain, for that the same is cold and moist like themselues. Betweene which (through the resemblance) the passage is easie.

Now if we conclude, that cold and moist are the qualities which worke an impairement in the reasonable part; and that his contraries, namely, hot and drie, giue the same perfection and encreasement, we shall find, that

the woman who sheweth much wit and sufficiencie, partaketh of cold and moist in the first degree; and if she be verie simple, it yeeldeth a signe that she is in the third, the partaking betweene which two extreames, argueth the second degree: for to thinke that a woman can be hot and drie, or endowed with a wit and abilitie conformable to these two qualities, is a verie great errour; because if the seed of which she was formed, had been hot and drie in their domination, she should haue been borne a man, and not a woman. But in that it was cold and moist, she was borne a woman, and not a man. The truth of this doctrine may cleerely be discerned, if you consider the wit of the first woman who liued in the world: for God hauing fashioned her with his owne hands, and that verie accomplished, and perfect in her sex, it is a conclusion infallibly true, that she was possessed of much lesse knowledge than *Adam*: which the Diuell well weeting, got him to tempt her, and durst not fall into disputation with the man, fearing his great wit and wisdome. Now to say, that *Eue* for her offence, was reft that knowledge which we wanted, cannot be auouched, for as yet she had not offended.

So then this defect of wit in the first woman grew, for that she was by God created cold and moist: which temperature, is necessarie to make a woman fruitfull and apt for childbirth, but enemie to knowledge: and if he had made her temperat like *Adam*, she should haue beene verie wise, nothing fruitfull, nor subiect to her monthly courses, saue by some supernaturall meanes. On this nature S. *Paul* grounded himselfe, when he said, Let a woman learne in silence, with all subiection: neither would he allow the woman to teach, or gouerne the man, but to keepe silence. But this is true, when a woman

man hath not a ſpirit or greater grace than her owne naturall diſpoſition: but if ſhe obtaine any gift from aboue, ſhe may well teach and ſpeake, for we know that the people of Iſrael being oppreſſed and beſieged by the Aſſirians; *Iudith* (a verie wiſe woman) ſent for the prieſts of the *Cabeits* and *Carmits*, and reproued them, ſaying: How can it be endured, that *Oſias* ſhould ſay, if within fiue dayes there come no ſuccour, he will yeeld the people of Iſrael to the Aſſyrians? See you not, that theſe words rather prouoke God to wrath than to mercie? how may it be, that men ſhould point out a limitted time for the mercie of God, and in their mind aſſigne a day, at which he muſt ſuccour and deliuer them? And in the concluſion of this reproofe, ſhe told him in what ſort they might pleaſe God, and obtaine their demaund. And no leſſe *Elbora*, (a woman of no leſſe wiſedome) taught the people of Iſraell, how they ſhould render thankes vnto God for the great victories which ſhe had attained againſt their enemies. But whileſt a woman abideth in her naturall diſpoſition, all ſorts of learning and wiſdome carrieth a kind of repugnancie to her wit. And for this cauſe, the Catholicke Church vpon great reaſon hath forbidden, that no woman doe preach, confeſſe, or inſtruct: for their ſex admitteth neither wiſdome nor diſcipline.

It is diſcouered alſo by the manners of a woman, and by her condition, in what degree of cold and moiſt her temperature conſiſteth: for if with a ſharp wit ſhe be froward, curſt, and wayward, ſhe is in the firſt degree of cold and moiſt, it being true (as we haue prooued tofore) that an ill condition euermore accompanieth a good imagination. She who partaketh this degree of cold and moiſt, ſuffereth nothing to eſcape her hands, noteth all things,

findeth fault with all things, and so is vnsupportable. Such are accustomably of amiable conuersation, and feare not to looke men in the face, nor hold him ill mannered, who maketh loue vnto them. But on the other side, to be a woman of good conditions, and to be aggreeued at nothing, to laugh vpon euery small occasion, to let things passe as they come, and to sleepe soundly, describeth the third degree of cold and moist: for much pleasantnesse of conceit is ordinarily accompanied with little wit. She who partaketh of these two extreames, standeth in the second degree. A voice hoarse, big, and sharpe (saith *Galen*) is a token of much heat and drouth, and wee haue also prooued it heretofore by the opinion of *Aristotle*, wherethrough we may gaine this notice, that if a woman haue a voice like a man, she is cold and moist in the first degree, and if verie delicate, in the third: and partaking betwixt both the extreames, she shall haue the naturall voice of a woman, and bee in the second degree.

How much the voice dependeth on the temperature of the cods, shall shortly hereafter bee prooued, where we entreat of the tokens appertaining to a man. Much flesh also in women, is a signe of much cold and moist: for to bee fat and big (sayth the Phisitions) groweth in liuing creatures from this occasion. And contrariwise, to be leane and drie, is a token of little coldnesse and moisture. To be meanely fleshed, that is, neither ouermuch, nor verie little, giueth euidence, that a woman holdeth her selfe in the second degree of cold and moist. Their pleasantnesse and courtesies sheweth the degrees of these two qualities: much moisture maketh their flesh supple and little, rough and hard. The meane is the commendablest part: the colour also of the face,

and

and of the other parts of the bodie, discouereth the extended or remisse degrees of these two qualities. When the woman is verie white, it boadeth (saith *Galen*) much cold and moist: and contrariwise, she that is swart and browne, is in the first degree thereof; of which two extreames is framed the second degree of white and well coloured.

To haue much haire, and a little shew of a beard, is an euident signe to know the first degree of cold and moist: for all Phisitions affirme, that the haire and beard are engendred of heat and drinesse: and if they be blacke, it greatly purporteth the same. A contrarie temperature is betokened, when a woman is without haire. Now she whose complexion consisteth in the second degree of cold and moist, hath some haire, but the same reddish and golden. Foulenesse moreouer and faireneſſe helpe vs to iudge the degrees of cold and moist in women. It is a miracle to see a woman of the first degree verie faire: for the seed whereof she was formed, being drie, hindereth that she cannot be fairely countenanced. It behoooueth that clay be seasoned with conuenient moisture, to the end vessels may be well framed, and serue to vse: but when that same is hard and drie, the vessell is foule and vnhandsome.

Aristotle farther auoucheth, that ouermuch cold and moist maketh women by nature foule: for if the seed be cold and verie moist, it can take no good figure, because the same standeth not togither, as wee see, that of ouer soft clay ill shaped vessels are fashioned. In the second degree of cold and moist, women prooue verie faire; for they were formed of a substance well seasoned, and pleasant to nature: which token of it selfe alone afoordeth an euident argument, that the woman is fruit-

full: for it is certaine that nature could do it, and we may iudge, that she gaue her a temperature and composition fit for bearing of children. Wherethrough she answers in proportion (welneere) to all men, and all men doe desire to haue her.

In man there is no power which hath tokens or signes to descrie the goodnesse, or malice of his obiect. The stomacke knoweth the meat by way of tast, of smelling, and of sight, wherethrough the diuine scripture saith, That *Eue* fixed her eyes on the tree forbidden, and her seemed that it was sweet in tast. The facultie of generation, holdeth for a token of fruitfulnesse, a womans beautie; and if she be foule, it abhorreth her, conceiuing by this signe, that nature erred, and gaue her not a fit temperature for bearing of children.

By what signes we may know, in what degree of hot and dry euery man resteth.

§. 1.

A Man hath not his temperature so limited as a woman, for he may be hot and drie (which temperature *Aristotle* and *Galen* held, was that which best agreed with his sex) as also hot and moist and temperat? but cold and moist, and cold and drie, they would not admit whilst a man was sound and without impairment: for as you shall find no woman hot and drie, nor hot and moist, or temperat? so shall you find no man cold and moist, nor cold and drie, in comparison of women, vnlesse in case as I shall now expresse. A man hot and drie, and hot and moist, and temperat, holdeth the same degrees in his temperature, as doth a woman in cold and moist: and so it behoueth to haue certain tokens,

kens, whereby to discerne what man is in what degree, that we may assigne him a wife answerable vnto him in proportion. We must therefore weet, that from the same principles, of which wee gathered vnderstanding what woman is hot and drie, and in what degree, from the selfe wee must also make vse to vnderstand what man is hote and drie, and in what degree: and because we sayd, that from the wit and manners of a man we coniecture the temperature of his cods, it is requisit that wee take notice of a notable point mentioned by *Galen*, namely, that to make vs vnderstand the great vertue which a mans cods possesse to giue firmnesse and temperature to all the parts of the bodie, he affirmeth that they are of more importance than the heart: and he rendereth a reason, saying, that this member is the beginning of life, and nought else, but the cods are the beginning of liuing soundly and without infirmities. How much it endammageth a man to be depriued of those parts (though so small) there need not manie reasons to prooue, seeing we see by experience, that forthwith the haire and the beard pill away, and the big and shrill voice becommeth small, and herewithall a man leeseth his forces and naturall heat, and resteth in far woorse and more miserable condition, than if he had bene a woman. But the matter most worth the noting is, that if a man before his gelding had much wit and habilitie, so soone as his stones be cut away, he groweth to leese the same, so far foorth as if he had receiued some notable dammage in his verie braine. And this is a manifest token, that the cods giue and reaue the temperature from all the other parts of the bodie, and he that will not yeeld credit hereunto, let him consider (as my selfe haue done oftentimes) that of a 1000 such capons who addict themselues to their booke, none at-

taineth to anie perfection, and euen in musicke (which is their ordinarie profession) we manifestly see how blockish they are; which springeth, because musick is a worke of the imagination, and this power requireth much heat, whereas they are cold and moist. So it falleth out a matter certaine, that from the wit and habilitie we may gather the temperature of the cods: for which cause, the man who sheweth himselfe prompt in the workes of the imagination, should be hot and drie in the third degree. And if a man be of no great reach, it betokeneth, that with his heat much moisture is vnited, which alwaies endammageth the reasonable part, and this is the more confirmed, if he be good of memorie. The ordinarie conditions of men hot and drie in the third degree, are courage, pride, liberalitie, audacitie, and cheerefulnesse, with a good grace and pleasantnesse, and in matter of women such a one hath no bridle nor ho. The hot and moist are merrie, giueh to laughter, louers of pastime, faire conditioned, verie courteous, shamefast, and not much addicted to women.

The voice and speech, much discouereth the temperature of the cods. That which is big and somewhat sharp, giueth token, that a man is hot and dry in the third degree: and if the same be pleasant, amiable, and verie delicat, it purporteth little heat and much moisture, as appeareth in the guelded. A man who hath moist vnited with heat, will haue the same high, but pleasant and shrill. Who so is hot and drie in the third degree, is slender, hard and rough fleshed, the same composed of sinewes and arteries, and his veines big: contrariwise, to haue much flesh, smooth and tender, is shew of much moisture; by means whereof, it extendeth and enlargeth out the naturall heat. The colour of the skin, if the same be

browne,

browne, burned, blackish greene, and like ashes, yeeldeth signe, that a man is in the third degree of hot and drie: but if the flesh appeareth white, and well coloured, it argueth litle heat and much moisture. The haire and beard are a marke also not to be ouerslipped, for these two approch verie neere to the temperature of the cods. And if the haire be verie blacke and big, and specially from the ribs downe to the nauell, it deliuereth an infallible token that the cods partake much of hot and drie: and if there grow some haire also vpon the shoulders, the same is so much the more confirmed. But when the haire and beard are of chesse-nut colour, soft, delicat, and thin: it inferreth not so great plentie of heat and drinesse in the cods.

Men verie hot and drie, are neuer faire, saue by miracle, but rather hard fauoured, and ill shaped: for the heat and drinesse (as *Aristotle* affirmeth of the Ethiopians) wryeth the proportion of the face, and so they become disfigured. Contrariwise, to bee seemely and gratious, prooueth a measurable hot and moist: for which cause, the matter yeelded it selfe obedient whereto nature would employ it. Whence it is manifest, that much beautie in a man is no token of much heat. Touching the signes of a temperat man, we haue sufficiently discoursed in the Chapter foregoing, and therefore it shall not be needfull to replie the same again. It sufficeth onely to note, that as the Phisitions place in euerie degree of heat three degrees of extention, so also in a temperat man we are to set downe the largenesse and amplenesse of three other. And he who standeth in the third, next to cold and moist, shall be reputed cold and moist: for when a degree passeth the meane, it resembleth the other, and that this is true, we manifestly find: for the

signes

signes which *Galen* deliuereth vs to know a man cold and moist, are the selfesame of the temperat man, but somewhat more remisse: so he is wise, of good conditions, and vertuous, he hath his voice cleare and sweet, is white skinned, of flesh good and supple, and without haire, and if it haue anie, the same is little and yellow; such are verie well fauoured and faire of countenance, but *Galen* affirmeth that their seed is moist and vnfit for generation: these are no great friends to women, nor women vnto them.

What women ought to marry with what man, that they may haue children.

§. 2.

TO a woman who beareth not children when she is married; *Hippocrates* commaundeth that two points of dilligence be vsed, to know whether it bee her defect, or that it grow because the seed of her husband is vnable for generation. The first is, to make her suffumigations with incense, or Storax, with a garment close wrapped about her, which may hang downe on the ground, in sort that no vapor or fume may issue out: and if within a while after shee feele the sauour of the incense in her mouth, it yeeldeth a certaine token that the barrennesse commeth not through her defect, in as much as the same found the passages of the belly open, wherethrough it pierceth to the nosthrils and the mouth. The second is, to take a garlicke head cleane pilled, and put the same into the bellie what time the woman goeth to sleepe, and if the next day shee feele

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in her mouth the sent of the garlicke, shee is of her selfe fruitfull without anie default.

But albeit these two proofs performe the effect which *Hippocrates* speaketh of, namely, that the vapour pierce from the inner part vp to the mouth, yet the same argueth not an absolute barrennesse in the husband, nor an intire fruitfulnesse of the wife, but an vnapt correspondence of both, wherethrough she prooueth as barren for him, as hee for her: which wee see to fall out in dayly experience, for the man taking another wife begetteth children, and (which encreaseth the maruell, in such as are not seene in that point of naturall Philosopie) is, that if these two separat each from other, vpon pretence of impotencie, and so hee take another wife, and shee another husband, it hath bene found that both of them haue had children. And this groweth becaule there are some men whose generatiue faculrie is vnable, and not alterable for one woman, and yet for another is apt & begetteth issue: euen as wee see by experience in the stomack, that to one kinde of meat a man hath a great appetite, and to another (though better) it is as dead. What the correspondence should be which the man and wife ought to beare each to other, to the end they may bring forth children, is expressed by *Hippocrates* in these words, If the hot answer not the cold, and the drie the moist, with measure and equalitie, there can be no generation: as if he should say, that if there vnite not in the womans wombe two seeds, the one hote and the other cold, and the one moist and the other drie, extended in equall degree, they cannot beget children. For a worke so maruellous as is the shaping of a man, standeth in need of such a temperature where the hot may not exceed the cold, nor the moist the drie. For if a mans seed bee hot, and the womans seed

hot

hot likewiſe, there will no engendring ſucceed. This doctrine thus preſuppoſed, let vs now fit by way of example a woman cold and moiſt in the firſt degree, whoſe ſignes we ſaid were, to be wily, ill conditioned, ſhrill voiced, ſpare fleſhed, and blacke and greene coloured, hairie and euill fauoured, ſhe ſhall eaſily conceiue by a man that is ignorant of good conditions, who hath a well ſounding and ſweet voice, much white and ſupple fleſh, little haire, and well coloured, and faire of countenance. She may alſo be giuen for wife to a temperat man, whoſe ſeed (following the opinion of *Galen*) we ſaid was moſt fruitfull and anſwerable to whatſoeuer woman: Prouided, that ſhe be ſound and of age conuenient; but yet with all their incidents it is verie difficult for her to conceiue child: and being conceiued (ſaith *Hippocrates*) within two moneths the ſame miſcarrieth: for ſhe wanteth bloud wherewith to maintain her ſelfe and the babe, during the nine months. Howbeit this will find an eaſie remedie, if the woman doe bath her ſelfe before ſhe companie with her husband, and the bayne muſt conſiſt of water freſh and warme: the which (by *Hippocrates*) righteth her temperature to a good ſort: for it looſeneth and moiſteneth her fleſh, euen as the earth ought to be alike diſpoſed that the graine may therein faſten it ſelfe and gather root.

Moreouer, it worketh a farther effect: for it encreaſeth the appetite to meat, it reſtraineth reſolution, and cauſeth a greater quantitie of naturall heat, wherethrough plentie of flegmaticke bloud is increaſed; by which the little creature may thoſe nine months haue ſuſtenance. The tokens of a woman cold and moiſt in the third degree, are to be dull witted, well conditioned, to haue a verie delicat voice, much fleſh, and the ſame ſoft and white, to

want

want haire and downe, and not to be ouer faire. Such a one ſhould be wedded to a man hot and drie in the third degree: for his ſeed is of ſuch furie and feruencie, as it behoueth the ſame to fall into a place verie cold and moiſt, that it may take hold and root. This man is of the qualitie of Creſſes, which will not grow ſaue in the water, and if he partaked leſſe hot and drie, his ſowing in ſo cold a bellie were nought els than to caſt graine into a poole.

Hippocrates giueth counſell, that a woman of this ſort ſhould firſt leſſen her ſelfe, and lay aſide her fleſh and her fat before ſhe marrie, but then ſhe need not to take to husband a man ſo hot and drie: for ſuch a temperature would not ſerue, nor ſhe conceiue. A woman cold and moiſt in the ſecond degree, retaineth a meane in all the tokens which I haue ſpecified, ſaue onely in beautie, which ſhe enioyeth in an high degree. Which yeeldeth an euident ſigne, that ſhe will be fruitfull, and beare children, and prooue gratious and cheerefull. She anſwereth in proportion welneere to all men.

Firſt to the hot and drie in the ſecond degree, and next to the temperat, and laſtly to the hot and moiſt. From all theſe vnions and conioynings of men and women, which we haue here laid downe, may iſſue wiſe children, but from the firſt are the moſt ordinarie. For put caſe, that the ſeed of a man encline to cold and moiſt; yet the continuall drineſſe of the Mother, and the giuing her ſo little meat, correcteth and amendeth the defect of the Father. For that this manner of Philoſophizing neur heretofore came to light, it was not poſſible that all the naturall Philoſophers could ſhape an anſwere to this probleme, which asketh, Whence proceedeth it, that manie fooles haue begotten wiſe children? Whereto they anſwer,

swer, that sottish persons apply themselues affectionately to the carnall act, and are not carried away to anie other contemplation. But contrarily, men verie wise, euen in the copulation go imagining vpon matters nothing pertinent to that they haue in hand, and therethrough weaken the seed, and make their children defectiue, as well in the powers reasonall, as in the naturall. In the other conioynings it is requisit to take heed that the woman be cleansed, and dried by a ripe age, and marrie not ouer-young: for hence it commeth, that children prooue simple and of little wit. The seed of young parents is verie moist: for it is but a whiles since they were borne, and if a man be formed of a matter endowed with excessiue moisture, it followeth of force, that he prooue dull of capacitie.

What diligence ought to be vsed, the children male, and not female may be borne.

§. 3.

THose parents who seeke the comfort of hauing wise children, and such as are towardly for learning, must endeuor that they may be borne male: for the female, through the cold and moist of their sex, cannot be endowed with anie profound iudgement. Onely we see, that they talke with some apparence of knowledge, in slight and easie matters, with tearmes ordinarie, and long studied, but being set to learning, they reach no farther than to some smacke of the Latine tongue, and this onely through the helpe of memorie. For which dulnesse, themselues are not in blame, but that cold and moist which made them women,

men, and these selfe qualities (we haue prooued heretofore) gainesay the wit and abilitie. *Salomon* considering how great scarcitie there was of wise men, and that no woman came to the world with a wit apt for knowledge, said in this manner, I haue found one man amongst a thousand; but I haue not found one woman amongst the whole rout: as if he should say, that of a thousand men he had found one wise; but throughout the race of women, hee could neuer light vpon one that had iudgement. Therefore we are to shun this sex, and to procure that the child be borne male: for in such onely resteth a wit capable of learning. It behoueth therefore first to take into consideration, what instruments were ordained by nature in mans bodie to this effect, and what order of cause is to be obserued, that we may obtaine the end which we seeke for. Wee must then vnderstand, that amongst manie excrements and humours which reside in a mans bodie: nature (saith *Galen*) vseth onely the seruice of one, to worke that mankind may be preserued. This is a certain excrement which is termed whey, or wheyish bloud, whose engendring is wrought in the liuer & in the veins, at such time as the foure humours, bloud, fleagme, choler, and melancholie, do take the forme and substance which they ought to haue.

Of such a licour as this, doth nature serue her selfe, to resolue the meat, and to worke, that the same may passe through the veines, and through the strait passages, carrying nourishment to all the parts of the bodie. This worke being finished, the same nature prouideth the veines; whose office is nought els, but to draw vnto them this whey, and to send it through their passages to the bladder, and from thence out of the bodie: and this to free man from the offence which an excrement might breed him.

him. But ſhee, aduiſing that hee had certaine qualities conuenient for generation, prouided two veines, which ſhould carry part thereof to the cods and veſſels of ſeed, togither with ſome ſmall quantitie of bloud, whereby ſuch ſeed might be formed, as was requiſit for mankind. Wherethrough ſhe planted one veine in the reines on the right ſide, which endeth in the right cod, and of the ſame is the right ſeed veſſell framed; and another on the left ſide, which likewiſe taketh his iſſue at the left cod, and of that is ſhaped the left ſeed veſſell.

The requiſit qualities of this excrement, that the ſame may be a conuenient matter for engendring of ſeed, are (ſaith *Galen*) a certaine tartneſſe and biting which groweth, for that the ſame is ſalt, wherethrough it ſtirreth vp the ſeed veſſels, and moueth the creature to procure generation, and not to abandon this thought. And therefore perſons verie letcherous are by the Latiniſts tearmed *Salaces*, that is to ſay, men who haue much ſaltneſſe in their ſeed.

Next to this, nature did another thing worthie of great conſideration, namely, that to the right ſide of the reines, and to the right cod ſhe gaue much heat and drineſſe; and to the left ſide of the reines, and to the left cod, much cold and moiſture: wherethrough the ſeed which laboureth in the right cod, iſſueth out hot and drie, and that of the left cod, cold and moiſt. What nature pretended by this varietie of temperature, as well in the reins as in the cods, and ſeed veſſels, is verie manifeſt, we knowing by hiſtories verie true, that at the beginning of the world, and manie yeares after, a woman brought foorth two children at a birth, whereof the one was borne male, the other female; the end whereof tended, that for euery man, there ſhould be a wife, that mankind might take

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the speedier increase. She prouideth then, that the right side of the reines should yeeld matter hot and drie to the right cod, and that the same with his heat and drineſſe should make the seed hot and dry for generation of the male. And the contrary shee ordained for the forming of a woman, that the left side of the reines should send forth seed cold and moist to the left cod, and that the same with his coldneſſe and moisture, should make the seed cold and moist, whence it ensued of force, that a female must be engendred. But after that the earth was repleniſhed with people, it seemeth that this order and concert of nature was broken off and this double childbearing surceased, and which is worst, for one man that is begotten, 6 or 7 women are borne to the world ordinarily. Whence we comprize, that either nature is growne weary, or some error is thwarted in the mids, which beareth her from working as she would. What the same is, a little hereafter we will expreſſe, when we may lay down the conditions, which are to be obserued, to the end a male child (without missing) may be borne. I say then, that if parents will attaine the end of their desire in this behalfe, they are to obserue 6 points. One of which is, to eate meates hot and drie. The second, to procure that they make stood digestion in the stomacke. The third, to vse much exercise. The fourth, not to apply themselues vnto the act of generation, vntill their seed be well ripened and seasoned. The fifth, to companie with the wife foure or fiue daies before the naturall course is to runne. The sixth, to procure, that the seed fall in the right side of the wombe, which being obserued (as we shall prescribe) it will grow impossible, that a female should be engendred. As touching the first condition, we must weet, that albeit a good stomacke doe parboile

and alter the meate, and ſpoile the ſame of the former qualitie, yet it doth neuer vtterly depriue it ſelfe of them: for if we eate lettice (whoſe qualitie is cold and moiſt) the blood engendred thereof, ſhalbe cold and moiſt, the whey cold and moiſt, and the ſeed cold and moiſt. And if we eat honny (whoſe quality is hot and dry) the blood which we breed, ſhalbe hot and drie, the whey hot and dry, and the ſeed hot and drie: for it is impoſſible (as *Galen* auoucheth) that the humours ſhould not attaine the ſubſtances and the qualities, which the meate had, before ſuch time as it was eaten. Then it being true, that the male ſex conſiſteth in this, that the ſeed be hot and dry at the time of his forming, for certaine it behooueth parents to vſe meats hot and drie, that they may engender a male child. I grant well, how in this kind of begetting, there befalleth a great perill: for the ſeed being hot and drie, wee haue often heretofore affirmed, it followeth of force, that there be borne a man, malicious, wily, cauilling, and addicted to many vices and euils, and ſuch perſons as theſe (vnleſſe they be ſtraightly curbed) bring great danger to the common wealth. Therefore it were better, that they ſhould not be begotten at all: but for all this there will not want parents, who will ſay, Let me haue a boy, and let him be a theefe and ſpare not, for the iniquitie of man is more allowable, than the wel-doing of a woman. Howbeit this may find an eaſie remedie, by vſing temperate meates, which ſhall pertake but meanely of hot and dry: or by way of preparation, ſeaſoning the ſame with ſome ſpice. Such (ſaith *Galen*) are Hennes, Partridges, Turtles, Doues, Thruſhes, Blackbirds, and Goates, which (by *Hippocrates*) muſt be eaten roſted, to heat and drie the ſeed.

The bread with which the ſame is eaten, ſhould bee white,

white, of the fineſt meale, ſeaſoned with Salt and Annis ſeed: for the browne is cold and moiſt (as wee will prooue hereafter) and very dammageable to the wit. Let the drinke bee White-wine, watered in ſuch proportion, as the ſtomack may allow thereof: and the water with which it is tempered, ſhould bee very freſh and pure.

The ſecond diligence which we ſpake of, is, to eate theſe meates in ſo moderate quantitie, as the ſtomacke may ouercome them: for albeit the meate bee hot and drie of his proper nature, yet the ſame becommeth cold and moiſt, if the naturall heate cannot digeſt it: Therefore though the parents eate honny, and drinke White wine, theſe meates, by this meanes will turne to cold ſeed, and a female child be brought forth. For this occaſion, the greater pert of great and rich perſonages, are afflicted by hauing more daughters than meaner folke: for they eate and drinke that which their ſtomacke cannot digeſt: and albeit their meate be hote and drie, ſauced with Suger, Spices, and Honny: yet through their great quantitie, they waxe raw, and cannot be digeſted. But the rawneſſe which moſt endammageth generation, is that of Wine: for this colour, in being ſo vaporous and ſubtile, occaſioneth, that the other meates together therewith paſſe to the ſeed veſſels raw, and that the ſeed falſly prouoketh a man, ere it be digeſted and ſeaſoned.

Whereon, *Plato* commendeth a law, enacted in the Carthaginean Common-wealth, which forbad the married couple, that they ſhould not taſt of any Wine that day, when they meant to performe the rights of the marriage bed, as well ware, that this liquor alwaies bred much hurt and dammage to the

childs bodily health, and might yeeld occasion that hee should prooue vitious and of ill conditions. Notwithstanding, if the same be moderately taken, so good seed is not engendred of any meate (for the end which wee seeke after) as of white wine: and especially, to giue wit and abilitie, which is that wherto we pretend. The 3 diligence which we speake of, was, to vse exercise somewhat more than meanely: for this fretteth and consumeth the excessiue moisture of the seed, and heateth and drieth the same. By this means a man becommeth most fruitful and able for generation: and contrariwise to giue our selues to our ease, and not to exercise the body, is one of the things which breedeth most coldnes and moisture in the seed. Therefore rich and dainty persons are lesse charged with children than the poore, who take pains. Whence *Hippocrates* recounteth, that the principall persons of Scythia were very effeminat, womanish, delicious, and enclined to doe womens seruices; as to sweepe, to rub, & to bake: and by this meanes were impotent for generation. And if they begot any male child, he prooueth either an Eunuch, or an Hermaphrodite. Whereat, they shaming, & greatly agreeued, determined to make sacrifices to their God, and to offer him many gifts; beseeching him not to entreat them after that maner, but to yeeld thē some remedy for the defect, seeing it lay in his power so to do. But *Hippocrates* laughed them to scorne, saying, That none effect betideth, which seemes not miraculous and diuine, if after that sort they fall into consideration thereof: for reducing which soeuer of them to his naturall causes, at last we come to end in God, by whose vertue all the agents of the world doe worke. But there are some effects, which must bee imputed to God immediatly, (as are those which come besides

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the order of nature) and others by the way of meanes, reckoning first as a meane, the causes which are ordayned to that end. The countrey which the Scythians inhabited (saith *Hippocrates*) is seated vnder the North, a region moist and cold beyond measure, where, through abundance of clouds, it seemes a miracle if you see the sunne. The rich men sit euer on horsebacke, neuer vse any exercise, eat and drinke more than their naturall heat can consume: all which things make the seed cold and moist: And for this cause they beget many females: and if anie male were borne, they prooued of the condition which we haue specified. Know you (said *Hippocrates* to them) that the remedie hereof consisteth, not in sacrifising to God, neither in doing ought like that; but it behoueth withall, that you walke on foot, eat little, and drinke lesse, and not so wholly betake your selues to your pleasures. And that you may the more plainly discerne it, looke vpon the poore people of this countrie, and your very slaues, who not onely make no sacrifices to your God, neither offer him gifts (as wanting the meanes) but euen blaspheme his blessed name, and speake iniuriously of him, because he hath placed them in such estate. And yet (though so leaud and sacrilegious) they are very able for procreation, and the most part of their children proue males, and strong; not cocknies, not eunuchs, not hermafrodits, as doe those of yours. And the cause is, for that they eat little & vse much exercise, neither keep thēselues alwaies on hosback, like their masters. By which occasion they make their seed hot and drie, & there through engēgender males and not females. This point of phylosophie was not vnderstood by *Pharao*, nor by his counsell, seeing that hee said in this manner: Come, let vs keepe them downe with oppression, that they may not

multiply, nor ioyne with our enemie, if warre be raiſed againſt vs. And the remedie which he vſed, to hinder that the people of Iſraell ſhould not encreaſe ſo faſt, or at leaſt that ſo many male children might not bee borne (which hee moſt feared) was to keepe them vnder with much toile of body, and to cauſe them for to eat leekes, garlike, and onions, which remedie tooke but a bad effect, as the holy ſcripture expreſſeth: for the harder hee held them oppreſſed, the more did they encreaſe and multiply. Yet hee making reckoning, that ths was the ſureſt way he could follow, doubled this their affliction of body. Which preuailed ſo little, as if to quench a great fire, hee ſhould throw thereinto much oile or greaſe: but if he or any of his counſellors, had beene ſeen in this point of naturall Philoſophy, hee ſhould haue giuen them barly bread, lettice, melons, cucumbers, and citrons to eat, and haue kept them well fed and well filled with drinke, and not haue ſuffered them to take anie paine. For by this meanes, their ſeed would haue become cold and moiſt, & thereof more women than men bin begotten; and in ſhort time their life haue beene abridged. But feeding them with much fleſh boiled with garlicke, with leekes, & with onions, and tasking them to worke ſo hard, he cauſed their ſeed to wax hot and drie, by which two qualities, they were the more incited to procreation, and euer bred iſſue male. For confirmation of this veritie, *Ariſtotle* propoundeth a probleme, which ſaith, What is the cauſe, that thoſe who labor much and ſuch as are ſubiect to the feuer Ecticke, ſuffer many pollutions in their ſleepe? whereto (verely) hee wiſt not to ſhape an anſwer: for he telleth many things, but none of them hit the truth. The right reaſon hereof is, that the toile of the body, and the actiue feuer, doe heat and dry the ſeed;

and these two qualities, make the same tart and pricking; and for that in sleepe all the naturall powers are fortified, this betideth which the probleme speaketh of. How fruitfull and pricking the hot and drie seed is, *Galen* noteth in these words: The same is moist, fruitfull, and soon inciteth the creature to copulation, and is leacherous and prone to lust. The fourth condition was, not to accompany in the act of generation, vntill the seed were setled, concocted, and duly seasoned: for though the three former diligenses haue gone before, yet we cannot thereby know whether it haue attained that perfection which it ought to haue Principally it behoueth, for 7 or 8 daies before, to vse the meats which we haue prescribed, to the end the cods may haue time to consume in their nourishment, the seed which all that time was engendred of the other meats, and that this which we thus go describing may succeed.

The like diligence is to be vsed touching mans seed, that the same may bee fruitfull and apt for issue, as the gardiners doe with the seeds which they will preserue: for they attend till they ripen, and cleanse, and wax drie: for if they pluck them from the stalke, before they are deeply seasoned, and ariued to the point which is requisit, though they lie in the ground a whole yeare they will not grow at all. For this reason I haue noted that in places where much carnall copulation is vsed, there is lesse store of children, than where people are more enclined to continencie. And common harlots neuer conceiue, because they stay not till the seed be digested and ripened.

It behoueth therefore to abide for some daies, that the seed may settle, concoct, and ripen, and be duly seasoned: for by this meanes, is hot and drie, and the good

ſubſtance which it had loſt, the better recouered. But how ſhall we know the ſeed to be ſuch, as is requiſit it ſhould be, ſeeing the matter is of ſo great importance; This may eaſily be knowne, if certaine daies haue paſſed ſince the man companied with his wife, and by his continuall incitement, and great deſire of copulation; all which ſpringeth, for that the ſeed is growne fruitfull and apt for procreation. The fifth condition was, that a man ſhould meddle with his wife in the carnall act, ſix or ſeuen daies before ſhe haue her naturall courſe: for that the child ſtraightwaies ſtandeth in need of much food to nouriſh it. And the reaſon hereof is, that the hot and drie of his temperature, ſpendeth and conſumeth not onely the good bloud of the mother, but alſo the excrements. Wherethrough *Hippocrates* ſaid, that the woman conceiued of a male, is well coloured and faire. Which groweth, becauſe the infant, through his much heat, conſumeth all thoſe excrements which are woont to disfigure the face, leauing the ſame as a waſhed cloth. And for that this is true, it is behoofull, that the infant be ſupplied with blood for his nouriſhment. And this experience manifeſteth, for it is a miracle that a male child ſhould be engendered ſaue vpon the laſt daies of the month. The contrarie befalleth, when a woman goeth with a female: for through the much cold and moiſt of her ſex, ſhee eateth little, and yeeldeth ſtore of excrements, wherethrough the woman conceiued of a girle, is ill fauoured and full of ſpots, and a thouſand ſluttiſhneſſes ſticke vnto her; and at the time of her deliuerie, ſhe muſt tarrie ſo many more daies to purge her ſelfe, than if ſhe had brought a manchild to the world. On the naturall reaſon whereof, God grounded himſelfe, when hee commanded *Moſes*, that the woman, who brought forth

forth a male, should remaine in her bed a weeke, and not enter into the temple vntill 33 daies were expired. And if she were deliued of a female, she should be vncleane for the space of two weekes, and not enter into the temple, vntill after 66 daies, in sort, that when the birth is of a female, the time is doubled. Which so falleth out, because in the nine moneths (during which the child remained in the mothers wombe) through the much cold and moist of her temperature, she doubly encreased excrements, and the same of very malignant substance and qualitie, which a male infant would not haue done. Therefore *Hippocrates* holdeth it a matter verie perillous, to stop the purgation of a woman who is deliuered of a wench.

All this is spoken to the purpose, that wee must well aduise our selues of the last day of the moneth, to the end the seed may find sufficient nourishment wherewith to relieue it selfe. For if the act of procreation be committed so soone as the purgation is finished, it will not take hold through defect of blood. Whereon it behoueth the parents bee done to vnderstand, that if both seedes ioyne not togither at one selfe time, (namely that of the woman and of the man) *Galen* saith there will ensue no conception, although the seed of the man bee neuer so apt for procreation. And hereof we shall render the reason to another purpose. This is very certaine, that all the diligences by vs prescribed, must also bee performed on the womans behoofe, otherwise, her seed (euill imploied) will mar the conception. Therefore it is requisit they attend ech to other, so as at one selfe instant, both their seedes may ioyne togither.

This, at the first comming, importeth very much for the right

right cod, and his seed vessell (as *Galen* affirmeth) is first stirred vp, and yeeldeth his seed before the left, and if the generation take not effect at the first comming, it is a great hap hazard, but that at the second a female shalbe begotten. These two seed are knowne, first by the heat and coldnesse, then by the quantitie of being much or little, and finally by the issuing foorth speedily or slowly. The seed of the right cod commeth foorth boiling, and so hot that it burneth the womans bellie, is not much in quantitie, and passeth out in hast: Contrariwise, the seed of the left cod taketh his way more temperat, is much in quantitie: and for that the same is cold and grosse, spendeth longer space in comming forth. The last consideration was, to procure that both the seeds of the husband and the wife fall into the right side of the wombe: for in that place (saith *Hippocrates*) are males engendered, and females in the left. *Galen* alleageth the reason hereof, saying, that the right side of the wombe is very hot, through the neighborhood which it holdeth with the liuer, with the right side of the reins, and with the right seed vessell: which members, we haue affirmed and approoued to be very hot. And seeing all the reason of working that the issue may become male, consisteth in procuring, that at the time of conception it partake much heat, it falleth out certaine, that it greatly importeth to bestow the seed in this place. Which the woman shall easily accomplish by resting on her right side when the act of generation is ended, with her head downe and her heeles vp: but it behoueth her to keep her bed a day or two, for the womb doth not straight waies embrace the seed, but after some hours space.

The signes whereby a woman may know whether she be with child or no, are manifest and plaine to euery ones vnder-

vnderstanding : for if when shee ariseth vpon her feet, the seed fall to the ground, it is certaine (saith *Galen*) that she hath not conceiued, albeit herein one point requireth consideration, that all the seed is not fruitfull or apt for issue : for the one part therof is very wateriſh, whose office serueth to make thin the principall seed, to the end it may fare through the narrow passages, and this is that which nature sendeth forth, and it resteth, when shee hath conceiued, with the part apt for issue. It is knowen by that it is like water, and of like quantitie. That a woman rise vp straightwaies on her feet, so soone as the act of generation hath passed, is a matter verie perillous. Therefore *Aristotle* compelleth that shee beforehand make euacuation of the excrements, and of her vrine, to the end shee may haue no cause to rise. The second token whereby we may know the same, is, that the next day following, the woman will feele her belly empty, especially about the nauell. Which groweth, for that the womb, when it desireth to conceiue, becommeth verie large and stretched out : for verely it suffereth the like swelling vp and stiffnesse, as doth a mans member, and when it fareth thus wise, the same occupieth much roome. But at the point when it conceiueth (saith *Hippocrates*) sodainly the same draweth togither, and maketh as it were a purse to draw the seed vnto it, and will not suffer it to go out, and by this meanes leaueth many emptie places, the which women do declare, saying, that they haue no tripes left in their belly as if they were sodainly become leane. Moreouer, forthwith they abhorre carnall copulation, and their husbands kindnesse, for the belly hath now got what it sought; but the most certain token (saith *Hippocrates*) is, when their naturall course faileth, & their breasts grow, and when they fall in loathing with meat.

What

What diligence is to bee vſed that children may proue wittie and wiſe.

§. 4.

IF we doe not firſt know the cauſe, whence it proceedeth that a man of great wit and ſufficiencie is begottē, it is impoſſible that the ſame may be reducēd to art, for through conioyning and ordering his principles and cauſes, we grow to attaine this end, and by none other meanes. The Aſtrologers hold; that becauſe the child is borne vnder ſuch an influence of the ſtarres, he commeth to be diſcreet, wittie, of good or ill maners, fortunat, and of thoſe other conditions and properties which we ſee and conſider euery day in men. Which being admitted for true, it would follow a matter of impoſſibilitie, to frame the ſame to any art: for it ſhould bee wholly a caſe of fortune, and no way placed in mens election. The naturall Philoſophers, as *Hippocrates*, *Plato*, *Ariſtotle*, and *Galen* hold, that a man receiueth the conditions of his ſoule, at the time of his forming, and not of his birth: for then the ſtarres doe ſuperficially alter the child, giuing him heat, coldneſſe, moiſture, and drouth; but not his ſubſtance, wherein the whole life relieth, as do the foure elements, fire, aire, earth, and water, who not only yeeld to the party compoſed, heat, cold, moiſture, and drineſſe, but alſo the ſubſtance which may maintain and preſerue the ſame qualities, during all the courſe of life. Wherethrough, that which moſt importeth in the engendring of children, is, to procure that the elements wherof they are compounded, may partake the qualities which are requiſit

requisit for the wit. For these according to the waight and measure, by which they enter into the composition, must alwaies so indure in the mixture, and not the alterations of heauen. What these elements are, and in what sort they enter into the womans wombe, to forme the creature, *Galen* declareth and affirmeth them to bee the same which compound al other naturall things: but that the earth commeth lurking in the accustomed meates which we eate, as are flesh, bread, fish, and fruits; the water in the liquors which we drinke, The aire and fire (he saith) are mingled by order of nature, and enter into the body by way of the pulse, and of respiration. Of these foure elements, mingled and digested by our naturall heate, are made the two necessary principles of the infants generation, to weete the seed, and the monthly course. But that whereof we must make greatest reckoning for the end which we enquire after, are the accustomable meats whereon we feed: for these shut vp the foure elements in themselues, and from these the seed fetcheth more corpulencie and qualitie, than from the water which we drinke, or the fire and aire which we breath in. Whence *Galen* saith that the parents who would beget wise children, should read three bookes which he wrot, of the facilitie of the elements: for there they should find, with what kinds of meate they may effect the same. And he made no mention of the water, nor of the other elements, as materials, and of like moment. But herein he swarued from reason: for the water altereth the body much more than the aire, and much lesse than the sound meats wheron we feed, And as touching that which concerneth the engēdring of the seed, it carrieth as great importance as all the other elements together. The reason is (as *Galen* himselfe affirmeth) because

becauſe the cods draw from the veines (for their nouriſhment) the wheyiſh part of the blood , and the greateſt part of this whey,which the veins receiue,partaketh of the water which we drinke. And that the water worketh more alteration in the body, than the aire, *Ariſtotle* prooueth, where he demandeth; what the cauſe is, that by changing of waters, wee breed ſo great an alteration in our health,whereas if we breath a contrarie aire,we perceiue it not. And to this hee anſwereth, that water yeeldeth nouriſhment to the body, and ſo doth not the aire.But he had little reaſon to anſwere after this maner: for the aire alſo (by *Hippocrates* opinion) giueth nouriſhment and ſubſtance,aſwell as the water. Where through *Ariſtotle* deuiſed a better anſwere, ſaying, that no place nor country hath his peculiar aire ; for that which is now in Flanders, when the North wind bloweth, paſſeth within two or three daies into Affricke, and that in Affricke, by the South is carried into the North ; and that which this day is in Hieruſalem, the Eaſt wind driueth into the Weſt Indies. The which cannot betide in the waters: for they doe not all iſſue out of the ſame ſoile, where through euery people hath his particular water conformable to the Mine of the earth where it ſpringeth, and whence it runneth. And if a man be vſed to drinke one kind of water , in taſting another, he altereth more than by meate or aire. In ſort,that the parents who haue a will to beget very wiſe children , muſt drinke waters, delicate,freſh,and of good temperature ; otherwiſe they ſhall commit error in their procreation. *Ariſtotle* ſaith, that at the time of generation, we muſt take heed of the South-weſt wind : for the ſame is groſſe , and moiſteth the ſeed, ſo as a female and not a male is begotten. But the weſt wind he highly commendeth, and aduanceth it

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with names and titles very honourable. He calleth the ſame temperate, fatter of the earth, & ſaith; that it commeth from the Eliſian fields. But albeit it be true that it greatly importeth, to breath an aire very delicate, and of good temperature, and to drinke ſuch waters: yet it ſtandeth much more vpon to vſe fine meats appliable to the temperature of the wit: for of theſe is engendred the blood and the ſeed, and of the ſeed the creature. And if the meate be delicate and of good temperature, ſuch is the blood made; and of ſuch blood, ſuch ſeed; and of ſuch ſeed, ſuch braine. Now, this member being temperate, and compounded of a ſubſtance ſubtile and delicate, *Galen* ſaith, that the wit will be like therunto: for our reaſonable ſoule, though the ſame be incorruptible, yet goeth alwaies vnited with the diſpoſitions of the braine, which being not ſuch as it is requiſite they ſhould be, for diſcourſing and philoſophizing, a man ſaith and doth 1000 things, which are very vnfitting. The meates then which the parents are to feed on, that they may engender children of great vnderſtanding (which is the ordinarie wit for Spaine) are, firſt, White bread made of the fineſt meale, and ſeaſoned with ſalt: this is cold and dry, and of parts very ſubtile and delicate. There is another ſort made (ſaith *Galen*) of reddiſh graine, which though it nouriſh much, and make men big limmed, and of great bodily forces; yet for that the ſame is moiſt and of groſſe parts, it breedeth a loſſe in the vnderſtanding. I ſaid, ſeaſoned with ſalt, becauſe none of all the aliments which a man vſeth, bettereth ſo much the vnderſtanding, as doth this minerall. It is cold, and of more drineſſe than any other thing; and if I remember well the ſentence of *Heraclitus*, hee ſaid after this maner. A drie brighneſſe, the wiſeſt minde. Then ſeeing that

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ſalt is ſo drie, and ſo appropriat to the wit, the ſcripture had good reaſon to terme it by the name of Prudence and Sapience. Partridges and *Francolini* haue a like ſubſtance, and the ſelfe temperature with bread of white meale, and Kid, and Muskadel wine. And if parents vſe theſe meats (as we haue aboue ſpecified) they ſhall breed children of great vnderſtanding. And if they would haue a child of great memorie, let them eight or nine daies before they breake themſelues to the act of generation, eate Trouts, Salmons, Lampreis, and Eeles, by which meat, they ſhall make their ſeed very moiſt and clammie.

Theſe two qualities (as I haue ſaid before) make the memorie eaſie to receiue, and very faſt to preſerue the figures a long time. By Pigions, Goats, Garlicke, Onions, Leekes, Rapes, Pepper, Vineger, White-wine, Honny, and all other ſorts of ſpices, the ſeed is made hot and drie, and of parts very ſubtile and delicate. The child who is engendred of ſuch meate, ſhalbe of great imagination, but not of like vnderſtanding, by meanes of the much heat, and hee ſhall want memorie through his abundance of drineſſe. Theſe are woont to be very preiudiciall to the common-wealth: for the heate enclineth them to many vices and euils, and giueth them a wit and mind, to put the ſame in execution: howbeit if we do keepe them vnder, the common-wealth ſhall receiue more ſeruice by theſe mens imagination, than by the vnderſtanding and memorie of the other. Hens, capons, veale, weathers of Spaine, are all meats of moderat ſubſtance; for they are neither delicat nor groſſe. I ſaid weathers of Spain: for *Galen*, without making any diſtinctiō, ſaith, that their fleſh is of a groſſe and noiſome ſubſtance, which ſtraieth from reaſon: for put caſe that in Italie,

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(where he wrot) it be the worſt of all others; yet in this our countrey, through the goodneſſe of the paſtures, we may reckon the ſame among the meates of moderate ſubſtance. The children who are begotten on ſuch food, ſhall haue a reaſonable diſcourſe, a reaſonable memory, and a reaſonable imagination. Wherethrough they will not be very profoundly ſeene in the Sciences, nor deuiſe ought of new.

Of theſe we haue ſaid heretofore, that they are pleaſant conceited, and apt, in whom may be imprinted all the rules and conſiderations of art, cleare, obſcure, eaſie, and difficult: but doctrine, argument, anſwering, doubting, and diſtinguiſhing, are matters wherewith their braines can in no ſort endure to be cloied. Cowes fleſh, Manzo, bread of red graine, cheeſe, oliues, vineger, and water alone, will breed a groſſe ſeed, and of faultie temperature: the ſonne engendred vpon theſe, ſhall haue ſtrength like a bull, but withall, bee furious and of a beaſtly wit. Hence it proceedeth, that amongſt vpland people, it is a miracle to find one quicke of capacitie, or towardly for learning: they are all borne dull and rude; for that they are begotten on meates of groſſe and euill ſubſtance. The contrary hereof befalleth in Citizens, whoſe children we finde to be endowed with more wit and ſufficiencie. But if the parents carie in very deed, a will to beget a ſonne, prompt, wiſe, and of good conditions, let them, ſixe or ſeuen daies before their companying, feed on Goats milke; for this aliment (by the opinion of all Phiſitions) is the beſt, and moſt delicate that any man can vſe, prouided that they be ſound, and that it anſwere them in proportion: but *Galen* ſaith, it behoueth to eate the ſame with hony, without which it is dangerous, and eaſily corrupteth. The reaſon hereof

is, for that the milke, hath no more but three elements in his compoſition, cheeſe, whey, and butter. The cheeſe anſwereth the earth; the whey, the water; and the butter the aire. The fire, which mingleth the other elements, and preſerueth them being mingled, iſſuing out of the teats, is exhalted, for that it is very ſubtile: but adioyning thereunto a little honny, which is hot and dry, in lieu of fire, the milke wil ſo partake of all the 4 elements. Which being mingled, and concocted by the operation of our naturall heat, make a ſeed very delicat, and of good temperature. The ſonne thus engendred, ſhall at leaſt wiſe poſſeſſe a great diſcourſe; & not be depriued of memorie and imagination. In that *Ariſtotle* wanted this doctrine, he came ſhort to anſwere a probleme, which himſelfe propounded, demanding what the cauſe is, that the yong ones of brute beaſts, carry with them (for the moſt part) the properties and conditions of their ſires and dammes; and the children of men and women not ſo? And we find this by experience to be true: for of wiſe parents, are borne fooliſh children; and of fooliſh parents, children very wiſe; of vertuous parents, lewd children; and of vitious parents, vertuous children; of hard fauoured parents, faire children; and of faire parents, foule children; of white parents, browne children; and of browne parents, white and well couloured children. And amongſt children of one ſelfe father and mother, one prooueth ſimple, and another wittie: one foule, and another faire: one of good conditions, and another of bad: one vertuous, and another vitious. Whereas if a mare of a good harrage, be couered with a horſe of the like, the colt which is foaled, reſembleth them aſwell in ſhape and colour, as in their properties. To this probleme, *Ariſtotle* ſhaped a very vntowardly anſwer, ſaying

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ing, that a man is caried away with many imaginations, during the carnall act: and hence it proceedeth that the children prooue so diuers. But brute beastes, because in time of procreation they are not so distraughted, neither possesse so forcible an imagination as man doth, make alwaies their young ones after one selfe sort, and like to themselues. This answere hath euer hitherto gone for currant amongst the vulgar phylosophers: and for confirmation hereof, they alleage the history of *Iacob*, which recounteth, that he hauing placed certaine rodes at the watering places of the beasts, the lambes were yeaned party coulored. But little auailes it them to handfast holy matters: for this historie recounteth a miraculous action, which God performed, therein to hide some sacrament. And the answere made by *Aristotle*, sauoreth of great simplicity. And who so wil not yeeld me credit, let him (at his day) cause some shepheards to try this experiment, and they shall find it to be no naturall matter. It is also reported in these our parts, that a ladie was deliuered of a sonne, more browne than was due, because a blacke visage, which was pictured, fell into her imagination. Which I hold for a iest: and if perhaps it be true that she brought such a one to the world, I say that the father who begat him, had the like colour to that figure. And because it may be the better knowne, how fromshapen this phylosophie is, which *Aristotle* bringeth in, together with those that follow him, it is requisite wee hold it for a thing certaine, that the worke of generation appertaineth to the vegetatiue soule, and not to the sensitiue, or reasonable: for a horse engendreth without the reasonall, and a plant without the sensitiue. And if we doe but marke a tree loden with fruite, we shall find on the same a greater variety, than in the children of any

man. One apple will be greene, another red; one little, another great; one round, another ill shaped; one sound, another rotten; one sweet, and another bitter. And if we compare the fruit of this yeare with that of the last, the one will be verie different and contrary to the other: which cannot be attributed to the varietie of the imagination, seeing the plants doe want this power. The error of *Aristotle*, is very manifest in his owne doctrine: for he saith, that the seed of the man, and not of the woman, is that which maketh the generation: and in the carnal act, the man doth nought els but scatter his seed without forme and figure, as the husbandman soweth his corne in the earth. And as the graine of corne doth not by and by take roote, nor formeth a stalke and leaues, vntil some daies beene expired: so (saith *Galen*) the creature is not formed all so soone as the mans seed falleth into the womans wombe: but affirmeth that thirtie or fortie daies are requisite, ere the same can be accomplished. And if this be so, what auaileth it that the father goe imagining of diuers things in the carnall act, when as the forming beginneth not vntill some daies after? especially, when the forming is not made by the soule of the father or the mother, but by a third thing which is found in the seed it selfe. And the same being onely vegetatiue, and no more, is not capable of the imagination, but followeth only the motions of the temperature, and doth nothing els. After my mind, to say that mens children are borne of so diuers figures, through the variable imagination of the parents, is none other, than to auouch, that of grains, some grow big, and some little, because the husband man (when he sowed them) was distraught into sundry imaginations. Vpon this so vnsound opinion of *Aristotle*, some curious heads argue, that the children of

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the adulterous wife resemble her husband, though they be none of his. And the reason which leadeth them, is manifest: for during the carnall act, the adulterers settle their imagination vpon the husband, with feare least he come and take them napping. And for the same consideration, they conclude that the husbands children resemble the adulterer though they be not his, because the adulterous wife, during the copulation with her husband, alwaies busieth her selfe in contemplation of the figure of her louer. And those who say, that the other woman brought forth a blacke sonne, because she held her imagination fixed on the picture of a blacke man, must also graunt this, which by these queint braines is inferred: for the whole carrieth one selfe reason, and is in my conceit a starcke leasing, and verie mockerie, though it be grounded on the opinion of *Aristotle*. *Hippocrates* answered this probleme better, when he said, that the Scythians are all alike conditioned, and shaped in visage, and rendereth the reason of this resemblance to be, for that that they all fed of one selfe meat, and dranke of one selfe water, went apparrelled after one selfe maner, and kept one selfe order in all things. For the same cause, the brute beasts engender young ones after their particular resemblance, because they alwaies vse the same food, and haue there through an vniforme seed. But contrariwise man, because he eateth diuers meates, euerie day maketh a different seed aswell in substance, as in temperature. The which the naturall Philosophers doe approoue, in answering to a probleme, that saith, What is the cause, that the excrements of brute beasts haue not so vnpleasant a verdure, as those of mankind? And they affirme, that brute beasts vse alwaies the selfe meates, and much exercise therewithall:

but a man eateth so much meate, and of so diuers substance, as he cannot come away with them, and so they grow to corrupt. Mans seed, and that of beasts, hold one selfe reason and consideration, for that they are both of them excrements of a third concoction. As touching the varietie of meats which man vseth, it cannot be denied, but must be graunted, that of euery aliment there is made a different and particular seed. Where it falleth out apparent, that the day on which a man eateth beefe or bloudings, he maketh a grosse seed, and of bad temperature; and therefore, the sonne begotten therof, shalbe disfigured, foolish, blacke, and ill conditioned. And if he eat the carcas of a capon, or of a henne, his seed shall be white, delicat, and of good temperature. Wherethrough the sonne so engendred, shalbe faire, wise, and very gentle conditioned. From hence I collect, that there is no child borne, who partaketh not of the qualities and temperature of that meate, which his parents fed vpon a day before he was begotten. And if any would know of what meate hee was formed, let him but consider, with what meate his stomacke hath most familiaritie, and without all doubt that it was. Moreouer, the naturall Philosophers demand what the cause is, that the children of the wisest men, doe ordinarily prooue blockish and void of capacitie? To which probleme they answere very fondly, saying; that wise men are very honest and shamefast, and therefore in companying with their wiues, doe abstaine from some diligences, necessarie for effecting that the child prooue of that perfection which is requisite. And they confirme this, by example of such parents, as are foolish and ignorant, who because they employ all their force and diligence at the time of generation, their children doe all prooue wise and wittie;

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but this answere tokeneth they are slenderly seene in naturall Phyloſophie. True it is, that for rendring an answere conuenient, it behoueth first to presuppose and prooue certaine points; one of which purporteth, that the reasonable faculties is contrarie to the wrathfull and the concupiscible, in sort, that if a man bee very wise, he cannot be very couragious, of much bodily forces, a great feeder, nor very able for procreation: for the naturall dispositions, which are requisite, to the end the reasonable soule may performe his operations, carrie a contrarietie to those, which are necessarie for the wrathfull and the concupiscible. *Aristotle* saith, (and it is true) that hardinesse and naturall courage consist in heate: and Prudence and Sapience in cold and drie. Whence we see by plaine experience, that the valientest persons are void of reason, spare of speech, impatient to be ieasted withall, and very soone ashamed; for remedie whereof, they straightwaies set hand on their sword, as not weeting what other answere to make. But men endowed with wit hath many reasons and quicke answeres and quippes, with which they entertaine the time, that they may not come to blowes. Of such a manner of wit, *Salust* noteth that *Cicero* was, telling him, that hee had much tongue, and feete verie light: wherein hee had reason, for so great a wisedome, in matters of armes, could not end but in cowardise. And hence tooke a certaine nipping prouerbe his originall, which saith; He is as valiant as *Cicero*, and as wise as *Hector*: Namely, when we will note a man to be a buzzard, and a cow-babie. No lesse doth the naturall faculties gainesay the vnderstanding, for if a man possesse great bodily forces, he cannot enioy a good wit; and the reason is, for that the force of the armes and

the legges, ſpringeth from hauing a braine hard and earthly, and though it be true, that by reaſon of the cold and drie of the earth, he might partake a good vnderſtanding, yet in that it hath his compoſition of a groſſe ſubſtance, it ruinateth and endammageth the ſame. For through his coldneſſe the courage and hardineſſe are quenched: where through, we haue ſeene ſome men of great forces to bee very cowards. The contrarietie which the vegetatiue ſoule hath with the reaſonable, is moſt manifeſt of all others, for his operations, namely, to nouriſh, and engender, are better performed with heate and moiſture, than with the contrarie qualities: Which experience cleerely manifeſteth, conſidering how powerfull the ſame is in the age of childhood, and how weake and remiſſe in old age. Againe, in boyes eſtate the reaſonable ſoule cannot vſe his operations; whereas in old age, which is vtterly void of heate and moiſture, it performeth them with great effect. In ſort, that by how much the more a man is enabled for procreation, and for digeſtion of food, ſo much hee leeſeth of his reaſonable facultie. To this alludeth that which *Plato* affirmeth, that there is no humour in a man, which ſo much diſturbeth the reaſonable faculty, as abundance of ſeed, onely (ſaith he) the ſame yeeldeth helpe to the art of verſifieng. Which we behold to be confirmed by daily experience: for when a man beginneth to entreate of amorous matters, ſodainely he becommeth a Poet: and if before he were greaſie and loutiſh, foorthwith he takes it at heart, to haue a wrinkle in his pompe, or a mote on his cape. And the reaſon is, becauſe theſe workes appertaine to the imagination, which encreaſeth and lifteth it ſelfe vp from this point, through the much heat, occaſioned in him by this amourous paſſion. And that loue is an

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hot alteration, sheweth apparently, through the courage and hardinesse, which it planteth in the louer, from whom the same also reaueth all desire of meate, and will not suffer him to sleepe. If the common wealth bare an eye to these tokens, she would banish from publicke studies, lusty schollers, and great fighters, inamoured persons, Poets, and those who are very neate and curious in their apparrell: for they are not furnished with wit or abilitie for any sort of study. Out of this rule, *Aristotle* excepteth the melancholicke by adustion, whose seed (though fruitfull) reaueth not the capacitie. Finally, all the faculties which gouerne man, if they be very powerfull, set the reasonable soule in a garboile. Hence it proceeds, that if a man be very wise, he proueth a coward, of small strength of bodie, a spare feeder, and not very able for procreation. And this is occasioned by the qualities which make him wise, namely; coldnesse and drinesse. And these selfe, weaken the other powers, as appeareth in old men, who (besides their councell and wisedom) are good for nothing els. This doctrine thus presupposed, *Galen* holdeth opinion, that to the end the engendring of whatsoeuer creature may take his perfect effect, two seedes are necessary, one, which must be the agent and former; and another which must serue for nourishment: for a matter so delicat as generation, cãnot straightwaies ouercome a meate so grosse, as is the blood, vntill the effect be greater. And that the seed is the right aliment of the seed members, *Hippocrates*, *Plato*, and *Galen* doe all accord: for by their opinion, if the blood be not conuerted into seed, it is impossible that the sinewes, the veines, and the arteries can be maintained. Wherethrongh *Galen* affirmed, the difference betweene the veines and the cods to bee, that the cods doe speedily make much seed,

ſeed, and the veines a little, and in long ſpace of time: In ſort, that nature prouided for the ſame, an alimẽt ſo like, which with light alteration, and without making any excrements, might maintain the other ſeed. And this could not be effected, if the nouriſhment thereof had bin made of the blood. The ſelfe pouiſion (ſaith *Galen*) was made by nature, in the engendring of mankind, as in the forming of a chicke, and ſuch other birds, as come of egs. In which we ſee there are two ſubſtances, one of the white, and an other of the yolke, of one of which, the thicke is made, and by the other maintained all the time whiles the forming endureth. For the ſame reaſon are two ſeeds neceſſarie in the generation of the man, one, of which the creature may bee made, and the other by which it may be maintained whilſt the forming endureth. But *Hippocrates* mentioneth one thing worthy of great conſideration, namely; that it is not reſolued by nature, which of the two ſeeds ſhalbe the agent and formour, and which ſhall ſerue of aliment. For many times, the ſeed of the woman is of greater efficacy than that of the man, and when this betideth, ſhe maketh the generation, and that of the husband ſerueth for aliment. Otherwhiles, that of the husband is more mightie, and that of the wife doth nought els than nouriſh. This doctrin was not conſidered by *Ariſtotle*, who could not vnderſtand, whereto the womans ſeed ſerued, and therefore vttered a thouſand follies, and that the ſame was but a little water, without vertue or force for generation. Which being graunted, it would follow impoſſible, that a woman ſhould euer couet the conuerſation of man, or conſent thereunto, but would ſhun the carnall act, as being her ſelfe ſo honeſt, and the worke ſo vncleane and filthy; wherethrough, in ſhort ſpace manking would decay,

decay, and the world reſt depriued of the faireſt creature that euer nature formed. To this purpoſe *Ariſtotle* demandeth, what the cauſe is, that fleſhly copulation ſhould be an action of the greateſt pleaſure, that nature euer ordained for the ſolace of liuing things. To which probleme he anſwereth, that nature hauing ſo deſirouſly procured the perpetuitie of mankind, did therefore place ſo great a delight in his worke, to the end, that they being mooued by ſuch intereſt, might gladly apply themſelues to the act of generation; and if theſe incitements were wanting, no woman or man would condiſcend to the bands of marriage, inaſmuch as the woman ſhould reape none other benefite, than to beare a burden in her belly the ſpace of nine monethes, with ſo great trauaile and ſorowes, and at the time of her child-birth, to vndergo the hazard of forgoing her life. So would it bee neceſſarie, that the commonwealth ſhould through feare enforce women to marrie, to the end mankinde might not come to nothing. But becauſe nature doth her things with pleaſing, ſhee gaue to a woman, all the inſtruments neceſſarie for making a ſeed, inciting, and apt for iſſue, whereby ſhee might deſire a man, and take pleaſure in his conuerſation. But if it were of that qualitie which *Ariſtotle* expreſſeth, ſhee would rather flie and abhorre him, than euer loue him. This ſelfe *Galen* prooueth, alleadging an example of the bruite beaſtes, wherethrough hee ſaith, that if a Sow bee ſpeyed, ſhe neuer deſireth the Boare, nor will conſent that hee approch vnto her.

The like wee doe euidently ſee in a woman, whoſe temperature partaketh more of coldneſſe than is requiſite: for if wee tell her that ſhee muſt bee married, there

there is no word which soundeth worse in her eare. And the like befalleth to a cold man, for he wanteth the fruitfull seed. Moreouer, if a womans seed were of that maner which *Aristotle* mentioneth, it could bee no proper aliment: for to attain the last qualities of actuall nutriment, a totall seed is necessarie, whereby it may be nourished. Wherethrough, if the same come not to be concted and semblable, it cannot performe this point: for womans seed wanteth the instruments and places, as are the stomacke, the liuer, and the cods, where it may be concocted. Therefore nature prouided, that in the engendring of a creature, two seeds should concurre; which being mingled, the mightier should make the forming and the other serue for nourishment. And this is seene euidently so to be: for if a blackamore beget a white woman with child, and a white man a *negro* woman, of both these vnions, will be borne a creature, partaking of either qualitie. Out of this doctrin I gather that to be true, which many authenticall histories affirme, that a dog carnally companying with a woman, made her to conceiue; and the like did a beare with another woman, whom hee found alone in the fields. And likewise, an ape had two yong ones by another. We read also one, who walking for recreation alongst a riuers side, a fish came out of the water, and begat her with child. The matter herein of most difficulty for the vulgar to conceiue, is, how it may be, that these women should bring forth perfect men, and partakers of the vse of reason, seeing the parents who engendred them, were brute beasts. To this I answer, that the seed of euery of these women, was the aget & former of the creature, as the greater in force, whence it figured the same, with his accidents of man shape. The seed of the brute beast (as not equall in strength) serued for aliment, & for

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nothing els. And that the ſeed of theſe vnreaſonable beaſts, might yeeld nouriſhment to mans ſeed, is a matter eaſie to be conceiued. For if any of theſe women had eaten a peece of beares fleſh, or of a dog, boyled or roſted, ſhee ſhould haue receiued nouriſhment thereout, though not ſo good as if ſhe had eaten mutton or partridges. The like befalleth to mans ſeed, that his true nouriſhment (in the forming of the creature) is another mans ſeed, but if this be wanting, the ſeed of ſome brute beaſt may ſupply the roome: but a thing which theſe hiſtories ſpecifie, is, that children borne of ſuch copulations giue token in their maners & conditions, that their engendring was not naturall.

Out of the things already rehearſed (though we haue ſomewhat lingered by the way therein) we may now gather the anſwere to that principall probleme, *vz:* that wiſe mens children, are wel-neere alwaies formed of their mothers ſeed: for that of the father (for the reaſons alreadie alleaged) is not fruitfull for generation, and in engendering, ſerueth onely for aliment. And the man who is ſhaped of the womans ſeed, cannot be wittie, nor partake abilitie through the much cold and moiſt of that ſex. Whence it becommeth manifeſt, that when the child prooueth diſcreet and prompt, the ſame yeeldeth an infalliable token, that hee was formed for his fathers ſeed. And if hee ſhew blockiſh and vntoward, we inferre, that he was formed of the ſeed of his mother. And hereto did the wiſe-man allude, when he ſaid, The wiſe ſonne reioyceth the father, but a fooliſh child is a griefe to his mother, It may alſo come to paſſe vpon ſome occaſion, that the ſeed of a wiſe man may be the agent and forme-giuer, and that of the woman, ſerue for nouriſhment, but the ſon ſo begotten will prooue of

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ſlender capacitie: for put caſe, that cold and dry be two qualities, whereof the vnderſtanding hath neede: yet it behoueth, that they hold a certaine quantitie and meaſure, which once exceeded, they doe rather hurt than good. Euen as we ſee men very aged, that by occaſion of ouermuch cold and dry, we find them become children anew, and vtter many follies. Let vs then preſuppoſe, that to ſome old man, there yet remaine ten yeares of life, with conuenient cold and dry to diſcourſe, in ſuch ſort, as theſe being expired, he ſhall then grow a babe againe.

If of ſuch a ones ſeed a ſonne be engendred, he ſhal til ten yeares age, make ſhew of great ſufficiency: for that til then, he enioyeth the conuenient cold and drouth of his father; but at eleuen yeares old, hee will ſodainely quaile away, for that he hath out-paſſed the point, which of theſe two qualities was behooffull. Which wee ſee confirmed by dayly experience in children begotten in old age, who in their childhood are verie aduiſed, and afterwards in mans ſtate, prooue verie dullards, and ſhort of life. And this groweth, becauſe they were made of a ſeed cold and dry, which had already out-run the one halfe of his race. And if the father be wiſe in the works of the imagination, and by meanes of his much heat & drineſſe, take to wife a woman cold and moiſt in the third degree, the ſonne borne of ſuch an accouplement, ſhalbe moſt vntoward, if he be formed of his fathers ſeed, for that he made abode in a belly ſo cold and moiſt, and was maintained, by a blood ſo diſtemperate the contrary betideth, when the father is vntoward, whoſe ſeed hath ordinarily heat and exceſſiue moiſture. The ſonne ſo engendred, ſhalbe dul till 15 yeares of age, for that he drew part of his fathers ſuperfluous moiſture. But the courſe

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of that age once ſpent, it giueth fitmeneſſe, in aſmuch as the fooliſh mans ſeed, is more temperat and leſſe moiſt. It aideth likewiſe the wit, to continue nine monethes ſpace in a belly of ſo little coldneſſe and moiſture, as is that of a woman cold and moiſt in the firſt degree, where it endured hunger and want. All this ordinarily befalleth, for the reaſons by vs ſpecified: but there is found a certaine ſort of men, whoſe genitories are endowed with ſuch force and vigour, as they vtterly ſpoile the aliments of their good qualities, and conuert them into their euill and groſſe ſubſtance. Therefore all the children whom they beget, (though they haue eaten delicate meates) ſhall prooue rude and dullards. Others contrariwiſe, vſing groſſe meates, and of euill temperature, are ſo mightie in ouercomming them, that though they eate beefe or porke, yet they make children of very delicate wit. Whence it prooueth certaine, that there are linages of fooliſh men, & races of wiſe men: and others, who of ordinarie are borne blunt and void of iudgement.

Some doubts are incountred, by thoſe who ſeeke to pearce into the bottome of this matter, whoſe anſwer (in the doctrine forepaſſed) is very eaſie. The firſt is, whence it ſpringeth, that baſtard children accuſtomably reſemble their fathers, and of a 100 lawfull, 90 beare the figure and conditions of the mother. The ſecond, why baſtard children prooue ordinarily deliuer, couragious, and very aduiſed. The third, what the cauſe is, that if a common ſtrumpet conceiue, ſhe neuer looſeth her burden, though ſhe take venomous drenches to deſtroy the ſame, or be let much blood, whereas if a married woman be with child by her husband, vpon euery light occaſion the ſame miſcarrieth. To the firſt, *Plato* anſwereth, ſaying;

saying, that no man is nought of his owne proper and agreeable will, vnlesse he be first incited by the vitiousnesse of his temperature. And he giues vs an example in lecherous men; who, for that they are stored with plentifull and fruitfull seed, suffer great illusions, and many combers; and therefore (molested by that passion) to driue the same from them, doe marrie wiues. Of such *Galen* saith, that they haue the instruments of generation very hot and dry: and for this cause breed seed very pricking & apt for procreation. A man then, who goeth seeking a woman not his owne, is repleniſhed with this fruitfull, digested, and well seasoned seed, Whence it followeth of force, that hee make the generation: for where both are equall, the mans seed carrieth the greatest efficacie; and if the son be shaped of the seed of such a father, it ensueth of necessitie that he resemble him. The contrarie betideth in lawfull children; who, for that married men haue their wiues euer couched by their sides, neuer take regarde to ripen the seed, or to make it apt for procreation, but rather (vpon euery light enticement) yeeld the same from them, vsing great violence and stirring; whereas women, abiding quiet, during the carnall act, their seed vessels yeeld not their seed, saue when it is well concoct and seasoned. Therefore married women do alwaies make the engendring, and their husbands seed serueth for aliment. But sometimes it comes to passe, that both the seeds are matched in equall perfection, and combat in such sort, as both the one and the other take effect in the forming, and so is a child shaped, who resembleth neither father nor mother. Another time it seemeth that they agree vpon the matter, & part the likenesse betweene them: the seed of the father maketh the nosthrils and the eies; and that of the mother, the

the mouth and the forehead. And which carrieth moſt maruell, it hath ſo fallen out, that the ſonne hath taken one eare of his father, and another of his mother, and ſo the like in his eyes. But if the fathers ſeed doe altogether preuaile, the childe retaineth his nature and his conditions: and when the ſeed of the mother ſwaieth moſt, the like reaſon taketh effect. Therefore, the father who coueteth, that his child may be made of his owne ſeede, ought to withdraw himſelfe for ſome dayes from his wife, and ſtay till all his ſeede be concocted and ripened; and then it will fall out certaine that the forming ſhall proceede from him, and the wifes ſeede ſhall ſerue for nouriſhment. The ſecond doubt (by meanes of that we haue ſaid alreadie) beareth little difficultie: for baſtard children are ordinarily made of ſeede hote and drie: and from this temperature (as we haue oftentimes prooued heretofore) ſpring courage, brauerie, and a good imagination, whereto this wiſedome of the world appertaineth. And becauſe the ſeed is digeſted and well ſeaſoned, nature affecteth what ſhe likes beſt, & pourtraieth thoſe children as with a penſill. To the third doubt may bee anſwered, that the conceiuing of lewd women, is moſt commonly wrought by the mans ſeede: and becauſe the ſame is drie, and verie apt for iſſue, it faſteneth it ſelfe in the woman with verie ſtrong rootes; but the child breeding of married women, being wrought by their owne ſeede, occaſioneth, that the creature eaſily vnlooſeth, becauſe the ſame was moiſt and watry, or as *Hippocrates* ſaith, full of muſtineſſe.

what diligences are to be vsed, for preseruing the children's wit after they are formed.

§. 5.

THe matter whereof man is compounded, proueth a thing so reasonable, and so subiect to corruption, that at the instant where he beginneth to be shaped, he likewise beginneth to be vntwined, and to altar, and therein can find no remedie. For it was said, so soone as we are born, we faile to be. Wherethrough nature prouided, that in mans bodie there should be four naturall faculties, attractiue, retentiue, concoctiue, and expulsiue. The which concocting and altering the aliments which we eate, returne to repaire the substance, that was lost, each succeeding in his place. By this we vnderstand, that it little auaileth to haue engendred a child of delicat seed, if we make no reckoning of the meates which afterwards we feede vpon. For the creation being finished, there remaineth not for the creature, anie part of the substance whereof it was first composed. True it is, that the first seed, if the same be well concocted and seasoned, possesseth such force, that digesting and altering the meats, it maketh them (though they be bad & grosse) to turne to his good temperature and substance, but we may so far forth vse contrarie meats, as the creature shall loose those good qualities, which it receiueth from the seed whereof it was made: therefore *Plato* said, that one of the things which most brought mans wit and his manners to ruine, was his euill bringing vp in diet. For which cause hee counselled that wee should giue vnto children, meats and drinks, delicate, and of good temperature, to the end, that when they grow big, they may know how to abandon the euil, and to embrace the good. The reason hereof is verie cleere: For if at the beginning

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the braine was made of delicate ſeed, and that this member goeth euery day impairing and conſuming, and muſt be repaired with the meats which we eate, it is certaine, if theſe being groſſe and of euill temperature, that vſing them manie dayes together, the braine will become of the ſame nature. Therefore it ſufficeth not, that the child be borne of good ſeede, but alſo it behoooueth that the meate which he eateth, after he is formed and borne, bee endowed with the ſame qualities. What theſe bee, it carrieth no great difficultie to manifeſt, if you preſuppoſe, that the Greekes were the moſt diſcreete men of the world, and that, enquiring after aliments and foode, to make their children wittie and wiſe, they found the beſt and moſt appropriat. For if the ſubtile and delicate wit, conſiſt in cauſing that the braine bee compounded of partes ſubtile, and of good temperature, that meate which aboue all others partaketh theſe two qualities, ſhall be the ſame which it behooueth vs to vſe, for obteining our end. *Galen,* and all the Grecke Phiſitions, ſay that Goats milke boyled with Honnie, is the beſt meate which anie man can eat: for beſides that it hath a moderate ſubſtance, therein the heat exceedeth not the cold, nor the moiſt the drie. Therefore wee ſaid (ſome few leaues paſt) that the Parents, whoſe will earneſtly leadeth them, to haue a childe, wiſe, prompt, and of good conditions, muſt eate much Goates milke boyled with Honnie, ſeuen or eight dayes before the copulation. But albeit this aliment is ſo good (as *Galen* ſpeaketh of) yet it falleth out a matter of importance for the wit, that the meate conſiſt of moderate ſubſtance, and of ſubtile parts. For how much the finer the matter becommeth in the nouriſhment of the braine, ſo much the more is the wit ſharpened. For which cauſe, the Greekes drew

out of the milke, cheese and whey (which are the two grosse aliments of his composition) and left the butter, which in nature resembleth the aire. This they gaue in foode to their children, mingled with honnie, with intention to make them wittie and wise. And that this is the trueth, is plainely seene by that which *Homer* recounteth. Besides this meat, children did eate cracknels, of white bread, of verie delicat water, with honnie and a little salt: but in steed of vinegar (for that the same is verie noisome and dammageable to the vnderstanding) they shall adde thereunto, butter of Goats-milke, whose temperature & substance, is appropriat for the wit. But in this regiment growes an inconuenience verie great, namely; that children vsing so delicate meats, shall not possesse sufficient strength to resist the iniuries of the aire: neither can defend themselues from other occasions, which are woont to breed maladies. So by making them become wise, they will fall out to be vnhealthfull, and liue a small time. This difficultie demandeth, in what sort children may bee brought vp, wittie and wise, and yet the matter so handled, as it may no way gainesay their healthfulnes. Which shall easily be effected, if the Parents dare to put in practise some rules and precepts which I will prescribe. And because deintie people are deceiued in bringing vp their children, and they treat stil of this matter: I wil first assigne them the cause why their children, though they haue Schoolemaisters and tutors, and themselues take such paines at their booke, yet they come away so meanly with the sciences; as also in what sort they may remedie this, without that they abridge their life, or hazard their health. Eight things (saith *Hippocrates*) make mans flesh moist and fat. The first, to be merry and to liue at hearts ease, the second to sleepe much, the third to lie in a soft

bed, the fourth, to fare well: the fifth, to be well apparelled and furnished: the sixth, to ride alwayes on horsebacke: the seuenth, to haue our will: the eighth, to be occupied in places & pastimes, and in things which yeeld contentment and pleasure. All which is verietie so manifest, as if *Hippocrates* had not affirmed it, none durst denie the same. Onely we may doubt, whether delicious people doe alwayes obserue this maner of life; but if it be true that they doe so, we may well conclude, that their seede is very moist, and that the children which they beget, will of necessitie ouer-abound in superfluous moisture, which it behoooueth first to be consumed: for this qualitie sendeth to ruine the operations of the reasonable soule: And moreouer the Phisitions say, that it maketh them to liue a short space and vnhealthfull. By this it should seeme, that a good wit, and a sound bodily health require one selfe qualitie, namely drouth; wherethrough, the precepts and rules which wee are to lay downe for making children wise, will serue likewise to yeeld them much health, and long life. It behooueth them, (so soone as a childe is borne of dilicious parents) inasmuch as their constitution consisteth of more cold and moist than is conuenient for childhood, to wash him with salt hote water; which (by the opinion of all Phisitions) soketh vp and drieth the flesh, and giueth soundnesse to the sinewes, and maketh the child strong and manly, and (by consuming the ouermuch moisture of his braine) enableth him with wit, and freeth him from manie deadly infirmities. Contrariwise, the bath being of water fresh and hote, in that the same moisteneth the flesh (saith *Hippocrates*) it breedeth fiue annoiances; Namely, effeminating of the flesh, weakenesse of sinewes, dulnesse of spirits, fluxes of blood, and baseneſse of stomacke. But if the

child issue out of his mothers belly with excessiue drinesse, it is requisite to wash the same with hote fresh water. Therefore *Hippocrates* said, children are to be washed a long time with hote water, to the end they may receiue the lesse annoiance by the crampe, and that they may grow and be well coloured: but (for certaine) this must be vnderstood of those who come foorth drie out of their mothers belly, in whom it behoooueth to amend their euill temperature, by applying vnto the contrarie qualities. The Almains (saith *Galen*) haue a custome to wash their childrē in a riuer, so sooneas they are born; them seeming, that as the iron which commeth burning hot out of the forge, is made the stronger, if it be dipped in cold water: so when the hote child is taken out of the mothers wombe, it yeeldeth him of greater force and vigour, if he be washed in fresh water. This thing is condemned by *Galen* for a beastly practise, and that with great reason: for put case, that by this way, the skinne is hardened and closed, and not easie to bee altered by the iniuries of the aire, yet will it rest offended by the excrements which are engendred in the bodie, for that the same is not of force, nor open so, as they may be exhaled and passe foorth. But the best and safest remedie is, to wash the children, who haue superfluous moisture, with hot salt water: for their excessiue moisture consuming, they are the neerer to health, and the way through the skinne, being stopped in them, they cannot receiue annoiance by anie occasion. Neither are the inward excrements therefore so shut vp, that there are not wayes left open for them, where they may come out. And nature is so forcible, that if they haue taken from her a common way, she will seeke out another to serue her turne. And when all others faile, shee can skill to make new wayes,

where-through to send out what doth her dammage. Wherefore of two extreames, it is more auaileable for health, to haue a skinne hard and somewhat close, than thin and open.

The second thing requisit to be performed when the child shalbe borne, is, that we make him acquainted with the winds, and with change of aire, and not keepe him stil locked vp in a chamber: for else it will become weake, womanish, peeuish, of feeble strength, and within three or foure dayes, giue vp the ghost. Nothing (saith *Hippocrates*) so much weakeneth the flesh, as to abide still in warme places, and to keepe our selues from heate and cold. Neither is there a better remedie of healthfull liuing, than to accustome our bodie to all winds, hot, cold, moist, and drie. Wherethrough *Aristotle* enquireth what the cause is, that such as liue in the Gallies are more healthie, and better colored, than those who inhabit a plashie soile. And this difficultie groweth greater, considering the hard life which they lead, sleeping in their clothes, in the open aire, against the sun, in the cold, and the water, and faring withall so coursly. The like may be demanded, as touching Shepheards, who of all other men enioy the soundest health: and it springeth, because they haue made a league with all the seueral qualities of the aire, and their nature dismaieth nothing. Contrariwise, we plainely see, that if a man giue himselfe to liue deliciously, and to beware that the sun, the cold, the euening, nor the wind offend him, within 3 dayes he shalbe dispatched with a post letter to another world. Therefore it may be well said, he that loueth his life in this world, shall leese it: for there is no man that can preserue himself frō the alteration of the aire; therefore it is better to accustome himselfe to euery thing, to the end man may liue careles, & not in suspence.

The errour of the vulgar consisteth, in thinking that the babe is borne so tender and delicate, as he cannot endure to issue foorth of the mothers wombe (where it was so warme) into a region of the aire so cold, without receiuing much dammage. And vtterly they are deceiued: for those of Almaine (a region so cold) vsed to dip their children so hote in the riuer: and though this were a beastly act, yet the same did them no hurt, nor deaths harme.

The third point conuenient to bee accomplished, is to seeke out a yoong nurse of temperature hot and dry: or (after our doctrine) cold and moist in the first degree; enured to hardnesse and want, to lie on the bare ground, to eate little, and to goe poorely clad, in wet, drouth, and heat; such an one will yeeld a firme milke, as acquainted with the alterations of the aire; and the childe beeing brought vp by her, for some good space, will grow to possesse a great firmnesse. And if she be discreet and aduised, the same will also be of much auaile for his wit: for the milke of such a one, is verie cleane, hot, and drie: with which two qualities, the much cold and moist will bee corrected, which the infant brought from his mothers wombe. How greatly it importeth for the strength of the creature, that it sucke a milke well exercised, is apparently prooued in horses, who being foaled by Mares, toiled in plowing and harrowing, prooue great Coursers, and will abide much hardnesse. And if the dammes run vp and downe idlely in the Pastures after the first cariere, they are not able to stand on their feete. The order then which should be held with the nurse, is, to take her into house, some foure or fiue months before the childbirth, and to giue her the same meats to eate, wheron the mother feedeth, that she may haue time to consume the

blood

blood and bad humours, which she had gathered by harmfull meats, that she vsed tofore, and to the end the child (so soone as it is borne) may sucke the like milke vnto that, which relieued it in the mothers bellie, or made at least of the same meats.

The fourth is, not to accustome the child to sleepe in a soft bed, nor to keepe him ouerwarme apparelled: or giue him too much meate. For these three things (saith *Hippocrates*) scarsen and drie vp the flesh, and their contraries, fatten and enlarge the same. And in so doing, the child shall grow of great wit, and of long life, by reason of this drinesse: and by the contraries, hee will prooue faire, fat, full of blood, & blockish; which habit, *Hippocrates* called Wrastler like, and holdeth it for very perillous. With this selfe receit and order of life, was the wisest man brought vp that euer the world had; To weet, our Sauiour Christ, in that he was man, sauing (for that he was borne out of Nazareth) perhaps his mother had no salt water at hand, wherewith she might wash him: but this was a custome of the Iewes, and of all Asia besides; brought in by some skilfull Phisitions, for the good of infants, wherethrough the Prophet saith, And when thou wert borne, at thy birth day thy nauill string was not cut off: neither wert thou for thy healths sake washed in water, nor seasoned with salt, nor wrapped in swathling clothes. But as touching the other things, so soone as he was borne, he began to hold friendship with the cold, and the other alterations of the aire. His first bed was the earth, his apparrell course, as if he would obserue *Hippocrates* receit. A few dayes after they went with him into Ægypt, a place verie hot, where he remained all the time that *Herod* liued. His mother partaking the like humours, it is certaine, that she must yeeld him a milke

milke well exerciſed, and acquainted with the alterations of the aire. The meat which they gaue him, was the ſame which the Greekes deuiſed, to endow their children with wit and wiſedome. This (I haue ſaid heretofore) was the butteriſh part of the milke eaten with honnie. Wherfore *Eſay* ſaith, He ſhal eat butter and honnie, that he may know to eſchew euill, and chuſe the good. By which words is ſeene, how the Prophet gaue vs to vnderſtand, that albeit he was verie God, yet he ought alſo to be a perfect man: and to attaine naturall wiſedome, he muſt apply the ſemblable diligences, as doe the other ſons of men. Howbeit this ſeemeth difficult to be conceiued, and may be alſo held a follie, to thinke that becauſe Chriſt our redeemer, did eate butter and honnie being a childe, hee ſhould therefore know how to eſchue euill, and make choyce of good, when hee was elder: God being (as he is) of infinite wiſedome, and hauing giuen him (as he was man) all the ſcience infuſed, which hee could receiue after his naturall capacitie. Therefore it is certaine that hee knew full as much in his mothers wombe, as when he was thirtie three yeeres old, without eating either butter or honnie, or borrowing the helpe of anie other naturall remedies requiſite for humane wiſedome. But for all this, it is of great importance that the Prophet aſſigned him that ſelfe meat, which the Troians and Greekes accuſtomably gaue their children, to make them witty and wiſe, and that he ſaid, To the end he may know to ſhun euill, and chuſe the good. For vnderſtanding, that by meanes of theſe aliments, Chriſt our ſauiour, got (as he was man) more acquiſit knowledge, than he ſhould haue poſſeſſed if he had vſed other contrarie meates; it behoooueth vs to expound this particle, (to the end) that we may know what he meant, when

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he ſpake in thoſe termes. We muſt therefore preſuppoſe, that in Chriſt our redeemer were two natures, as the verie trueth is, and the faith ſo teacheth vs; one, diuine, as he was God; and another humane, compounded of a reaſonable ſoule, and of an elimentall bodie, ſo diſpoſed and inſtrumentalized, as the other children of men. As concerning his firſt nature, it behoooueth not to entreat of the wiſedome of our Sauiour Chriſt: for it was infinit without encreaſe or diminiſhment, and without dependance vpon ought elſe, ſaue onely in that he was God, and ſo he was as wiſe in his mothers wombe, as when he was 33 yeares of age, and ſo from euerlaſting. But in that which appertaineth to his ſecond nature, we are to weet, that the ſoule of Chriſt, euen from the inſtant when God created it, was bleſſed, and glorious, euen as now it is; and ſeeing it enioyed God and his wiſdome, it is certaine that in him was none ignorance: but he had ſo much ſcience infuſed as his naturall capacitie would beare: but withall, it is alike certaine, that as the glorie did not communicate it ſelfe vnto all the partes of the bodie, in reſpect of the redemption of mankinde; no more did the wiſedome infuſed, communicate it ſelfe; For the braine was not diſpoſed, nor inſtrumentalized, with the qualities and ſubſtance which are neceſſarie, to the end the ſoule may with ſuch an inſtrument, diſcourſe and philoſophize: for if you call to mind that which in the beginning of this worke wee deliuered, the graces *gratis* giuen, which God beſtoweth vpon men, doe ordinarily require, that the inſtrument with which they are to be exerciſed, and the ſubiect whereunto it is to bee receiued, doe partake the naturall qualities, requiſite for euerie ſuch gift. And the reaſon is, becauſe that the reaſonable ſoule, is an

act

act of the bodie, and worketh not without the ſeruice of his bodily inſtruments. The braine of our redeemer Chriſt, whilſt he was babe, and lately borne, had much moiſture: for in that age it was behooffull ſo to bee, and a matter naturall, and therefore in that it was of ſuch qualitie, his reaſonable ſoule (naturally) could not diſcourſe nor philoſophize with ſuch an inſtrument. Wherthrough, the ſcience infuſed, paſſed not to the bodily memorie, nor to the imagination, nor the vnderſtanding, becauſe theſe three are inſtrumentall powers (as toſore we haue proued) and enioyed not that perfection, which they were to haue; but whilſt the braine went drying, by meanes of time and age: the reaſonable ſoule went alſo manifeſting euery day more and more, the infuſed wiſedome which it had, and communicated the ſame to the bodily powers. Now, beſides this ſupernaturall knowledge, he had alſo another, which is gathered of things that they heard whileſt they were children, of that which they ſaw, of that which they ſmelled, of that which they taſted, and of that which they touched: and this (for certaine) our ſauiour Chriſt attained as other men doe. And euen as for diſcerning things perfectly, hee ſtood in neede of good eyes, and for hearing of ſounds, good eares: ſo alſo he ſtood in neede of a good braine, to iudge the good and the euill. Whence it is manifeſt, that by eating thoſe delicate meates, his head was dayly better inſtrumentalized, & attained more wiſdome. In ſort, that if God had taken frō him his ſcience infuſed, thriſe in the courſe of his life (by ſeeing that which hee had purchaſed) we ſhall find, that at ten yeeres he knew more than at fiue, at twentie, more than at ten, and at thirtie three, more than at twenty. And that this doctrine is true and catholicke, the letter of the Euangelicke text

proueth

prooueth, saying; and Iesus encreased in wisedome and age, and grace, with God, and with men. Of manie catholicke senses which the holie Scripture may receiue, I hold that euer better which taketh the letter, than that which reaueth the termes and wordes of their naturall signification. What the qualities are which the braine ought to haue, and what the substance, we haue alreadie reported, by the opinion of *Heraclitus*, That drinesse maketh the wisest soule. And by *Galens* mind we proued, That when the braine is compounded of a substance verie delicat, it maketh the wit to be subtile. Christ our redeemer, went purchasing more drinesse by his age: for from the day that we are borne, vntill that of our death, we daily grow to a more drinesse, and leesing of flesh, & a greater knowledge. The subtile and delicate parts of his braine, went correcting themselues whilst he fed vpon meats, which the Prophet speaketh of. For if euery moment hee had neede of nourishment, and restoring the substance which wasted away (and this must be performed with meates and in none other sort) it is certaine, that if hee had alwayes fed on Cowes beefe, or Porcke, in few dayes he should haue bred himselfe a braine grosse and of euill temperature: with which his reasonable soule could not haue shunned euill, or chosen good, saue by miracle, and imploying his diuinitie. But God leading him by naturall meanes, caused him to vse those so delicat meats, by which the braine being maintained, the same might be made an instrument, so well supplied, as (euen without vsing the diuine or infused knowledge) he might naturally haue eschued euill, and chosen good, as doe the other children of men.

FINIS.

A Table of the Chapters
contained in this Booke.

IT is prooued by exãple, that if a child haue not the disposition and abilitie, which is requisite for that Science whereunto he will addict himselfe, it is a superfluous labour to be instructed therein by good Schoolemaisters, to haue store of Bookes, and continually to studie it. fol. 1

2 That Nature is that which makes a man of abilitie to learne. 13

3 What part of the bodie ought to be well tempred, that a yoong man may haue abilitie. 23

4 It is proued that the soule vegetatiue, sensitiue and reasonable, haue knowledge without that anie thing be taught them, if so be that they possesse that conuenient temperature, which is requisit for their operation. 33

5 It is prooued that of the three qualities, hot, moist, and drie, proceed all the differences of mens wits. 51

6 Certaine doubts and arguments are propounded against the doctrine of the last Chapter, and their answere. 69

7 It is shewed, that though the reasonable soule haue need of the temperature of the foure first qualities, aswell for his abiding in the bodie, as also to discourse and syllogize, Yet for all this, it followeth not, that the same is corruptible and mortall. 88

8 How there may be assigned to euery difference of wit, his Science, which shalbe correspondent to him in particular: and that which is repugnant and contrarie, be abandoned. 102

9 How it may be prooued that the eloquence and fineness of speech cannot find place in men of great vnderstanding. 120

10 How

10 *How it is prooued that the Theoricke of Diuinitie appertaineth to the vnderstanding, and preaching (which is his practise) to the imagination.* 126

11 *That the Theoricke of the lawes appertaineth to the memorie, and pleading and iudging (which are their practise) to the vnderstanding, and gouerning of a common-wealth to the imagination.* 150

12 *How it may be prooued, that of Theoricall Phisicke, part appertaineth to the memorie, and part to the vnderstanding, and the practicke to the imagination.* 173

13 *By what meanes it may be shewed, to what difference of abilitie the art of warfare appertaineth, and by what signes the man may be knowen, who is endowed with this maner of wit.* 200

14 *How we may know to what difference of abilitie the office of a king appertaineth, and what signes he ought to haue, who enioyeth this maner of wit.* 238

15 *In what manner Parents may beget wise children, and of a wit fit for learning.* 263

1 §. *By what signes we may know, in what degree of hot and dry euery man resteth.* 278

§. 2. *What women ought to marry with what man, that they may haue children.* 282

§. 3. *What diligence ought to be vsed, that children male, and not female may be borne.* 286

§. 4. *What diligence is to bee vsed that children may proue wittie and wise.* 300

§. 5. *What diligences are to be vsed, for preseruing the childrens wit after they are formed.* 322

FINIS.